JUDGMENT
P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. This Special Civil Application is to declare Rule 5(3)(b) of the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1961 which is Annexure-F to the petition as ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void and to direct the respondent by appropriate writ, order or direction to appoint the petitioner to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Gujarat Judicial Service Class II (Junior Branch) and to give him the benefit of seniority as if he has been appointed by letter dated 10-6-1986 alongwith other selectees. The short facts of this case are that the petitioner, in response to the advertisement issued by Gujarat Public Service Commission dated 30-6-1984, applied for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). He was called for elimination test on 30-9-1984 and in that test, the petitioner was taken in for the purpose of appearing for interview. On 16-10-1985, the petitioner was called for an interview and selected for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and his name was recommended by the Gujarat Public Service Commission to the Government for appointment. On 19-2-1986. the petitioner was sent for physical fitness test at Surat. Subsequent lo that, it is the case of the petitioner that he did not hear anything from the authorities concerned and later on 10-6-1986, he came to know that the juniors in the select list got appointed by getting appointment order. On enquiry, the petitioner came to know that he has not been given the appointment order on the ground that he has not satisfied Rule 5(3)(b) of the said Rules. Hence, the petitioner has come forward with the abovesaid Special Civil Application. It is not necessary to elaborately state the argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner except stating that if such a rule restricting the selection to only those who practise either in the High Court of Gujarat or Courts subordinate thereto, it will definitely offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Mr. G.D. Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent put forth the argument which has been stated in the affidavit-in-reply by the Government to the effect that the petitioner never practised either in this Hon’ble Court or in any subordinate Court thereto and as such he is not eligible to be appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division). As far as the present case is concerned, only disqualification for the petitioner is that he has not practised either in the High Court of Gujarat or the subordinate Courts thereto. This is an admitted fact. The Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1961 which have been passed by virtue of the Articles 234 and 309 of the Constitution of India, define “High Court” in Rule 2(d). It states that “High Court” means the High Court of Gujarat. Explanation reads as under:
Reference to ‘the High Court’ with respect to any period prior to 1st Nov. 1956, shall be construed as reference in relation to the areas of the former Saurashtra and Kachchh States to the High Court of the former States of Saurashtra and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Kachchh respectively and with respect to the period prior to 1st May 1960, reference to the High Court shall be construed as reference to the ‘High Court’ of the former Bombay State.
2. Rule 5 deals with the recruitment of Class II of the Junior Branch. It is to this Branch the petitioner wants to be selected. Rule 5(3)(b) states that:
The appointments shall be made from amongst candidates who being members of the Bar have practised as Advocates, Attorneys or Pleaders in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto for not less than three years on the last date prescribed for the submission of application for the post.
3. Pressing this rule into service, the respondent states that the petitioner having not practised in the Gujarat High Court or the Courts subordinate thereto, he has incurred disqualification under Rule 5(3)(b) and as such, the respondent correctly did not appoint him as Civil Judge (Junior Division) even though he was selected for the purpose by Gujarat Public Service Commission. It is this provision of the Rules Mr. J. F Shah questions, and slates that it is ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel brought to our notice the decision in the case of J. Pundurangrao v. A.P.P.S.C. . In this decision, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the case wherein also the question as to whether the selection has to be made from only those Advocates practising in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh or the Courts subordinate thereto has been considered. Dealing with various aspects, as far as those facts are concerned, the Supreme Court held as under:
That immediately raises the question about the validity of the impugned rule. The petitioner argues that by prescribing the limitation that the applicant must be an Advocate of the Andhra High Court, the rule has violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. As a result of the rule, persons who are not practising as Advocates of the Andhra High Court are disqualified and that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Article 14 which provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India, as well as Article 16(1) which provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State have been frequently considered by this Court. The scope and effect of the provisions of Article 14 can no longer be the subject-matter of any doubt or dispute. It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classifications for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. As the decisions of this Court show, the classification on which the statutory provision may be founded may be referable to different considerations. It may be based on geographical considerations or it may have reference to objects or occupations or the like. In every case, there must be some nexus, between the basis of the classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute vide Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar . It is in the light of these principles that we must now proceed to examine the problem raised by the petitioners.
The object of the rule is to recruit suitable and proper persons to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra with a view to secure fair and efficient administration of justice and so, there can be no doubt that it would be perfectly competent to the authority concerned to prescribe qualifications for eligibility for appointment to the said Service. Knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of the regional language and adequate experience at the bar may be prescribed as qualifications which the applicants must satisfy before they apply for the post. In that connection, practice in subordinate Courts or in the High Court may also bye a relevant test to prescribe. The respondents contend that the impugned rule seeks to do nothing more than to require the applicant to possess knowledge of local laws and that being so, the validity of the rule cannot be impeached on the ground of discrimination. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of the Andhra High Court in Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar v. Secretary, Andhra Public Service Commission, Kurnool (S) AIR 1956 Andhra 14, in which the validity of the impugned rule has been upheld.
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It is not clear that the impugned rule can effectively meet the alleged requirement of the knowledge of local laws. If the object intended to be achieved is that the applicant should have adequate knowledge of local laws, the usual and proper course to adopt in that behalf is to prescribe a suitable examination which candidates should pass, or adopt some other effective method. No material has been placed before us to show that the alleged requirement about the knowledge of local laws can be met on the two grounds suggested in support of the validity of the rule. Besides, study of general laws prevailing in the country as a whole and the study of important local laws are generally included in the curriculum prescribed for the Law Degree and obtaining a Law Degree which would entitle a person to be enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement of the knowledge of important local laws.
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If the basis of the impugned rule is that a person who applies for appointment to the post of a District Munsif, should have been enrolled as an Advocate of a High Court, that basis can be satisfied even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the Andhra High Court, but of any other High Court. All the High Courts have the same status; all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice, and Advocates enrolled in all of them are presumed to follow the same standards and to subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the administration of justice. Therefore, in our opinion the impugned rule has introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. That being so, it must be held that the decision of the Andhra High Court in the case of Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar (S) AIR 1956 Andhra 14 is not correct.
3.1 In all force, the said decision would apply to the facts of the present case. As observed by the Supreme Court, the impugned rule has introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the said classification and the objects intended to be achieved by the relevant rule. Rule 5(3)(b) definitely states “High Court or subordinate Courts thereto”. This means, reading with the definition of Rule 2(d), Advocate ought have practised either in the High Court or the Courts subordinate thereto. If that be so, such a restriction, in the light of the abovesaid decision of the Supreme Court, clearly offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In our view, the words “in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto” have to be deleted or otherwise such a restriction will be ultra vires the Constitution.
4. For all these reasons, we hold that portion of Rule 5(3)(b) to the effect that “in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto” is ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the same has to be struck down; the result being that an Advocate or Attorney or Pleader who has practised for not less than three years on the last date prescribed for the submission of the application for the post, is eligible to get selected if he satisfies other conditions of recruitment rules without any restriction as regards the Court in which he has practised in the Union of India.
5. For all these reasons, the Special Civil Application is allowed with a direction that the petitioner has to be appointed in the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gujarat Judicial Service Class IJ (Junior Branch) by giving him the benefit of seniority at appropriate place. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.