JUDGMENT
Chandrashekhara Das, J.
1. Rule.
Returnable forthwith.
By consent heard both sides.
Respondents waive service.
The Petitioner is a Union under the establishment of the first respondent. The several demands have been raised by the Petitioner – Union with the first respondent. With reference to these demands, there was conciliation, and when the conciliation failed, the Petitioner – Union requested to the Government to refer these disputes the Industrial Tribunal. Even though the request was made for reference of these disputes, the State Government did not act in time. In that context, the Petitioner – Union filed a Writ Petition before this Hon’ble Court being Writ Petition No. 163 of 1995 seeking mandamus to direct the State Government to refer the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, by the judgment dated June 26, 1995, this Hon’ble Court directed the State Government to refer the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication as contemplated under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, the Government referred the disputes except three disputes, as shown below :
(a) Demand of permanency of workmen “Demand No. (34) : PERMANENCY :
Workmen who have worked 120 days in aggregate in any one of the years 1991, 1992 and 1993 should be made permanent with effect from the date on which they have completed the required period of 120 days and further they should be given compensation for the loss caused to them by the Company’s Act of employees’ sons and daughters;
(b) Demand of employment of employees sons and daughters :
“DEMAND NO. (18) EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEES’ SONS AND DAUGHTERS :
In case the company wants to recruit fresh hands for filling up vacancies caused in permanent posts or new posts are created the company should give preference in employment to workmen’s sons and daughters provided they are vocationally fit for the jobs. In furtherance to this object, the company should maintain for purpose of recruitment in future a list showing therein names of workmen’s sons and daughters in order of seniority of their fathers service in the company for purpose of recruitment in future.”
(c) Demand for strike period wages;
“DEMAND NO. (35) : WAGES/SALARIES FOR THE LOCKOUT/STRIKE PERIOD :
All workmen affected by lockout/strike should be paid full wages/salaries for the entire period of lockout and for the period of strike upto-date.”
The Petitioner approached this Court by way of this writ petition challenging the order of the State Government refusing to refer to the industrial disputes enumerated hereinabove.
2. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the State Government has no jurisdiction to withold the reference of the industrial disputes as sought to be referred under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this behalf, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on a decision in the case of M. P. Irrigation Karmachari langh v. State of M. P. reported in (1985-I-LLJ-519). In that case, the Supreme Court has examined and defined the power of the State Government in respect of referring or not referring the industrial disputes before the Industrial Tribunal. We would refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in para (5).
“Therefore, while conceding a very limited juristdiction to the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of the demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that adjudications of demands made by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to decide ……………. In our opinion, the reasons given by the State Government to decline reference are beyond the powers of the Government under the relevant Sections of the Industrial Disputes Act. What the State Government has done in this case is not a prima facie examination of the merits of the question involved. To say that granting of dearness allowance equal to that of the employees of the Central Government would cast additional financial burden on the Government is to make a unilateral decision without necessary evidence and without giving an opportunity to the workmen to rebut this conclusion. This virtually amounts to a final adjudication of the demand itself. The demand can never be characterised as either perverse or frivolous.”
In para (7) of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus :
“There may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to decline reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes. To allow the Government to do so would be to render Sec. 10 and Sec. 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act nugatory.”
3. In view of the above propositions propounded by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the State Government in such a situation is very limited. As the Hon’ble Supreme Court held, the State Government can only withhold the reference in case the demands as such are frivolous and perverse.
4. Mr. Padiyar, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 submits that Demand No. 35 has been referred to, after the Government has passed the impugned order. Out of remaining 2 demands, in respect of Demand No. 34, Mr. Dessai, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 submitted that it is concluded by a settlement, and therefore, it falls outside the purview of adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. The said contention was supported by the learned Counsel for the State. We have gone through the demands and are satisfied that this demand has not been covered by settlement. In fact, the settlement cited by the Counsel for the respondents with regard to Demand No. 34 relates to Packing Sections, and therefore, it cannot be accepted. We think that withholding of reference of Demand No. 34 by the State Government is not in consonance with the provisions of law, and therefore, we set aside that part of the impugned order.
5. As regards demand No. 18, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that it is a part of the condition of service that the workmen’s sons and daughters should be provided with the job if they are otherwise qualified and found to be fit. As we see the demand as it is, we are of the opinion that if such a demand is allowed and allowed to be worked itself for 10 years, we are afraid that the group of almost all employees will be the family members of former employees. Such a situation is not in conformity with the public policy in view of growing explosive unemployment problem, that our country now faces. Therefore, we are of the opinion that such a demand should go against the public policy, and the State Government is justified in refusing to refer the demand to the Industrial Tribunal.
6. In view of the above discussion, we direct the State Government to refer Demand No. 34 to the Industrial Tribunal within 4 weeks from today. As far as Demand No. 35 is concerned, it is submitted that the said demand has already been referred to the Tribunal. We make it clear that if it is not referred to the Tribunal, the State Government is directed to refer that demand also to the Industrial Tribunal.
Writ Petition is disposed of and Rule disposed of accordingly.