PETITIONER: KAPUR CHAND JAIN Vs. RESPONDENT: B. S. GREWAL & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/1964 BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1965 AIR 1491 1965 SCR (2) 36 ACT: The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953), ss. 9(1) (ii) and 14A (1) and (ii) -Non-payment of rent-Whether without sufficient cause Determination--If conduct prior to Act can be considered. HEADNOTE: The appellant and respondent were the tenant and land-lord of certain agricultural lands to which the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 applied. The appellant tried to avoid payment of rent for each year of the lease period (1951-1955), under one pretext or the other, and for every year recoveries of rent were only made through the court. After the period of lease expired, the appellant continued to hold over without paying rent. So the respondent filed two applications to the appropriate authorities, one for arrears of rent under s. 14A(ii) and the other for eviction under s. 14A(1), on the ground, inter alia, specified in s' 9(1) (ii) that the appellant had failed to pay the rent regularly, without sufficient cause. On the application for rent, the appellant was asked to pay the arrears which he did within the time fixed. The application for eviction was dismissed, but on appeal by the respondent, the appellant was ordered to be evicted. The appellant's further appeal application for revision and petition to the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution were all dismissed. In the appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that, (i) s. 9(1) (ii) applies only prospectively and therefore the conduct of the tenant, prior to the enactment of s. 14A in 1955, could not be taken into account for determining that there was not sufficient cause for non-payment, and (ii) as the appellant had paid the arrears within the time fixed he could not be ,evicted. HELD : Though the appellant could not be evicted under s. 14A(ii) his case was covered by s. 14A(1) and his eviction could be ordered because, the irregularity in payment was patent and there was no sufficient cause. [42 A] The necessary condition for the application of s. 9 (1) (ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act, cannot be overlooked. A statute is not applied retrospectively merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn- from a moment prior to its passing. [41 A-C] The scheme of the Act shows that cls. (1) and (ii) of s. 14A are entirely different and that there is no inconsistency between them. Clause (ii) deals with eviction as punishment for non-compliance with an order to deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment, whereas cl. (1) deals with eviction for any of ',he reasons given in s. 9(1), one of which is non-payment of rent regularly without sufficient cause, under s. 9(1) (ii) [41 D-E] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 833 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the order, dated March 9, 1961
of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 291 of 1961.
37
B. R. L. Iyengar and T. S. Venkataraman, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent
No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. The appellant obtained on lease from the
4th respondent (Raja Charanjit Singh) 208 canals of
agricultural land for five years commencing from Rabi 1951
to Kharif 1955 on an annual rent of Rs. 7,500. The lease
deed was registered and was executed on November 20, 1950.
The appellant paid a sum of Rs. 7,500 as advance rent for
one year. There was a tube well on the land and one of the
terms of the lease was that the Raja would put the tube well
into working order and the lease was to commence on the day
this was done. The tube well was repaired on July 11, 1951
and the lease is said to have commenced on that day.
According to the appellant the tube well did not deliver the
right quantity of water and that led to certain disputes.
The appellant did not pay rent for the subsequent years. On
August 15, 1952 the Raja filed a suit for recovery of Rs.
7,500 as rent for Rabi and Kharif, 1951. He claimed that
Rs. 7,500 paid to him was to be retained as deposit to be
adjusted towards the final payment. The appellant resisted
this demand mainly on the ground that the tube well was not
functioning as required by the lease deed. This suit was
decreed on March 23, 1957 and an amount of Rs. 859-4-0 was
found due. This was because on April 15, 1953 the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 came into force and under
s. 12 of that Act the maximum rent payable by a tenant for
any land held by him was not to exceed 1/3rd of the crop of
such land or of the value of the crop determined in the
manner to be prescribed by Rules. For this period an amount
of Rs. 4,313 was held to be the value of the produce and
after making deduction for sundry payments to the Raja the
decree was for the amount stated. The appellant paid that
amount forthwith. The appellant did not pay the rent for
the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 and on January 5, 1955 the
Raja brought another suit for the recovery of Rs. 22,500 as
arrears of rent for these three years and on October 8, 1956
filed a revised application under s. 14-A(ii) added from
1955 to the Act. During the pendency of this suit the
appellant was asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 7,000 which he
did on January 22, 1957. Later, the amount payable under s.
12 of the Act was found to be Rs. 13,378-2-0 and on June 21,
1957 the appellant deposited the balance. The appellant did
not pay
38
rent for the year 1955 and though his lease expired with
Kharif, 1955 he continued holding over and did not pay rent
for Rabi 1956. The Raja made an application on October 10,
1956 under s. 14-A(1) for the eviction of the appellant on
the ground inter alia that he had failed to pay rent
regularly without sufficient cause. Under s. 14-A(1) the
application for eviction lay before an Assistant Collector,
First Grade, while under s. 14-A(ii) the application for
recovery of arrears of rent (to which category belonged the
revised application dated October 8, 1956, which we have
mentioned before) lay before an Assistant Collector Second
Grade. As a result the question of the eviction of the
tenant on the ground that he was irregular in payment of
rent was tried in one court and the recovery proceedings
were tried in another court. The proceedings under s. 14-
A(1) terminated in favour of the appellant on December 24,
1958, the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Jullundur
holding that the tenant had sufficient cause not to pay rent
fixed by the lease deed and the Raja could not claim eject-
ment on that ground. The Raja appealed. The Collector,
Jullundur District, on May 20, 1959, reversed the order and
directed that the appellant be evicted. An appeal by the
appellant before the Commissioner, Jullundur Division failed
as also an application for revision before the Financial
Commissioner, Punjab. The appellant then moved the High
Court of Punjab at Chandigarh under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. His petition was summarily dismissed by a
Division Bench on March 9, 1961. The appellant has filed
this appeal by special leave.
Section 14-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act,
1953 reads as follows :-
“14-A. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law for the
time being in force, and subject to the
provisions of section 9-A,-
(i)a land-owner desiring to eject a tenant
under this Act shall apply in writing to the
Assistant Collector, First Grade, having
jurisdiction, who shall thereafter proceed as
provided for in sub-section (2) of section 10
of this Act, and the provisions of sub-section
(3) of the said section shall also apply in
relation to such application, provided that
the tenants’ rights to compensation, and
acquisition of occupancy rights, if any, under
the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (X-VI of 1887),
shall not be affected;
(ii)a landowner desiring to recover arrears
of rent from a tenant shall apply in writing
to the Assistant Col-
39
lector, Second Grade, having jurisdiction, who
shall thereupon send a notice, in the form
prescribed, to the tenant either to deposit
the rent or value thereof, if payable in kind,
or give proof of having paid it or of the fact
that he is not liable to pay the whole or part
of the rent, or of the fact of the landlord’s
refusal to receive the same or to give a
receipt, within the period specified in the
notice. Where, after summary determination,
as provided for in sub-section (2) of section
10 of this Act, the Assistant Collector finds
that the tenant has not paid or deposited the
rent, he shall eject the tenant summarily and
put the land-owner in possession of the land
concerned;
(iii)(a) if a land-lord refuses to accept
rent from his tenant or demands rent in excess
of what he is entitled to under this Act, or
refuses to give a receipt, the tenant may in
writing inform the Assistant Collector, Second
Grade, having jurisdiction of the fact;
(b)on receiving such application the
Assistant Collector shall by a written notice
require the landlord to accept the rent
payable in accordance with this Act, or to
give a receipt, as the case may be, or both,
within 60 days of the receipt of the notice.”
In this connection we may quote the relevant
provisions of s. 9
“9(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, no
land-owner shall be competent to eject a
tenant except when such tenant-
(i) is a tenant on the area reserved under
this Act or is a tenant of a small land-owner;
or
(ii)fails to pay rent regularly without
sufficient cause; or
(iii)is in arrears of rent at the
commencement of this Act; or
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(Vii)
Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (iii),
a tenant shall be deemed to be in arrears of
rent at the
40
commencement of this Act, only if the payment
of arrears is not made by the tenant within a
period of two months from the date of notice
of the execution of decree or order, directing
him to pay such arrears of rent.”
Section 10 provides the procedure which has to be followed
when the landlord makes an application. That section,
however, need not be quoted because no question about the
right procedure arises here.
It will be noticed that the first clause of s. 14-A is
general. It enables a land-owner to apply for the eviction
of his tenant on any of the grounds stated in the Act in s.
9. The second clause is designed primarily to enable the
land-owner to recover arrears of rent from a tenant but the
tenant may be ordered to be evicted if after the
determination of the rent be does not pay it within the time
fixed by the Collector. Clause (iii) enables a tenant to
inform the Collector of the landlord’s refusal to accept
rent from him or of a demand of rent in excess of what it
should be under the Act.
-The Rules for the determination of the value of the produce
under s. 12 did not come into existence till May 19, 1953.
The appellant has taken advantage of this circumstance to
plead before us that his failure to pay the rent was solely
due to his inability to determine the exact rent in the
manner contemplated in s. 12 and the Rules. This belies his
statement that he took the amount to the landlord but the
landlord refused to receive it. His statement was rightly
not believed because if the landlord had refused to receive
payment, the appellant would have informed the Assistant
Collector under s. 14-A(iii) and asked for protection. He
did nothing of the kind. It is quite clear that he took
advantage of the new Act to avoid payment of rent. For the
first year he did so on the ground that the tube well was
not functioning according to the agreement. For the
subsequent years he avoided payment on the ground that he
was only required to pay 1/3rd of the produce or its value.
For every year a suit had to be filed and recoveries were
only made through the court. This establishes the very kind
of conduct which is contemplated by S. 9 (1 ) (ii) and which
furnishes a ground for eviction of the tenant under s. 14-
A(1).
Mr. Iyengar argues that s. 9(1)(ii) applies prospectively
and the conduct of the tenant prior to the enactment of S.
14-A cannot
41
be taken into account. In our opinion, the conduct of the
tenant prior to the coming into force of the new section can
be taken into account. No doubt a statute must be applied
prospectively. But a statute is not applied retrospectively
because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn
from a moment of time prior to its passing. The clause in
question makes a particular conduct the -round for an
application for eviction. The necessary condition for the
application of s. 9 (1) (ii) may commence even before the
Act came into force and past conduct which is as relevant
for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the
Act, cannot be overlooked. The Tribunals were therefore
right in considering conduct of the appellant prior to the
coming into force of s. 14-A while determining whether the
appellant was irregular in paying the rent.
Mr. Iyengar next contends that as under cl. (ii) of s. 14-A
the appellant was asked to pay the arrears of rent and he
paid them within the time fixed, no eviction can be ordered.
Clause (ii) deals with eviction as punishment for non-
compliance with the orders of the court. Clause (1) deals
with evictions for any of the reasons given in s. 9 (1). One
such reason is that the tenant has failed to pay rent
regularly without sufficient cause. Eviction under the
second clause is for failure to carry out the orders to
deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment
and eviction under the first clause is a penalty for not
paying the rent regularly without sufficient cause. The
clauses are on different footing and as the scheme of the
Act itself shows different Tribunals determine the two
issues. The appellant tried to have the various proceedings
consolidated in the same court, but curiously enough he
asked that the proceedings for the recovery of arrears of
rent should be stayed. His motive is quite apparent. He
wanted to defend himself against liability arising tinder s.
0 (Ion the ground that he could not pay the rent till 1
1/3rd of the or its value was determined under the Rules. We
above that his statement was that he wanted to pay the extra
amount but the landlord did not receive it. It is quite
obviously that he avoided Payment over the years under one
pretext or the other and the Tribunal-, were right in
holding that be had failed to make out sufficient cause for
non-payment. Indeed such a finding giving concurrently by
the High Court and the three Tribunals below would be
sufficient for the disposal of the case. We have only
allowed the argument to be used because Mr. Iyengar claimed
that conditions on which persons can be evicted under the
two clauses of s. 14-A were inconsistent. On examination it
is apparent that the reasons for eviction under the two
clauses are
3Sup.165 4
42
entirely different. The appellant could not be evicted
under the second clause of S. 14-A but it is obvious that
his case is covered by the first clause. The irregularity
in payment is patent and there was no sufficient cause.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal
dismissed.
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