JUDGMENT
M. Ramachandran, J.
1. The Taluk Supply Officer, Trichur had issued notices during July, 1998 and the recipients have filed these Original Petitions challenging the same, a specimen copy of which is produced as Ext.P3 in O.P.No. 14891 of 1998. He had brought it to the attention of the petitioners, who are hoteliers, an order (No. Fl.2396/98) of the District Collector, whereby he had classified the hotels, and had fixed the prices of normal food items. The Officer found that excess charges were being levied. For instance, in the case of first petitioner in O.P.No. 14720 of 1998, the price of tea exhibited was Rs. 3/- whereas the prescribed price was Rs. 2.50 and therefore, excess of fifty paise was being collected from the general public. Some other food items also were named and it had been warned that this is illegal. The direction was that price lists published are to be appropriately streamlined with the general directions, and in case of failure, petitioners were liable to be prosecuted. Although individual petitioners, as also their Association had objected to the above proposal pointing out that this was unauthorised, since they were apprehending prosecution proceedings, original petitions had come to be filed. Interim orders had been passed by this Court staying all coercive steps.
2. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, and the District Supply Officer is the signatory as authorised to swear to the affidavit. According to him, the Original Petitions were misconceived, and were liable to be rejected. It had been pointed out by the said officer that Ext.P3 was not unauthorised as pointed out, and as a matter of fact, the minutes of the Food Advisory Committee showed that such restrictions were validly incorporated as a condition for operating the establishments. Advertence was made to a report made by the Sub Committee. The hotels were classified to four groups, depending upon the seating capacity, investment and the general ambience that had been found available. The representatives of the Hotel Owners Association were also there in the committee, and the proposals became binding on them. It is further submitted that the decision was taken in public interest. Complaints were forthcoming from several individuals and organisations about the levy of extra price, in spite of general notifications, and it was why the Administration had sprung to action.
3. Further, it had been claimed that it was the duty of the Government to maintain fair price. The authorities had been compelled to take steps noticing the exorbitant prices charged for food stuffs sold. The Food Advisory-cum-Vigilance Committee had been constituted for Thrissur District of which the District Supply Officer is the Convenor and the District Collector the Chairman. The Committee consisted of members from various walks of life, including representatives from elected bodies and the Sub Committee had come to a decision taking notice of all relevant materials. Mostly, it was unobjectionable. This was as per Government directives.
4. The Government Pleader had attempted to sustain the order on the strength of the Kerala Food Stuffs (Display of Prices by Catering Establishments) Order, 1977. It required the caterers to publish the price of food articles sold by them. Such orders were issued under the authority of Essential Commodities Act. Ext.P3 was valid and one made in the right step.
5. In spite of the above submissions, I find it difficult to accept the stand that any of these are enabling provisions for imposing restriction in the matter of price of food articles sold by an eating house. It may be in public interest to restrict the price, but such powers, if at all, are circumscribed by the requirement to recognise the fundamental rights of a person to carry on an industry or business to his liking. The District Authorities might be getting complaints about the prices levied by the establishments, but only in authorised matters, it may be possible for them to exert themselves. The issue is far too complex for them to issue edicts. There is no case that the licences issued to the petitioners by the Local Authority contain a stipulation that they would be subjected to such restrictions. The orders referred to also do not authorise the Administration to impose upper limit in the price. What is contemplated there is only publication of price. The respondents have also no case that there is any supply of rationed articles at concessional prices to the hotel owners and they are reaping profits forfeiting the trust or violating any undertakings given by them.
6. Price of a food item may depend on various factors. To cite a few, the investment that is there for starting up or running the same will be one. The expenditure that is incurred for running an establishment vary from place to place and locality. The quality of food stuff also will necessarily require the caterer to fix a price, if he is keen to make a profit. Above all, there is no compulsion of whatever nature for a person to go and take food from any public eating house, which is not to his taste. A person can avoid a hotel which charges higher prices, if price alone is his concern.
7. In the matter of services, unless there is law in operation (e.g. bus fare, taxi fare etc.), it may be difficult for the Administration to prescribe prices, be it personal service or professional service. Imagine the situation where the District Administration is of opinion that fee charged by a hospital or a chartered accountant or even a lawyer is excessive. The theory of demand and supply is a time tested concept. It may not be possible for them to suggest a control in such areas, unless the State applies its mind and bring in legislation, which authorises restriction; thereby fettering the freedom of an entrepreneur. Therefore, the hotelier will have the absolute discretion as of now at least to prescribe the price of his ghee roast, parotta or pulavu, if the business is not situated in restricted places or areas.
8. I find that the petitioners are justified in contending that Ext.P3 and similar orders issued by the District Supply Officer/District Administration suffer from want of jurisdiction. Consequently, impugned orders in these Original Petitions stand set aside.