JUDGMENT
M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 8.11.75 (Annexure 6) issued by the respondent-Managing Director terminating the services of the petitioner and further for quashing the order dated 18.10.97 passed by the said Managing Director as being illegal and void and also for a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to notional benefits of promotion to different grades and is entitled to get all consequential benefits.
2. The fact of the case lies in a narrow compass.
The petitioner was initially appointed in the Indian Ordnance Factory, Khamaria under the Ministry of Defence and holding post of L.D.C. and was granted informal lien/protection by order dated 27.9.56. The petitioner was subsequently released from Ordnance Factory and joined to Bhilai Steel Project sometime in the year 1956. After the establishment of M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. the petitioner was transferred some time in 1961 as Head Assistant and was directed to report to the officer on Special duty (Planning) at Ranchi. The petitioner’s further case is that on the incorporation of Bokaro Steel Ltd., under Hindustan Steels Ltd., the services of the petitioner were transferred and absorbed in the Bokaro Steel Ltd. to the post of Section Officer by Office order dated 1.4.65. It appears that the petitioner was then promoted to the post of Assistant Store Officer in E-1 sometime in 1971. While the petitioner was holding the post of Assistant Store Officer an office order dated 20.8.74 was issued by the Managing: Director, Bokaro Steel Plant purported to suspend the petitioner on the ground of his involvement in a CBI Case being Ranchi R.C Case No. 7/73 and was placed under suspension. Subsequently, by order dated 8.11.75th respondents terminated the services of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to collect the salary and other dues. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a representation to the Chairman, Steel Authority of India against the order of suspension and order of termination of his services. The petitioner also made representations to different authorities up to the Ministry level. The petitioner also filed an application under Section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act before the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, which was rejected as not maintainable. However, the outcome of the representation filed by the petitioner was that the petitioner was informed that the case of the petitioner for re-appointment/reinstatement shall not be considered till the pendency of the CBI case against him before the Special Court, Patna. In the meantime, all persons involved in the CBI criminal case were convicted by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi. Against the judgment of conviction criminal appeals were filed in the High Court being Cr. Appeal No. 78/93(R) with analogous case and the appeal was allowed and the order of conviction was set aside. The petitioner accordingly moved this Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 1992/96(R) on the ground that several employees, who were involved in C.B.I. case and acquitted by the judgment of this Court, have been reinstated but the case of the petitioner was not considered and he has not been reinstated. That writ application was disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to represent his case before the authority concerned and if the case of the petitioner is found to be identical to another employee, namely, Arjun Deo Sharma, necessary order shall be passed by the respondents upon his representation. A copy of the order has been annexed as Annexure-13 to the writ application. The petitioner accordingly filed a representation but the same was rejected by the Managing Director in terms of the impugned order dated 18.10.97.
3. In the counter-affidavit, the case of the respondents is that the services of the petitioner was terminated under Clause 2(vii) of the letter of appointment whereas service of Arjun Deo Sharma and others were terminated on the ground of conviction in CBI case and, therefore, petitioner’s case is totally different and distinct with that of the case of Sri Sharma. It is further stated that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was challenged by him by filing an application under Section 26 of the Shops and Establishment Act and the same was rejected by then Labour Court. Lastly, it is stated that the petitioner has already superannuated in 1990 and, therefore, there is no question of reinstatement of the petitioner in service.
4. I have heard Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. M.M. Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing oh behalf of the respondents.
5. From perusal of the impugned order dated 18.10.97, whereby the representation of the petitioner was rejected, it transpires that the claim of the petitioner was rejected as his case was not similar to another employee Arjun Deo Sharma on the following grounds:
(i) The, services of the petitioner were terminated, vide order dated 8.11.75, in terms of Clause 2(vii) of his letter of appointment while Arjun Deo Sharma was dismissed from service after conviction in CBI case.
(ii) Ater judgment of conviction is set aside by the High Court Mr. A.D. Sharma filed C.W.J.C. No. 2338/94(R) challenging the order of dismissal on the ground of judgment of acquittal passed in above case and the High Court allowed the writ petition. Consequently A.D. Sharma was reinstated.
(iii) In case of petitioner the order of termination still holds good as even on challenging of the said termination order under Section 26 onf the Shops and Establishment Act, the Labour Court rejected the case of the petitioner.
6. So far as the first, two grounds are concerned, prima fade the decision taken by the respondents appears to be arbitrary and discriminatory. Admittedly, the petitioner and Sri A.D. Sharma both were suspended on the same day, vide order dated 20.8.74 on the ground of their involvement in CBI case being R.C. Case No. 7/73. Subsequently, the respondents issued a letter dated 8.11.75 terminating the services of the petitioner purported to be under Clause 2(vii) of the letter of appointment. Although, the letter of termination appears to be a termination simpliciter but in my opinion, the order of suspension on the ground of involvement in CBI case followed by the letter of termination, prima facie, is to be treated as ‘founded’. This was the reason the representation made by the petitioner was given full consideration by the respondents and by letter dated 15.12.78 (Annexure 9) and letter dated 4-3-81 (Annexure 10) issued by the respondents Bokaro Steel Plant and Steel Authority of India Ltd., the petitioner was informed that his case for reinstatement will be considered after disposal of CBI case pending before the Special Judge.
7. From perusal of the records, it appears that in 1993 by judgment dated 6.4.93 passed by the Special Judge, CBI in R.C. Case No. 7/73 the accused-persons namely, the petitioner, A.D. Sharma and others were convicted under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471, I.P.C. In the meantime, Mr. Sharma was dismissed from services on the ground of order of conviction. Sri Sharma challenged the order of conviction before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2338/94(R). The accused-persons also filed appeals against the order of conviction being Cr. Appeal Nos. 73/93(R) and 92/93(R). Those appeals were eventually allowed, in terms of the judgment dated 17.1.96 and the order of conviction was set aside. Consequently, the said writ petition filed by Sri Sharma was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to reinstate him in service and accordingly, Sri Sharma was reinstated.
8. As noticed above, both the petitioner and A.D. Sharma were suspended on the ground of involvement in Criminal case lodged by CBI. During the pendency of criminal case, the services of the petitioner were terminated while after judgment of conviction Sri Sharma was dismissed from service. Both of them filed representation against the order of termination of their services. The respondents-authorities were aware of the fact that the order of suspension followed by order of termination of services of the petitioner was because of his involvement in CBI case. This was the reason that by letters (Annexures 9 and 10), the respondents informed the petitioner that his case for reinstatement will be considered after conclusion of criminal case pending before the Special Judge. From perusal of the documents (Annexure-11), it reveals that, on the same day, i.e., on 8.11.75 the services of several other officers namely, Sri O.D. Srivastava, Sr. Purchase Officer, Sri V.R. Tata, Sr. Inspecting Inspector, Sri Y.K.R. Murti, Sr. Inspecting Inspector and two doctors namely, Dr. K.M. Roy and Dr. Choudhary were terminated for the same reason but subsequently, all of them were reinstated in service. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents. It is, therefore, manifest that, the service of the petitioner was terminated only because of criminal case pending against him. The order of termination of services of the petitioner is, therefore, not simplicitor as alleged by the respondents rather it was well founded. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service and the case of the petitioner cannot be said to be distinct and not similar to that of the case of Sri A.D. Sharma.
9. Moreover, from1 the sequences of facts of this case, the inference is irresistable thai the impugned order of termination of the services of the petitioner is a penal in nature having civil consequences. It is well settled by several decisions of the apex Court that though the order is innocuous on the face of it still then the Court if necessary, for the ends of fair play and justice can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order and if it is found that the impugned order is penal in nature even though ii is couched with the order of termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment, the order will be set aside. In this Connection, reference may be made to a decision of the apex Court in the case of Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. .
10. In the case of Babu Lal v. State of Haryana and Ors. (1991) 1 UJ (SC) 528, a similar question falls for consideration before the Apex Court and their Lordships held:
This judgment is under challenge in this appeal. The pivotal question that poses itself for consideration before this Court is firstly whether during the period of suspension in view of the criminal proceeding which ultimately ended with the acquittal, an order of termination can be made against the appellant by the respondent No. 2 terminating his ad. hoc services without reinstating him as he was acquitted from the charge under Section 470, I.P.C. and secondly whether the impugned order of termination from his service can be made straight away without reinstating him in the service after he earned, acquittal in the criminal case and thereafter without initiating any proceeding for termination of his services as the impugned order of termination was of penal nature having civil consequences. It has also to be considered in this connection that the respondent No. 2 has also not considered the case of the appellant for regularisation of his services even though he had completed two years of service as on 31.12.1979 fulfilling all the requisite terms and conditions mentioned in the said Notification. The order of suspension made by the respondent No. 2 is admittedly on the sole ground that criminal proceeding was pending against the appellant. The order of termination had been made illegally during the pendency of the order of suspension and also during the pendency of the criminal proceeding which ultimately ended with the acquittal of the appellant. It is the settled position in law that the appellant who was suspended on the ground of pendency of criminal proceeding against him, on being acquitted of the criminal charge is entitled to be reinstated in service.
11. The third ground upon which the petitioner’s representation for reinstatement was rejected is that his application under Section 26 of the Shops and Establishment Act was disallowed by the Labour Court. The impugned order rejecting the representation of the petitioner on this ground is also illegal and arbitrary. From perusal of the order passed by the Labour Court under Section 26 of the Act, it appears that it was respondents who raised a preliminary objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for entertaining the application under the aforesaid Act. According to the respondents, the petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the aforesaid Act. The Labour Court only formulated a preliminary issue with regard to jurisdiction and held that application is not maintainable as the respondent-Bokaro Steel Ltd. is a factory within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948. The Labour Court has not gone into the merit of the case of the petitioner and has not touched the issue with regard to the validity of the order of termination. It is, therefore, clear that the refusal by the respondents to reinstate the petitioner on the ground of order passed by the Labour Court rejecting the application under Section 26 of the Act is illegal and arbitrary.
12. Having Regard to the facts arid circumstances of the case and the discussion made above, I am of the definite opinion that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner and subsequent order rejecting the representation of the petitioner for reinstatement is absolutely illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. Since the petitioner has superannuated from service in 1990, he will be entitled to get all consequential benefits as if he was in service till the date of his superannuation.
13. In the result, this writ application is accordingly allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.