JUDGMENT
B.S. Chauhan and Dilip Gupta, JJ.
1. This petition has been filed by an advocate practising in this Court for a direction upon the respondent U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parishad’) to make payment of the professional bills of the petitioner along with interest.
2. It has been stated in the petition that the petitioner had been appointed as a counsel for the Parishad by the letter dated 24th July, 1996 and after his appointment as counsel the petitioner conducted many cases for which he submitted bills to the Parishad but payment was not made. This compelled the petitioner to send letters to the Parishad for making the payment but the Parishad failed to make the payment. In the supplementary-affidavit filed by the petitioner it has also been stated that the petitioner was informed on telephone that his name has also been removed from the panel of lawyers of the Parishad though no communication in writing was sent to him.
3. We have heard Sri K.N. Mishra, advocate in person and have perused the materials available on record. The basic issue that needs to be considered is whether a writ petition can be entertained for claiming the aforesaid relief.
4. The petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. R. Thillaivillalan, . In the said case the High Court had directed for payment of the amount of professional fees of an advocate along with interest against which the Government of Tamil Nadu had approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court contending that such a relief could not have been given in exercise of the writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and in any case the award of interest was unjustified. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that having regard to the lapse of time, if the contentions of the appellants were accepted, it would only serve to expose both the parties to a fresh bout of litigation and, therefore, in such circumstances, it was considered reasonable to decide the matter. This decision does not expressly decide whether a writ petition is maintainable or not and, therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner.
5. The petitioner has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of the Court in the case of Dr. Hart Nandan Singh v. U. P. Higher Education Services Commission, Allahabad and Anr., 1993 (1) AWC 568 : 1992 A/EC 359. In this case the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission had unilaterally terminated the instructions of its counsel. This Court relied upon the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Tamil Nadu (supra) and directed for payment of the balance amount of Rs. 767. This decision, therefore, also does not help the petitioner,
6. However, the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision given in Improvement Trust, Ropar v. S. Tejinder Singh Gujral and Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 577, held that a writ petition does not lie for a recovery of amount by an advocate under the contract and, therefore, the High Court had committed an error in entertaining the writ petition for recovery of the professional fees. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:
We find that the High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent-advocate for the recovery of his professional fees from the petitioner. No writ petition can lie for recovery of an amount under a contract The High Court was clearly wrong in entertaining and allowing the petition. There is no separate law for the advocates. In the circumstances, we set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge on 26.7.1991 and dismiss the writ petition. The result is that the letters patent appeal pending before the Division Bench of the High Court would also come to an end. The appeal is allowed.
(emphasis supplied)
7. In Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Kurten E. Kalathil and Ors., , the Supreme Court observed:
We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr. Raval. Learned Counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract, would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature.
A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is Justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition.
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Ghulam Mohd. Dar and Anr., AIR 2004 SC 510, the Supreme Court observed:
Furthermore, the respondent herein filed the aforementioned writ petition for enforcing a contract qua contract. Although an objection has been taken as regards the maintainability of the writ petition by the appellant herein, the same unfortunately has not been considered by the High Court. It is well-settled that writ of or in the nature of mandamus would not ordinarily be issued for enforcing the terms and conditions of a contract qua contract. A writ of mandamus would issue when a question involving public law character arises for consideration.
9. The aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court clearly lay down that a writ petition does not lie for recovery of an amount under a contract and even though a Statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions but disputes arising out of the terms of such contracts have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract and the fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body does not affect the principles to be applied. It has also been emphasised that such a contract is not a statutory contract and the disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, whether any amount is due or not and refusal to pay it is justified or not are not matters which can be agitated and decided in a writ petition.
10. This apart, in Tejinder Singh Gujral (supra), which is a case specifically dealing with recovery of professional fees of a lawyer, it has been clearly observed by the Supreme Court that a writ petition should not be entertained and there cannot be a separate law for advocates. As noted above in R. Thillaivillalan (supra) the Supreme Court did not decide the issue whether a writ petition by a lawyer for recovery of his professional fees can be, entertained. On the other hand, in Tejinder Singh Gujral (supra) the Supreme Court categorically held that a writ petition by a lawyer for recovery of his professional fees cannot be entertained. In such circumstances the issue is no longer res-integra and we have no difficulty in holding that the present petition cannot be entertained.
11. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to claim the reliefs before the appropriate forum.