Bombay High Court High Court

Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. vs Union Of India on 25 July, 1997

Bombay High Court
Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. vs Union Of India on 25 July, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1999 (105) ELT 277 Bom
Author: A Desai
Bench: A Desai, T C Das


JUDGMENT

A.A. Desai, J.

1. The petitioner manufactures Drill Rods Penumatic Tools. In view of the Notification No. 164/83 duty was paid from time to time during the period from 1983 to 1985. Subsequently, it was realised that the duty payable is as per Notification No. 858-4-1991 (sic). They, therefore, filed the instant petition in 1987, principally, claiming the refund of the duty as paid.

2. In view of the decision laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India – , petition cannot be entertained as the claim was not preferred within the statutory period as envisaged by Section 27 of the Act.

3. Our attention is particularly invited to observation recorded in para 100 of the report of the judgment. The Supreme Court to mitigate the situation, owing to law as declared, observed that Petitioner who filed Writ Petition or suit is at liberty to present claim for refund within 60 days from the date of the judgment i.e., 19th December, 1996. However, the Petitioners have not availed the opportunity as such and therefore cannot now take the advantage.

4. Another decision referred to us is reported in the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Anam Electrical Manufacturing Co. – wherein it is observed that even if the claim is not instituted within a stipulated period but petition or suit filed within the period prescribed, the parties according to law are entitled to the relief of refund. Even this observation is of no avail since the instant Petition is filed beyond the period of limitation as envisaged by Section 27.

5. The learned Counsel Mr. Nankani then urged that observation of the Supreme Court needs to be interpreted liberally. Even acceding to the submission, the words which are deployed are plain, unambigous and cannot be stretched beyond what they convey in common parlance. The Supreme Court as discussed has stated that 60 days from the date of the judgment “(To-day)”; this phraseology by no stretch of imagination cannot be interpreted to convey something else.

6. In view of this, the Petition is without any merit and is dismissed.

7. Rule is discharged.

8. No order as to costs.