JUDGMENT
Narayan Roy, J.
1. Heard Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. S. Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3.
2. By this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders as contained in Annexures 4 and 5, whereby and whereunder notice was issued to respondent No. 3, the land-holder, and the proceeding under Section 48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter to be referred to as “Act”) was decided against the petitioner.
3. It appears that the petitioner filed as application under Section 48-E of the Act before the authority concerned, to prevent the threatened ejectment by the land-holder, respondent No. 3. Pursuant to the application filed by the petitioner, a case under Section 48-E of the Act was registered and directions were issued for issuance of notice to the land-holder, respondent No. 3. After appearance of respondent No. 3, the matter was heard by the Collector under the Act and the Collector under the Act having been not satisfied with the genuineness of the claim of the petitioner rejected his claim under Section 48-E of the Act.
4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner firstly submitted that two inquiries were not permissible under the Act, inasmuch as after filing of the application by the petitioner, the Collector under the Act could not have directed for issuance of the notice upon the landholder and thereafter he could not have adjudicated upon the matter entertaining the objections raised by the land-holder. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Collector under the Act failed to take steps for amicable, settlement of the dispute and the Collector under the Act was duty-bound to refer the matter to the conciliation board, no sooner the application under Section 48-E of the Act was filed by the petitioner. Lastly, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Collector without appreciating the case of the petitioner in correct, perspective of the case rejected his claim and, thus, acted beyond the mandates of law; therefore, the order impugned is wholly without jurisdiction.
5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, on the contrary, submitted that the claim of the petitioner was based on a Sood bharna-deed, which was redeemed by respondent No. 3 on 8.7.1997 itself, which would be evident from Annexure-A and only after redemption of the Sood bharna-deed, the petitioner filed an application oil 4.8.1997 stating therein in relation to threat of ejectment by the land-holder for the land in question. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 has also drawn by attention to the writ application to show that the petitioner had approached the Superintendent of Police, Purnea for return of Rs. 8,000/- giver; to respondent No. 3 by virtue of the Sood bharna-deed, It is further submitted that the letter written by the petitioner, as contained in Annexure-3 is undated. It does not support the factum of existence of Sood bharna in between the parties.
6. I have perused the orders impugned. It appears that after filing of the application by the petitioner under Section 48-E of the Act, the Collector under the Act directed for issuance of notice to the land-holder and after service of notice upon the land-holder, the matter was heard by the Collector in presence of the parties. The Collector under the Act having considered the case of the respective parties came to the conclusion that the petitioner was claiming bataidari right over the land in question by virtue of the Sood bharna deed, as referred to above. Since the Sood bharna deed was redeemed few days prior to the application of the petitioner the Collector under the Act held that the petitioner had not made out a prima facie case and the proceeding was vexatious one.
7. On plain reading of the order impugned, it does not appear that the petitioner had tried to adduce evidence to show that he was bataidar under respondent. No. 3 not by virtue of Sood bharna-deed. No evidence, whatsoever, was led by the petitioner, nor the petitioner satisfied the Collector about the genuineness of his claim. The direction issued by the Collector for issuance of notice upon respondent No. 3 and deciding the matter in presence of the parties cannot be said to be two proceedings or inquiries and it must be held that only one inquiry was held as permissible under the Act. The question as to whether the matter can be referred to the conciliation board in a routine manner is no more res Integra. It is settled that subjective satisfaction of the Collector is paramount and the Collector only after satisfying himself that some dispute existed in between the land-holder and the bataidar, should refer the matter to the conciliation board for its amicable settlement. In this connection, reference can be made to the case of Dinesh Murmu and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. 1998 (1) P.L.J.R. 110. In the instant case, to me it appears that the Collector was not even satisfied that the petitioner had some genuineness with regard to his claim, therefore, he rejected his claim on due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. For the reasons, therefore, I do not find any merit in this application. It is, thus, dismissed, but without costs.