JUDGMENT
J.B. Goel, J.
1. By this order application (IA No. 1383/97) under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC the plaintiff seeks a decree for possession against the defendant in respect of the suit premises on the basis of admissions made by the defendant in the written statement in a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits.
2. Plaintiff’s case is that they are tenants in respect of Flat No. 29 First Floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, Connaught Place, New Delhi and they had sublet the premises to M/s. United Industrial Bank Ltd. (for short ‘UIB’) under a registered sublease dated 18.5.87 at a monthly rent of Rs. 10,500/- with escalation clause regarding increase in rent.
3. UIB was amalgamated with the defendant Bank in pursuance of Notification dated 30.10.89 issued by the Central Government under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 but plaintiff has not accepted the defendant as their tenant alleging that the tenancy of UIB could not have been transferred in favour of the defendant by means of the aforesaid amalgamation order and the defendant is in unauthorised possession of the premises.
4. The defendant in their written statement is contesting the suit. On the question of possession it is admitted that formerly UIB was a subtenant of the plaintiff, the subtenancy had started under sublease dated 28.1.77 at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,750/-, the rent could not be increased under the Delhi Rent Control Act but in 1987 the plaintiff pressurised and coerced the UIB to increase the rent from Rs. 3,750/- to Rs. 32,000/- by executing sublease dated 18.5.87 in favour of plaintiff and another licence deed in favour of M/s. Smarts (P) Ltd. which is sham agreement; that in pursuance of aforesaid Central Government Notification dated 30-10.89 all the assets, liabilities, rights and interests of UIB including the tenancy rights have vested in the defendant Bank, the defendant Bank is thus a subtenant in the said premises on the same terms and conditions at the monthly rent of Rs. 3,750/- with increase if any not more than 10% under Delhi Rent Control Act. The defendant is not in unauthorised possession of the premises and is not liable to vacate as the subtenancy is still continuing.
5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that on account of amalgamation of United Industrial Bank with the Allahabad Bank, the defendant, i.e. Allahabad Bank, is in unauthorised occupation?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the tenancy of the defendant has been legally terminated?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits? If yes, from which date and at what rate?
4. Whether the defendant, by way of counter claim, is entitled to Rs. 16,286.85, as averred in written statement?
5. To what relief if any, the plaintiff /defendant is entitled to?
6. What order and decree?
The case is at the trial stage and in the meantime as the sublease has come to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.1997, taking advantage of this fact the present application was filed by the plaintiff under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC. The defendant has filed a reply contesting the said application.
6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that defendant has admitted in the written statement that they have succeeded to the rights of UIB, the former subtenant of the plaintiff and thus they have admitted tire relationship of landlord and tenant; the sublease dated 18.5.1987 is also admitted; this sublease was for ten years which has come to an end on 1.2.1997 by efflux of time and as such plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the admission of the defendant and the Court can take into consideration subsequent events. He has placed reliance on M/s. S.L. Associates Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Karnataka Handloom Dev., 62 (96) DLT 386; Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Air India, M/S., Sun Chandra and Company Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank, 1996 (5) AD (Del) 323; Surjit Sachdev Vs. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., and R.N. Sachdeva Vs. Ram Lal Mahajan Charitable Trust, 1997 (III) AD (Del) 997. Whereas learned Counsel for the defendant has contended that on the pleadings of the parties issues have been framed, issues need investigation and on the cause of action as pleaded by the plaintiff no decree of possession could be passed as the plaintiff has not admitted the defendant as their tenant or subtenant and also that no cause of action had arisen to file suit for possession as the tenancy was subsisting when the suit was filed. In any case without amendment of the plaint no decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC can be passed.
7. The case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint no doubt is that the defendant has not succeeded to the tenancy rights of the erstwhile UIB and is ill unauthorised possession of the premises. But the defendant in its written statement claimed to be a subtenant having succeeded to the rights and interest including the tenancy rights of UIB by virtue of amalgamation in pursuance of Notification of the Central Government dated 30.11.89 issued under Section 45 of the Banking Regulations Act.
8. Normally, a party cannot be allowed to abandon its own case, adopt that of the defendant and claim on that footing where the latter is prejudiced by such a course. However, where a party makes an admissions finding favour of the other party based on such admission is not incompetent even though it is at variance with the case set up by the latter in its pleadings in as much as there could be no surprise or prejudice in such a case.
9. In Firm Srinivas Ram Vs. Mahabir Prasad, , in suit for specific performance of a contract, in part performance the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs. 30,000/-, the defendant denied the contract of sale and pleaded that money was taken by him as a loan. The suit of the plaintiff for specific performance was dismissed by the Trial Court but a decree for recovery of this amount with interest was passed; the High Court in appeal dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowing the cross objections set aside die decree of the money as well on the ground that no case of a loan was made by the plaintiff and no relief was claimed on that basis. In further appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of the plaintiff that the decree for money was wrongly set aside and it was held as under: “It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff’s case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000/- was advanced by way of loan to the defendants, second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P.C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations & claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Act. to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Act. cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings & which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in this suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant’s own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter & no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the deft., it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff , to a separate suit.”
10. Ex. P-12 is the sublease dated 18th May, 1987 executed between the plaintiff and UIB, admitting the latter as a subtenant of the premises for a period of 10 years from 1st February, 1987, agreeing to payment of Rs. 10,500/- for first three years, Rs. 16,000/- for the next three years and then Rs. 22,500/- for the remaining four years. This sublease is registered and is admitted in the written statement by the defendant.
11. Ex. P-2 is the scheme of the amalgamation sanctioned by the Central Government amalgamating UIB with Allahabad Bank under Section 45 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 with effect from 31.10-89 and vesting all rights, powers, claims, interests, assets, properties immovable and movable including premises subject to all incidents of tenure and to the rents and other sums reserved by or contained in leases or agreements under which they are held.
The Allahabad Bank, the defendant herein thus had succeeded to the tenancy rights in the premises with effect from 31.10.89 and from that date is the sublessee of the plaintiff in respect of the unexpired term of the sublease by operation of law. The sublease came to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.1997. It is also the case of the defendant pleaded in its written statement that they have succeeded to the right and interest of UIB as a sublessee. Subrule (1) of Rule 6 of Order 12 reads as under: “6(1) Where admissions, of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such admissions.”
12. A plaintiff may move for judgment under this provision at any stage. This can obviously be availed even after he has joined issues on the defense. The admission may be made either in pleadings or otherwise which means that the admissions contained in documents written or executed between the parties before the action is brought are also sufficient for the purpose of this rule.
13. Learned Counsel for the defendant has contended that there was no cause of action for the relief of possession when the suit was filed as sublease was still subsisting and the suit is not maintainable and as such the question of passing a decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC does not arise. Whereas learned Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that the Court can always take into consideration the altered circumstances or the events which take place after the suit is instituted to shorten the litigation and pass appropriate orders. He has relied on S.L. Associates Vs. Karnataka Handloom Development, .
14. In the case of S.L. Associates (supra) the tenant had taken a plea that suit for possession was not maintainable as after the expiry of the initial lease period of three years the lease has further been renewed for a period of three years. The plaintiff had not admitted this renewal however this extended period also came to an end during the pendency of the suit and on that basis the plaintiff claimed decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC. It was held “that no doubt the suit must be practical (sic) in all stages on the cause of action as it existed on its date of commencement but the Court may however in suitable cases take notice of the events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions. This must be done by the Court by giving relief to the parties on the basis of altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation and get complete justice between the parties”. Similar view had also been taken by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sikhar Chand & Ors. Vs. Mst. Bari Bai & Ors., .
15. In the present case also the sublease period of 10 years had expired on 1.2.1997 during the pendency of the suit. To shorten litigation the Court obviously can take into consideration the altered circumstances.
16. The position that, thus, emerges is that, (i) the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted; (ii) the sublease of defendant had come to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.97; (iii) the last rate of rent as agreed in the sublease is Rs. 22,500/- and (iv) in any case it is admitted in the written statement that initially the rent of the premises was Rs. 3,750/- which is more than Rs. 3,500/- per month. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of D.C. Vs. Union of India, JT 1993 (7) SC 114, the Delhi Rent Control Act is not applicable and after the tenancy had been terminated and had come to an end, the landlord is entitled to seek possession and the Civil Court is competent to grant a decree for possession.
17. In that view of the matter there is no triable issue which needs investigation so far as the relief of possession is concerned. Suit to this extent thus can be decreed under Order 12, Rule 6, of the Code.
18. Allowing this.application, a decree for recovery of possession is accordingly passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant in respect of the premises in property no. 29, 1st floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi let out by sublease dated 18-5.1987 (Ex. P- 12).
19. In that view, it is also held that the defendant was a law full tenant/occupant of the premises till 1.2.1997 when the lease came to an end by efflux of time and the defendant will not be liable to pay damages till then. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 also stand disposed of accordingly.
20. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to. costs.
This application is, accordingly, allowed.