JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J.
Page 0698
1. This appeal challenges the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18th October, 2006. The learned Single Judge had prefaced the impugned order with the following paragraph:
At loggerheads, in these proceedings, are the members of same family, who would have, perhaps, been well advised to strive to sort out amicably their ongoing dispute over use of trademark “KANGARO” instead of slugging it out by entangling themselves in multifarious litigious bouts.
2. The learned Single Judge’s description adequately summarized the nature of a business family’s feud which had transversed the borders of the country and found itself reflected in litigations spread all over the world. The impugned order was occasioned by a suit filed in Dubai by the appellant against the party who imported the goods made by the respondent herein.
3. The genesis of the dispute between the parties arose from the trade mark proceedings relating to trade mark “KANGARO” in respect of stationary articles such as Staplers etc. The original suit was filed in Ludhiana when on 7th January, 1997, the following interim order was passed:
The application under Section 8 of the New Arbitration Act has been dismissed as not pressed. Learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 claims that he is the registered owner of Trade Mark Kangaru. plaintiff No. 1 claims that he is using the same as owner. Let status quo regarding use of trade mark be maintained and W.S. be filed on 10.1.1997.
4. The above order was passed in CS(OS) No. 156/2004 in Ludhiana which suit apart Civil Suit being CS (OS) No. 157/2004 and Civil Suit being CS(OS) No. 155/2004, were also filed in Ludhiana. A rectification application CO No. 4/1997 was filed by the appellant before this Court. Eventually, by an order dated 8th September, 2003, the Hon’ble Supreme Court transferred all proceedings from the Ludhiana court to this Court and directed the suits pending in Ludhiana to be tried along with CO No. 4/1997 in this Court. Currently, the above status quo dated 7th January, 1997 which was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, continues to operate and hold the field up to date and the alleged violation of which has led to the present appeal.
5. For one reason or the other the application for interim injunction was not disposed of and both the parties continued with manufacture and export business under the trademark ‘Kangaro’. The respondents herein -plaintiffs exported their goods under the said trademark to Dubai in September, 2006. The appellants/defendants lodged a complaint with the custom authorities of Dubai that their goods had been counterfeited by the respondents-herein whereupon the goods of respondents were confiscated at Dubai. The appellants-herein were, however, directed to furnish a bank guarantee to the tune of Rs. 2 lacs UAE Dirhams. The appellants were to pursue their Page 0699 complaint at Dubai and in case the goods were to be released then the bank guarantee could be encashed.
6. The case of the respondents-plaintiffs is that the action/complaint by the appellants-defendants in a Dubai court amounted to disobedience of the status quo order dated 7th January 1997 because the appellants-defendants have virtually stopped the business of the plaintiffs and are seeking destruction of their goods at Dubai which was sought to be prevented by the status quo order (supra).
7. It is alleged that the appellants-defendants had concealed from the Dubai Court that the status quo order dated 7th January 1997 permitting both the parties to use trademark ‘Kangaro’ was in force. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC read with Section 151 and Section 2(a) and Section 2(b) of CPC read with Section 11 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1979 for initiating contempt of courts action against the appellants-defendants was filed in the pending suit. An application for interim relief was also made to restrain the defendants from pursuing the matter before the Dubai Court. In the presence of counsel for both the parties the learned Single Judge passed the following order on 10th October 2006:
Notice to show cause to the respondents. Notice accepted on behalf of the respondents.
At request by the learned Counsel for the respondents, renotify on 13th October, 2006.
In the mean time, the respondents shall not pursue the matter further before Dubai Court concerning infringement action in respect of trademark “Kangaro”.
8. This order dated 10th October 2006 was confirmed after notice to the respondents on 18th December, 2006 by the learned Single Judge leading to the present appeal.
9. Before we deal with the appeal, it is necessary to analyze the interim order dated 7th January, 1997. The violation of the order dated 7th January, 1997 had led to the contempt petition in which pending determination of the contempt proceedings an interim order impugned in the present appeal was passed restraining the appellants from continuing the proceedings filed by them in Dubai Court.
10. The order dated 7th January, 1997 itself shows that the appellants were permitted to use the trade mark “KANGARO” as averred registered owners and the respondents were permitted to use the same as owners and status quo of such user of the trademark was required to be maintained during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court.
11. The appellants case as put forth by the learned Senior Counsel Shri Sudhir Chandra is as under:
(a) That the learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with the contempt jurisdiction could not have passed the interim orders which according to him added to the terms of the original order dated 7th January, 1997 thereby violating the mandate of the decision of the Page 0700 Hon’ble Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. and Ors. . The relevant para of the said judgment reads as follows:
7. “Part III of the Act bears the heading ‘Preventive Relief and fasciculus of sections therein included provide for injunctions generally. Section 36 provides that preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. Section 37 specifies the nature and character of temporary and perpetual injunctions. Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the Court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Permanent injunctions can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon merits of the suit and thereby, defendant in the suit is perpetually enjoined from assertion of a right or from commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiffs. Section 38 sets out situations in which the court can grant a perpetual injunction to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in its favor, whether expressly or by implication. Section 38 is thus an enabling section which confers power on the Court to grant perpetual injunction in situations and circumstances therein enumerated. Section 41 caters to the opposite situation. It provides that an injunction cannot be granted in the situation and circumstances therein set out. The Corporation relies on Section 41(b) in support of its contention that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction because perpetual injunction could not have been granted by the Court in terms in which temporary or interim injunction was sought. Section 41(b) reads as under:
41. An injunction cannot be granted:
(a) …. … …
(b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought;
…. … …
The predecessor of Section 41(b), Section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act of 1887 repealed by 1963 Act read as under:
56. Injunction cannot be granted:
(a) …. …. ….
(b) to stay proceedings in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought.
A glance at the two provisions, the existing and the repealed would reveal the legislative response to judicial interpretation. Under Section 56(b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a Court not subordinate to Page 0701 that from which the injunction was sought. In other words, the Court could stay by its injunction a proceeding in a Court subordinate to the Court granting injunction. The injunction granting stay of proceeding was directed to the Court and the Court has to be the court subordinate to the one granting the injunction. This is postulated on the well recognized principle that the superior Court can regulate proceedings in a Court subordinate to it. It is implicit in this assumption and the language used in Section 56(b) that the Court could not grant inunction under Section 56(b) of the repealed Act to stay proceeding in a Court superior in hierarchy to the Court from which injunction is sought. But by judicial interpretation, a consensus was reached that as injunction acts in personam while the Court by its injunction cannot stay proceedings in a Court of superior jurisdiction; it could certainly by an injunction restrain a party before it from further prosecuting the proceeding in other Courts may be superior or inferior in the hierarchy of Courts. To some extent this approach not only effectively circumvented the provisions contained in Section 56 of the repealed Act but denuded it of its content. The Legislature took notice of this judicial interpretation and materially altered the language of the succeeding provision enacted in Section 41(b) replacing Section 56(b) of the repealed Act while enacting Specific Relief Act of 1963. The Legislature manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Section 41(b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personam, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Section 41(b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the Court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings in a Court which is subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. As a necessary corollary it would follow that the Court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court of co-ordinate superior jurisdiction. This change in language deliberately adopted by the Legislature after taking note of judicial vacillation has to be given full effect.
(b) Indeed his further plea is that since IA No. 1976/2005 was pending where a stay of foreign court proceedings had been sought in substantive proceedings in the original side, the learned Single Judge sitting in contempt jurisdiction ought not to have granted the same relief as an interim measure in the contempt proceedings even prior to the recording of the finding that the appellants were guilty of contempt.
(c) That the respondents had not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge in their application, the fact that their own litigations in foreign countries had been pending qua the same subject matter.
Page 0702
(d) The learned Single Judge has erroneously interpreted the provisions of Section 41(b) & (h) of the Specific Relief Fact.
41. Injunction when refused – An injunction cannot be granted –
(a) xxxxxx xxxxx
(b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought;
(c) xxxxxxx xxxxx
(d) xxxxx xxxxxxx
(e) xxxxxx xxxxxx
(f) xxxxxxxx xxxx
(g) xxxxxx xxxxxx
(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust.
….
(e) The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-defendants also emphasized that an appeal by the respondents against order dated 30th October 1996 of rectification passed by Registrar pertaining to the Trade Mark “KANGARO” had been dismissed by a Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 1st May 1997, Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal vide order dated 10th May 2002 and even a SLP was dismissed on 8th September 2003.
(f) The use of the trade name or the mark KANGARO did not amount to user running foul of the subsisting order dated 7th January, 1997 and indeed could not therefore have constituted contempt. The Contempt Court was required to look into the willful disobedience and the successive litigations between the parties including the suits filed by the respondents themselves in Cambodia and Uruguay certainly demonstrates one factor eloquently, that whether or not there was disobedience warranting contempt proceedings, the disobedience was certainly not willful.
(g) Reliance has also been placed on the position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Ors. , which reads as follows:
11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. Page 0703 The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercise contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “that it has exceeded its power in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.
(h) Reliance has also been placed on V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Anr. (2004) 13 SCC 610, wherein in para 7 of the said judgment it was held that “An order passed in the contempt petition, could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting relief”. It was also submitted that reliance has wrongly been placed on DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. Ltd. related to the powers exercisable by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 142 and the Page 0704 High Court was not competent and authorized to pass such orders as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
12. Mr. Parag Tripathi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted:
(a) That the impugned order dated 18th October 2006, has strongly relied upon paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. . He has submitted that the plea of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that such orders denying the fruits of the contempt to the respondents could not have been passed by the High Court are clearly settled against the appellants as per the law laid down in the said judgment as in the said judgment the exercise of the High Courts to assert the effectiveness of their orders in contempt jurisdiction was approved. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as follows:
17. The principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well settled. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month’s imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected….
18. The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by civil courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed:
I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of court should be obeyed. Willful disobedience of an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did, nevertheless these acts were validly done. Of court, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that Page 0705 it was done in breach of the law. If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequences of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.
19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v S. Suppiah and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun. In Century Flour Mills Ltd., it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order.
20. In Sujit Pal a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfillled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.
21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if any, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give way. The court must ensure full justice between the parties before it.
13. The learned Counsel for the respondents has thus submitted that in the above judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court had clearly upheld the use of the power of contempt by the High Courts to set right the wrong committed by one of the parties. He submitted that this exercise of the contempt power of the High court which was quoted approvingly by the Supreme Court and such exercise was not based upon Article 141 of the Constitution.
(b) He also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in .
Page 0706
(c) Reliance has also been placed on Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 642 and in particular paragraph 8 thereof, which reads as follows:
8. Now it is perfectly clear that it is envisaged under our constitutional scheme that Parliament in India may make laws which operate extra-territorially. Article 245(1) of the Constitution prescribes the extent of laws made by Parliament. They may be made for the whole of any part of the territory of India. Article 245(2) declares that no law made by the Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation. Therefore, a Parliamentary statute having extra-territorial operation cannot be ruled out from contemplation. The operation of the law can extend to persons, things and acts outside the territory of India. The general principle, flowing from the sovereignty of States, is that laws made by one State can have no operation in another State. The apparent opposition between the two positions is reconciled by the statement found in British Columbia Electric Railway Company Limited v. King.
A legislature which passes a law having extra-territorial operation may find that what it has enacted cannot be directly enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts of its country must enforce the law with the machinery available to them.
In other words, while the enforcement of the law cannot be contemplated in a foreign State, it can, nonetheless, be enforced by the courts of the enacting state to the degree that is permissible with the machinery available to them. They will not be regarded by such courts as invalid on the ground of such extra-territoriality.
(d) As postulated under Section 41(b), defending proceedings in UAE cannot be construed as an equally efficacious remedy and consequently there is no other remedy available with the appellant except the present proceedings in contempt pending in this Court.
(e) Merely because an application had been filed and is pending in the suit for staying foreign proceedings before the same learned Judge who heard the contempt proceedings it can not debar the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce its order in contempt jurisdiction.
14. The learned senior counsel for the respondents has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Jaininder Jain and Ors. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Ors. 2004(29) PTC 160 (Del)(DB). He has further sought to distinguish the ONGC’s judgment relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants and stated that there is nothing in Cotton Corporation’s case which Page 0707 supports the plea of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that inherent powers cannot be exercised by the High Court.
15. After considering the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel of both the parties, we are of the view that the order dated 7th January 1997 passed by the learned Single Judge stated in clear and unequivocal terms that the status quo regarding the use of the trademark ‘KANGARO’ had to be maintained between the appellants and the respondents, i.e., both the parties, appellants who were the registered owners, of the trademark “KANGARO” and the respondents who were using the trademark ‘KANGARO’ as the owners, were entitled to continue to use the same. The order of the seizure of the goods of the respondents at Dubai has prima facie impeded and interfered with right of the respondents to carry on their business as the owners of the trade mark ‘KANGARO’. Therefore, in these circumstances, the action of the appellants in instituting legal proceedings in Dubai is a prima facie violation of the order of this Court dated 7th January 1997 because it sought to alter the status quo which was sought to be maintained by the court by the said order.
16. We are bound by the position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Skipper Construction’s case(supra) that the contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and / or keep the fruits of his contempt. In the said case, the plea that the Court was not justified in giving certain directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt was rejected. In Skipper’s Constuction’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court also affirmed the judgment of the Madras High Court in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah AIR 1975 Mad 270, wherein it was held that where an act is done in violation of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of wrong doing. The Court is bound to exercise its inherent power to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Skipper’s Construction (supra) also affirmed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Sujit Pal v. Probir Kumar Sun wherein it was held that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent power and that Article 129 of the Constitution, i.e., the power of the Court to punish for its contempt is a Constitutional Power and when exercised in tandem with the Article 142 of the Constitution all objections should give way and the Court must ensure full justice between the parties. The approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, of the view taken by the Madras High Court in Century Flour Mills’ case (supra), and the Calcutta High Court in Sujit Pal’s case (supra) clearly shows that the power of the Court to set right the violation of any stay or injunction was not confined to only Article 142 of the Constitution. Consequently, the plea of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the judgment in Skipper’s case (supra) was based entirely upon the powers derivable from the Article 142 Page 0708 cannot be sustained. Thus, keeping in view the above mentioned position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge could not have passed the interim order for injunction of the proceedings in the Court at Dubai cannot be accepted.
17. Further, according to Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon the case of Cotton Corporation (supra) to submit that a subordinate court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction. But the position of law laid down in the Cotton Corporation’s case (supra) does not help the appellants’ case as the Court of Dubai in respect of which injunction orders were passed by this Court cannot be said to be a Court which is superior or co-ordinate to this Court. Therefore, this Court was empowered to issue an inunction restraining the appellants from instituting the proceedings in Dubai.
18. An apparent ex-parte order was passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks in favor of the appellants which was challenged before the Single Judge of this Court. The learned Counsel for the appellants himself had brought to the notice of the Single Judge that the respondents herein (petitioners before the Single Judge) had obtained the order of status quo and there was also an order against the appellants and therefore no injury could be caused to the petitioners in that petition who are respondents-plaintiffs before us. Considering the facts and circumstances of that case the operation of the order dated 30th October 1996 was not stayed because the main matter CO-4/97 was pending and is still pending. At present there is no dispute as mentioned in the order dated 7th January 1997 that the appellants are registered owners and the respondents are owners because their rights emanate from the common family business. The order dated 7th January 1997 regarding status quo already stood passed and in fact it was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge by the learned Counsel for the appellants stating that no harm would be caused to the respondents-plaintiffs even if the interim stay application regarding the Registrar’s order was rejected. The order dated 7th January 1997 remained unchallenged and is still in force. Therefore the order passed by the Registrar or by the Single Bench or DB or in SLP can have no bearing or repercussions on the operation of the status quo order dated 7th January 1997 and the appellants cannot make pre-varicating statements and approbate and reprobate in the same breath.
19. In so far as Jhareswar Prasad Paul’s judgment (supra) relating to approaching the same Court which passed the interim order, rather than proceeding in contempt for clarification or further direction is concerned, Page 0709 the said issue is academic in nature as the same learned Single Judge is dealing with the plea in contempt as well as the applications in the suit and indeed the suit. However, we are not expressing any final opinion on this issue as the contempt proceedings are pending before the learned Single Judge and it is only an interim order in the pending contempt proceedings which has been challenged in this appeal. For the same reason, we are not expressing any opinion on several other contentions advanced while challenging the interim orders before us. Consequently, we have dealt with the legality of the interim orders only without going into the pleas on merits as any observations made by us may affect the adjudication before the learned Single Judge.
20. Thus, the appeal has no merits and is accordingly dismissed.