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LPA/669/2011 12/ 12 JUDGMENT
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
LETTERS
PATENT APPEAL No. 669 of 2011
In
SPECIAL
CIVIL APPLICATION No. 4774 of 1997
For
Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
=========================================================
1
Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2
To be
referred to the Reporter or not ?
3
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
5
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
=========================================================
KHIMJI
JAMNADAS OIL CAKE INDUSTRIES - Appellant(s)
Versus
STATE
OF GUJARAT & 1 - Respondent(s)
=========================================================
Appearance
:
MR
ASHISH H SHAH for
Appellant(s) : 1,
None for Respondent(s) : 1 -
2.
=========================================================
CORAM
:
HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA
and
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date
: 03/05/2011
CAV
JUDGMENT
(Per
: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)
The
appellant – original writ petitioner has preferred this Appeal
under clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the judgment and
order dated 24th November 2008 passed by the learned
Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.4774/1997, whereby the
learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
Facts
relevant for the purpose of deciding the present Appeal can be
summarised as under:
The
appellant-original writ petitioner is in the business of edible and
non-edible oils. It is his case that he has been issued licence by
the State Government under the Gujarat Essential Articles
(Licensing, Control and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981 (for short,
‘the Order of 1981).
The
business unit of the appellant was suddenly inspected on 17th
June 1997 by officers of Food and Civil Supplies, Junagadh. On
inspection of the said unit, it was found that the appellant was in
possession of essential articles in the form of raw oil. The entire
consignment was seized under the seizure order dated 17th
June 1997. The details are as under:
Sr.
No.
Particulars
Quantity
Value
(Rs.)
1.
Ground
nut solvent oil
17010
3,74,220/-
2.
Rapeseed
solvent oil
10180
2,64,680/-
3.
Partly
processed ground nut
115575
8,55,255/-
4.
Partly
processed rapeseed
320775
14,43,487/-
Total
Value Rupees
29,37,642/-
It
appears that thereafter show-cause notice was issued against the
appellant – original writ petitioner calling upon the
appellant to show-cause as to why the entire consignment of oil
should not be confiscated under the provisions of the Order of 1981.
The
District Supply Officer, Junagadh, vide order dated 15th
July 1997, ordered confiscation of the entire stock of oil which was
seized from the business unit of the appellant. The order passed by
the District Supply Officer was challenged before the Collector,
Junagadh. The Collector, vide order dated 17th October
1998, ordered 50% confiscation of the consignment of oil cake. It
deserves to be noted that the Collector, however, released the
entire consignment of oil cake.
Aggrieved
by the said order passed by the Collector, ordering 50% confiscation
of the oil cake, the appellant preferred Special Civil Application
No.4774/1997. The said petition was heard and dismissed by the
learned Single Judge.
It
appears that the principal contention of the appellant –
original writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge was to the
effect that the Collector committed grave error in passing the order
of confiscation because the seized oil was not edible and,
therefore, not covered under the provisions of the Order of 1981,
since it is not one of the essential items declared under the Order
of 1981. It also appears that the appellant relied on the report of
the Public Analyst indicating that the sample is of raw solvent
extracted ground-nut oil and that it cannot be used for human
consumption. It was also submitted before the learned Single Judge
that the appellant – original writ petitioner was detained
preventively under the provisions of Black Marketing Act and on the
same contention canvassed before the learned Single Judge, the order
of detention was quashed.
The
learned Single Judge took the view that there was sufficient
evidence before the authorities to hold that the seized quantity
comprised of raw oil in the process of being made in the humanly
consumable edible oil. The learned Single Judge took the view that
the authorities below were justified in coming to the conclusion
that the seized oil would be included in the entry “edible
oil” and on this reasoning, thought fit to dismiss the
petition.
We
are of the view that the learned Single Judge, in taking the view as
reflected from the judgment and order, has not committed any error
and we are in complete agreement with the reasonings assigned by the
learned Single Judge. However, in the present case, as the issue
relates to essential commodities, we would like to give our
independent finding in this regard which would further fortify the
view taken by the learned Single Judge, which we are confirming.
We
have heard learned counsel Mr.Ashish H.Desai appearing for the
appellant and the learned AGP Mrs.Manisha L.Shah for the State.
In
this Appeal before us also the same contentions have been reiterated,
namely, that the commodity seized as per the seizure order dated 17th
June 1997 was raw solvent oil and the same was admittedly not edible.
It was also submitted further that the commodity seized was not the
essential article within the meaning of clause 2(8) of the Order of
1981. It was also submitted that as per the provisions of Section
2(a)(v) of the Essential Commodities Act, “edible oil” is
the sub-category of “food stuffs” and, therefore, “edible
oil” should fall within the general category of “food
stuffs” and by no stretch of imagination “raw solvent
extracted oil” can be included in the general category of “food
stuffs”.
We
have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant –
original writ petitioner and we are of the opinion that there is no
merit in any of the contentions.
For
better adjudication of the issue, it would be expedient to look into
certain provisions of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing,
Control and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981. Section 2(8) defines
“essential articles”, which means “an article
specified in the Schedule-I”. Schedule-I appended to the Order
of 1981 is as under:
Food
stuffs
A.
Foodgrains including products thereof.
xxx
xxx
Paddy
Rice
xxx
xxx
Wheat
B.
Pulses including dal whether whole or split with or without husk.
Tur
Moong
Arhar
Masoor
Lobia
Rajmaha
Gram
including peas
Urad
Any
other dal whether whole or split with or without husk.
C.
Edible Oilseeds.
Groundnut
shelled or unshelled
Til
Mustard
Rapeseed
Soyabean
Imported
edible oilseeds
Kharsani
seeds
D.
Edible Oils.
Groundnut
oil (including solvent extracted).
Til
oil, Mustard oil, Rapeseed oil, Cottonseed oil, Soyabean oil,
Sun-flower oil.
Hydrogenated
vegetable oil.
“Imported
edible oils” means (a) Palmolein (b) Palmoil (c) Soyabean oil
(d) Sun-flower oil, or (e) any other edible oil containing any of
the aforesaid oils.
Kharsani
Oil
E.
Sugar-Khandsari.
We
are concerned with clauses (C) and (D) of “food stuffs”
of Schedule-I, so far as the present Appeal is concerned. It is
evident from Schedule-I appended to the Order of 1981 that “edible
oilseeds” and “edible oils” fall within the ambit
of “food stuffs”. The word “edible”,
according to Webster’s Dictionary, in its adjectival sense, means
“fit to be eaten as food; eatable, esculent”. According
to Chambers’ 20th Century Dictionary “edible”
in its adjectival sense means “fit to be eaten”.
Similarly, according to the shorter Oxford Dictionary the word
“edible” in its adjectival sense means “eatable,
fit to be eaten”. The contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the oil which was seized was not “edible oil”
and was “raw oil” and, therefore, not covered under the
provisions of the Order of 1981 since it is not one of the essential
items declared under the Order of 1981, deserves to be rejected on
two good grounds. It is well known rule of interpretation that
associated words take care of their meaning from one another and that
is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction, noscitur
a sociis. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in
collocation with its companion word. The pristine principle based on
the maxim noscitur a sociis (meaning of a word should
be known from its accompanying or associating words) has much
relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory
provision. When “foodstuffs” are associated with edible
oil-seeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be
consumed, it is appropriate to interpret “foodstuffs” in
the wider sense as including all articles of food which may be
consumed by human beings after processing.
In
taking this view, we are fortified by a Supreme Court’s decision in
the matter of K.Janardhan Pillai and another v/s. Union of India
and others, reported in (1981)2 SCC 45. In this case,
before the Supreme Court, the challenge related to the validity of
the declaration made by the State Government of Kerala on 20th
March 1976 declaring that raw cashew-nut was an essential article, in
exercise of the power under clause(a) of Section 2 of the Kerala
Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Kerala Act 3
of 1962) and other Orders. In the said case, the contention before
the Supreme Court was that since the Order regulates only procurement
and distribution of raw cashewnut as industrial raw material for
processing in the factories, it is not being dealt with as foodstuff.
Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 14
of the judgment as under:
“It
is not disputed by the State Government that if raw cashewnut is
foodstuff within the meaning of the Central Act, it cannot be
declared as an essential article under the Kerala Act. What is,
however, urged is that since the Order regulates only procurement and
distribution of raw cashewnut as industrial raw material for
processing in the factories, it is not being dealt with as foodstuff.
Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the
Central Act. There are at least two good reasons to reject this
contention advanced on behalf of the State Government – first, the
language used in Section 2(a)(v) of the Central Act and secondly the
purpose of the Central Act. Section 2(a)(v) of the Central Act reads:
“foodstuffs, including edible oil-seeds and oils”. It is
a well known rule of interpretation that associated words take their
meaning from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of
statutory construction, noscitur a sociis. When ‘foodstuffs’ are
associated with edible oil-seeds which have to be processed before
the oil in them can be consumed, it is appropriate to interpret
‘foodstuffs’ in the wider sense as including all articles of food
which may be consumed by human beings after processing. It is in this
wider sense that the said term has been understood by Indian Courts
as can be seen from some of the decisions to which we shall presently
refer. Secondly, having regard to the history of legislation relating
to foodstuffs dealt with above and the object of the Central Act
which regulates the production, supply and distribution of essential
commodities amongst the poverty-stricken Indian people, the
expression ‘foodstuffs’ should be given a wider meaning as including
even raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles. Any
interpretation that may be given in this case should not be governed
by its consequence on the impugned Order but in the light of the
importance of the Central Act in the context of the national economy.
A narrow interpretation may result in the exclusion of several
articles from the purview of the Central Act although nobody has
entertained any doubt so far about their being essential
commodities.”
In
this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that no error much
less an error of law can be said to have been committed by the
learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant
and, therefore, the Appeal fails and it deserves to be dismissed.
The
Appeal stands dismissed. No order as to cost.
(S.J.Mukhopadhaya,
CJ.)
(J.B.Pardiwala,
J.)
/moin
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