ORDER
B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the show-cause notice dated 21st May 1983, issued by the Superintendent, Central Excise, Range II, Varanasi to the petitioners. Under this notice the petitioner is called upon to show cause as to why he should not be required to pay an amount of Rs. 20,88,111.02 towards the duty short-paid. The period for which this duty is demanded is December 1978 to 31st March 1983. The reasons, for which the show-cause notice is given, are mentioned 1 in annexure-A to the show cause notice. Annexure-A recites:
During the period from Dec. 1978 to March 1983 they knowingly and deliberately suppressed the material facts for the correct classification of their and product “Electrical Resistance wires” under tariff item No. 33(B)(ii) and continued to pay duty on their product wrongly under tariff item No. 26-AA at the much lower rate than the rate; actually they required to pay duty under tariff item No. 33(B)(ii); consequently they have made short payment of duty to the tune of Rs. 20,88,111.02 as per details given in annexure ‘B’ (enclosed) which they are required to pay.
The above duty is recoverable from them under Section 11-A of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Though this writ petition prays for quashing the said notice, it is evident that the writ petition is in the nature of a writ of prohibition. Such a writ petition lies only where total want of jurisdiction is made out.
3. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged the following two contentions:
(1) That the notice is ex facie bad inasmuch as ‘Electrical Resistance Wires’ can by no stretch of imagination fall within item 33(B)(ii). He says they squarely fall within item 26-AA(1)(a). In support of this argument the learned Counsel relies upon the Explanation to item 33-B. Learned Counsel also relies upon the Schedule to 1985 Act in particular item 72.13 in Chapter 72.
(2) That the notice is vague in as much it does not give the particulars and facts in support of the allegation of suppression of material facts levelled against the petitioner. The notice is liable to be quashed on this ground, says the counsel.
4. So far as the first contention is concerned we do not wish to express any opinion in this writ petition. We have seen both the entries as also the entry in the Schedule to the 1985 Act. The question is an arguable one. Suffice it to say that we cannot say that on the material before us the goods in question fall under entry 26-AA(1)(a). This is a question which the petitioner can always raise in his explanation to the show cause notice. Mr. Sudhir Chandra further says that there has been no suppression of the material facts and that the correspondence that passed between the parties clearly establishes that the authorities knew all along all the material facts. This again is a question pertaining to merits and it would not be proper for us to express any opinion on this factual aspect.
5. So far as the second contention is concerned, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the notice is vague, we cannot issue a writ of prohibition restraining further proceedings on that ground. All that it-could mean is that the petitioner would be entitled to ask for supporting particulars or facts before he can be called upon to furnish his explanation. If the petitioner thinks that the notice is vague in any particular respect, it is always open to him to ask for particulars and if the authority is satisfied in that behalf, he shall furnish the relevant supporting facts or particulars as the case may be.
6. For the above reasons we decline to go into the merits of this case. It is open to the petitioner to file an explanation to the show cause notice, if not already filed, within six weeks from today. The Authority shall consider the same and pass orders in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, inasmuch as the show cause notice is of the year 1983.
7. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with above observations. No cost.
8. Certified copy of this order may be given to learned Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within five days.