JUDGMENT
M.S. Parikh, J.
1. In this petition under Article 227, of the Constitution of India the petitioner has brought under challenge the order dated 28th September, 1992 passed by the Joint Secretary, Revenue Department of the State of Gujarat in sua motu Revision under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
2. The short ground on which this matter can be disposed of is that the power under Section 34 of the Act has been invoked after passage of 2 years and 7 months, that is to say, after passage of unreasonable period.
3. For the purpose of appreciating the aforesaid ground pressed into service on behalf of the petitioner it would be necessary to state some uncontroverted facts which have been narrated in the petition.
The Kavita Benefit Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act was carrying on the business of Chit Fund since 1967, but on account of weak financial position it had to face Company Petition No. 4 of 1978 for its winding up. During the pendency of said petition, Company Petition No. 330 of 1984 was moved before this Court submitting a scheme of arrangement with the object of ensuring payment to the creditors of the Company within reasonable time. This Court appointed Committee on 10th December, 1984 consisting of 4 members, out of whom one was to be the Chairman thereof. The Official Liquidator was one of the members of the Committee. The function of the Committee was to discharge liabilities and collect dues. Accordingly the Committee possessed some land in the sim of Isanpur and Memnagar. It filled in Form No. 1 as provided under the relevant provisions of the Act. The said form was sent to the Competent Authority as per order dated 27th December, 1987 passed by the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department to the Government of Gujarat. The said Competent Authority while clearing Form No. 1 passed order dated 22nd February, 1990 holding inter alia that the Company, in respect of whom the aforesaid Committee was appointed, held vacant land as under:
1. Memnagar Survey No. 266 457.92 sq. mtr.
2. Isanpur Survey No. 234 300.00 sq. mtr.
752.92 sq. mtr.
The Competent Authority also held that the remaining land in Isanpur as also Memnagar had within it constructions respectively for the industrial purpose and residential purpose. Annexure 'A' is the decision of the Competent Authority.
Thereafter this Court was moved to pass appropriate order in respect of sale of the land including the constructions and this Court passed order dated 25th June, 1990 to advertise the sale of the said property. Accordingly, first advertisement was published in the newspaper on 28th June, 1990. It was again advertised on 5th August, 1990 on account of poor response to the earlier advertisement. The same exercise repeated on 11th November, 1990, pursuant to which highest offer that was received was Rs. 14 lacs and this Court passed an order dated 21st January, 1991 approving the acceptance of such offer.
As the sale was for an amount exceeding Rs. 10 lacs Income-Tax Department’s permission was necessary. A sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- was due against the aforesaid Company to the Income-Tax Department and that amount was paid, with the result that permission was granted by letter dated 19th December, 1989.
4. The petitioner has then set out certain facts with regard to invocation of the provision of Section 26 of the Act, but they are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the present petition on the aforesaid limited point. It is then stated by the petitioner that on the strength of the order dated 18th December, 1989 this Court passed an order for sale of the land and after receipt of the money the second instalment payable to the creditors was paid from 10th September, 1991. Inspite of that facts the Government informed the Committee that it wanted to revise the order, of the Competent Authority. It was only after a passage of 2 years that, the Government thought of revising the order passed by the Competent Authority. Under such circumstances, states the petitioner, the petitioner would face irreparable hardship and irreparable complications arising from the fact that the petitioner made payment to the Income-Tax Department as stated above and the petitioner also made payment to the creditors as stated above pursuant to the direction issued by this Court in the aforesaid Company petitions.
5. In support of the ground with regard to passage of unreasonable time after passing of the order by the Competent Authority, for the purpose of taking the matter in suo motu Revision under Section 34 of the Act, a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav has been relied upon. There the Honourable Supreme Court was concerned with the power of the Commissioner to revise the order passed under Section 651 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (5 of 1879). The Supreme Court observed that although there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 of the Code the power of the Commissioner to revise the order under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code must be exercised in reasonable time. What has been observed in para 11 may be reproduced:
11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can review an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.
6. It is thus clear that where the power of revision has been invested in the appropriate Authority under a particular Statute without prescribing period of limitation, such power has to be exercised within reasonable time unless a contrary intention can be spelled out. Similarly for exercise of power contained in Section 34 of the Act mere is no period of limitation prescribed. This provision’ of the Act came to be considered by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2462 of 1984 in the case of Patel Nathabhai Polabhai v. Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Gujarat and Anr.; and in the decision dated 15-7-1991 (Coram : S.D. Shah, J.) rendered in that Special Civil Application the question has been resolved thus:
Therefore, in my opinion Section 34 shall have to be reasonably read and so read it would mean that power of revision shall have to be exercised by the State Government within reasonable period and it cannot be exercised after expiry of unreasonably long period.
7. In the aforesaid Special Civil Application reference was also made to a decision contained in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Nathabhai as also a decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Minish K. Sheth and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. . The reference has also been made to decision of Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4077 of 1982 from the decision of learned single Judge noted above. It has been held that the revisional power under Section 34 of the Act is to be exercised in reasonable manner and within reasonable time. The time element enters into consideration only from the limited point of view to see it is a genuine exercise of power. It has been observed that no inflexible rule stipulating duration as reasonable for exercising revisional power can be laid down. It has been further observed that when the legislature in its wisdom having thought it fit not to prescribe any period of limitaion for the exercise of revisionalpower, the Court cannot and should not undertake mat exercise and mat would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would be for the authority to decide as to whether exercise of revisional power can be said to be beyond reasonable period. However, while exercising such power, number of factors should enter into consideration. Some of the factors came to be enumerated holding them to be not exhaustive. They may be reproduced below:
(i) A large number of officers working as Competent Authority all throughout the State exercise power under Section 9 at different points of time and large number of orders are passed day in and day out. As against large number of officers who pass the orders and large number of orders which are passed, the revisional authority is one, namely, the State Government, or responsible officers of the State Govt. and, therefore, exercise of revisional power should not be curtailed to a unreasonably short period. Some concessions for a large period would have to be made in favour of State Govt.
(ii) It would be advisable for the State Govt. to issue general instructions to all Competent Authorities to send their orders within stipulated period to the State Govt. so that the State Govt. can decide as to whether the orders passed by various Competent Authorities with respect to various parcels of land were required to be revised or not. If such orders are directed to be sent to the State Govt. within period of three months from the date the orders are passed, period of one year from the date of receipt thereof by the State Govt. would be a reasonable period within which revisional power can be exercised by the State Govt.
(iii) In a given case, the State Govt. may justify invocation of revisional power even beyond period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order of Competent Authority, if the facts and circumstances demand such revisional exercise of power even beyond said period.
(iv) In cases where the order of the Competent Authority is in favour of the holder of land and the same is operated for a period of about 15 to 18 months, the holder of the land is justified in assuming that the order of the Competent Authority holds the field, and is also further justified in dealing with his/her properties on the supposition that the order of the Competent Authority has become final.
(v) He may either himself develop the property and put the property for his own use or he may transfer or alienate the same to third parties. The third parties as bona fide purchasers may make necessary enquiries and such enquiries would reveal that the Competent Authority has by a final order found that the land was not held in excess and that the holder of the land was holding land within permissible limits. On such enquiry a bona fide purchaser would be emboldened and justified to purchase the said land for his own use or for putting up construction thereon. When the third parties come in the picture and acquire right, title and interest in the parcels of land based on the order passed by the Competent Authority, exercise of revisional power after expiry of unreasonably long period would, not only affect the holder of the land but would adversely affect the third parties who have purchased such parcel of land from the holder of the land.
(vi) It is also not advisable to keep the right, title and interest of the holder of the land in abeyance or under suspension for indefinitely long period. If he is entitled to hold the land he should be permitted to deal with the land in the manner he likes and his right and title over the land cannot be kept under eclipse for all time to come because the State Govt. may think to exercise its revisional power at any point of time.
(vii) However, when the holder of the land has not changed his position or has not acted to his detriment and the properties remained in the same condition in which they were on the date on which the Competent Authority passed the order, even late exercise of power by the revisional authority cannot be invalidated especially when the holder of land is not changed. Even in such a. case it would be necessary for the State Govt. to satisfy the Court as to why it did not exercise its revisional power within reasonable period. On proper explanation being given by the State Govt. exercise of revisional power even after lapse of long period may be accepted in a given case.
8. It can thus be seen that what should be the reasonable time obviously should depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and in so far as the present case is concerned what transpired between the date of the order passed by the Competent Authority and the Revisional Authority taking matter in revision requires serious consideration. It can be seen that not only the sale transaction has ensued pursuant to the direction of this Court in the above referred Company Petition, but payments were also made to the Income-Tax Authority as also to the creditors and such creditors are not other than the persons belonging to a low middle class of the society. All that exercise has been undertaken not by the company itself but by an independent agency, viz., the Committee appointed by this Court in the Company Petition. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the transactions entered into by the Committee appointed by this Court in the Company Petition. All that has happened during the intervening passage of time of about two and half years. It is thus clear that after such a passage of time, the Authority thought to commence the proceedings of revision. The exercise on the part of Revisional Authority thus on the face of it, is unreasonable.
9. In the result the impugned order of the Revisional Authority shall have to be quashed and set aside.
The order passed by the respondent No. 1, i.e., Joint Secretary, Revenue Department of the Government of Gujarat on 28th September, 1992 and annexed at Annexure ‘B’ is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.