REPORTED
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO NO. 705/2002
KANSHI RAM VERMA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Navneet Goyal, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
% Date of Decision : December 7, 2010
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REVA KHETRAPAL
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed
to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
JUDGMENT
: REVA KHETRAPAL, J.
The short question which arises for decision in the present
appeal is whether the driver of a motor vehicle, having pleaded guilty
to the charge of rash and negligent driving under Section 279 of the
Indian Penal Code, can claim exoneration from the charge of rash and
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 1 of 12
negligent driving in the Motor Accident Claims Petition filed by the
injured-claimant.
2. Briefly delineated the case of the appellant is that on 7th July,
1994 at about 6.45 p.m. he was driving his two-wheeler scooter no.
DAB-7801 when a CRPF truck No. DL-1L-A-2720, driven rashly
and negligently by the respondent no.3, came from the opposite
direction and hit his scooter near Chaburja Marg, Malka Ganj,
resulting in his sustaining injuries as detailed in the claim petition.
The respondents no.1 and 2, who are the owners of the CRPF vehicle
in question, have given an entirely different version in their written
statement and their stand is that the respondent no.3 was driving the
CRPF vehicle in question, but the accident did not take place as
alleged by the petitioner. The respondents no.1 and 2 state that minor
injuries were received by the appellant due to his own fault and for no
fault of the respondent no.3, and for this reason the appellant did not
lodge any FIR, but subsequently after four months of the incident,
manipulated to lodge a false First Information Report.
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 2 of 12
3. The appellant appeared in the witness box as his own witness
as PW6 and examined PW2, PW3 and PW4 to prove the medical
records of his treatment as well as PW5 to get the FIR, Ex.PW5/1
proved on record. He also examined PW1 to prove his leave account
as Ex.PW1/1. The respondent no.3 appeared in the witness box as
RW1 but no other witness was examined from the side of the
respondents.
4. The learned Tribunal while dealing with the aspect of rash and
negligent driving examined the evidence on record and held that the
appellant had failed to prove that he had suffered injuries due to the
rash and negligent driving of the respondent no.3. The relevant part
of the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal in this regard are
reproduced hereunder:
“8. ISSUE NO. I & III.
Both these issues are inter-related and they are being
taken up together. Petitioner in his evidence has
stated that he was driving his two wheeler scooter and
his colleague Sh. Lallan was sitting on the pillion seat
of the scooter and when they reached the top of
Kamla Nehru Ridge, CRPF vehicle driven by
respondent No.3 came from opposite side and had hit
the scooter of the petitioner resulting in injuries to the
petitioner. Counter version has been given byFAO NO. 705/2002 Page 3 of 12
respondent No.3 in his evidence. It is the categoric
stand of the respondent No.3 that there was slight
drizzling and he was slowly driving the CRPF vehicle
in question and he took a turn towards left side at a
very slow speed near circle curve of Kamla Nehru
Ridge and he had felt that something had hit the
CRPF vehicle from left rear side and he immediately
stopped his vehicle and saw that the petitioner along
with pillion rider had fallen on the road after hitting
the left rear wheel of CRPF vehicle in question and
the petitioner had apologized for his mistake and he
took the petitioner to Hindu Rao Hospital and there
was no damage to the scooter of the petitioner and no
FIR was lodged by anyone and the petitioner was not
bleeding at that time.
9. Petitioner had lodged an FIR after about four
months of the accident in question and the reason
given by him in his evidence is that he was not in a
position to lodge the FIR prior to 25.10.94. However,
the petitioner has admitted in his evidence that he was
not admitted in hospital after the accident in question.
To prove the negligence of respondent No.3,
petitioner strongly relies upon certified copy of order
dated 17.03.2001 of the criminal court vide which
respondent No.3 was held guilty and convicted under
Section 279 IPC and was admonished. It is evident
from the aforesaid order Exbt. RW-1/P2 that the
respondent No.3 was acquitted under Section 338 of
IPC on compounding of the offence with the injured.
The aforesaid order of the criminal court is based
upon the statements Exbt. RW-1/P1 made by the
petitioner as well as respondent No.3. Petitioner had
stated before the criminal court that he had
compromised the matter with the respondent No.3
without prejudice to his claim before the Motor
Accident Tribunal. Petitioner had belatedly lodged an
FIR after four months of the accident in question
without any justification and from the order Exbt.
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 4 of 12
RW-1/P2 of the criminal court, it cannot be concluded
that the negligence was of the respondent No.3. The
aforesaid order of the criminal court was based on the
compromise arrived at between the petitioner and
respondent No.3. In any case, order of the criminal
court, convicting the driver cannot be made the basis
of holding that the driver of CRPF vehicle was
negligent. Independent evidence has to be led in the
present proceedings. To find out whether the version
given by the petitioner or respondent No.3 regarding
the manner of taking place of this accident is correct,
it is necessary to have a look at the certified copy of
the site plan of the place of accident on record. A
bare perusal of the site plan Exbt. PW-6/50 on record
reveals that at point A, the scooter of the petitioner
was said to have been hit by the CRPF vehicle and at
point B, CRPF vehicle was found to be standing.
According to the petitioner, CRPF vehicle was
coming from opposite direction and if it was so and
had hit the scooter of the petitioner, then, in all
probability, the CRPF vehicle should have been found
stand (sic. standing) ahead of two wheeler scooter of
the petitioner towards East side. The above-referred
site plan on record does not support the version of the
petitioner regarding the manner of taking place of the
accident in question. Rather, it lends credence to the
version given by respondent No.3 regarding the
manner of taking place of this accident. Moreover,
mechanical inspection report exbt. PW-6/54 of the
scooter of the petitioner does not indicate any
extensive damage to the scooter of the petitioner.
Had there been on head collusion of the CRPF vehicle
and the scooter of the petitioner, there would have
been extensive damage to the scooter of the petitioner.
It is not so.
10. In view of what is observed above, I hold that
the petitioner has failed to prove that he had suffered
injuries due to rash and negligent driving byFAO NO. 705/2002 Page 5 of 12
respondent No.3. This issue is accordingly decided
against the petitioner.”
5. In view of the aforesaid findings, the learned Tribunal
proceeded to dismiss the claim petition filed by the appellant herein.
Aggrieved therefrom the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
6. In the course of arguments, Mr. Navneet Goyal, the learned
counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that in the claim
petition as well as in the course of his deposition as PW6, the
appellant had given a vivid account of the accident by stating that
when he reached at the top of Kamla Nehru Ridge on his scooter and
was on his left side near the crossing, the CRPF vehicle came from
the University side and hit his scooter with its front, due to which he
received injuries on his right leg with multiple fractures both bones
and a cut of 5″ to 6″, where 15-16 stitches were applied on the left
arm, besides other injuries; and he was taken to Hindu Rao Hospital
in the same vehicle. The respondent no.3, who was responsible for
the accident by his rash and negligent driving, after leaving him at the
hospital ran away without even informing the constable on duty.
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 6 of 12
7. Mr. Navneet Goyal, the learned counsel for the appellant, also
contended that though after the conclusion of the evidence of the
appellant, the respondent no.3 was produced in the witness box to
rebut the version of the appellant, the testimony of the respondent
no.3 does not inspire confidence. The version given by him is
contrary to the site plan which shows that the appellant was hit by the
front of the CRPF Vehicle. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Goyal
on the following decisions of the different High Courts to contend
that the courts have consistently held that where the driver of the
offending vehicle has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by the
criminal court, it is not necessary for the claimants to prove by
adducing further evidence that the accident was caused by the rash
and negligent driving of the offending vehicle:
(i) Sukhinder Anand vs. Khaza Vazir Ali and Ors., 1994 ACJ
786;
(ii) L.N. Prakash vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.,
1996 ACJ 217;
(iii) Vinobabai and others vs. K.S.R.T.C. and another, 1979 ACJ
282;
(iv) Labh Kaur and Ors. vs. Raj Kumar and Ors., 1996 ACJ 744;
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 7 of 12
(v) Basavaiah vs. N.S. Ashok Kumar and Another, 1985 ACJ
789; and
(vi) Govind Singh vs. A.S. Kailasam, 1975 ACJ 215.
8. In Sukhinder Anand’s case (supra), the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, after taking into consideration the plea of guilt entered by
the driver and his consequent conviction by the Magistrate held that:
“…no further evidence was necessary to prove that
the accident was due to the rash and negligent
driving of RW-1. It follows that the Claims
Tribunal was not correct in holding that the
petitioner failed to prove negligence of the driver of
the lorry.”
9. In the case of L.N. Prakash (supra) also, the plea of guilt had
been entered by the motorcyclist in the criminal case and on the
aforesaid basis the Karnataka High Court held that:
“….Where such plea of guilt is made, it is for the
respondent to place satisfactory and convincing
material to dislodge the presumption arising out of
plea of guilt made before the criminal court. In
my opinion, this legal burden has not been
satisfactorily discharged. He cannot be allowed at
this stage to plead innocence or ignorance….”
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 8 of 12
10. In the case of Vinobabai and others (supra), a Division Bench
of the same High Court in a case where the driver had pleaded guilty
and was convicted on his aforesaid plea, held that:
“Thus, the law is well settled that when the driver is
convicted in a regular trial before the criminal
court, the fact that he is convicted becomes
admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it
becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was
culpably negligent in causing the accident. The
converse is not true; because the driver is acquitted
in a criminal case arising out of the accident, it is
not established even prima facie that the driver is
not negligent, as a higher degree of culpability is
required to bring home an offence.”
11. In the case of Labh Kaur (supra), it was reiterated by the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, relying upon its earlier judgment in
Gulshan Kumar vs. Balwinder Singh, 1986 ACJ 809 (P&H) that it
is a settled principle of law that while the judgment of the criminal
court pertaining to an accident is not relevant for adjudication of a
claim for compensation beyond the fact that the driver of the
offending vehicle was tried and convicted, any admission of guilt
made by him in the course of such trial, in the absence of any
explanation or other material on record leads to the only interpretation
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 9 of 12
that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of
the driver.
12. In Basavaiah’s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Karnataka
High Court held that the driver of the car having pleaded guilty to the
charge and on his own plea of guilt, he having been convicted and
sentenced, it could safely be said that the offending car was being
driven in a rash and negligent manner by him, resulting in the
accident, causing injuries to the claimant.
13. A similar view was expressed by the High Court of Madras in
the case of Govind Singh’s case (supra) where the Court held: “The
admission of the driver made before a criminal court that the accident
was committed by his rash and negligent driving shifts the legal
burden on the driver to show that such an admission, if at all, was
made by extraneous motive.”
14. In the instant case, the Tribunal has completely failed to
appreciate and to consider this aspect of the matter. The Tribunal
ought to have held that in his testimony RW1 had rendered no
explanation, leave alone any plausible explanation for entering the
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 10 of 12
plea of guilt before the criminal court. The Tribunal instead relied
upon the site plan enclosed with the chargesheet which was not
prepared at the time of the accident, but much later on, presumably at
the time when the First Information Report was registered. Indeed,
the site plan could not have been prepared at the time of the accident
since it is the respondent’s own case that the driver of the CRPF
vehicle had taken the appellant to Hindu Rao Hospital immediately
after the accident.
15. Then again, I find that a stand has been taken by the
respondents no.1 and 2 in their written statement that the driver of the
scooter had merely brushed against the rear wheel of the CRPF
vehicle and sustained minor injuries. The record shows otherwise.
The appellant, it is borne out from the record, sustained multiple
fractures of the right leg, both bones and remained in a cast from toe
to hip for about 10 weeks and thereafter from toe to below knee for
another 1 ½ months. Apart from this he suffered a deep cut on his left
arm on which 15-16 stitches were administered apart from other
injuries. His leave record and his medical records both been
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 11 of 12
testimony to the fact that the injuries were far from minor and could
not have been so categorized.
15. In view of the above aforesaid, the findings of the Tribunal are
unsustainable. The driver of the CRPF vehicle is accordingly held
guilty of rash and negligent driving. The matter is remanded back to
the Tribunal to assess the quantum of damages payable to the
appellant by the respondents no.1 and 2. Since the accident occurred
in the year 1994, it will be in the interest of justice if Tribunal takes
up the matter on priority basis and disposes of the same not later than
four weeks from the date of the receipt of this order.
16. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid directions. Records
be sent back to the concerned court.
REVA KHETRAPAL
(JUDGE)
December 7, 2010
sk
FAO NO. 705/2002 Page 12 of 12