JUDGMENT
Tripathi, J.
1. The appellant is a tenant of premises No. 19/27 Patkapur, Kanpur, Respondent No. 4 Smt. Chando Devi is the landlady of the premises. The premises is governed by the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The landlady moved an application tinder Section 3 of the said Act before Rent Control and Eviction Officer for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the appellant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after hearing the parties refused to grant permission. The respondent landlady filed a revision against that order which was dismissed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad on July 17, 1964. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid order, the respondent challenged its validity by filing a petition under Section 7-F of the Act to the State Government. The State Government allowed the petition by its order dated February 9, 1966 (Annexure K to the writ petition). The appellant thereafter challenged the validity of the aforesaid order by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
One of the grounds taken in the writ petition was that as the proceedings before the State Government were quasi-judicial in nature, the State Government was bound to state reasons for its order and as the order did not contain reasons for interfering with the concurrent findings of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner, it was bad in law. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition, however, was of the opinion that “there is no warrant to hold that the law costs on the State Government a duty to give reasons” and further that “it is the need of the landlord or the owner which tilts the scale and the Rent Control authorities would be in error if they emphasise the need of the tenant in such a matter and refuse to grant the permission to the owner on that ground alone.” Accordingly the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition; hence this appeal.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Pt. G. N. Kunzru, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that as till 1965 the view of the High Court was that although the State Government is to act quasi-judicially under Section 7-F of the Act, it was not required to give any specific reasons, and as the impugned order of the State Government is in accordance with those decisions of the High Court, the subsequent view taken by two Full Benches of this Court should not be allowed to have adverse repercussion on the impugned order which was passed before they were rendered. It has been urged further that the State Government had passed the order after holding an enquiry into the matter and after coming to the conclusion that the landlady needed the house for her residence. We regret our inability to agree with these contentions.
3. Annexure K to the writ petition is the impugned order of the State Government in which it is stated that after taking into account the papers relating to the issue in dispute and after considering what the respondent had to say, it is considered necessary in the interest of justice to make the aforesaid premises available to the respondent for her personal use and, therefore, the order of the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad dated July 17, 1964 is quashed and the landlady is given permission to file a suit in the Civil Court for the ejectment of the tenant.
4. A perusal of the aforesaid order makes it evidence that no specific reasons had been given by the State Government for interfering with the order of the Commissioner in the case. It is true that an omnibus reason has been specified, namely, that the State Government considered it in the interest of justice to give her the permission. That is, however, no reason for interfering with the concurrent findings arrived at by the Rent Control Officer and the Commissioner that the landlady was not entitled to get permission to eject the tenant. It can be easily inferred from the orders of the Rent Control Officer and the Commissioner that in addition to the reasons mentioned in their orders they too were satisfied that it was in the interest of justice that the landlady should not be allowed permission to file a suit for ejectment. Therefore, if the State Government was of opinion, that the orders of the subordinate authorities suffered from any defect, it should have given specific reasons for the same.
5. In Haji Manzoor Ahmad v. State of U. P., 1968 All LJ 809 = (AIR 1970 All 467) (FB), a Full Bench of this Court, inter alia, held that where an order of an inferior authority is carried in appeal of revision before a superior authority, and the superior authority in disposing of the appeal or revision makes an order in exercise of quasi judicial jurisdiction, in all cases where a superior authority interferes with the order of an inferior authority, the order of the superior authority must set out its reasons. The aforesaid decision was rendered by the Full Bench, in a case under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the earlier Division Bench cases reported in Vinod Chandra Maheshwari v. State of U. P., 1965 All LJ 740 and Bhagwat Pd. y. State of U. P., 196S All LJ 961 were noticed and it was observed that they did not reflect the true position in law.
The Full Bench following the decision of the Supreme Court in Prag Das Vaishya v. Union of India, 1967 MPWR 448 (SC) held further that it is not open to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to look into the records of the Government and from the notings contained in it to spell out the reasons for the order of the Government which itself did not state the reasons. Again, in the case of Ham Murti Saran v. State of U. P., 1970 All LJ 1177 = (AIR 1971 All 54) (FB) another Full Bench of this Court held that the State Government acts as a quasi judicial authority when deciding a case relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the landlord for filing a suit in the civil court against the tenant for his ejectment and that the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order under Section 7-F of the aforesaid Act.
6. We have no other option but to follow the decisions of the aforesaid Full Benches in deciding this writ petition. In the light of those decisions, it is obvious that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. In the result this Special Appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is quashed. In the circumstances of this case, parties will bear their own costs.
