JUDGMENT
Ratnam, J.
1. The tenant, who is in occupation of one room in the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 10, and three rooms, a Varandah, two bath rooms and open space in the ground floor, on a monthly rent of Rs. 155 in door No. 74, Narayana Mudali Street, Madras-1 is the petitioner in these Civil Revision Petitions, arising under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Respondents 1 to 3 in these Civil Revision Petitions are the landlords and there is no dispute regarding this. They in R.C.P. No. 1424 of 1983, filed under S.10 (2) (i) of the Act, before the Rent Controller (XI Judge, Court of Small Causes) Madras, prayed for an order of eviction against the petitioner from the room in her occupation in the ground floor on the ground that she had committed wilful default in the payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 10 per mensem for 21 months from 1-5-1981 to 31-1-1983. In the counter filed by the petitioner in that application, she denied having committed wilful default in payment of rent and stated that she had always been ready and willing to pay the entire rent or deposit it before the Court as per its directions and that she had also deposited the entire rent in the branch of the Indian Bank at Kothaval Bazaar to show her bona fides, as the money orders sent by her, had been refused by the landlords. In R.C.O.P. No. 1425 of 1983 filed under Section 10 (2) (i) of the Act before the Rent Controller, (XI Judge, Court of Small Causes) Madras the landlords prayed for an order of eviction against the petitioner with reference to the other portions of the building in her occupations on the ground that she had committed wilful default in the payment of rent for a period of 21 months from 1.5.1981 to 31.11983 at the rate of Rs. 155 per mensem. In addition, they also prayed that they required the premises in the occupation of the petitioner as and by way of additional accommodation. The petitioner, in her counter, refuted the claim of the landlords for additional accommodation, and she pleaded that though she had been willing to pay the rents, the landlords evaded to receive the rents and that she is ready and willing to pay the sum of Rs. 3,255 claimed as arrears of rent, either directly to the landlords or deposit it into court as per the directions of the Court.
2. Both the applications were heard together on common evidence. On a consideration of the evidence, the Rent Controller found that the landlords had not established that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents, as claimed in both the petitions, that the bona fide requirement of the landlords of the premises in the occupation of the tenant as and by way of additional accommodation was not established, and, therefore, the landlords are not entitled to an order for eviction against the petitioner as prayed for. On the aforesaid conclusions, R.C.O.P. Nos. 1424 and 1425 of 1983 were dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the landlords preferred appeals in R.CA. No. 331 and 336 of 1985, respectively before the Appellate Authority (VII Judge Court of Small Causes) Madras. On a reconsideration of the entire evidence, the Appellate Authority held that the petitioner had not paid the rents and that she had also not taken any steps whatever to deposit the rent, and, therefore, the petitioner should be held to have committed wilful default in the payment of rent in respect of both the tenancies. However, the Appellate Authority found that the requirement of the landlords on the ground of additional accommodation had not been made out. On the aforesaid conclusions, the Appellate Authority passed an order of eviction against the petitioner with reference to the portions in her occupation. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in C.R.P. Nos. 2461 and 2528 of 1986.
3. It is now necessary to refer to a second round of proceedings for eviction initiated by the landlords against the petitioner. In R.C.O.P. No. 1016 of 1985 filed under Section 10 (2) (i) of the Act, before the Rent Controller (IX Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras the landlords prayed for an order of eviction against the petitioner on the ground that she had committed wilful default in the payment of the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 10 for the period from 1.2.1983 to 31.1.1985-She had committed wilful default in the payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 155 per mensem.(sic) In the counter filed by the petitioner in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 while denying that wilful default in the payment of rents had been committed, she expressed her readiness and willingness to pay the rents and also contended that the landlords did not have any cause of action for filing the applications for eviction of R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 and that the pendency of appeals against the orders passed by the Rent Controller in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1424 and 1425 of 1983, would preclude the landlords from maintaining the applications for eviction in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985. While matters stood thus, the landlords filed M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985, under Section 11 of the Act praying for a direction to the petitioner to pay the landlords the arrears of rent in a sum of Rs. 500 and Rs. 7,550 respectively, failing which further proceedings in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 should be stopped and the petitioner evicted. In the affidavit, it was stated that the petitioner had not paid the rent for a period of 50 months from 1.5.1981 to 30.6.1985 at the rate of Rs. 10 and Rs. 155 per mensem, respectively. In the counter filed by the petitioner in those applications, she stated that she had not committed any wilful default and she cannot be blamed for the non payment of rent, as the landlords refused to receive the rent. When M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 came up for orders on 26.8.1985, the Rent Controller, after holding that the petitioner had not substantiated the stand taken by her in the counters, acceded to the request for time made by the petitioner and directed the petitioner to pay to the landlords or to deposit before Court, on or before 2.9.1985, the sum of Rs. 500 and Rs. 7,550 respectively, and further directed the petitions to be called on 3.9.1985. On that day, a further order was passed allowing M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985, as the petitioner did not pay the landlords or deposit the amount into Court, as directed by the earlier order dated 26.8.1985. In view of this, consequential orders in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 were also effected from May, 1981. The petitioner should have, in the normal course, tendered the rent for the month of May, 1981 by the end of June 1981, for the month of June by the end of July 1981 and for the month of July by the end of August, 1981. However, what is seen from Ex.R.2 is that for the three months May, June and July, 1981 the petitioner had purported to send a money order (date not seen in Ex.R.2) for Rs. 495, which had been returned. Likewise, Ex.R.3 shows (date not clear) that rent for two months had been sent by the end of September, 1981. Exs.R.4 and R.5 also show (date not clear in Ex.R.4) that the money orders sent for Rs. 165 each had been returned. It is only on the strength of these returned money orders, the petitioner raised the plea that the landlords had refused to receive the rents. Earlier, it has been pointed out how even the very first tender of rent under Ex.R.2 for the months of May and June, 1981 only towards the end of August, 1981 was not in order as per the provisions of the Act. Likewise, under Ex.R.3 also, two months’ rent had been sent and that tender was also not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When the rent tendered was not properly tendered and in due time as per the provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that the refusal by the landlords to receive the rents so tendered was improper. It is in this context that the provisions of Section 8 of the Act are relevant. If, according to the petitioner, the refusal of the rent by the landlords sent under Exs.R.2 to R.5 was not justified then, under Section 8 (2) of the Act, the petitioner should have required the landlords to specify within 10 days of receipt of a notice sent by her, a Bank in which the rent may be deposited by her to the credit of the landlord under Section 8 (3) of the Act, on the specification of such a Bank, the tenant should deposit the rent into that Bank and continue to deposit the subsequent rents also. In the event of the landlord not specifying a Bank, Section 8 (4) of the Act provides that the tenant shall remit the rent to the landlords by money order and if the landlords refuse to receive the rent remitted by money order, then the tenant may deposit the rent before the Rent Controller under Section 8 (5) of the Act. It is thus seen that Section 8 of the Act makes comprehensive provision protecting the tenant from wrongful refusal of a landlord to receive the rents. It is not the case of the petitioner, as stated earlier, that the rent was tendered to the landlords as it should have been and that was refused. It is significant that in the refused money orders, in the coupon portion, there is no whisper about any refusal of the rent tendered by the petitioner. Indeed, R.W.I admitted that it is not mentioned in Exs.R.2 to R.5 that the landlords had refused to receive the rents. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the landlords were required to specify a Bank and that they omitted to do so. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioner had omitted, without any reason or justification, to pay the rents from May, 1981 onwards and had put forward an unacceptable plea of refusal of rents by the landlords when tendered. The question of remitting the rent by money order statutorily arises only in the event of the omission on the part of the landlords to specify a Bank and without even calling upon the landlords to name a Bank, the petitioner had proceeded to send the rents consolidatedly for three months and two months, without any justification whatever. Even on the basis that the landlords had not specified a Bank and had refused the money orders, nothing prevented the petitioner from filing an application for deposit before the concerned Rent Controller with a view to deposit the rents, so as to avoid wilful default in the payment of rents. In the course of her evidence, R.W.I had clearly admitted the arrears of rent since May, 1981 and had also accepted that after 19.11.1981, she had not taken any steps whatever for the payment of rents. Considering the available evidence, the Appellate Authority cannot be stated to have committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents for the period 1.5.1981 to 31.1.1983 with reference to the premises under her occupation under the two tenancies, referred to earlier.
4. That leaves for consideration the initiation of the second round of proceedings by the landlords for the eviction of the petitioner in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985. In those petitions, the landlords stated that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents for the period 1.2.1985 to 31.3.1985 at the rate of Rs. 10 and Rs. 155 per mensem, respectively. It was in these proceedings that the landlords have invoked Section 11 of the Act by filing M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 praying for the issue of suitable directions. Though in the counters filed by the petitioner in M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985, she had denied wilful default in the payment of rent, it is seen from the order passed by the Court on 26.8.1985 that the petitioner did not place any materials before Court to establish that she was not liable to pay the arrears of rent, as claimed, and further that, the petitioner would pay the arrears, provided some time was granted. The Rent Controller, finding that the petitioner had not established that she was not liable to pay the arrears as claimed, granted time to the petitioner to pay the respondents/landlords or deposit into Court the arrears and on her failure to do so, stopped further proceedings and ordered her eviction. What is important is that the petitioner had not established that the arrears of rent, as claimed, were not payable by her. Under those circumstances, the request of the petitioner for time for paying or depositing the arrears, was accepted and an order was passed. On the basis of the available materials, it cannot be said that the Rent Controller was in error in having passed the order stopping the proceedings and directing the eviction of the petitioner, when she did not comply with the earlier order directing the payment or deposit of the arrears of rent, as claimed by the landlords. Therefore, the consequential order passed in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 also cannot be taken exception to. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the initiation of the second round of eviction proceedings in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985, during the pendency of the earlier proceedings in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1424 and 1425 of 1983, was not in order and relied upon the decision reported in Durgai Ammal v. K.T. Mani (1989) 1 L.W.155. It was also contended that as a consequence thereof, it would follow that M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 were not maintainable. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the landlords submitted that proceedings in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 were initiated on the arising of a cause of action subsequent to the filing of the earlier application for eviction and in the absence of any prohibition in the Act, the second round of eviction proceedings were properly initiated and therefore, the filing of applications in M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 was perfectly in order. Attention in this connection was also drawn to the Proviso to Section 10 (7) of the Act and the decision of Full Bench in K Perumal Chettiar v. V. Muthuswami (1962) 2 M.L.J. 218. Earlier, it has been noticed that R.C.O.P. Nos. 1424 and 1425 of 1983 related to the period 1.5.1981 to 31.1.1983 while R.C.O.P. Nos. 1016 and 1017 of 1985 related to the period 1.2.83 to 31.1.1985. It is thus seen that two applications for eviction in relation to two different tenancies, though in the name of the petitioner, have been initiated by the landlords for different periods. There is no prohibition in the Act against the filing of a second application for eviction with reference to a cause of action arising after the filing of the prior application for the same relief under the Act. Indeed, the proviso to Section 10 (7) of the Act clearly recognises that even during the pendency of the prior proceedings initiated for eviction, it would be open to the landlord to file again an application for evicting the tenant on any of the other grounds mentioned in Sub-sections (2) or (3) or (3-A) of Section 10 of the Act. Considering this provision, the Full Bench in K. Perumal Chettiar v. V. Muthuswami (1962) 2 M.L.J. 218, pointed out that it will be an unwarranted extension of fiction to hold that the landlord should be at a disadvantage by not being able to rely on defaults or necessities which arise subsequent to the filing of the previous application, but before its termination, and if that were so, the consequence would be that so long as, what is ultimately found to be an ill-founded petition by a landlord for eviction of his tenant, is pending (whether before the Rent Controller or the appellate authority or Court of revision) or so long as he is able to delay final disposal thereof, the tenant, could with impunity commit defaults in payment of rent incurring no penalty therefor, and such a construction would have the effect of defeating the express and mandatory provisions of the Act. Dealing with the arguments that no petition for eviction could be filed during the pendency of an earlier one, which is subsequently dismissed, the Full Bench pointed out that argument cannot be accepted as the statutory right under Section 7 (2) and 7 (3) (now Section 10 (2) and (3) of the Act cannot be in any manner be qualified. Referring to the case of wilful default, the Full Bench pointed out, if an application for eviction is filed on the ground of default of payment of rent in a particular month, the landlord can file another application in case there is a default in the next month, as to hold otherwise, would lead to results inconvenient, if not repugnant to the scheme of the Act itself. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench, referred to above, it follows that the second round of proceedings for eviction initiated in respect of wilful default in respect of a subsequent period cannot be held to be not maintainable or that the applications filed therein in M.P. Nos. 714 and 715 of 1985 were not competent. It is necessary, in this connection, to make a brief reference to the decision of the Division Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T. Mani (1989) 1 L.W.155 relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In that case also, two eviction petitions came to be filed. The earlier one was for the period from 1.5.1978 to 30.9.1978, while, the latter covered the period 1.12.1980 to 30.6.1981. In both the proceedings, the Appellate Authority held that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rent and on a consideration of the facts, it was held with reference to the proceedings arising out of the first application for eviction that the tenant had not committed wilful default. Dealing with the propriety of the filing of the second application, the Division Bench pointed out that if during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, there is a failure on the part of the tenant to pay the rent, the landlord can file an application under Section 11 of the Act and obtain reliefs and that is a special machinery and in disregard of or by-passing that special machinery, the landlord cannot institute fresh proceedings on the ground of non-payment. The analogy of the applicability of Section 11, on the basis of which that conclusion was come to, is not only inappropriate, but inapplicable as well, as, in that case, from the facts, as could be gathered from the judgment, there was no application at all under Section 11 of the Act. Even otherwise, as laid down by the Full Bench in the decision referred to earlier, there is no prohibition in the Act against the institution of proceedings for eviction for a second time during the pendency of proceedings already initiated for eviction on a cause of action, which arises subsequent to the institution of the earlier proceedings. Indeed the decision in K. Perumal Chettiar v. Muthuswami (1962) 2 M.L.J. 218 (F.B.) is binding on me, as it was also of the Division Bench, and the decision of the Division Bench has been rendered without even so much as a reference to the Full Bench decision of this Court, which has also stood the test of time. Therefore, the reliance placed by learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the decision of the Division Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T. Mani (1989) 1 L.W.155 would not be of any avail.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner next contended that the landlords must be deemed to have waived their right to proceed with the applications under Section 11 of the Act, as they had withdrawn the amounts deposited by the petitioner. It was also submitted that the deposits were made by the petitioner out of time and the withdrawal of such deposits would preclude the landlords from sustaining the order of eviction passed under Section 11 (4) of the Act. Reliance in this connection was placed upon the decisions in Bibi Amna Khatun and Ors. v. Zahir Hussain and Anr. (1981) 1 R.C.J. 426 (Patna) and A.C. Das Nevese Souza v. A.B.E. Ribeiro and Ors. (1984) 2 R.C.J. 431, (Bombay).
6. The avowed purpose of Section 11 of the Act is to prevent defaulters from continuing indefinitely in possession of the propriety without payment of the arrears of rent and current rent, taking advantage of the pendency of the proceedings and also to reduce the burden on tenants and to enable the landlords to realise the rents during the pendency of the proceedings, failing which, the landlords would also be in a position to get possession of the tenanted premises. Under Section 11 (1) of the Act, before contesting an application for eviction filed by a landlord under Section 10 of the Act or the preferring of an appeal under Section 23 of the Act, the tenant is obliged to pay or deposit all arrears of rent due in respect of the building and he should continue to pay or deposit even the subsequent rents till the termination of the proceedings, either before the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be Section 11 (2) provides that the deposit of rent under Section 11 (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. Provision is also made under Section 11 (3) for resolving any dispute regarding the quantum of rent. Section 11 (4) provides that if the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent, the controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Section 11 (5) enables the landlord to withdraw the amount deposited under Section 11 (1) by filing an application before the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed, the amount deposited could be withdrawn. It is in the background of the aforesaid provisions in Section 11, the question of waiver has to be considered. A plea regarding waiver has to be considered as not a pure question of law. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of any particular case, there is a waiver, has to be determined on a consideration of the materials in support thereof. To constitute waiver, it should be made out by the person putting forth such a plea that there had been an intentional relinquishment of a right or a voluntary abandonment of an existing legal right or conduct, such as would warrant an irresistible inference of the relinquishment or abandonment of a right or privilege. What is significant in this case is that the petitioner did not, during the course of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, attempt to raise any such question of waiver. Apart from it, under the scheme of the provisions under Section 11 of the Act, there is no scope whatever for importing the idea of waiver by the withdrawal of the rents by the landlords. Though, in this case, the petitioner was directed to deposit the arrears of rent on or before 2.9.1985, it is not in dispute that the petitioner did not deposit the rents, as directed. As a consequence of the failure of the petitioner to pay or deposit the arrears of rent, as directed, and in the absence of showing of sufficient cause for such non-deposit by the tenant, under Section 11 (4) of the Act, the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority was obliged to exercise its jurisdiction and stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the petitioner to put the landlords in possession of the building. Therefore, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, there was no question of withdrawal at all of the amounts deposited by the tenant and the question of waiver could not arise. Whether such a plea at all would be available to the petitioner at a latter stage, may now be considered. The jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under Section 11 (4) of the Act having been exercised in a particular manner by the Controller the Appellate Authority is concerned only with the question whether the exercise of such jurisdiction under Section 11 (4) of the Act in the circumstances of the case by the Controller, was a proper one or not. Further, having regard to the manner in which Section 11 (4) of the Act is couched, it looks as though there is no question of any discretion either in the controller or in the Appellate Authority to decline to stop further proceedings and direct the eviction of the tenant. The only circumstance statutorily taken note of is the showing of sufficient cause by the tenant for the failure to pay or deposit the rent, and in its absence, the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority is bound to stop all further proceedings. That there is no other course that can be followed by the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority, flows not only from the language employed in Section 11 (4) but also the mandatory nature of the duty cast on the Controller or the Appellate Authority as the case may be to follow that particular course indicated in Section 11 (4) of the Act and no other. It would be relevant in this connection to refer to Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath and Anr. 1954 S.C.J. 290 and Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram (1965) 2 S.C.J. 873. In the first of the decisions, the Supreme Court had to consider the propriety of the order of the Judicial Commissioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with reference to an order of eviction against the tenant, who had not done what was incumbent on him to do under the law. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Judicial Commissioner was right in holding that the authorities below acted arbitrarily in declining to make an order for ejectment and though the courts realised the legal position, in effect they declined to do what was incumbent on them to do by S.13 (2) (i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram (1965) 2 S.C.J. 873, the Supreme Court was again concerned with the interpretation of S.13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, and after referring to the decision in Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath and Anr. 1954 S.C.J. 290, the Supreme Court stated that it was incumbent on the Rent Controller to order eviction, though one part of S.13 used the expression ‘may’ and the other the expression ‘shall’. Under Section 11 (4) of the Act, in the matter of exercising the jurisdiction vested in the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority the Authority is bound to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 11 (4), unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary and stop all further proceedings and pass an order for eviction. On the facts of this case, the petitioner has not show sufficient cause for the non-payment or deposit of the arrears of rent, as directed, and, under those circumstances, the Rent Controller or even the Appellate Authority had no other course open to it, except to order eviction on the failure of the petitioner to pay or deposit the rent, as directed earlier. It now remains to briefly refer to the two decisions relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner. It would suffice to refer to the first of the decisions, as the second one merely follows it. In Bibi Amna Khatun and Ors. v. Zahir Husain and Anr. (1981) 1 R.C.J. 426 (Patna) prior to the filing of the application for striking out of the defence of the tenant on the ground that the deposits were made after delay and therefore, not in accordance with law, the landlord had withdrawn the two earlier deposits on 18.8.1970 and 7.5.1971. The amounts deposited having been withdrawn even prior to the filing of the applications for striking out the defence, such withdrawals cannot possibly be stated to operate as waiver on the right of the landlord to have the defence struck off. If at all, it could apply only with reference to the withdrawal made by the landlords after the filing of the application for striking out of the defence of the tenant. One of the learned Judges dealt with this in para 13 of the judgment and it was stated that as the landlord did not press the application for striking out the defence until he had already withdrawn the amounts, and had thus taken advantage of the deposits, that would disentitle him to claim his right to get the defence of the tenant struck off, as by such withdrawal, it was accepted that the deposits were within time. Admittedly, in this case, there was no deposit within the time granted. The application filed by the landlords was not on the ground that the deposits or payments were made by the tenant after delay. These two circumstances would suffice to render inapplicable the ratio of the decision in Bibi Amna Khatun and Ors. v. Zahir Husain and Anr. (1981) 1 R.C.J. 426. Further, as pointed out earlier, on the failure of the tenant to pay the amount, under Section 11 (4) of the Act, it is for the Controller or the Appellate Authority to proceed further by exercising its jurisdiction and it is difficult to accept that in such a case, there can be a waiver affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to deal or further proceed with the matter. Apart from it, under Section 11 (4) of the Act, there is no question of the filing of an application by the landlord, but it is the duty of the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11 (4) of the Act and pass orders. It is also difficult to accept that deposits made by the tenant out of time, if withdrawn by the landlords, would enable the putting forward of a plea of waiver. If there was an attempted deposit of arrears of rent by the tenant out of time, the Court ought not to have received it. Having received a deposit out of time and not in conformity with the order of Court, by the mere withdrawal of the amount by the landlord, it cannot be stated that he has waived his right to have the defence of the tenant struck off. In receiving a deposit, out of time, the Court had committed a mistake and it is well settled that no person can be prejudiced by an act of Court. In any event, though under Section 11 (5) of the Act, provision is made for the withdrawal of the amounts deposited under Section 11 (1) of the Act, there is no prohibition against the withdrawal by the landlords of the rents deposited out of time by the tenant and such withdrawal cannot, therefore, be put against the landlords, though in all such cases, it might well be that the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority, might have already proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11 (4) of the Act. Under those circumstances, the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no application at all. There is therefore, no substance in this arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
7. It is seen from the orders of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. Nos. 966 and 967 of 1985 and 1024 and 1025 of 1985, that the Authority had proceeded on the footing that even by the time the appeals came to be dealt with, the petitioner had not paid the rents, as directed, and that enabled the Appellate Authority to dismiss the appeals filed by the petitioner. It is seen that R.C.A. No. 966 and 967 of 1985 against M.P. Nos. 715 and 714 of 1985, were filed on 30.8.1985 and R.C.A. Nos. 1024 and 1025 of 1985 had been filed on 23.9.1985. The petitioner had not paid the arrears of rents, as indicated already, even on 30.8.1985 or 23.5.1985 as the petitioner had made an endorsement in R.C.A. Nos. 566 and 967 of 1985, as late as 17.4.1986 that the arrears would be paid. Under those circumstances, the principle of the decision in Iqbal & Co. v. Abdul Rahim (1982) 1 M.L.J. 221 would stand attracted and as at the time of the preferring of the appeals, the arrears had not been paid or deposited by the petitioner, the Appellate Authority was right in rejecting the appeals. No other point was urged. The Civil Revision Petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in one petition.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the event of the order of eviction passed against the petitioner being upheld, she should be granted some time to vacate and hand over the premises in her occupation to the landlords and the learned Counsel for the landlords had no objection to grant three months time for the purpose. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted three months time from to-day to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in her occupation to the landlords subject to her filing an affidavit of undertaking to that effect before this Court within ten days from to-day, failing which the order of eviction could be put into execution forthwith.