JUDGMENT
Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The grievance of the petitioners is that an interim order passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 7.11.2005 (Annexure P.10) has been violated by the respondents.
2. The respondent-Gram Panchayat has sought the ejectment of the petitioners herein by initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (regulation) Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”). The learned Collector dismissed the petition on 10.4.2002 but the appeal against the aforesaid order was accepted by the learned Director on 8.7.2005. Vide the aforesaid order, the learned Block Development and Panchayat Officer was directed to get demarcated the pond and if it is found that the respondents are in illegal possession, they be removed immediately.
3. In the writ petition against the aforesaid order, this Court stayed the dispossession of the petitioners on 7.11.2005. It is the case of the petitioners that in spite of the order of stay communicated to respondent No. 1, the said respondent started stacking rig for drilling bore, pipes and auxiliary machinery for installing tube well on the land in dispute. The petitioners even approached the police authorities but respondent No. 1 on 19.11.2005, started digging of bore in the land in dispute, which is in possession of the petitioners. It is also pointed out that the Block Development and Panchayat Officer has issued a letter on 29.11.2005 directing respondent No. 1 to stop the works being undertaken by the Panchayat in Khasra No. 306 in view of the stay order passed by this Court. Since, respondent No. 1 was not desisting his activities and violated the stay order passed by this Court, respondent No. 2 called respondent No. 1 and the petitioners in his office on 25.11.2005 but respondent No. 1 willfully, deliberately and intentionally continued the digging of the tubewell in the land in dispute. It is also alleged that respondent Nos. 1,5,6 and 7 threw inflammable substance on the wife of petitioner No. 1, namely, Paramjit Kaur and set her ablaze and gave lathi blows to Rajinder Kaur, wife of respondent No. 2. The wife of the petitioner No. 1 has suffered 40% burn injuries whereas Rajinder Kaur, sustained fracture on the left leg. It was, thus, alleged that interference of respondent Nos. 1,5,6 and 7 into the peaceful possession of the petitioners is deliberate, intentional and willful and thus, the respondents have made themselves liable for proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
4. In reply, it has been pointed out that the writ petition filed by the petitioners has been dismissed on 4.5.2006. The said order was passed on the basis of demarcation report dated 28.9.2005, which was carried out after the order was passed by the Director. It is also pointed out that vide Resolution dated 12.12.2003, the Panchyat has resolved to give the lands in dispute to the Public Health Department for providing water tank for the purposes of drinking water. In pursuance of the said Resolution, the officers of the State Government have approved the tender to carry out the digging of the tubewell in respect of which a contract was given to the contractor on 24.10.2005. Thus, it was pointed out that neither the State Government nor the Contractor was impleaded in the writ petition and, therefore, the work allotted to the contractor was carried out by the contractor as the order of the stay was not communicated to him.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that through interim order dated 7.11.2005 passed by this Court has come to an end with the dismissal of writ petition on 4.5.2006 but still the respondents are liable to be proceeded with for violation of the orders passed by this Court as they have carried out the digging operation in the disputed land even though dispossession of the petitioner was stayed. Reliance is placed upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case reported as Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt Ltd. .
6. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, I do not find that the present contempt petition can proceed further in view of the fact that interim order has come to an end with the dismissal of writ petition on 4.5.2006. This Court in Darshan Singh v. Sadha Singh and Ors. (2002-2) 131 P.L.R. 681, relying upon State of Bihar v. Rani Sanobati Kumari and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Rashpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh , held that neither initiation nor continuation of proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2(3) now Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter to be referred as “the Code”) would be competent after the injunction had been vacated by virtue of the dismissal of the suit. In the instant case, since the contempt petition is in respect of an interim order passed in the writ petition which has since been dismissed, therefore, the petitioner cannot make a grievance against such an interim order.
7. The judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners arises out of a civil suit wherein ad interim injunction was granted. The Court has considered Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (Maharashtra Amendment) inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 65 of 1977. By virtue of the said provision, it is provided that even if any objection is raised regarding the jurisdiction of the civil Court, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending determination of such question as preliminary issue. In Para No. 28 of the judgment, it was found that the orders made by the trial Court were within the jurisdiction of the Court and they have to be obeyed and implemented. It may be noticed that the civil Court granted ad interim injunction and returned a finding that the civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appeal against the said order was also dismissed. Before the appeal was dismissed, the plaintiff moved an application for initiating proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code for flouting the order of interim injunction. When the application filed by the defendants in respect of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was declined and the civil Court confirmed the temporary injunction, subsequently the application filed by the plaintiff was allowed. In appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the impugned order must be complied with.
8. In the suit, the Civil Court granted ad interim injunction holding that it has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Without giving reference to the various proceedings taken out against the order passed by the learned trial Court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code and in proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code, it is sufficient to say that the High Court in revision held that Bombay City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In that circumstances, the question arose whether ad interim injunction granted by the Civil Court is to be implemented by the defendants even though it is held by the High Court that the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was found that the defendants are being sought to be punished for violation committed before the decision of the High Court and according to Section 9-A, the Civil Court and the High Court have the power to pass interim order until that decision.
9. The said judgment provides little assistance to the petitioner inasmuch as the challenge in the present writ petition was to an order of eviction passed against the petitioner under Section 7 of the Act. Though there was an order of stay of dispossession but such order has merged with the final order on 4.5.2006 when the writ petition was dismissed. With the dismissal of writ petition, the order of eviction has attained finality. Present is not the case of lack of jurisdiction of the Court in granting interim order. This Court had the jurisdiction to grant ad interim injunction but such order has since merged with the final order. The respondents cannot be punished for an order which is not in operation now. Still further, Public Heath Department was not party in the writ petition nor there is anything on the record to show that the order was communicated to them. The allotment of contract was complete before interim order was granted by this Court. The contract was for a public purpose i.e., provision of drinking water. Therefore, I do not find any justification to continue with the present contempt petition.
10. Dismissed.