JUDGMENT
Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. The Petitioners’ lands fall within 13 villages which have been acquired for the ‘Planned Development’ of Delhi. The village in question is Barwala. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued on 21.3.2003 followed by a Declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 19.3.2004. Award dated 5.8.2005 bearing No. 12/2005-06 had already been published. Mr. Poddar, learned Counsel for LAC states that all the Petitioners have participated in the Award proceedings. Possession of portions of the land which were vacant i.e. not constructed upon, was taken by the Respondents on 28.9.2005 Mr. Poddar has underscored the fact that the petitions do not mention that any Objection under Section 5A of the Act had been filed by the Petitioners. No document purporting to be an objection is available on the record. Hence, a challenge to the acquisition at this stage is not permissible.
2. We have had an occasion of considering the subject acquisition of 13 villages in WP(C) No. 15946/2004 titled as Rajesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors. decided on 9.7.2007 in which the very same acquisition has been upheld. In some of those petitions, it had been alleged that farm houses had been constructed after taking clearance/approval of the Municipal Authorities. Even then, we were not pursuaded into returning the finding that legally constructed properties could also be acquired under the Act. Mr. Dalal has also raised an argument that the built up properties, within a distance of 100 mtrs. of acquired Lal Dora, were not the subject matter in any of the Rajesh Yadav’s petition.
3. Mr. Dalal may be right in castigating the Respondent for not completing their statutory duties of consolidation, as envisaged under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 especially, since Notification under Section 14 of the said Act had duly been issued. However, that would have made no difference so far as acquisition is concerned. We shall assume that the Petitioners’ land and buildings constructed thereon would fall within extended Lal Dora or extended abadi to use common phrases. Even if this is so, that does not insulate the Petitioners from the acquisition of their lands.
4. Mr.Dalal has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chand and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 162. In the first place their Lordships have clarified that the directions given by them were peculiar to the facts and circumstances of those cases and were not intended for any general application. However, the observations made in that case militate against the stand of the Petitioners since it was specifically noted that even if some portions had been left out in earlier proceedings, those could be acquired for the purpose of road, hospital and other civic amenities. Large scale acquisition of land intended for the purpose of developing the metropolis/capital would clearly take within its sweep the term civic amenities etc. Wherever large tracts of land are acquired for the purpose of developing a satellite colony, it is but unavoidable that roads, hospitals and other civic amenities will be required.
5. Mr. Dalal has also sought to rely on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 641 but we are unable to see how it is relevant since that particular case revolves around the legal propriety of invocation of Section 17 of the Act.
6. We may only reiterate that no Objections have been filed and to expect a detailed order under Section 6 would be illogical if we may use that word.
7. Mr. Dalal has also pressed into service the principle of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel. In this regard our attention has been drawn to a specific column in the case of WP(C) No. 19961-62/2005 that the society shall apply for land to DDA for establishing schools as per laid down norms. It is clear, therefore, that these principles will have no role to play and construction that has been made was not at the instance or prompting of the Respondents. In any event these arguments have been dealt with in detail in Rajesh Kumar Yadav’s case (supra) and we need not make any further observation.
8. The writ petitions are without merit and are dismissed. In Rajesh Kumar Yadav’s case we had imposed cost of Rs. 5,000/- on each of the petitioner. Keeping in view the fact that Mr. Dalal was concise in his arguments, we decline to impose cost.