JUDGMENT
K. Veeraswami, C.J.
1. There are two appeals before us, one arising out of a suit for specific performance which had been decreed and the other, for redemption of a mortgage which was dismissed. The appellant is a third mortgagee who was not a party to the suit for redemption instituted by the mortgagor ; but, by leave of this Court, he preferred these appeals. The third mortgagee, was, however, a party to the suit for specific performance. One Kasturi Sakuntala mortgaged to one V. Ranganatham Chetty on 6th March, 1956, for Rs. 13,200. The deed of mortgage reserved to the mortgagee a power of sale under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. Though there was a suit to prevent the exercise of the power of sale, the mortgagee eventually, through -auctioneers, exercised his power of sale and accepted the highest bid of Rs. 52,000. The purchaser immediately paid Rs. 13,000 into the hands of the auctioneers. The balance of Rs. 39,000 Was paid by the purchaser on 1st March, 1963, and it is not in dispute that a fair sale deed engrossed on stamp paper was drawn up on 15th March, 1963. On that day, the mortgagor instituted O.S. No. 605 of 1963, which was converted into C.S. No. 193 of 1963, for redemption. She claimed that the sale held in exercise of the power of sale under the deed was invalid and she had still the right of redemption. The second mortgagee, one Swarnakumari, was impleaded as a defendant. Pending the suit, an interim injunction was granted. The purchaser, at the same time, instituted O.S. No. 175 of 1963 for specific performance. As” indicated earlier to this suit the second and third mortgagees were made parties. Ramamurti, J., who tried both the suits together, granted specific performance and declined to allow redemption.
2. The two appeals thus turn on the question whether the right of redemption in those circumstances subsisted so that the mortgagor could redeem the mortgage. As we mentioned, it is not the mortgagor who has filed these appeals, but the third mortgagee. But that, we think, can make no difference, as the third mortgagee has been granted leave to file the appeals and has the right to redeem up. Ramamurti, J., differed from Abraham Esra v. Abdul Latiff A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 156 and, on equitable consideration and in the light of Maring (Lord) v. London and Manchester Assurance Company 1935 Ch. 310 was of opinion that the mortgagor had no longer the right of redemption after the auction sale had been held and the purchaser had paid the entire purchase money. In fact, we find from the record that, after the money was deposited, the third mortgagee himself applied for distribution of his share which was ordered out of the purchase money.
3. Mr. V.K.T. Chari for the appellant contends that, since the sale deed in exercise of the power of sale under Section 69 had not been executed yet as required by law, the right to redemption was still available, and it had not been extinguished by any act of the parties. We are, however, unable to subscribe to the view that, only as and when the sale is completed by a registered instrument, extinguishment of the right to redemption is brought about. That certainly is one way by which the right to redemption may be extinguished. But there may be other acts of parties which, in the light of facts and circumstances, may well be held to have extinguished the right to redemption. The right to redemption is not always controlled by conveyance in accordance with law. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the right of a mortgagor to redemption. But the proviso to this section suggests that the right conferred by the section may be extinguished by act of parties or by decree of Court. We are not, in these appeals, concerned with sales in enforcement of mortgages through Court. In passing, we may say that, in such cases, until confirmation of Court sales, the right to redemption subsists, in view of the specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. On the facts in this case, we are of the view that the mortgage’s light to redemption had been extinguished, because, after the purchaser had paid the full purchase money and the same had been appropriated towards the debt and the balance distributed, the mortgage itself no longer subsisted. That situation was brought about by the parties which had the effect of extinguishing the mortgagor’s right to redemption. Abraham Esra v. Abdul Latiff A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 156, Thota Chinna Subba Rao v. Malta Palli Raju (1949) 50 F.C.R. 484 : A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 1 : 1949 F.L.J. 398 : (1950) 1 M.L.J. 752 and A.E.I. Mansoor v. Abdul Mahomed A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 154, are distinguishable on facts. We do not understand those cases to lay down that, only when there is a conveyance by a registered instrument, the right to redemption is extinguished.
5. Take for instance the case of a mortgagor himself having paid the entire mortgage money and the same having been applied and adjusted. No one will say that, even thereafter, the mortgage subsisted and, therefore, the mortgagor had the right to redemption. When the mortgagor gave the power of sale to the mortgagee under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, the mortgagee exercised that power and, when the purchaser paid the money which, as we. said, has been distributed, that would certainly have the effect of discharging the mortgage. The mortgagee having been paid the mortgage debt, the mortgage came to an end and, with that, the mortgagor’s right to redemption. That is what has happened in this case. That situation, in our view, squarely falls within the ambit of the proviso to Section 60.
6. On that view, the appeals are dismissed. The plaintiff-respondent in O.S.A. No. 79 of 1966, will be entitled to her costs. No costs in the other Appeal.