JUDGMENT
K.A. Puj, J.
1. The present petition is filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution praying for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 30.9.2002 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in TEN. B.S.90/1996. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners and the respondents were the tenants of land bearing Survey No. 375 of Village Vesu, Taluka Choryasi and District Surat and since then they are in possession of the said lands. The petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 are paying Rs. 700 as rent p.a. to respondent No.2 up to 1976 and thereafter they were paying Rs. 1000. The petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 applied before the Mamlatdar, Choryasi u/s. 70(b) and u/s. 32(g) of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The ld. Mamlatdar declared the petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 as the tenants of the land in question and fixed the purchase price at Rs. 7230/-. The respondent No.2 appeared before the Mamlatdar and conceded that the petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 are the tenants of the land and the receipts of rent produced on record are given by him. It is further stated that the respondent No.2 has withdrawn the amount of purchase price deposited by the petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4. Thereafter on 24.10.83 the names of the petitioners and respondents No. 3 & 4 are mutated in the revenue records of right (Village Form No.6) vide Entry No. 1214 and the same was certified on 8.1.84 after following due procedure of law. It is further stated that the value of the land in question increased due to afflux of time and hence respondent No.2 preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 51 of 1996 before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Surat. The said appeal was dismissed after hearing both the parties vide order dated 9.7.1996.
2. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Dy. Collector, the respondent No.2 had preferred Revision Application No. TEN.B.S. 90/96 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The respondent No.2 after lapse of more than 6 years preferred a second application for stay of the order dt. 9.7.96 of the Dy. Collector and the Tribunal has decided the said interim application in favour of respondent No.2 and stayed the order passed by the Dy. Collector.
3. It is this order which is under challenge in the present petition filed by the petitioners under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
4. Mr. YN Oza, the learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. YM Thakkar, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is absolutely unjust, and improper and in utter disregard of the provisions of law as well as evidence produced on record. It is further submitted that while granting the order of stay against the order of the Dy. Collector dated 9.7.96 the Tribunal has failed to consider the material aspect of the matter that earlier also an application for stay was preferred but the same was not pressed by the respondents. Though the Tribunal has observed that in the changed circumstances the order of the Dy. Collector is required to be stayed, no such changed circumstance was brought on record by the respondent No.2. He has further submitted that once the application for stay was filed and that was not pressed by the respondent No.2 it was not open for the respondent No.2 to move such an application and it is also not just and proper on the part of the Tribunal to grant stay in the said application. Mr. Oza has further submitted that even on merits, the petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 have been declared tenants way back in 1983 by the Mamlatdar in the proceedings initiated under Sec. 32(g) and 70(b) of the Act. He has further submitted that the petitioners are in possession of the land in question since 1971 and the same was admitted by the respondent No.2 before the Mamlatdar in his deposition under Sec. 32(g) of the Tenancy Act. He has, therefore, submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal being illegal deserves to be quashed and set aside.
5. At the time of issuance of notice by this Court on 18.8.2003, this Court has made very clear that notice was issued for final disposal of the matter. This Court has also recorded the statement made on behalf of the petitioners that the application dated 13.5.2002 on which order 30.9.2002 was passed was not served on the petitioner nor the petitioner was heard in the matter, and keeping this fact in mind though the petition was filed after 10 months notice was issued by this Court for final disposal of the petition.
6. On service of the notice, the respondent appeared through his advocate and affidavit-in-reply was filed.
7. Mr. YN. Ravani, ld. advocate appearing for respondent No.2 has raised four grounds for dismissal of the petition. He has submitted that the petitioners may have to prove the pleadings and incorrect statements are made before this Court. He has further submitted that the petitioners have suppressed material facts as an application for vacating interim relief is filed before the Tribunal and the same is pending for final disposal on 4.9.2003. He has further submitted that when the Tribunal has granted interim order, this Court normally does not exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, he has submitted that the petitioners have approached this Court after much delay and therefore on the ground of delay and latches the present petition is required to be rejected.
8. In support of his submissions, Mr. Ravani has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chhagan Ranchod Kukvava vs. General Manager, Western Railway, Bombay & Anr. – 1998 (1) GLH 461, wherein this Court has observed that the order of the Tribunal can only be challenged if there is any jurisdictional error and that under Art. 227 the High Court would not review or reweigh evidence. It is held as under:
“An order passed by the Tribunal can be challenged under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India only if there is any jurisdictional error or procedural error apparent on the face of the record. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd Mustaquim and Ors., reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 38 that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to seeing that an interior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court of Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
The above decision has been followed by this Court in the case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors 1998 (2) GLH 513, wherein this Court has held that :
“The matter is yet to be examined from another angle. From the scheme of the Act, 1958, it transpires that the application for registration of trade marks has to be disposed of expeditiously. Otherwise also leaving apart the scheme of the Act aforesaid, whether it is a proceeding before the Civil Court or Criminal Court or before this Court or even before any quasi-judicial authority or administrative authority, the same has to be disposed of expeditiously. This object, as well in some of the cases the mandate of the statute, can only be achieved or attained where the Courts which are having powers of superintendence or extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, do not permit the parties to stall the final adjudication of the matter by questioning the decision of the authorities with regard to interlocutory matters when the matter if worthy, can be agitated even after final orders are passed.”
With regard to certain discrepancies in the record, Mr. Ravani has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. – AIR 1982 SC 1249, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the Judges’ record was conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else. The court could not launch into inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court.”
9. On the basis of the facts of the present case as well as on the basis of the authorities relied upon by him, Mr. Ravani submitted that if the stay granted by the Tribunal is vacated the above equity will be changed and the respondents will be put to hardship. He has further submitted that in such an eventuality the petitioners may transfer the land in question to somebody else and the entries made may be mutated in others names and thereafter it will be very difficult for the respondents to challenge the said actions of the present petitioners. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal does not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution.
10. I have heard the ld. advocates appearing for the respective parties and I have also considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the order passed by the Tribunal. I have also perused the papers and documents attached with the petition as well as the affidavit-in-reply. What emerges from the facts found on record is that the Revision Application was filed in 1996 and no application for stay was filed at the time when the revision was filed. The Dy. Collector’s order therefore remains in operation till 2001 and even after filing of the revision application for the first time in 2001 an application for setting aside the abatement is filed and in that application the request for stay was also made by the respondent No.2 and the abatement was set aside by the Tribunal. The application for stay was not pressed on the ground that the auction of the property was postponed. Thereafter the application of respondent No.2 for stay was moved on 31.5.2002 on the ground of change of circumstances and that the petitioners have tried to create new right in the property. It has been brought to the notice of the Court that one more proceeding is pending before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal wherein the applicants have claimed tenancy in respect of the same land and the present petitioners though joined as respondents did not oppose the said application. On that basis, it was contended that the stay application preferred by the present respondent No.2 is required to be granted. However, from the Tribunal’s order there is nothing to this effect and the Tribunal has only weighed with the aspect that earlier stay application was not withdrawn but it was not pressed at that stage. As a matter of fact, the application was not pressed and it was not withdrawn as contended by the petitioners. There would not be much difference in both the cases. The respondent No.2 is not in a position to satisfy this Court on the point that the application for stay was not pressed only at that stage. There is nothing to that effect in the record. No liberty was reserved for making fresh application for stay. Hence the natural presumption which will be drawn that the application was not pressed during the pendency of the revision application. The revision application is still pending before the Tribunal, and more than 7 years have passed and it is ripe for final hearing. When the respondent No.2’s application for stay was decided by the Tribunal, the Tribunal was aware of the fact that the main revision application is pending for more than 7 years and yet the said application was not decided and instead of that while deciding the stay application the order which was passed in 1996 was stayed. On these facts, this Court is of the view that the Tribunal is not justified in deciding such stay application especially when the matter is already ripe for final hearing and parties have agreed to go on with the hearing. This Court is also of the view that no changed circumstances which promoted the Tribunal to decide the said application and to grant the stay especially when there was no stay for last more than 6 years against the order passed by the Dy. Collector. Because of the peculiar facts of the present case, the authorities relied on by Mr. Ravani are not applicable as here in the present case there was no stay and the Tribunal has granted the stay after 7 years without deciding the main Revision Application. It is an interim order but once such application was considered and no stay was granted by the Tribunal on the ground that it was not pressed by the respondent No.2, for the same reason when the Tribunal is approached and stay is granted, that would certainly amount to reviewing the position which was prevalent at the earliest stage. The Tribunal is, therefore, not justified in considering the second stay application and in granting stay to the respondent No.2. The interim order passed by the Tribunal is therefore set aside and the Tribunal is directed to decide the main application finally within one month from the date of receipt of writ from this Court or from the date of receipt of certified order of this Court whichever is earlier. During the course of hearing, Mr. Ravani has pointed out that one of the co-tenants has moved an application before the Tribunal for vacating the interim relief and the same has been fixed on 4.9.2003. The Tribunal is, therefore, directed to decide the said application finally along with the revision application so that the parties can know at what stage they stand. After 7 years when the main revision application itself is to be taken up for final hearing, there is no need to encourage any stay application preferred by any of the parties. It is made clear that if the parties may change their position during the pendency of the revision application and that too after directions are given by this Court for final disposal of the said application, the same may be subject to the final outcome of the revision application and no party can claim any equity even if a case is made out for the same.
11. It is made clear that since specific time is prescribed by this Court, the parties should cooperate with the disposal of revision application and even if any application for adjournment is moved, the Tribunal would not grant such adjournment application and would decide the main application within the time granted by this Court.
12. With these observations and directions, the present Special Civil Application is allowed to the above extent. D.S. is permitted.