JUDGMENT
1. This writ appeal is preferred by the sixth respondent in the writ petition, namely, the trade union by name the Kerala Spinning Mill Workers Union, Komalapuram, against the judgment of the learned single Judge in OP 14850 of 1993 dated December 20, 1993, allowing the said writ petition filed by the management, namely, M/s. Kerala Spinners Ltd., Komalapuram. The Mill is under lock-out and there was vigilance and then the writ petition was allowed granting ‘police protection’ to the management to remove the finished products and semi-finished products and raw materials from the factory for the purpose of the management performing its obligations under existing contracts, both Indian and foreign. Protection is also given to the personnel of the management, vehicles etc. The Union has filed this appeal objecting to the grant of ‘police protection’ to the management.
2. The Kerala Spinners Ltd., Komalapuram, Alappuzha is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The Company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile yam and sells the same in India and abroad. There are about 897 workmen in the factory, apart from clerical and administrative staff. The appellant (sixth respondent in the O.P.) and four other Unions are the recognised trade unions.
3. Appellant and other unions have raised a demand of bonus at the rate of 25% and an ‘ex gratia’ of 25%, in all totalling 50% of their total earnings during 1992-93. They also claimed one month’s salary as festival allowance.
4. The Company was not willing for these demands and was prepared for 11.02% by way of bonus as per their balance sheet and profit and loss account for the relevant year.
5. As the Unions were not willing to accept this offer, the matter was referred for conciliation, but no solution is yet found. The workers started first with a half-an-hour strike in all three shifts, then raised it to one hour, and then there was dharna, gherao and violence. They started assembling in front of the administrative office and entered the Chief Executive’s office-cabin and shouted slogans, gheraoed the Chief Executive and drove away the working staff from work. For 12 hours the Chief Executive and other officers were kept under illegal custody.
6. The production fell below 65% due to strike and stoppage of machineries and deliberate absenteeism. It is stated that the workers compelled the Chief Executive to sign a paper submitted by them. It is said that they threatened to kill the Chief Executive if he did not sign the paper. Then the workers went on a rampage, destroyed the furniture and papers and samples of yam kept in the show-cases. Window-panels were broken, electric fittings and telephone wires were tampered with.
7. Eventually, the management decided upon a lock-out with effect from 11 P.M. on September 24, 1993 and the Company is still under lock-out. The position, even when this OP was filed on October 29, 1993 was that the workers are conducting dharaa in front of the factory-gate, causing obstruction to the ingress and egress not only to the officers but also in respect of finished and semi-finished products and raw materials. The result is that the Company is not able to discharge its contractual obligations to Indian and foreign buyers. The company is losing business and its reputation is also becoming liable for damage. The Country is losing by way of foreign exchange as well as production of finished goods and in the consumption of raw materials.
8. The company approached the police officers for protection to the person and property of the management and also for ingress and egress of person and goods (both finished products and raw materials). As there was no response, they filed the O.P. on October 29, 1993, seeking directions to the police for police protection.
9. After the counters were filed and the arguments were heard, the learned single Judge delivered an elaborate judgment, holding that this was a fit case for exercising discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for directing respondents 1 to 5 in the OP to grant police protection. The learned single Judge, after narrating the facts, as stated above, felt that in view of the violence, gherao for 12 hours of the Chief Executive and officers, damage to furniture, electrical and telephone lines, and from the obstruction at the gate of the factory and the inaction of the police, the Court should give directions protecting the personnel and also property of the factory and also directed that the finished, semi-finished products and raw material should be allowed to be moved from or into the factory, as the case may be, by removal of the obstruction or dharna of the workers. Incidental directions were also given. The learned single Judge also kept in mind the effect of the lock-out on the workmen. It is against these directions that one out of the 5 unions has preferred this writ appeal.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Union, Sri Balagangadhara Menon, contended that while the violence and gherao was true, only a section of the employees were involved and even if violence is to be prevented, the management should not be allowed to remove the finished, semi-finished products or the raw material, from out of the premises, for that would adversely affect the financial claims regarding wages etc. which the workmen have against a Company which has been under lockout from September 24, 1993. According to him, this aspect has not been given sufficient importance by the learned single Judge. He also contended that police protection order cannot be granted under Article 226 to the management merely for the asking of it and such orders of police protection are likely to tilt the balance of bargaining power in favour of the management. He relied upon All Mohammed v. State of Kerala(1915 KLT (SN) 5 – Case No. 10), Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. v. District Collector(1982 KLT (SN) 13 Case No. 21) and C. Kannan v. Supdt. of Police, Kannur and Ors. (1975-I-LLJ-83) for this purpose. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment in Kainbetta Estate v. Rajamanickam and Ors.(1960-II-Lab LJ-275) to contend that workmen not given employment on account of lock-out may be entitled to claim lay-off compensation.
11. In our view, the facts found in this case amply justify the grant of an order of police protection to the management for purpose of enabling them to remove the finished and semi finished products or raw material. We have already referred to the gherao of the Chief Executive and other working staff for 12 hours and the latter were not allowed to go out even to attend calls of nature. The workers virtually kept the above persons under unlawful custody for 12
hours or more. They threatened to kill the Chief Executive if he did not sign on the paper produced by the workers. The workers went on a rampage, destroyed the furniture and papers and samples of yarn kept in show-cases; window-panels were broken, the electrical and telephone fittings were interfered with. Surely, the management are entitled to seek prevention of further damage to life and property. With the experience the management had as above stated, their apprehension that the workers may, at any time, resort to similar activities, cannot be said to be unreasonable.
12. The rulings referred to by the appellant’s counsel, each of which was rendered by various learned single Judges of this Court, far from supporting the appellant, in fact, go against them. All that the rulings state is that police protection orders should not be given by the High Court under Article 226 for the mere asking of it. The discretion has to be soundly exercised. But, at the same time, when there have been acts of violence by workmen against the person and property of the employer, if the police, to whom the employer has resorted to, do not give adequate and timely protection, the employer must have a legal remedy to enforce his right to protection of his person and property. We are governed by the rule of law and the State has a solemn duty towards its citizens for protection of their person and property. Whether any particular situation deserves grant of police protection from the court, it is for the court to decide, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the past conduct of the workman and the reasonableness of the apprehension of the employer in regard to the likelihood of the recurrence of such conduct on the part of the workmen. It cannot be said that, even in cases of proof of past violent conduct of the workmen, police protection to the employer if granted by Court, would tilt the balance of bargaining power in favour of the management. If the rulings cited by the appellant lay down any such broad proposition, we respectfully dissent from the same.
13. We may add that if in a case of violent acts or obstruction or gherao by the workers, the management is not granted protection, the balance of the bargaining power may, indeed, tilt in favour of the workmen. It is the duty of the court to see that peace is restored and parties are allowed to come to the negotiation table, without the balance being tilted either way. We are of the view that grant of police protection to the management, if the court considers it to be necessary on the facts of a given case, only restores normalcy and cannot be said to put the management in any advantageous position. The position between management and workmen is one of inter-dependence and it is the duty of the court to see that one party does not, by resort to unlawful methods, such as gherao, obstruction or violence, compel the management to accede to terms which, but for such compulsion, the management would not have acceded to.
14. The Industrial Disputes Act, Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, Kerala Head-load Workers Act and other similar statutes provide for conciliation through the assistance of statutory authorities. On failure of conciliation, there are provisions for reference of the dispute to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal or other body. The law requires parties to take to lawful methods for resolution of disputes and does not favour pressurisation, gherao, obstruction or violence.
15. The contention that in every situation of lock-out, the workmen are entitled to compensation is too broadly stated. The very decision of the Supreme Court in Kainbetta Estate’s case (supra), states that whether the workmen are entitled to compensation or not would depend upon whether the lock-out was justified or not.
16. Another contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant was that, even if police protection orders could be granted to prevent violence, the management could not be allowed to remove the finished or semi-finished products nor the raw material in the factory especially when the wages are unpaid. It must be noted that here, the company had already incurred various obligations under pending contracts to Indian and foreign buyers, in respect of the finished products manufactured. So far as semi- finished products and raw material are concerned, they would get spoiled if they are allowed to rot. As pointed ouf by the learned single Judge, the management may become liable for damages and may lose future purchase orders or export orders, as the case may be. The management will have to pay income tax, municipal taxes, excise duty, sales tax, electricity and water charges, interest on borrowed monies, and other levies during the financial year and if it had already spent a large part of its funds for purchase of raw material and if it has to pay for the above items, it may, indeed, become bankrupt. Hence, the Court cannot, while granting police protection as stated above, impose restrictions that the company should not be allowed to perform its contractual obligations referred to above. The question as to whether and if so, what wages are payable, has to be decided in the various proceedings the workers or the management may take under various Acts. It will be highly disadvantageous if the performance of the contractual and statutory obligations by the employer is to be postponed till the completion of the adjudication of these industrial disputes. If the procedures under the various industrial or labour laws otherwise permit, it will be open to the workmen to adopt the said procedures to safeguard their rights, or wages. In any event, the Company has its other tangible assets sufficient to meet these financial dues of the workmen, as and when the same are determined by the appropriate courts, tribunals or authorities.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, we confirm the directions given by the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ appeal.