JUDGMENT
Loknath Prasad, J.
1. This revision is directed against the orde: dated 23.8.97 passed by Munsif, Chaibassa, in Eviction Suit No. 3/97 thereby and thereunder the leave as. prayed by the petitioner-defendant under Section 14(4) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (in short, to be called as the ‘Control Act’) was rejected and it was ordered by the Learned Munsif that the Eviction suit will be heard in view of the provision of Section 14(4) of the Act and the tenant has no right to contest the claim of eviction.
2. The fact, in short, for the purpose of this revision is that the opposite party party filed the aforesaid Eviction suit in the Court below claiming himself to be the landlord and the suit premises is required for his personal need and necessity. The petitioner-defendant entered appearance on 2.5.97 and on three occasions or so simply filed petitions for adjournment for filling written statement and lastly on 16.6.97 prayed for leave supported with affidavit to contest the suit as required under Section 14/(4) of the said Act. This prayer was opposed by the learned opposite party mainly on the ground that the prayer was made at a belated stage and it was incumbent on the part of the tenant to seek leave of the Court after making out a ground on the day he makes appearance in the suit itself and if the tenant fails to make such prayer then on subsequent date he is debarred from making same claim. The trial Court accepted the contention of the landlord-plaintiff and rejected the prayer of leave to contest the suit and it was ordered that the suit will be taken up and the tenant-defendant has no right to contest the claim of eviction as required under Section 14(4) of the Control Act. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with this order, this revision has been preferred. The landlord-opposite party entered appearance and contested this revision at the admission stage itself.
3. All the other facts are admitted meaning thereby the suit filed by the landlord on the-ground of personal necessity and the suit is covered under Section 14 of the Control Act, Now in view of the provision of Section 14(4), the tenant if at all wants to contest the claim of eviction has to obtain a leave by making a prayer stating the ground and to be supported by affidavit and unless the leave is granted the tenant has no right to contest the claim of eviction. In the instant case, the tenant entered appearance on 2.5.97 and prayed for leave of the Court on 16.6.97. The trial Court rejected the prayer not on merit, but mainly after interpreting the provision of Section 14(4) in view of the decision of this Court reported in 1993 Vol. 1 PLJR 495 and came to the conclusion that if the tenant fails/neglects to make a prayer for leave to contest the suit, as required under Section 14(4) of the Act, the day he makes appearance in the suit, then on subsequent date he has no right to make such a prayer, and as such it will be deemed that no such leave was granted and the suit will proceed. Consequently the Counsel for the petitioner challenged this very proposition of the Court below mainly for the reason that Section 14(4) has not specifically enuntiated clear provision that such leave is to be prayed on the date of appearance. In that view of the matter, if there is some delay in making such prayer, the Court is required to consider the prayer on merit and if the delay is deliberate and intentional or not. But summarily the Court is not expected to reject the prayer without entering into the merit of the petition.
4. To me it appears that Section 14(4) of the Control Act simply makes a provision that the tenant should seek leave of the Court making out a ground to contest the suit and it is for the Court to consider the same. If at all the legislature has the intention to give some rider, then the Legislature would have indicated that prayer for leave should be made on the very date of appearance and in such a situation the tenant can make same prayer for leave on subsequent date even the appearance. But such prayer is not expected to be made at an abnormal late stage with sole intention to delay the disposal of the suit because such suit in view of the provision laid down in the Control Act itself requires expeditious disposal. There may be case which indicates that the tenant was deliberate and negligent in making such prayer only to defect the provision of the law so far the expeditious disposal is concerned. In such a situation the trial Court is justified in refusing such prayer.
5. But in the instant case, the prayer was made after 45 days or so from the date of appearance and reason was also assigned for such delay. So definitely there is not a dilatory tactice on the part of the tenant in making such prayer, and in a case reported in 1998 Vol. 1 PLJR 126, Sachidanand Shukla v. Sudha Singhs and Ors. similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court relying upon the previous decision of this Court reported in 1989 PLJR 489, and it was held that the tenant can make a prayer for leave to contest the suit on subsequent date even after his appearance in the suit and the Court is to consider such prayer on merit. However, an observation was made that the tenant is not expected and has no right to adopt a dilatory tactics and in such a situation the Court can refuse the prayer if he is satisfied that there was abnormal delay in making such prayer. The trial Court has relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1993 Vol. 1 PLJR 495 and on that basis rejected the prayer of the petitioner wherein a Bench of this Court without considering the previous decision of this Court reported in 1989 PLJR 489 laid down a principle that if the tenant fails to make a prayer for leave to contest the suit on the date of appearance, he has no right to make such prayer on subsequent date and so after considering all these facts and the previous principle laid down in 1989 case (Supra) it was held in Sachidanand Shukta case (Supra) that the decision as contained in 1993 Vol. 1 PLJR 495 to be judgment in per curiam.
6. So the order dated 23.8.97 recorded by Munsif Chaibassa is not sustainable either in law or in fact and he has erred in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner in which a prayer for grant of leave was made to contest the suit summarily without considering the same on merit mainly for the reason that the prayer was made at a belated stage.
7. Accordingly, this revision is allowed and the order dated 23.8.97 is hereby set-aside and the learned Munsif is hereby directed to consider the petition of the defendant-petitioner dated 16.6.97 on its own merit and will pass appropriate order according to law.