JUDGMENT
P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
1. These three Civil Revision Petitions arise out of a common order.
2. The plaintiffs in O.S.No. 98/80 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Markapur are the petitioners herein, who are questioning the order made in I.A.Nos. 8/91,9/91 and 10/91 dismissing the petitions filed by them. The suit was filed for declaration of title in respect of Ac. 19-00 cents in S.No. 468 and for permanent injunction.
3. The suit was originally dismissed. The plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal-A.S. 1 /83 before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the lower Court. While remanding the matter, the learned single Judge observing that as the trial Judge has not properly applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, directed the trial Court to dispose of the matter afresh. After remand, the petitioners filed three applications viz., I.A.8/91 under Order 16 Rule 6 C.P.C to summon witnesses and to produce documents; I.A.9/91 under Order 18 Rule 17 C.P.C. to recall P.Ws.1, 5 and D.Ws.2,3; and I.A.No. 10/91 under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. to condone the delay in filing the documents and to receive the same in evidence. The lower court dismissed I.A.No. 10/91 holding that there is no proper and convincing reason for not filing the documents previously in the suit As I.A.No. 10/91 was dismissed, consequently, the other two applications were also dismissed. Challenging these three orders, the above Civil Revision Petitions are filed.
4. The main question that falls for consideration in these revisions, is whether, after remand, the trial Court can receive additional evidence in the absence of any specific direction by the appellate Court?
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri. M. Ramachandra Reddy contends that a reading of Rule 23 and 23-A of Order 41 C.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that on remand, the trial Court will again clutch at the original jurisdiction which it has prior to the remand, unless it is circumscribed by the order of remand.
Rule 23 makes it clear that where a suit is disposed of on a preliminary point, the trial Court may reverse the said decree and remand the case with a direction that some issue or issues shall be tried in the case and the evidence already recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. The words “subject to all just exceptions” abundantly make it clear that the evidence already on record alone need not be the evidence after remand. Rule 23 A deals with cases of remand in other respects. Under this rule also, the appellate Court shall have the same powers as it has under Rule 23. So, whenever the appellate Court feels that the evidence already on record is sufficient to dispose of the case, it is open to the appellate Court to say so. If the appellate Court does not give any indication that the lower Court on remand should proceed on the basis of die evidence already on record, the trial Court has got the same jurisdiction as it has before the suit was disposed of.
6. In this case, the learned single Judge of the High Court in A.S.No. 1/83 felt that the matter requires to be re-considered afresh and therefore, remanded the matter for fresh consideration on merits. In other words, the entire matter is at large as the jurisdiction of the trial Court is not circumscribed or restricted in any way by the terms of remand order. Rule 23 of Order 41 C.P.C. also throws light on this aspect. Even the appellate Court has power to receive any document or examine any witness, if it requires the same to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. So, by analogy, the trial Court also after remand, has got power to receive any document or examine a witness for valid or substantial cause.
7. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Budhilal v. Jagannathdas, held as follows:-
“The powers and jurisdiction of the lower Court to deal with the suit, after remand, depend on the specifications of the remand order. Because, but for the order of remand, it had ceased to have any seisin of the case and the jurisdiction conferred on it to re-deal with it was circumscribed by the terms of the order in which the remand was made. We are, therefore, of opinion that where the order of remand lays down any limits for the enquiry to be made by the lower Court, that Court has no jurisdiction to enter into any question which falls outside those limits.”
In another decision reported in Sanatan Mohapatra v. Hakim Mohammad, the Orissa High Court also took the same view which is as follows:-
“In other words, the suit is relegated to the stage of trial where trial has commenced but is not concluded. The direction for a fresh disposal obviously means a direction to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. There is nothing in the remit order nor is that order susceptible to an interpretation as amounting to prohibition to amend the pleadings, even though a case for amendment arose.”
Therefore, it is clear that unless the scope of enquiry by the trial Court is restricted or circumscribed by the terms of the order of remand, the trial Court will clutch at the original jurisdiction to hear the matter and dispose of the same. The words ‘fresh consideration’ in the order of remand, leave no doubt that the trial Court has all the powers it has before disposal of the suit.
8. The only question that remains for consideration is, whether the application to condone the delay in filing documents should be allowed or not? The documents sought to be produced are certified copies and true copies and letters written by the first defendant. Therefore, the defendants will not be taken by surprise or in any way prejudiced. It is no doubt true that the petitioners did not file these documents all these years while the matter was pending in the trial Court or in the appellate Court before remand. But, this cannot be a ground to withhold leave to receive those documents. After the documents are filed, the question of probative value of those documents will be decided. The respondents will have an opportunity to dispute the truth and genuineness or relevancy of those documents. It cannot therefore be said that the respondents will suffer hardship if the documents are allowed to be received. As it is a suit for declaration of title in order to come to just conclusion and decide the real dispute between the parties, these documents would be necessary in the interest of justice. In this view, the lower Court went wrong in rejecting the documents on the ground of laches. As I have already stated,as there is delay in filing those documents, the petition should have been allowed on terms. I, therefore, while allowing this revision petition, by setting aside the order of the lower Court, direct that I.A.No. 10/91 be allowed subject to the condition that the petitioners pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- to the Counsel for the respondents Sri Y.V. Narayana, on or before 20th June, 1993. Subject to the above condition the C.R.P.No. 2189/91 is allowed.
9. For the same reasons, the C.R.P.Nos. 2180 and 2182/91 are consequently, allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.