PETITIONER: KAKINADA ANNADANA SAMAJAM ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLEENDOWMENTS, HYDE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/1970 BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N. CITATION: 1971 AIR 891 1971 SCR (2) 878 1970 SCC (3) 359 CITATOR INFO : R 1973 SC2237 (2) RF 1976 SC 475 (4) ACT: Hereditary trustee-Office of-If 'property' within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution. Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments Act (17 of 1966), ss. 15, 17, 27, 36 and 97- If violative of Art. 19 of the Constitution. HEADNOTE: The appellants were hereditary trustees of religious and charitable institutions and endowments. They claimed the right to manage and administer the secular estate of the institution or endowment of which they were hereditary trustees but never claimed proprietary or beneficial interest either in the corpus or in the usufruct of the estate. They challenged the validity of s. 15 read with ss. 17, 27, 36 and. 97 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, on the ground that they are violative of Art. 19 of the Con- stitution. The High Court held that the office of hereditary trustee was property but that the restrictions imposed by the various provisions of the Act are reasonable and are in the interests of the public. In appeal to this Court, HELD : (1) The position of a hereditary trustee who claims a bare right to manage and administer the secular estate, is the same as that of a Dharmakarta or a mere manager or custodian of an institution except that the hereditary trustee succeeds to the office as of right and in accordance with the rules governing succession. He cannot be equated to a shebait, methadhipathi or a mahant in whose case, the ingredients of both office and property, of duties and personal interest and rights are blended together. Hence the office of such a hereditary trustee is not property within the meaning of Art. 19. The observation in Sambuda- murthi Mudaliar v. State of Madras, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 424 that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property is obiter. The pronouncement of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Patrdaram, 27 I.A. 69, Ganesh Chander Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur, (1936) 71 M.L.J. 740 (P.C.) and Bhaba Tarini Debi v. Asha Lata Debi, I.L.R. [1943] 2 Cal. 137 (P.C.) that the rule in the Tagore case, (1872) 9 B.L.R. 377 applies to succession of hereditary trustees does not afford any assistance in deciding whether an office holder. who has a bare right of management, can claim to have a right or interest in the nature of property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f). [886 B-D; 887 F-H] Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561 and Raja Birakishore V. Orissa, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 32, followed. (2)Even if the right constituted property the restrictions which have been imposed by the provisions of the Act on the hereditary trustees are reasonable and are in the interest of the general public. [888B] 879 The statute has been enacted because, a high powered body, namely the Hindu Religious Endowment Commission, had reported that there was mismanagement invariably of the endowment property by the trustees. The power to appoint non-hereditary trustees or executive officers under ss. 15 and 27, even where there is already a hereditary trustee or trustees, notwithstanding that there is no mismanagement, is only for the purpose of ensuring better and efficient administration and management of the institution or endowment. Under s. 17, the hereditary trustee is not removed but is to be the chairman of the Board of Trustees, and if there are more than one hereditary trustee, one of them is to be chairman by rotation. Instead of managing the institution alone he has to administer it in collaboration with other trustees who are non-hereditary; but it is only the secular aspect-and not matters of religion-that is touched. [883 D; 888 B-G] [Questions whether some of the institutions were private or were religious denominations within Art. 26, left open for determination by the appropriate forum.] [889 D] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1249 to
1251, 1271, 1358, 1350, 1381, 1382, 1521, 1522, 1544, 1612,
1668, 1669, 1879, 1880, 1912, 1973 and 1974 of 1970.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 31, 1969
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 2871
of 1968 etc. etc.
M.Natesan and A. Subba Rao, for the appellants (in C.As.
Nos. 1249 to 1251, 1360, 1382, 1521 and 1522 of 1970).
A.Subba Rao, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1381,
1544, 1879, 1880, 1912, 1973 and 1974 of 1970).
Shyamala Pappu, Balaparameshwari Rao and Vineet Kumar, for
the appellant (in C.A. No. 1271 of 1970).
M.Natesan and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellant (in C.A.
No. 1358 of 1970).
K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1663 of 1970).
M. Natesan and K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in C.A. No.
1669 of 1970).
A. V. Rangam, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1612 of
1970). A. K. Sen., Venugopala Reddy and Parameswara Rao, for
the respondents Nos. 1 to, 4 (in C.A. No. 1522 of 1970)
respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.A. No. 1669 of 1970) and the
respondents in other appeals.
P. Basi Reddy and G. Narayana Rao, for respondent No. 6 (in
C.A. No. 1669 of 1970).
K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the intervener.
880
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. These appeals by certificate are from a common
judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and involve the
question of the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religions
Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (Act 17 of 1966),
hereinafter called the Act’.
A number of petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution
were filed before the High Court on behalf of the
institutions or endowments some of which were public and
some private in character. A few institutions were
societies registered under the Societies Registration Act
while others claimed to be religious endowments or public
bodies like municipalities which were managing the
institutions. We might, for the sake of convenience, state
the facts in Civil Appeal No. 1360 of 1970. In the
affidavit of Nalam Ramalingaiah it is stated that he is the
hereditary trustee of the Nalam Choultry and Vyasya Seva
Sadanam which are private trusts. They were founded by his
ancestor in the year 1879 and 1920 respectively. He had
been the managing trustee from 1943. The Choultry was
endowed with immoveable property comprising an area of 453
acres of land which by careful management was now fetching
an income of Rs. 40,000/-. Besides feeding the poor and
affording free lodging facilities to pilgrims scholarships
were being given to deserving students. The Sevasadanam was
endowed with huge properties which were fetching Rs.
18,000/- as income. The objects of this charity were, (1)
to impart education and training in handicraft to women; (2)
to feed poor girls, (3) provide free shelter to women
students and (4) run women’s Sanskrit School. At no time
there had been any complaint about mismanagement of the
aforesaid trust. A number of other countries were also
mentioned which were being managed by the hereditary trustee
or trustees. Some of them were providing food and shelter
to students and travellers of all castes and creeds
including Muslims and Christians. Among the objects of some
of the Choultries was included the performing of pujas in
temples. These Choultries were founded in the last century
and ever since their inception the members of the family of
the founder or founders had been managing them. At no time
there had been any complaint of any kind against the
management. On the contrary the hereditary trustees had
improved the endowment properties and added several
charitable activities to the existing objects.
The validity of the main provisions of the Act was
challenged on the ground that the office of the hereditary
trusteeship was property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f)
and that these
881
provisions were ultra vires and void as violative of that
Article as also of Art. 14, 25, 26 and 31 of the
Constitution. On behalf of the respondents the position
taken up was that all the, institutions in question were
public and none of them was private in character that they
were religious and charitable institutions and endowments
within the meaning of the Act. It was denied that the
office of hereditary trustee was property within the meaning
of. Art. 19 (1) (f) or that there was infringement of any
of the fundamental rights mentioned in the various
petitions. It was maintained that the hereditary trustees
etc. had only a bare right to manage the affairs of the
institution and the secular matters which could not be
regarded as property within the meaning of the aforesaid
Article.
The High Court formulated five questions for decision but it
is unnecessary to mention or go into all of them as the
matters in controversy before us relate to two of these
questions. These are, (1) whether on the facts and in the
circumstances the office of hereditary trusteeship is or is
not property within the meaning of Art. 19(1) (f) and Art.
31 and (2) whether all or any of the material provisions of
the Act are hit by Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f), 25, 26 or 31. The
High Court was of the view that the office of hereditary
trustee was property within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f).
It was, however, held that the impugned provisions only
imposed reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
of the trustees, in the interest of general public and good
administration of the public institutions. It was further
found that none of the impugned provisions were violative of
Arts. 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution.
According to the High Court the material provisions of the
Act were only intended to regulate and ensure proper,
efficient and better administration and management of the
institution. All the writ petitions were dismissed.
The learned counsel for the appellants has invited our
attention to the various sections of the Act but has
confined his challenge mainly to the provisions contained in
s. 15 read with ss. 17, 27, 97 and 36 of the Act. We may
advert to the main provisions and the general scheme of the
Act. According to the preamble the Act has been enacted to
consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration
and governance of charitable and Hindu religious charitable
institutions and endowments in the State of Andhra, Pradesh.
It applies to all public charitable institutions and
endowments other than wakes governed by the provisions of
the Wake Act 1954. According to the explanation to s.
1(3)(a) the expression “charitable institutions and endow-
ments” shall include every charitable institution or
endowment the administration of which is, for the time being
vested in any department of Government or civil court, Zila
Parishad or other
L6949up.CI/71
882
local authority or any company, society, Organisation,
institution or other person. The Act also applies to all
Hindu public religious institutions and endowments.
“Charitable endowment” has been defined by s. 2(3) to mean
all property given or endowed for any charitable purpose.
“Charitable institution” has been defined by S. 2 (4) to
mean any establishment, undertaking,, organisation or
association formed for a charitable purpose and includes a
specific endowment. Various sub-clauses of s. 2 define ”
charitable purpose”, “Commissioner”, “Executive Officer”,
“Hereditary Office-holder”, “Hereditary Trustee”, “Religious
charity”. “religious endowment”, “specific endowment” etc.
The definition of “hereditary trustee” contained in sub-
clause 15 and a “trustee” in sub-clause 28 may be reproduced
:
” Hereditary trustee’ means the trustee of a
charitable or religious institution or
endowment the succession of whose office
devolves according to the rule of succession
laid down by the founder or according to usage
or custom applicable to the institution or
endowment or according to the law of
succession for the time being in force, as the
case may be”.
“‘Trustee’ means any person whether known as
mathadhipati, mohant, dharmakarta, mutwalli,
muntazim, or by any other name, in whom either
alone or in association with any other person,
the administration and management of a
charitable or religious institution or
endowment are vested; and includes a Board of
Trustees.”
Chapter II deals with the appointment of Commissioner, Joint
Commissioners etc. and their powers and functions. Section
6 provides for preparation and publication of list of
charitable and religious institutions and endowments on the
basis of income. By Section 7 the Commissioner is to be a
corporation sole having a perpetual succession and common
seal. Section 8 provides that subject to other provisions
of the Act the administration of all charitable and Hindu
religious institutions and endowments shall be under the
general superintendence and control of the Commissioner and
such superintendence and control shall include the power to
pass any order which might be deemed necessary to ensure
that such institutions and endowments are properly admi-
nistered and their income is duly appropriated for the
purpose for which they are founded or exist. Section 12
empowers the Commissioner to enter and inspect institutions
and endowments. Chapter III relates to administration and
management of charitable and Hindu religious institutions
and endowments. Section 14 declares that all properties
belonging to or given or endowed to a charitable or
religious institution or endowment shall vest in
883
the charitable or religious institution or endowment as the
case may be. It is unnecessary to set out s. 15 in extensor
It provides for the constitution of a Board of Trustees,
whose number has been specified, in respect of charitable or
religious institution or endowments of the various
categories mentioned in the section. The power to
constitute The Board has been conferred on the Government,
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant
Commissioner, as the case may be. It is discretionary where
there is a hereditary trustee but a Board must be
constituted in every other case. In making the appointment
of trustees it has been enjoined that due regard should be
given to the religious denomination or other section thereof
to which the institution belongs or the endowment is made
and wishes of the founder. AR properties belonging to the
institution or endowment shall stand transferred to such
Board of trustees or trustee, as the case may be Section 16
gives the disqualifications for trusteeship. Section 17
deals with the appointment of a Chairman of the Board of
trustees. It has been provided, inter alia, that where
there is only one hereditary trustee he shall be the
Chairman. Where there are more than one the Government etc.
may nominate by rotation one of them to be the Chairman.
Section 22 gives the duties of the trustee. He is bound to
produce books, accounts, returns………. relating to die
administration of the institution or endowment for
inspection by the Commissioner and other functionaries
whenever required to do so. Section 27 provides for the
appointment of the Executive Officer by the Government and
the Commissioner respectively. It also lays down the duties
of the Executive Officer. It is declared that the Executive
Officer shall be the employee of the Government who shall
determine the conditions of his service. Section 31 lays
down how the vacancies amongst the office-holders or
servants of charitable or religious institution or endowment
have to be filled up by the trustees. Section 32 deals with
the punishment of office-holders and servants. The general
control vests in the trustee who can take disciplinary
action in accordance with the prescribed procedure for the
various matters mentioned in sub-s. (1). In case of an
institution or endowment whose annual income exceeds two
lakhs the power to impose any penalty has been conferred on
the Executive Officer. Section 35 gives power to the
Executive Officer not to implement orders or resolution of
the trustee or Board of Trustees in certain cases. Section
36 gives overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter III
over the existing corresponding provisions. Chapter IV
deals with registration of charitable and religious
institutions and endowments; Chapter V with muths and
endowments attached thereto; Chapter VII with budget,
accounts, and audit; Chapter VIII with finance; Chapter X
with alienation of immoveable property and resumption of
Inam lands; Chapter XII with inquiries and Chapter XIII with
appeals, revisions and
884
review etc. Section 95 empowers the Government to dissolve
the Board of Trustees in certain cases and S. 97 enables it
to ;appoint a specific authority where the Board (A trustees
has ceased to function or has been dissolved. Section 102
is in the following terms :
“Nothing in this Act shall-
(a)save as otherwise expressly provided in
this Act or the rules made thereunder, affect
any honour, emoluments or perquisite to which
any person is entitled by custom or otherwise
in any charitable or religious institution or
endowment, or its established usage in regard
to any other matter, or
(b)authorise any interference with the
religious or spiritual functions of the head
of a math including those relating to the
imparting of religious instruction or the
rendering of spiritual service.”
Under s. 110, ss. 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure
1908 can no longer be applicable to charitable institutions
and Hindu religious institutions and endowments to which the
Act applies.
The main stress, on behalf of the appellants, has been laid
on the effect of the provisions of the Act and in particular
s. 15 read with the other sections mentioned before on the
office of the hereditary trustee. It has been contended
that a hereditary trustee has to manage the institution or
the endowment in accordance with the directions of the
founder. It was his duty and responsibility,to appoint the
staff and take disciplinary action whenever necessary and to
regulate the expenditure and carry out generally the objects
of the charitable institution or endowment. By the
appointment of a Board of trustees the hereditary trustee
can no longer manage and exercise control over the
institution alone or in association with other hereditary
trustees. He has to share the management and responsibility
with other members of the Board who may be drawn from the
section or faction which may be politically motivated and
may be hostile to him. The appointment of the Board, it is
pointed out, rests with the Government, the Commissioner or
the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be and although
hereditary trustee or trustees have to be included in the
Board, the entire administrative power is vested in the
Executive Officer. This Officer is a permanent Government
servant and the Board or the trustee cannot either remove
him or take any disciplinary action against him which means
that the Board or the trustee cannot exercise any effective
control over him. The Executive Officer can in certain
eventualities even refuse to implement orders of the Board.
The hereditary trustee has
885
thus been left only with what may be called the “husk of the
title” and his right to hold property has been seriously
interfered with.
The first and the main question is whether the office of a
hereditary trustee is “property” within the, meaning of Art.
19 (1) (f). For the reasons, which will be presently
stated, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the
office of hereditary trustee is “property” within that
Article.
The view that the office of hereditary trustee was itself
“property” within Art. 19 (1) (f ) even if no emoluments
were attached to it found favour with many High Courts. We
need refer only to the leading judgment of a Division Bench
of the Madras High Court in Kidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan
Nambudripad & Others v. The State of Madras & Anr. (1) The
line of reasoning which prevailed, was that the office of
hereditary trusteeship descended like partible property on
the heirs of a trustee and even females were entitled to the
office if they happened to succeed as heirs. The rule in
the Tagore(2) case has been applied to the devolution of the
office of hereditary trustee as if it was property; [vide
Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur(3) and Bhaba Tarini
Debi v. Asha Lata Debi (4 )-both decisions of the Privy
Council]. Support was also sought from the observations, in
Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick(5) relating to the
office of a shebait which was held to be property. Another
reason given was that “property” in Art. 19(1) (f) was of
wide import and was of sufficient amplitude to take in
hereditary trusteeship.
The High Court in the judgment under appeal delved into the
history and the background in which hereditary office had
been equated to property in Hindu Law. Starting from
Krishnabhat Hiragagne v. Kapabhat Mahalabhat et al(6) most
of the later decisions of the Privy Council and the, High
Courts were discussed. We need refer only to Gnanasembanda
Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (7) in which their
Lordships pointed out that the rule in Tagore case(2) that
all estates of inheritance created by gift or will so, far
as they were inconsistent with the general law of
inheritance were void was applicable “to an hereditary
office and endowment as well as the other immovable
property”.
In cases in which the office of hereditary trusteeship has
been held to be property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)
(f) the true character and incidents of that office do not
appear to have been
(1) I.L.R. [1955] Mad. 356.(2) [1872] 93.L.R. 377.
(3) [1936] 71 M.L.J. 740. (4) I.L.R.[1943] 2Cal.137.
(5) [1951] S.C.R. 1125. (6) (1869) 6 Bom. H.C.R. 137.
(7) 27 I.A. 69.
886
fully kept in view. It was common ground before the High
Court and has not been disputed before us that the
hereditary trustees of the institutions with which we are
concerned have only claimed a bare right to manage and
administer the secular estate of the institution or the
endowment and in no case any hereditary trustee has claimed
proprietary or beneficiary interest either in the corpus or
in the usufruct of the estate. The position of a hereditary
trustee does not appear to be in any way different from that
of a Dharamkartha or a mere manager or custodian of an
institution or endowment. There is one exception only. The
hereditary trustee succeeds to the office as of right and in
accordance with the rules governing succession. But in all
other respects his duties and obligations are the same as
that of Dharamkartha. No one has ever suggested that a
hereditary trustee can be equated to a Shebait of a
religious institution or a Mathadhipati or the Mahant. The
ingredients of both office and property, of duties and
personal interest are blended together in the rights of a
Mahant as also a Shebait and a Mathadhipati. The position
of Dharamakartha, on the other hand, is not that of a
Shebait of a religious institution or of the head of a math.
These functionaries have a much higher right with larger
power of disposal and administration and they have a
personal interest of beneficial character; [See Srinivasa
Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar(1)]. There would thus be no
justification for holding- that since the office of the
aforesaid functionaries has been consistently held by this
Court to be property the office of a hereditary trustee is
also property within Art. 19 (1) (f).
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharai v. The State of Rajas-
than & Others (2) the distinction between the office of
mahant and that of the Tilkayat of Nathdwara temple was
clearly enunciated. It was pointed out that the mahant or
Shebiat was entitled to be maintained out of the property of
the math or the temple. The Tilkayat never used any income
from the property of the temple for his personal needs or
private purposes nor did he claim any proprietary interest
therein. What he claimed was merely the right to manage the
property, to create leases in respect of it in a reasonable
manner and the right to alienate it for the purposes of the
temple. These rights were exercised by him under the
absolute-and direct supervision of the Durbar of Udaipur.
It was laid down by this Court that the aforesaid rights
could not be equated with the totality of the powers
generally possessed by the mahant or the Shebait. In our
judgment the hereditary trustee cannot in any way claim any
higher rights of managing the properties of the institution
or the endowment than the Tilkayat.
(1) 49 I.A. 237 251.
(2) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.
887
His rights fall far short of those of the Mahant and the
Shebait. It may be that in the case of the Tilkayat his
rights were governed by the fireman issued by the Durbar
which had the force of law but the ratio of the decision
essentially is that a bare right to manage an institution or
an endowment cannot be treated as property within Art. 19(1)
and Art. 31. In Raja Birakishore v. The State of Orissa(1)
the constitutionality of Shri Jagannath Temple Act 1954 (Act
2 of 1955) was challenged. The attack was based mainly on
the ground that the Act took away the perquisites of Raja of
Puri which had been found to belong to him in the record of
rights. The Raja had two fold connection with the temple. In
the first place he was the Adyasevak i.e. the chief servant
of the temple and in that capacity he had certain rights and
privileges. He was also the sole superintendent of the
temple and was incharge of the management of the secular
affairs of the temple. After reviewing the provisions of Act
2 of 1955 this Court observed that it provided for the
management of the secular affairs of the temple and did not
interfere with the religious affairs thereof. The rights
which the Raja possessed had been exercised by the
predecessor also but because he had been deprived only of
the right of management which carried no beneficial interest
in the property the attack based on the provisions of Arts.
19 (1) (f ) and 31 (2) could not be sustained. One of the
features common to that case and the present one is that the
management had been transferred from the sole control of the
Raja to the control of a committee. This was regarded as a
purely secular function which did not carry with it any
right to property and could not be hit by Art. 19 (1) (f).
It is true that in the latest decision of this Court in
Sambudamurthi Mudaliar v. State of Madras & Anr.(2) it was
taken to be well established that the office of a hereditary
trustee is in the nature of “property” and this is so
whether the trustee has beneficial interest of some sort or
not. This observation, we apprehend, was not necessary for a
decision of that case. There the question was whether the
appellant was a hereditary trustee within the meaning of s.
6(9) of the Madras Act 1951 and there was no discussion or
determination of the point that the office of a hereditary
trustee was property within Art. 19 (1) (f ) or any other
Article. Nor do we consider that the various pronouncements
of the Privy Council that the rule in the Tagore(3) case
applies to succession of hereditary trustees can afford much
assistance in deciding whether an office holder who has a
bare right of management can claim to have any right or
interest-in the nature of property within the meaning of
Art. 19(1)(f). Following the principles laid down in the
Tilkavat (4) And Raja Bira-
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 32.
(2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 424.
(3) [1872] 9 B.L.R. 377.
(4) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.
888
kishore cases we are unable. to endorse the view that the
office’ of hereditary trusteeship is property within Art.
19(1) (f) or, any other Article of the Constitution.
We may add that even if it was held that the rights in
question constituted “property” their regulation by the
relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be
protected by Art. 19 (5). We have no hesitation in
concurring with the decision of the High Court that
restrictions which have been imposed by the provisions of
the Act on the hereditary trustees are reasonable and are in
the interest of the general public. The power to appoint
non-hereditary trustees or Executive Officers where there is
already a hereditary trustee or trustees notwithstanding
there is no mismanagement, is only for the purpose of
ensuring better and efficient administration and management
of the institution or endowment. Non-hereditary trustees
have been associated with the hereditary trustee who has not
been removed from his office. As a matter of fact complete
safeguards have been provided for ensuring that he retains
his office. He or one of the hereditary trustees has to be
the Chairman of the Board. He has various powers under the
provisions of the Act already noticed. All that can be said
is that instead of managing the institution alone he has to
administer it in collaboration with other trustees who are
non-hereditary. In matters of religion such as’ puja,
dittam, rituals etc. there can be no interference. It has
been provided in categorical terms that the same, must be
continued to be performed according to Agamasastras or usage
or custom prevalent in the institution. It is only the
secular aspect that has been touched and there can be no
manner of doubt that the same has been done in the interest
of better and efficient administration. It must be
remembered that the legislation relating to public and
charitable institutions or endowments has taken place as a
result of careful deliberation by high powered bodies.
In the report of the Hindu Religious Endowment Commission
presided over by Dr. C. P. Ramaswami lyer which was
appointed in March 1960 it has been pointed out that
legislation relating to endowments became necessary in the
States as a result of the almost invariable mismanagement of
the endowment properties of temples by the trustees,
misappropriation of the funds of the endowment for, purposes
unconnected with the original aims and objects of such
endowments, utilisation of funds of the endowment by the
trustees or managers for their personal purposes etc. All
this fully supports the decision of the High Court that the
restrictions which have been placed on the hereditary
trustees as also on others in whom the management of the
institution in H question vests are reasonable and in the
public interest. Thus
(1) [1994] 7 S.C.R.32.
889
the appellants cannot succeed on the principal point which
has been argued before us.
A faint attempt was made to sustain the attack under Arts.
14 and 26(d) of the Constitution but finally hardly any
arguments were addressed worth noticing on these points. It
is unnecessary to deal with individual appeals some of which
were filed by societies registered under the Societies
Registration Act i.e. Civil Appeal No. 1249 of 1970. C.A.
No. 1271 of 1970 by the Municipal Council, Visakhapatnam,
related to the Turners Choultry which, according to the
Municipal Council, was its private property. So far as the
validity of the impugned provisions is concerned the same
must be sustained in these cases on the same reasoning as
in the case relating to the hereditary trustee. The High
Court has rightly left open the question whether the Tumer’s
choultry is a private or a public charitable institution.
This the Municipal Council is entitled to agitate before the
Deputy Commissioner under s. 77 of the Act. Before the High
Court some of the writ petitioners had claimed that their
institutions were religious denominations within Art. 26 and
were therefore entitled to the protection guaranteed by that
Article. The High Court has, quite rightly, observed that
these matters should be agitated in a proper forum and they
have been left open for determination if add when so
desired. This indisputably was the correct course to
follow.
The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of
hearing fee.
V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.
890