ORDER
Goda Raghuram, J.
1. The revisional order of the 1st respondent dated 11.8.1997 bearing No. 4211/M.II(1)/97, is assailed in this writ petition.
2. The chronology of facts as asserted by the petitioner, leading to the order impugned is set out briefly as under:
3. One Mr. R. Muralimohan Reddy made an application for grant of quarry lease of black granite in an extent of 1.5 Hectares in Sy. No. 56 of Timmapalli village, Gudipalem Mandal, Chittoor District. Eventually quarry lease was granted for the period 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984. Mr. Reddy submitted an application for renewal for a period of 5 years on 19.7.1984, for the period from 18.10.1984 to 17.10.1989. This renewal application was not disposed of and since under the statutory environment of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short ‘1966 Rules’) such non-disposal is to be treated as a deemed rejection, Mr. Reddy preferred a revision to the State Government under Rule 35A of the 1966 Rules. While so, he filed W.P. 11033/86 inter alia seeking to continue quarry operations. By an interim direction dated 12.8.1986 this court permitted Mr. Reddy to carry on quarry operations. This writ petition was disposed of on 15.2.1989 with a direction permitting the lessee to operate quarrying till the establishment of a cutting and polishing unit on or before 24.4.1990. It may be noted that despite renewal even if granted being only for a period up to 17.10.1989, the quarry operations even beyond the period for which renewal was sought by Mr. Reddy.
4. Be that as it may, on 11.7.1989 Mr. Reddy submitted an application for second renewal for the period from 18.10.1989 to 17.10.1994, assuming a first renewal qua the interim directions of this court in W.P. 11033/86. This second renewal application also not having been disposed of, Mr. Reddy filed W.P. 568/90 and obtained an interim order to continue the quarry operations. Noticing that the period for which the 2nd renewal was sought also expired by 17.10.1994, this writ petition was dismissed by this court as infructuous on 2.4.1997.
5. On 22.7.1994 Mr. Reddy executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the petitioner herein. Earlier on 16.7.1994, Mr. Reddy made an application for 3rd renewal for a restricted extent of 1.00 Hct, as against 1.5 Hct, in respect of which he had initial lease and in respect of which extent he continued quarrying even beyond the period of initial grant, by virtue of interim or final orders of this court. On 29.4.1995 Mr. Reddy died leaving behind as legal representatives a wife and a son. The 6th respondent herein however asserts that Mr. Reddy also had a daughter who was his legal representative too along with his wife and son.
6. After the death of Mr. Reddy, the petitioner by a representation dt 11.3.1996 sought renewal of the lease, for the third time, for the entire extent of 1.5 Hct, as against 1 Hct, for which third renewal was sought by Mr. Reddy during his life time on 16.7.1994. It requires to be noticed that this application dt 11.3.96 preferred by the writ petitioner purportedly on behalf of Mr. Reddy and as his GPA Holder was filed beyond the period within which a renewal could be sought under the statutory environment as also by a GPA holder subsequent to the death of the principal. That this is so is an admitted position.
7. On 20.7.1995 after the demise of the original lessee Mr. Reddy, the wife and the son executed G.P.A in favour of the petitioner. Responding to the application for third renewal dated 16.7.1994, the Director of Mines and Geology granted quarry lease in favour of Mr. Reddy for a further period of 15 years in an extent of 1.5 Hct.
8. On 7.2.1997 and 15.2.1997 the wife and the son of late Mr. Reddy addressed the Assistant Director, Mines and Geology concerned stating that they are filing affidavits, duly attested by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chittoor, declaring themselves respectively as legal heirs.
9. Meanwhile on 21.12.1995, the 6th respondent filed an application for grant of a quarry lease for an extent of 2 Hct, in the same Sy. Nos. , in respect of which Mr. Reddy was granted quarry lease and the extent applied for by the 6th respondent included the extent of 1.5 Hct, granted on lease to late Mr. Reddy.
10. After noticing the orders dt 9.1.1997 of the 3rd respondent granting 3rd renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy, the 6th respondent filed W.P. 1723/97, challenging the order dt 9.1.1997 of the 3rd respondent. This court disposed of the said writ petition on 25.2.1997 relegating the 6th respondent to pursue the available remedies under Rule 35A of the 1966 Rules, by way of revision. During the pendency of this writ petition itself, the 6th respondent preferred a revision. Notices on this revision application were issued initially to Mr. Reddy, the grantee of the lease under the orders of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 and thereafter on coming to know of his demise also to the petitioner. There is some dispute as to whether adequate opportunity was provided to the petitioner in the matter of considering the revision, but the fact remains that the revisional record discloses the participation of the writ petitioner in the hearing of the revision petition. Be that as it may, having regard to the adjudication on the substance of the petitioner’s entitlement to a third renewal or having regard to the entitlement of the legal representatives of Late Mr Reddy for a right or legitimate expectation for a third renewal, any inadequacy of opportunity pleaded but not demonstrated before this court by the petitioner would not effect the vitality of the revisional order passed by the State Government without the petitioner demonstrating a real and substantial prejudice suffered, vide – Aligarh Muslim University v Mansoor Ali Khan, , M.C. Mehta v Union of India, , State of U.P. v Harendra Aurora, AIR 2001 SCW 2029.
11. In the circumstances I am inclined to adjudicate upon the order of the 1st respondent dt 11.8.1997,impugned in this writ petition, on its substantive merits without divagating on the issue as to whether the order is vitiated on account of any irregularity in affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner.
12. The substance of the grievance of the writ petition is founded upon his assertion that as the GPA Holder of the wife and son of Late Mr. Reddy, he is entitled to the consideration for a third renewal of the initial lease granted in the year 1979 and that the grant of third renewal by the order of the Director of Mines and
13. Geology dated 9.1.1997 in favour of Mr. Reddy could be sustained on the basis of a referential adoption of Rule 25A of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 (for short ‘1960 Rules’) as being implicated in to the silence of 1966 Rules. Alternatively Mr. Seshasai, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the application of Late Reddy dt 16.7.1994 should be construed as an application for grant of quarry lease even assuming that there was no entitlement for a 3rd renewal and even if so construed the grant of quarry lease by the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 could be sustained as the grant of a fresh lease and on the application of principles underlying Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules the grant in favour of Late Reddy could be sustained in the hands of Late Reddy’s legal representatives – his wife and son, and therefore in the hands of the petitioner-their GPA Holder.
14. Analysis of the contentions:
After the determination of the first lease period with effect from 17.10.1989 no further renewal of lease has been granted to Mr. Reddy. He continued quarrying operations in the leased premises pursuant to the interim directions of this court in W.P. No. 11033/86 and thereafter interim directions in W.P. 568/90. With the dismissal of W.P.568/90 as infructuous, by the order of this court dt 2.4.1997 the interim direction in that writ petition also stood dissolved in the absence of any adjudication or determination by this court declaring that the petitioner is entitled to a renewal. Factually Mr. Reddy was granted a renewal neither in the first instance nor in the 2nd instance. The only valid lease granted was for the period from 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984. He had no lease thereafter. In the circumstances neither the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 during his life time seeking 3rd renewal for a restricted extent of 1 Hct, or the application of the petitioner herein on behalf of Mr. Reddy dt 11.3.1996 for the full extent of 1.5 Hct, could have been considered as an application for renewal; there being no lease whatsoever in favour of the petitioner beyond 17.10.1984. Be that as it may, the representation of the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 as GPA Holder of Mr. Reddy subsequent to the demise of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995, was no representation in the eye of law on behalf of Mr. Reddy. The power held by the petitioner was co-extensive with Mr. Reddy and stood extinguished on his death.
15. Sri Sesha Sai, learned counsel for the petitioner would, however, contend that after the demise of Mr. Reddy, his legal heirs – his widow and son, executed a GPA in favour of the petitioner on 29.7.1995 and that in view of this power the representation of the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 could be sustained. This contention does not commend itself to this court. The representation dt 11.3.1996 is seen to have been made on behalf of Late Mr. Reddy and not on behalf of his legal heirs. If a representation had been made on behalf of the legal heirs seeking 3rd renewal, it could have fallen for consideration whether the legal heirs of the deceased – former lessee, are entitled to a renewal or even whether there is an entitlement for a 3rd renewal. In any view of the matter, the petitioner could not have made representation, valid in law, on behalf of a person who died on the date of making of such a representation.
16. Sri Sai, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the provisions of Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules to urge entitlement for the widow and son of Late Mr. Reddy to the lease and the right to seek renewal thereof.
17. Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules reads as under:
“25.A Status of the grant on the death of application for mining lease: (1) Where an application for grant or renewal of mining lease dies before the order granting him a mining lease or its renewal is passed, the application for the grant or renewal of a mining lease shall be deemed to have been made by his Legal Representatives
(2) In case of an application in respect of whom an order granting or renewing a mining lease is passed, but who dies before the deed referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 31 is executed, the order shall be deemed to have been passed in the name of the Legal Representatives of the deceased.”
18. It is to be noticed that this provision enabling the legal heirs to step into the shoes of an applicant or grantee o a lease occurs in the 1960 Rules. These Rules are made by the Government of India under the provisions of Sec. 13 of the A.P. Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 (for short ‘the Act’) whereas the 1966 Rules are made by the State of Andhra Pradesh under the power available qua Sec. 15 of the Act. Sec. 14 of the Act excludes the application of Sections 4 to 13 to minor minerals. Therefore, neither the provisions of Sec. 13 nor any Rules made by the Central Government under the power available under Section 13 of the Act could ipso facto be applicable to legal heirs of a deceased lessee of a minor mineral. It was and is of course open to the State Government to have either incorporate a rule such as Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules into the 1966 Rules or to have adopted the provisions of the said Rules by reference for the purpose of felicity of drafting. From the text and structure of the 1966 Rules it is clear that no such adoption is made either expressly or by any necessary implication. Thus it is, that the provisions of Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules cannot enable the legal heirs of an applicant for a quarry lease or an existing leaseholder to step into shoes of such applicant or leaseholder.
19. As already analysed the application by Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 stood abated with his demise on 29.4.95. The application on behalf of Late Mr. Reddy by the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 is inoperative on account of the extinguishment of the writ petitioner’s power under the GPA, on the death of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995.
20. On the analysis above, there is thus no application for renewal validly made, recognisable in law, which could legally found the grant of renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy or for that matter his legal heirs. In the circumstances the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 is void and inoperative.
21. It is alternatively contended on behalf of the petitioner that the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 could, even if there was no provision fora 3rd renewal, be considered as an application for fresh grant of quarry lease and on this contention it is urged that the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 could be sustained. Whether the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994, during his life time, is to be treated as an application for third renewal or as an application for grant of quarry lease, the fact remains that the application abated with his death on 29.4.1995. The application dt 11.3.96 by the petitioner on behalf of Mr. Reddy as his duly constituted GPA Holder could not have been considered as an application for afresh quarry lease either, as with the demise of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995 the petitioner had no manner of entitlement in law to represent Late Reddy qua the GPA executed by Late Mr. Reddy during his life time on 22.7.1994.
22. On the above analysis after 17.10.1984, which is the date up to which Mr. Reddy had a valid lease pursuant to the grant of lease in the first instance, there was on record only the quarry lease application of the 6th respondent dt 21.12.1995, which was entitled to consideration by the official respondents under Rule 12 of the 1966 Rules. In the light of this circumstances the application of the 6th respondent which was the sole application, in the absence of any valid application for a quarry lease or a renewal on behalf of Mr. Reddy, as analysed above, the official respondents could not have granted a renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy as was done by the 3rd respondent by the order dt 9.1.1997.
23. The validity of the impugned revisional order of the 1st respondent in the circumstances adverted to above, falls to be considered in the factual matrix recorded above. A revision of the 6th respondent against the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 granting a 3rd renewal to Mr. Reddy was allowed by the Government on a plurality of grounds : Firstly for the reason recorded that the first renewal application submitted by Mr. Reddy was itself rejected by the Government on 5.12.1984 as having been made beyond the time, which orders not having been adjudicated nor set aside became final. Mr. Reddy has thus no lease beyond 17.12.1984. Secondly the revisional order records the 3rd renewal application of Mr. Reddy as having abated with the death of Mr. Reddy on 29.5.1995 and the application of the petitioner on behalf of Late Reddy for 3rd renewal was incompetent consequent on the death of Mr. Reddy. Thirdly that the Director, Mines and Geology has granted renewal for an area beyond that applied for by Mr. Reddy.
24. As is apparent from the aforesaid analysis of the chronology of events and facts, the order of the 3rd respondent – Director of Mines and Geology, 9.1.1997 granting a quarry lease in favour of Mr. Reddy in an extent of 1.5 Hct, was wholly incompetent and void. This order has been set aside in revision and it is seen from the revisional order that the conclusions are based on a rational appreciation of evidence, relevant facts and on a cogent analysis of the legal position.
25. I find no infirmity in the order impugned warranting interference in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.