K.S. Ramachandra Rao vs Karnataka Appellate Tribunal … on 4 July, 2005

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Karnataka High Court
K.S. Ramachandra Rao vs Karnataka Appellate Tribunal … on 4 July, 2005
Equivalent citations: ILR 2005 KAR 3505, 2005 (5) KarLJ 42
Author: N Patil
Bench: N Patil

ORDER

N.K. Patil, J.

1. The petitioner, questioning the legality and validity of the order dated 30th July 2002 in Appeal No. 522/2000 on the file of the first respondent-Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore and also the award dated 27th May 2000 in Dispute No. D.R.D. 820/88-89 on the file of the third respondent-Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies vide Annexures A and F respectively, has presented the instant petition. Further, he has sought for a direction, directing the respondent-Bank to release the goods pledged by the petitioner including the missing goods and direct the fourth respondent-Bank to account for the remittance of Rs. 10,720/- made by petitioner under Exhibits P.21 to P30 and also dis-allow the interest and penal interest calculated by Bank on the principal amount up to date.

2. The undisputed facts of the case are that, the petitioner had availed a loan of Rs. 35,000/- on 29th September 1975 from the fourth respondent-Industrial Co-operative Bank, Hassan, (hereinafter called ‘Bank’) by pledging his automobiles goods. In view of non payment of necessary instalments within the stipulated time fixed by the Bank authority, at the time of releasing the loan to the petitioner, the Bank was constrained to raise a dispute under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter called “Act”) before the competent authority. The competent authority, in turn, has referred the matter to the Arbitrator, who conducted the enquiry and after evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence, has passed the award dated 15th March 1982 in Dispute No.RCS.Disp. No. 102/78-79. Aggrieved by the said award passed by the Arbitrator, the petitioner herein has filed the Appeal in No. 749/1982 on the file of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore (hereinafter called ‘appellate Tribunal’) and fourth respondent also filed Appeal No. 918/1982. Both the appeals were disposed of by a common order, setting aside the award passed by the Arbitrator dated 15th March 1982 and the matter was remitted back to the Arbitrator for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority remanding the matter for reconsideration, the petitioner had filed the writ petition before this Court and the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After dismissal of the writ petition filed by petitioner, the Arbitrator took up the matter afresh and after considering the reply and documentary evidence and also the stand taken by petitioner and the Bank, has passed a detailed order dismissing the dispute raised by petitioner, disbelieving item Nos. 12 and 13 which has been elaborately considered and discussed in internal page numbers 11 and 12 of the order dated 27th May 2000 vide Annexure F. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Arbitrator, vide Annexure F, petitioner herein has filed an appeal before the appellate Tribunal, in Appeal No.522/2000. The said appeal had come up for consideration before the appellate Tribunal on 30th July 2002. The appellate Tribunal after re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence with reference to the mandatory provisions of the Act and Rules, has dismissed appeal filed by petitioner. Being aggrieved by the impugned orders passed by both the authorities vide Annexures A and F respectively, as stated above, petitioner felt necessitated to present the instant writ petition.

3. The principal submission canvassed by Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner is that, both the orders passed by the competent authorities are contrary to the material on record, facts and on law. To substantiate the said submission, he placed heavy reliance on the secondary evidence adduced by petitioner is pursuance of the permission accorded by this Court in the earlier round of litigation, where the petitioner was permitted to adduce secondary evidence to establish his plea of discharge of part of the claim and the Arbitrator was directed to afford reasonable opportunity to both the parties to adduce any further evidence. He submitted that, the Ex.P21 to P30 are neither considered nor any finding has been given on that and has arbitrarily recorded the finding that, petitioner has failed to establish that, he remitted the amount as mentioned in the xerox copies of the vouchers produced by him. He submitted that, those are the only secondary evidence that are available with the petitioner. This fact has been specifically pleaded and a specific ground also has been taken in the appeal filed by petitioner before the appellate Tribunal. He submitted that, the appellate Tribunal also has committed the same error and material illegality in not considering the case put forth by petitioner. Therefore, he submitted that, the impugned orders passed by both the authorities are liable to be set aside.

4. Per contra, Learned Counsel appearing for fourth respondent-Bank and Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 3, inter alia, contended and substantiated the impugned orders passed by both the authorities. The Learned Counsel appearing for fourth respondent-Bank vehemently submitted that, the instant writ petition filed by petitioner is liable to be dismissed in limine. To substantiate the said stand, he has taken me through the order passed by the Arbitrator dated 27th may 2000 vide Annexure F and pointed out that, all the contentions urged by the petitioner have been considered in detail by the Arbitrator by assigning cogent reasons for rejecting his respective claim and so far as the reliance placed by the petitioner on Exs. P21 to P30, he has taken me through the relevant discussion and reasoning given by Arbitrator in internal page Nos. 10 and 11. Therefore, he submitted that, there is no force in the submission made by the Learned Counsel for petitioner that, both the authorities have failed to take into consideration Exhibits P21 to P30. Further, he vehemently submitted that, this specific ground urged by learned Counsel for petitioner has been considered by the appellate Tribunal and after re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence and alter verification of the Lower Court Records and the written arguments filed before it, the appellate Tribunal has given a specific finding that, petitioner has failed to prove his contention that, the pledged goods are missing he submitted that, the appellate Tribunal after thorough evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence, threadbare and after re-appreciation of the material available on file has rightly rejected the case of the petitioner. Both the authorities have recorded a concurrent finding of fact against the petitioner and therefore, interference by this Court is not justifiable. To substantiate his submission, he placed heavy reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate, AIR 2001 SC 3225 (paragraph 6 to 8) and in the case of Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, and submitted that, in view of the settled proposition of law by the Apex Court and this Court, interference by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is not justifiable nor petitioner has made out any good grounds to interfere in the well considered orders passed by both the authorities.

5. After hearing the Learned Counsel for petitioner and Learned Counsel for respondents, after careful evaluation of the material available on record, after perusal of the order passed by the Arbitrator dated 27th May 2000 vide Annexure F and order passed by appellate Tribunal dated 30th July 2002 vide Annexure A, it is manifest on the face of both the orders that, both the authorities have not committed any error of law much less material irregularity. Both the authorities have recorded concurrent finding of fact against the petitioner holding that, petitioner has failed to make out a case and also to prove that, the pledged goods are missing. Further it is observed in the order passed by the appellate Tribunal that, this Court in earlier round of litigation, had directed the Arbitrator to consider and allow the petitioner to adduce secondary evidence to establish his plea of discharge of part of the claim and to afford reasonable opportunity to both the parties to adduce any further evidence. This fact has been considered by the Arbitrator in detail and he has given a finding that the secondary evidence placed by the petitioner is not acceptable in evidence after thorough verification with the exhibits, the xerox copies of the original vouchers with the register maintained by fourth respondent-Bank. The original records pertaining to the same are very much available on the file of the Arbitrator. Further, the appellate Tribunal has specifically observed that, “It is also seen that the lower Court has examined the connected documents with reference to the concerned dates of the said xerox copies and found that, no such payments or deposits made by petitioner with R-2 Bank on the concerned date.” Further, the appellate Tribunal has observed that, the Arbitrator has considered the secondary evidence in detail with reference to the Bankers Book Evidence Act and the xerox copies produced by petitioner. As per the provisions of Indian Evidence Act and Bankers Book Evidence Act, the uncertified xerox copies produced by petitioner as secondary evidence do not fit in to the meaning of secondary evidence. The appellate Tribunal, after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence has dismissed the appeal holding that, the order passed by Arbitrator is just, lawful and sustainable and they do not find any merits in the case. The said reasoning given by the appellate Tribunal is in strict compliance of the material available on record and is in accordance with law. Therefore, I do not find any justification to interfere in the well considered orders passed by both authorities, when the said authorities have recorded concurrent finding of fact after thorough evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence.

6. Yet another reason as to why the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed as rightly pointed out by Learned Counsel for fourth respondent-Bank is, in view of the well settled law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd. (Supra) It is worthwhile to extract the reference made by Apex Court regarding the ambit and scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which reads thus;

“7. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Courts sub-ordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the Courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate Court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate Court to correct an error, Which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of in ferior Court or Tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the Court or Tribunal has come to.”

(emphasis supplied)

7. The Apex Court, following the law laid down by it in, the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd v. Ramtahel Ramanand, has held that, “Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Reference also has been made in this regard to the case Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SCR 565. Further the Supreme Court has observed that, “Judged by these pronounced principles, the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in passing the impugned order”. If the ratio of law laid down by Supreme Court, as stated supra, is taken into consideration, the same is squarely applicable to the instant case where, both the authorities after critical evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence, have recorded concurrent finding of fact against the petitioner after giving sufficient opportunity to both parties. Therefore, interference by this Court by exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction as envisaged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not at all justifiable.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, the writ petition filed by petitioner is dismissed.

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