Andhra High Court High Court

K. Padma Reddy vs Station House Officer And Ors. on 4 August, 2003

Andhra High Court
K. Padma Reddy vs Station House Officer And Ors. on 4 August, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003 (5) ALD 345, 2003 (2) ALD Cri 421, 2004 CriLJ 503
Author: L N Reddy
Bench: L N Reddy


ORDER

L. Narasimha Reddy, J.

1. The petitioner claims to be the President of the Community Development Society (C.D.S.) of Bellampalli Municipality, Adilabad District, established in the year 1998, as part of a Central Government sponsored Scheme. It is her case that a meeting of the Selection Committee comprising of the Chair-person of the Municipality, Commissioner of Municipality, Mandal Revenue Officer, Mandal Vocation Officer and the petitioner has taken place on 21-12-2002 for selection of certain Groups for implementation of the Mid-day Meal scheme. The petitioner contends that at the time when the list of selected groups was about to be typed, the 3rd respondent entered the Chambers of the Chair-person at 8-30 p.m., in an intoxicated condition abused her and prevented the preparation of the list. The petitioner states that apprehending threat to her security, she telephoned to the police. The police is stated to have come in time and on the complaint submitted by the petitioner, a case in Crime No. 109 of 2002 was registered against the 3rd respondent under Sections 290, 306, 384 IPC. The 3rd respondent is said to have been sent to medical examination and that it revealed that he was in an intoxicated condition.

2. The 3rd respondent in turn submitted a complaint on the next day i,e., on 21-12-2002 alleging that the petitioner had abused him in the name of Caste and thereby committed an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of S.C/S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, the Act). F.I.R. No. 110 of 2002 was registered on this complaint in I Town P.S., Bellampalli. The petitioner seeks the relief of quashing of the same. It is her case that even if the complaint of the 3rd respondent which constitutes the basis for registration of F.I.R., is taken on the face value, it does not disclose any offence.

3. A counter-affidavit is filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2. It supports the case of the petitioner to the extent of registering F.I.R. No. 109 of 2002 against the 3rd respondent and sending him to medical examination. So far as the F.I.R. No. 110 of 2002 registered against the petitioner is concerned, they submit that the truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the petitioner have to be enquired into, only during the investigation and trial of the offence and that no interference is called for at this stage.

4. The 3rd respondent also filed his counter-affidavit. He has stated that he has realized that the incident which gave rise to submission of a complaint was unfortunate and the matter since been settled between himself and the petitioner.

5. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Home and Sri T.V. Ramana Rao, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent.

6. In view of the counter-affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent, ordinarily, this Court need not go further to decide as to whether the F.I.R. was liable to be quashed or not. However, since what is involved is quashing of F.I.R. for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, which is not compoundable, the adjudication of the matter does not depend on the version presented by the 3rd respondent; irrespective of the justification thereof.

7. It is settled principle of Law that this Court can interfere with the F.I.R., if only a plain reading of the same does not disclose of an offence. The truth or otherwise of the allegations contained therein can never constitute the subject-matter of such adjudication. Therefore, it is to be proceeded as though the entire allegations contained in F.I.R. in question, are true.

8. The main ground of attack advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that mere utterances in the name of Caste by themselves would not attract the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder, unless such utterances were made in any place within public view’. According to him, even the complaint of the 3rd respondent discloses that the so called utterances were made within the Chambers of the Municipal Commissioner, which by no stretch of imagination be treated as a public place or at any rate within the public view. He placed reliance upon the Judgment of this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai and Ors. v. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum, and Natural Gas and Ors., .

9. Section 3(1)(x) of the S.C/S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, which is invoked by the 3rd respondent in his complaint reads as under:-

“3. Punishment for offences of atrocities :–(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,–

(i) to (ix) xxxx xxxx xxxx

(x) Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.”

10. As observed earlier, the truth or otherwise of the utterances attributed to the petitioner cannot constitute the subject-matter of this writ petition. In fact, the version put forward by the 3rd respondent is required to be taken as true, for the purpose of this case. In such an event, it cannot be said that the utterances do not constitute an offence, if taken to be true. This however, is not the end of the matter. A further question would arise as to whether the provisions referred to above get attracted to the facts of this case. The provision is very clear, in so far as it requires the intentional insult, or intimidation with an intent to humiliate the member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, to take place (in any public place within public view), to constitute an offence. Therefore, every utterance which comes within the purview of this provision by itself is not an offence, unless it is made in any place within public view.

11. In the complaint, the 3rd respondent has categorically stated that the scene of offence was the Chambers of the Municipal Commissioner and there is no allegation to the effect that such utterance was made ‘within public view’. Once this basic ingredient is lacking, the offence cannot be said to have been committed by the writ petitioner. In the decision referred to above, this Court dealt with this aspect extensively and held that any of the comment or utterance made at a private place not being a place within public view does not attract the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder.

12. Following the same, the writ petition is allowed and the F.I.R. No. 110 of 2002 on the file of Bellampalli I Town Police Station, Adilabad District, is quashed. No costs.