ORDER
N.Y. Hanumanthappa, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the first respondent under the provisions of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Act’), the petitioner has approached this Court. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in initiating proceedings against him under the Act as illegal and to set aside the order of detention in proceedings RC No. D3/883/96, dated 23-4-1996 as illegal and arbitrary.
2. The petitioner has attacked the impugned order on the ground that the said order is illegal and arbitrary for the reasons that there is nothing to indicate that he had involved himself in any of the activities as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act and that the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by others with whom he has nothing to do and there is no nexus as to the object. The incidents are three in number and they are as follows:
“1. Cr.No. 184/95 dated 10-07-1995.
On 10-07-1995 when the Excise Officers were on routine route watch at Chityal Bridge they detected a case of illegal transportation of 18 O.T. Whisky bottles of 750 ML each on Scooter API 4251. They arrested the accused S. Satyapal Reddy who confessed that Sri Kalva Narsareddy has given him the bottles for sale and he is doing the business at his instance. The officers conducted the panchanama, arrested the accused Satyapal Reddy. The accused Kalva Narsareddy could not be arrested as he obtained anticipatory bail from District & Sessions Judge, Adilabad in Crl.M.P. No. 970 of 1995 in COR No. 184/94-95, dt. 10-7-1995 of Station Nirmal.
2. PR.No. 43/95 dated 11-11-1995.
On 11-11-1995 the Excise Officers on reliable information raided H.No. 4-1-122 (5-13-25) at Vishwanathpet, Nirmal and found 2 gunny bags containing 44 and 48 deshi daroo bottles in each bag. One person by name Donthula Shanker s/o Bheemanna ran away. The officers conducted panchanama and registered the case vide PR No. 43/95 dated 11-11-1995 of Station Nirmal. They arrested the house owner Danthula Bheemanna. He admitted that Sri Kalva Narsareddy has supplied deshi daroo bottles for retail sale in Nirmal Town.
3. PR No. 208/96 dated 08-04-1996.
On 08-04-1996 when the Excise Officers were on route watch at Jewly village, they caught one person Sada Manikyam who was illegally transporting 48 nips of deshi daroo from across the border. They conducted panchanama and registered the case vide PR.No. 208 dated 08-04-1996 of Station Nirmal. On interrogation he confessed that Sri Kalva Narsareddy has supplied deshi daroo bottles for sale in Nirmal.”
3. It is not in dispute that against the three persons separate crimes were registered. The petitioner has obtained stay and thus, avoided detention for all these days.
4. Sri Vijay Kumar Heroor, learned Counsel for the petitioner challenged the order of detention inter alia by contending that the order of detention is quite vague, the circumstances narrated are quite remote and as such, the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind as no order could have been passed as the petitioner has nothing to do with the grounds mentioned in the order. It is further contended that the authorities will get jurisdiction to pass the order of detention if it is shown that the petitioner is either transporting or selling any such liquor, that too which is injurious in nature. He lastly contended that mere confession by others is not a proof but the authorities passed the order of detention on the basis of such confessional statement, which according to the Counsel cannot be sustained. To support his contentions he placed reliance on Addl. Secy., Government of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 496, K. Syamala (Smt.) v. The Collector & District Magistrate, Kakinada, and A. Raja Reddy v. The Collector & District Magistrate, Adilabad . In these circumstances, Counsel urged that the impugned order be quashed.
5. Smt. Vijaya Laxmi, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents supported the order of detention. She contended that the order of detention is a just one and there is no remoteness or vagueness in the impugned order. On the other hand, Counsel stated, the detention order is resultant of proper application of mind on the part of the authorities and none of the circumstances is irrelevant. She contended that unless a person surrenders against whom a detention order is made, writ is not maintainable. She lastly contended that the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no application to the facts of the present case.
6. In order to know whose contentions are to be accepted, it is proper to compare some of the provisions of the Act and test the grounds urged under the provisions of the Act. Section 3 (3) of the Act reads as follows:
“3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons-(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in Sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government.”
7. The grounds of detention have already been extracted. It is no doubt true that normally detention order cannot be quashed unless a person surrenders. But it does not mean that when a citizen’s personal liberty is sought to be deprived of on irrelevant grounds, this Court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court while dealing elaborately on the scope of Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the orders of detention in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case (1 cited supra) held as follows:
“As regards his last contention, viz., that to deny a right to the proposed, detenu to challenge the order of detention and the grounds on which it is made before he is taken in custody is to deny him the remedy of judicial review of the impugned order which right is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we find that this argument is also not well merited based as it is on absolute assumptions. Firstly, as pointed out by the authorities discussed above, there is a difference between the existence of power and its exercise. Neither the Constitution including the provisions of Article 22 thereof nor the Act in question places any restriction on the powers of the High Court and this Court to review judicially the order of detention. The powers under Articles 226 and 32 are wide, and are untrammelled by any external restrictions, and can reach any executive order resulting in civil or criminal consequences. However, the Courts have over the years evolved certain self-restraints for exercising these powers. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. It is in pursuance of this self-evolved judicial policy and in conformity with the self-imposed internal restrictions that the Courts insist that the aggrieved person first allow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedies provided by it before approaching the High Court and this Court to invoke their discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. That jurisdiction by its very nature is to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. We have while discussing the relevant authorities earlier dealt in detail with the circumstances under which these extraordinary powers are used and are declined to be used by the Courts. To accept Shri Jain’s present contention would mean that the Courts should disregard all these time-honoured and well-tested judicial self-restraints and norms and exercise their said powers, in every case before the detention order is executed. Secondly, as has been rightly pointed out by Shri Sibal for the appellants, as far as detention orders are concerned if in every case a detenu is permitted to challenge and seek the stay of the operation of the order before it is executed, the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made will be frustrated since such orders are in operation only for a limited period. Thirdly, and this is more important, it is not correct to say that the Courts have no power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The Courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the Courts have interfered with them at the pre-execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the Courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it has no authority to do so. The refusal by the Courts to use their extraordinary powers of judicial review to interfere with the detention orders prior to their execution on any other ground does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenu, but prevents their abuse and the perversion of the law in question.”
8. Apart from this, recovery or confession cannot be a basis for conviction. Likewise confession of third person is not a basis to detain a particular person as held by this Court in the cases cited supra. In the background of well established principles of law on the scope of Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India when it is shown that benefit of Article 22 has been denied to a person, the only conclusion we can draw is that the impugned order is arbitrary and illegal. Accordingly, the same is quashed. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.