JUDGMENT
Aloke Chakrabarti, J.
1. Petitioner No. 1 is owner of sugar mill situated at Ramnagar in the district of Nadia having a land measuring 8045.63 acres distributed in Nadia and Murshidabad districts. Earlier the said sugar mill was known as M/s. Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd. which was renamed as Khaitan India Ltd. (hereinafter called as petitioner company).
2. The Government of West Bengal by its order dated 12th March, 1964 passed under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 allowed the aforesaid Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd. to retain an area of 8046.13 acres of land for use of said mill.
3. Petitioner company was served with a notice dated 20th September, 2002 granting the petitioner liberty to file objection against decision of State Government proposing to resume the remaining area of the land as surplus to its requirement under proviso to Section 6(3) of the said Act upon a finding that an area of more or less 1743.27 acres of land may be required for the purpose of running the said mill.
4. Petitioner preferred an application before West Bengal land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, inter alia, asking for withholding and/or rescinding the said notice dated 20th September, 2002 or for quashing the same. By order dated 16th April, 2003 the said application was disposed of without granting any relief to the petitioner. Challenging the same, present writ petition was filed.
5. Heard Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Debasish Kar Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents.
6. Contention of petitioner is that the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and Chapter IIB thereof were already in force when show-cause notice was issued on 20th September, 2002 by the concerned authorities against the petitioner and therefore, no proceeding under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act could be initiated in respect of the said lands in respect of which West Bengal Land Reforms Act applied and not the similar provision as contained in Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.
7. Contention of petitioner is that Section 3 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act provides for an overriding effect of the said Act and also Section 14J contained an overriding effect of the said Chapter providing for ceiling prescription therein.
8. It is contended by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel for petitioners that Tribunal failed to consider the vital difference in respect of the status of petitioners under the said two statutes. Reference was made to Sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 4 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954 recognising the petitioner No. 1 as a tenant under the State and the provisions contained in Section 4(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act recognising petitioner No. 1 as the owner of the lands. It is argued on behalf of petitioners that in view of such vital difference in the status of petitioner No. 1 in respect of the said land, proceeding under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act cannot be initiated any further. In case a Government proposes to resume land at any time it becoming excess than the requirement, it has to proceed under Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.
9. Contention has further been made as regards scope of Section 14-Q of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act as it stood at the relevant time.
10. Mr. Debashis Kar Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents first raised a preliminary objection as regards maintainability of present writ petition on the point urged by petitioners as this point of law as regards applicability of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and Section 6(3) thereof, no contention was made before the learned Tribunal and there being no decision on the point by the learned Tribunal, according to law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125, the present impugned proceeding cannot be continued. Reliance was specifically placed on paragraphs 90 to 95 of the judgment in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra). Notice of this Court was drawn to the position of law that on any grievance a party aggrieved is to first approach the Tribunal for its decision which, in turn, can be challenged before appropriate Division Bench of this Court. Further reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Entertainment Tax v. Mitra Cinema, reported in 2000(1) CLJ 59.
11. Fully relying on the above contentions, Mr. Kar Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents contended with respect to the argument of the petitioner that expression ‘intermediary’ has been defined in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which includes both proprietor and lessee. It is contended that Section 3 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act has also an overriding effect.
12. Further contention of Mr. Kar Gupta, is that both Clauses (f) and (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act has the opening expression “subject to the provision of Sub-section (3)” and therefore, retention under said clauses are permissive retention subject to Section 6(3). It is contended by Mr. Kar Gupta, that the petitioner company was permitted by order dated 12th March, 1984 to retain land more than the ceiling prescribed under Section 14M of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The ceiling prescribed under Section 14Q should not be considered as the same has been deleted with effect from 19th October, 2003. It is contended that in such circumstances when petitioners were allowed to retain land more than the ceiling prescribed on that day in March, 1964, the Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act being not available on that day as it was enforced from the year 1969, only a procedure under Section 6(3) is permissible in this respect and not Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act which is applicable only in cases of persons who are allowed to retain land more than the prescribed ceiling after the said Section 14Z was added by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 published in Calcutta Gazettee, Extraordinary dated March 24, 1986. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of Mahesh Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2004(1) CHN 10.
13. After considering the aforesaid contentions, we find that law as explained in the case of L. Chandra Kumar(supra) requires High Court to consider a decision of the Tribunal as argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents. We are satisfied that in the present case, petitioners also have challenged a decision of the learned Tribunal. In view of the contention of the respondents we have to find as to whether in order to exercise our jurisdiction of a Writ Court there must be a decision by the learned Tribunal even on every particular question of law. Considering the law respectively cited by the contesting parties, we are of the opinion that the law is settled in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) that only a decision of the Tribunal can be challenged before this High Court and there is no requirement stated anywhere in the judgment in the case of L. Chandra Kumar(supra) that any additional point of law either in support of said decision or against it cannot be considered by the Writ Court. As authority of a Writ Court is recognised to consider the validity of a decision by a learned Tribunal, the Writ Court is expected to exercise all its power as contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In exercise of such power, there is no limitation that any additional point of law either in support of impugned decision or against it, cannot be considered by a Writ Court. Our Constitution has recognised a very wide power of the Writ Court in the interest of justice. The judgment of L. Chandra Kumar(supra) also recognised such a power and attempt to curtail it by providing an appeal from the orders of various Tribunals directly to Apex Court, was held to be not appropriate. There cannot be a presumption that wider power under Article 226 stands curtailed in any manner whatsoever when the same was not done by the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar(supra) in so many words. Therefore, we hold the present contention being an exclusive question of law can be very well urged in the Writ Court for the first time while challenging a decision of the learned Tribunal in the Writ Court.
14. In view of the above findings as regards maintainability, on merit we find that Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act though was enforced subsequently but the same is an enforcement of a new provision of law in an existing statute, but making a declaration which is clarificatory in nature and not an enforcement of new law. Therefore, the provision of Section 14Z has to be accepted as the law applicable in the present case. Moreover, if retention was permitted of an excess land beyond the permissible ceiling at any point of time when the West Bengal Land Reforms Act was not in force still then, law is to be applied as is applicable when a proceeding for resumption of excess land is proposed. In the present case such proposal has been made in September, 2002 when admittedly provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act including Section 14Z applies for resumption of land allegedly allowed in excess of prescribed ceiling. Therefore, in our opinion, provision for resumption is to be applied as contained in Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and not Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.
15. Moreover, Section 6(3) applies in case of resumption of a land of a tenant and when petitioners are entitled to be treated as owner by virtue of applicability of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in view of provision contained in Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, for any proposal of resumption of excess land proceeding has to be availed as provided under Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and not Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.
16. This law was considered by another Division Bench wherein one of us (Aloke Chakrabarti, J.) was a party, in WPLRT No. 279 of 2002 (Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.) decided on July 11, 2003 holding as follows:
“Agreeing with the above view, I also find that provisions of Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act was applicable at the initial stage but after introduction of a similar provisions in Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, such power could be exercised only under such law contained in Section 14Z.”
17. The said law was followed by another Division Bench in its judgment dated October 31, 2003 deciding WPLRT No. 1183 of 2001 (Central Glass Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.).
18. In view of our above findings, the writ petition is allowed and the original application No. 1528 of 2003 is hereby allowed and the notification dated 20th September, 2002 at annexure P-1 to the writ petition is hereby quashed upon a finding that proceeding under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is not maintainable in view of enforcement of the provisions of Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.
19. In view of above findings, CAN 7399 of 2004 is also disposed of.
S.P. Talukdar, J.
20. I agree.