JUDGMENT
V.S. Deshpande, J.
1 This writ application is directed against the decision of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court, hereinafter referred to as ”the Appellate Court” dated 10-1-1980. Petitioners are the shareholders of respondent No. 10, Pohegaon Khurd Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Society Ltd., Pohegaon. Managing Committee Elections of this Society were scheduled to be held in accordance with the programme published under the authority of the Managing Committee dated 21-9-1978. The last date for nomination was 5-10-1978 and last date of withdrawal for nomination was 9-10-1978. Date of Polling, counting of votes and declaring results was fixed for 17-10-1978, and the date of scrutiny of nomination was fixed for 6-10-1978.
2. All the 9 petitioners before us had filed their nomination papers for contesting the 9 seats on the Managing Committee. Respondents 1 to 9 had also filed their nomination papers. Nomination papers of the petitioners were rejected by the Returning Officer. Other candidates that the 9 respondents whose nomination papers were accepted, withdrew from the Election before the fixed date for withdrawal. The Returning Officer, therefore, declared on 10-10-1978 respondents Nos. 1 to 9 to have won the election unopposed to the Managing Committee for three year 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81,
3. The petitioners challenged the validity of these elections by an Election Petition before the Co-operative Court on or before 4-12-1978. The Co-operative Court upheld contentions of the petitioners and held that there nominations papers were wrongly rejected. The respondents contested this election petition also on the ground that it was filed after the expiry of one month from the date of declaration of the results on 17-10-1978. Dispute as to the validity of election is required to be raised within one month of the declaration of the election results under section 92(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, hereinafter referred to as ”the Act”. It is a common ground that the agenda of the General Body Meeting dated 5-11-1978 included an item as to the announcement of the names of the Managing Committee Members elected and accordingly the members of the Managing Committee so elected were notified in the said General Body Meeting. Petitioners claimed to have filed the dispute on 4-12-1978 within one month of such declaration at the General Body Meeting on 5-11-1978. According to the petitioners one month’s period is to be counted from 5-11-1978 and not from the declaration of such results by the Returning Officer on 17-10-1978. This contention of the petitioners was accepted by the trial Court. Out of the 9 petitioners, trial Court accepted the case only of the petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7. The trial Court did not find any defect in the rejection of nomination papers of petitioners Nos. 3, 4, 8 and 9.
4. Respondents Nos. 1 to 9 challenged the validity of this order of the Co-operative Court in the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concurred with the trial Court’s finding that the petitioner’s nomination papers were rejected on flimsy grounds. The Appellate Court, however, found that the elections were declared by the Returning Officer on 17-10-1978 in terms of the election rules framed under bye-law 26(10) r/w. Rule 60 of the Rules under the Act and election petition should have been filed within one month from that date. The election petition filed on 4-2-1978 was, therefore time barred. It appears that arguments before the Appellate Court were concluded on 4-1-1980 the petitioners presumably get some hint of the view of the Appellate Court at the time when the arguments were concluded on 4-1-1980, petitioners, therefore made an application for condoning delay in making the election petition. This applications was presented to the Appellate Court on 8-1-1980 and the same was rejected by the Appellate Court on 10-1-1980 holding that the same was belated and was mala fide having been made after knowing the views of the Appellate Court on the question of limitation. The appeal of the respondents was allowed and election petition of the petitioners was rejected on the ground that it was time barred. It is the validity of these orders dated 10-1-1980 and 11-1-1980 that is, challenged in this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. That the Nomination papers of the present petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were rejected on flimsy grounds is the concurrent view of both the courts below. Mr. Govilkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents could nor show any error apparent on the face of record to justify any interference in the said concurrent finding of fact. Only question that survive for consideration in the present application are : (1) whether one month’s period of election petition is to be counted from the date of declaration made by the Returning Officer on 17-10-1978 or from the date of notifying the names of the members of the Managing Committee at the General Body Meeting on 5-11-1978.
6. Rule 60 does not deal with any election as such. It firstly provides for the election of the President or Vice-President of the Society or in the absence of provision therefore, election of the President for the said meeting. It secondly indicates how generally all resolutions should be passed at the General Body Meeting and require (1) voting by ballot papers thereon when the share capital of any such society to take steps to distribute ballot papers and counting of votes and (3) to announce the result of such voting at the meeting. Bye-law 26(1) requires the election rules to conform with this process of voting by ballot papers and declaration of the result by the President and that too at the meeting. Bye-law 26 deals with what ordinarily should be the agenda for the General Body Meeting. It contains in all 14 sub-clauses, each dealing with different subject. Election of the Managing Committee for the next year by secret ballot paper is one such necessary agenda under bye-law 26(2). Reference to Rule 58 is intended to ensure elimination of disqualified persons, from the contest. Under the combined effect of Rule 60, bye-law 26(2) Managing Committee Elections are required to be held at the General Body Meeting and not otherwise.
7. Bye-law 26(10) also indicated one more subject of the General Body Meeting. At some General Body Meeting, election rules are framed and passed under this bye-law. Such rules under Bye-law 26(10) have to conform with Rule 60 under which President of the General Body Meeting has to declare the result of such voting by ballot paper at the meeting. If any election rules provide to the contrary the same shall have to be ignored as being ultra vires of the rule making power under Bye-law 26(10) r/w. Rule 60 and the election would be effective being inconsistent with bye-law 26(2).
8. The election rules are placed on the record as Exhibit C. Election of the new Managing Committee thereunder is contemplated to be held under the supervision of the existing managing Committee, power to scrutinise the nomination papers being vested in it under Rule 8. Rule 5 authorises the ”Sabhapati” to except the nomination paper and act virtually as Returning Officer under Rule 12 referred to loosely as Presiding Officer. Dr. Naik and Mr. Govilkar informed us at the Bar, that bye-laws of this Society do not provide for election of any President or Vice-President at the General Body Meeting-Bye-Law 44 however, authorises the Managing Committee at its first meeting to elect ”Sabhabati” and ”Up-Sabhapati”. Reference to Sabhapati or Presiding Officer in the election rules is obviously intended for him. He is authorised to no doubt to count the voted cast through ballot papers and declare its result. It however, cannot amount to be the effective declaration of the result of election within the meaning of section 92 of the Co-operative Societies Act firstly because it is not made at the General Body Meeting as required under bye-law 26(2) and 26(2) and 26(10) r.w. Rule 60 no meeting as such being contemplated in this process of election under election rules, and secondly because Sabhapati so elected under bye-laws 44 is authorised to act as the Presiding Officer at the election under Rule 12, is not the President of the General Body Meeting within is meaning under Rule 60(2), and thirdly because such Managing Committee cannot held any meeting or functions otherwise as the bye-law or contemplates its first meeting only after the meeting of the General Body. This clearly show how effective declaration of election can be said to have been made at the General Body Meeting on 5-11-1978.
9. In fact in this case the Returning Officer was not required to wait till the proposed date of declaration of counting on 17-10-1978. With only 9 candidates left in the filed after the withdrawal or respondents by 9-10-1978, the Officer could make declaration on 10-10-1978 itself even before the scheduled date of 16-10-1978, which does not conform with bye-law 26(2) or Rule 60.
10. It is true that, Rule 60 contemplates distribution of ballot papers and counting and announcement of result on one and the same day impliedly while election rules contemplates the same on different dates. This does not necessarily create any inconsistency. The process of election consists of several stages. All these stages cannot be completed on one and the same day when membership consist of large numbers. There is nothing wrong if the main process is reserved for the President at the meeting and other process is got completed earlier, subject to its control through other authorised agencies in accordance with the Rules in this behalf.
11. Mr. Govilkar tries to make distinction between a General Body and Ordinary General Body Meeting, and contends that process of election contemplated under bye-law 26(2) is not required to be held at the meeting and it is enough compliance therewith if all the members entitled to participate in this process of election, vote even without any such meeting. This contention is untenable. Bare reading of the Bye-law 26 shows that Clause (2) represents one of the agenda of the ordinarily general body meeting as 13 other clauses do about other subject of such agenda. It is difficult to get over the fact that election by secret ballot papers under bye-law (2) has to be held at the meeting. At last final process of election namely the declaration shall have to be made at the meeting through other ministerial parts of the process are permitted to be finished at earlier stages in terms of the rules framed by the General Body itself under bye-law 26(10).
12. Mr. Govilkar then drew our attention to the working of amended and pre-amended bye-law 38 in support of the same contention. It is true that while pre-amended bye-law 38 expressly contemplated the election of the Managing Committee at the General Body meeting, amended bye-law 38, omits any reference to the General Body Meeting from such elections. This does give an impression as if the Managing Committee Election process is divorced from the process of the General Body meeting. However, bye-law 26(2) remains unamended as also bye-law 26(10) which requires the contemplated election rules to comply with Rule 60. As long as both the bye-laws remain unamended mare omission to refer to General Body Meeting in bye-law 32 cannot have the effect suggested by Mr. Govilkar.
13. We may, however, draw the attention of the registrar towards apparent incompatabilities in the Rule 60, bye-laws No. 26(2), 26(10) and actual election rules. These infirmities may give rise to unnecessary litigation though the same may have no bearing on the point raised before us.
14. Even assuming that we are wrong in this view, we are still unable to see any justice in, or any good relevant ground for, refusing to condone the delay when an application to that effect was made before the decision of the appeal. It is true that the application was made after the arguments before the Appellate Court were over. Ordinarily an application for condoning delay should have accompanied the election petition itself. The question, however, as to at which stage, declaration of election result can be said to have been made, and for precisely from which date one month’s period of limitation for section 92 of Co-operative Societies Act is to be computed, is not free from ambiguity in this case. That the Appellate Court differed from the trial Court is itself illustrative of this ambiguity. On an earlier occasion, the Tribunal had taken a different view from the one taken now by the Appellate Court. This obviously appears to have misled the petitioners. This was unanswerable explanation for the delay. The petitioner’s view obviously was based on the earlier judgment of the Tribunal and it was upheld by the trial Court. They had no reason to doubt its correctness till contrary indications were given at the hearing before the Appellate Court. It is difficult to see any lack of bona fides in making application for condoning the delay after coming to know of the different view at the hearing of appeal. The Appellate Court has completely missed the real point. It should have been the anxiety of the Co-operative Appellate Court as of the other Court, to prevent such genuine misunderstanding of the petitioners coming in the way of the justice when it was found that the nomination was rejected on flimsy grounds.
15. This, to our mind, appears to be a pre-aminently a fit case in which the Appellate Court should have condoned the delay. The question of condoning delay or nor, is entirely a matter of discretion with the courts called upon to consider the same. The Co-operative Court does not, however appear to have borne relevant consideration in mind while rejecting the application of the petitioners. The petitioners are entitled to succeed on this ground also.
16. This petition deserves to be allowed and we accordingly allow the petition, make the rule absolute and restore the order of the trial Court and set aside the order of the Appellate Court. The Society is directed to hold election, afresh. Petitioners will get their costs from the respondents.