JUDGMENT
Sharad D. Dave, J.
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner Keshavji Ravjibhai Patel under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Award passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference No. 1825 of 1987 dtd.12/5/1994 whereby the Labour Court rejected the reference filed by the petitioner.
2. Brief facts of the case are such that the petitioner was working in the office of the respondent No. 1 from 22/9/1951 at the monthly salary of Rs.750/p.m. As per the case of the petitioner, the petitioner has served in the office of the respondent from 22/5/1961 to 1/7/1987 and his service has been terminated by the respondent without following mandatory procedure, illegally and arbitrarily. The petitioner therefore wrote a letter dtd.10/7/1987 to the respondent requesting to reinstate the petitioner, but the respondent refused the request of the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner raised a dispute before the Labour Court, Rajkot against his illegal termination. The petitioner submitted his statement of claim before the Labour Court and reply was given by the respondent vide Ex.10. According to the respondent, they are working as Income-tax Consultant which is a legal profession and therefore, under sec. 2(J) of the Act, their profession is not covered within the meaning of Industry and therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide or adjudicate the dispute filed by the petitioner before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The respondent also raised a contention that the service of the petitioner was not terminated but he abandoned the service and did not turned up for service from 6/6/1987 and therefore, the respondent has not terminated the service of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted documentary evidence before the Labour Court vide Ex.11 and the respondent submitted documentary evidence vide Ex.123. The petitioner was examined vide Ex.37 and the witness of the respondent was examined vide Ex.46.Considering the evidence on record and judgement of Hon’ble Apex Court in reported in 1978 (1) LLJ 404 and other judgements, the Labour Court come to the conclusion that the legal profession is not covered within definition of Industry and therefore, provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not applicable to the legal profession and therefore mainly on that ground the Labour Court rejected the reference filed by the petitioner.
3. Heard Mr.M.H. Rathod, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms.Yamini Desai, on behalf of Mr. YS Lakhani, learned counsel for the respondent.
4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly argued that the Labour Court has erred in considering the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 1978 (1) LLJ 404. He has further argued that in the said judgment, the Apex Court in clear terms has held that the legal profession is also covered within the definition of the Industry under the provisions of the ID Act and considering the oral evidence Ex.37 and 46 it is clear that the systematic activity carried out by the respondent with the help of employees and the respondent has provided services to the clients with the help of employees and there is relation between the petitioner and respondent as employee and employer. He has further argued that the test pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment is fully satisfied, however, the Labour Court has rejected the Reference of the petitioner misinterpreting the said judgment of the Apex Court.
4.2. He has further argued that the Labour Court has erred in considering two decisions of the Bombay High Court and Supreme Court, wherein Solicitor’s work of attorney does not satisfy the test and is not within the definition of Industry u/sec. 2(J) of the ID Act. He has further argued that in view of the view taken by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1080 (National Union of Commercial Employees and Anr. Versus M.B. Maher, the Supreme Court has held that the Solicitor’s firm is not an industry. The said decision has been overruled by the judgment reported in AIR 1978 SC 548, wherein in para 111, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1080 is wrongly decided and the Solicitor’s firm or a Lawyer’s firm becomes successful not merely by the efforts of a single lawyer but by the cooperation of the staff, specialist, juniors and seniors, likewise necessarily the service of stenographer, paralegal supportive services are equally important. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the claim for exclusion on the library profession is unwarranted from the definitional angle. The flood gets all exemption from the obligation under the Act will be open if professions flow out of its scope. In view of these facts, the observations of the Apex Court is certainly covered within the meaning of industry as defined under ID Act. The important factor was the Solicitor’s case has been overruled by the Apex Court with a observation that the legal profession is also covered within the meaning of industry under the provision of the ID Act.
4.3. He has further argued that the Labour Court has failed to consider the important fact that with the respondent, there are four partners and about 11 employees are working as clerk, driver, typist, accountant etc. in the office of the respondent; the office timing for the employees working under the respondent is fixed and the respondent is paying salary to those employees. The activities which are being carried out by the respondent as a legal profession is with the help of employees, which is a relevant factor, but the Labour Court has totally ignored the said material aspect of the matter and a view contrary to the decision of the Apex Court is taken. He has further argued that the respondent is providing services with the help of employees and therefore, there was relation between the petitioner and the respondent as employee and employer and therefore, the case of the petitioner is covered within the definition of Industry, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1978 SC 548. He has also drawn my attention to para 111 of the said judgment.
4.4. He has further argued that the labour court has erred in holding that the petitioner is of 60 years age and having weakness in eyes and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement. He has further argued that there is nothing on record to show the age of the petitioner and weakness of the eye of the petitioner. He has further argued that in 1951 when the petitioner joined the service of the respondent, he was having only one eye and at present there is 1.1/2 number in the second eye. However, the petitioner has served for many years to the satisfaction of the respondent and during the service tenure, no complaint was made by the respondent regarding his eyes.
4.5. Consequently, he has argued that the Labour Court has misinterpreted the judgment of the Apex Court and has held that the legal profession is not a commercial establishment. In fact, the real question before the Labour Court was whether the profession is an industry within the meaning of Sec. 2(s) of the ID Act or not and therefore, the conclusion of the Labour Court is based on commercial aspect and not on the basis of industry as defined under the ID Act. The error committed by the Labour Court is misconception of law and the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court rejecting the reference of the petitioner is contrary to the decision of the Full Bench of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1978 SC 548. He therefore, prayed to quash and set aside the impugned order and direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner and pay all back wages as if his service was not terminated.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned Award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rajkot and submitted that the impugned Award is in conformity with the decisions of the Apex Court, reported in 1978 (1) LLJ 404 (Supra). She has further argued that there is no legal bar declaring the legal profession as an industry, however, there is no relationship between the petitioner and the respondent as employee and employer. She has further argued that the petitioner has abandoned the service at his sweet will and the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court is just, legal and proper and no error is committed by the Labour Court while passing the impugned Award and therefore, no interference of this Court is required. Lastly, she has argued that this petition is filed under Article 227 challenging the impugned Award and this Court has limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, this court may not interfere with the impugned Award.
6. This petition has been admitted by this Court (Coram ; S.M. Soni, J, as the then he was) vide order dtd.29/7/1994.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the material on record, it is an undisputed fact that the petitioner by filing this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot. The scope of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very narrow and limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaquim, reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 has held as under;-
“A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct error of law in the decision.”
8. Considering the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot, and keeping in mind the fact that the present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court in this writ petition in absence of any valid reasons, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus (Supra). The impugned Award has been passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.
This petition has been decided by this court only on the point of scope of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, without entering into the merits of the matter.
9. In view of the above discussion, the petition fails and dismissed. Rule is discharged.