BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 22/2/2010
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN
W.P.(MD).No.1892 of 2010
Kaliya muthu ... Petitioner
Vs
1. The Managing Director
Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation
IV Floor, C.M.T.A Tower 2
Egmore
Chennai 8.
2. The Senior Regional Manager
Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation
Tiruchirapalli.
3. The District Manager
Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation
Pudukottai District. ... Respondents
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records
pertaining to the order of the third respondent in Na.Ka.No.R.V4/2005 dated
27/9/2005 and to quash the same as arbitrary and illegal and subsequently
directing the third respondent to reinstate the petitioner within time limit.
!For Petitioner ... Mr.K.Baalasundharam
^For R.1 to R.3 ... Mr.V.Karthikeyan
for Mr.J.Ravindran.
*****
:ORDER
Mr.V.Karthikeyan for Mr.J.Ravindran, learned Standing Counsel, takes
notice on behalf of the respondents.
2. By consent, the Writ Petition is taken up for final disposal at the
time of admission itself.
3. The prayer in the Writ Petition is to quash the order passed by the
third respondent in Na.Ka.No.R.V4/2005 dated 27/9/2005.
4. The case of the petitioner is that he was working as a Salesman in
TASMAC Shop No.6714, Machuvadi, Pudukottai. According to him, he was terminated
from service on the ground of unauthorised retail sale of liquor. Therefore,
the third respondent by his proceedings in Na.Ka.No.R.V4/2005 dated 27/9/2005
terminated the petitioner from service. Challenging the same, he has come
forward with the present Writ Petition.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the materials
available on record.
6. It is the cardinal principle that under the Service Law jurisprudence,
termination from service is a major punishment, which could be imposed after
following the procedure contemplated under the relevant Rules and after
providing a reasonable and fair opportunity of hearing to the employee. It is
also well settled by this Court in catena of decisions that in respect of TASMAC
employees, disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated, opportunity should be
given and then only, final order could be passed. In the instant case, no such
procedure has been followed by the respondent. Therefore, the impugned order is
violative of principles of natural justice and on that ground alone, the
impugned order is liable to be quashed.
7. In similar circumstances, this Court in (V.L.Lakshmanakumar v. The
District Manager, “TASMAC” Limited, Madurai District, Madurai and another)
reported in 2006 (1) CTC 660, following the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in (State of Haryana v. Satyender Singh Rathore) reported in (2005) 7 SCC
518 and (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic
Sciences) reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60, set aside the termination order on the
ground that no enquiry was conducted.
8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satwati Deswal v. State of
Haryana reported in 2010 (1) SCC 126, held as follows:-
“8. Apart from that, on a cursory look of the statutory provision of the
Constitution of the Parishad Working Committees, it would be clear that before
imposing any major penalty against an employee, namely, an order of termination
of service, an enquiry must be held in the manner specified in the statutory
rules by which the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the
basis of allegations on which an inquiry shall be proposed and opportunity must
be given to the employee to submit a written statement stating therein whether
he/she desires to be heard in person and no order of termination also can be
passed without the approval of the Managing Committee. On this count alone,
therefore, the High Court was, in our view, in grave error in dismissing the
Writ Petition of the Writ Petitioner.
9. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the order of termination passed against the appellant is quashed and the Writ
Petition stands allowed. However, it would be open to the authorities, if they
so desire, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for her
termination from service and if such disciplinary proceedings are initiated, the
authorities shall give proper opportunity of hearing and permit the parties to
adduce evidence in support of their respective stands and after giving such
opportunity, the disciplinary authorities thereafter shall give hearing to the
appellant and then pass a final order on the question of termination of service
of the appellant in compliance with the statutory rules concerned applicable to
the appellant.”
9. From the reading of the above, it is manifestly clear that before
passing an order of termination from service, an enquiry must be held in the
manner specified in the statutory rules by which the disciplinary authority
shall frame definite charges on the basis of allegations on which an enquiry
shall be proposed and opportunity must be given to the employee.
10. The analysis of the impugned order of the case would reveal that the
petitioner is terminated from service pending enquiry, on the basis of serious
allegations and, therefore, the respondents are duty bound to issue notice and
after getting explanation, if the allegations are denied, a regular charge memo
should be issued and only after conducting enquiry, termination order could be
passed. In the case on hand, the said procedure has not been followed.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed and the
impugned order of the third respondent dated 27/9/2005 is set aside. However,
liberty is given to the respondents to initiate appropriate disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner, if so advised and pass final orders after
affording sufficient opportunity to him. The respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service within a period of two weeks from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order. On the given facts and circumstances of
this case, it is further
directed that the petitioner shall not be entitled for backwages for the
period during which he was out of employment. No costs.
mvs.