ORDER
AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. Both the Contempt Applications were filed Under Sections 10 to 12 of the contempt of Courts Act to punish the respondents for having committed contempt of Court and for disobeying the order of this Court dated 3.5.1994 in W.M.P.Nos. 11872 and 11973 of 1994 in W.P.Nos. 7760 and 7761 of 1994.
2. According to the petitioners, they were implicated in an offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act and their place of business and residence were raided by the authorities on 21.1.1994 and Indian currency worth Rs. 2,55,000/- was seized by the officials of the 1st respondent. The petitioners would submit that the seizure was without justification since the amount is duly accounded for in the books of accounts. The authorities have also recorded statements from the petitioners on 21.1.1994, 22.1.1994 and 27.1.1994. The petitioners, thereafter, sent letters to the respondents requesting them to furnish with copies of such statements but the respondents replied that the same will not be furnished. Challenging the said refusal of the 1st respondent to give copies of the documents in their communication dated 4.4.1994, W.P.Nos. 7760 and 7761 of 1994 were filed in this Court by both the petitioners for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus. Along with the writ peitions, they fled W.M.P.Nos. 11872 and 11873 of 1994 for interim injunction restraining the respondents from in any manner using the statements of the petitioners dated 21.1.1994, 22.1.1994 and 27.1.1994 without giving copies of the same to the petitioners, pending disposal of the writ petitions.
3. According to the petitioners, the above writ petitions came up for hearing before me and after considering the avermens and records, I passed an order graning interim injunction in terms of the prayer and also directed notice to be served on the respondents. I further directed that the matter be posted in the third Vacation Court, 1994. The petitioners would submit that their counsel immediately intimated the order of injunction to the respondents. A letter was sent to the 2nd resonent on 2.5.1994 by speed post with acknowledgment due. The same was sent to the 1st respondent on 6.5.1994 by Registered post with acknowledgment due. The injunction applications again came up for hearing before this Court and the learned Judge extended the earlier order of injunction by order dated 17.5.1994. According to the petitioners, the said order was also despatched by the Court to the respondents, as could be seen from the records, within a few days from 17.5.1994. The petitioners have also obtained a copy of the same. Thus, it is contended that the original order of injunction granted on 3.5.1994 is current, subsisting and is in force to the knowledge of both the respondents.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondents instead of complying with the orders of this Courts, have seriously violated the same. It is stated in the affidavit that the 1st respondent appears to have sent his report to the 2nd respondent based on the statements of the petitioners above referred to with a requisition to pass an order of detention against the petitioners under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The 2nd respondent notwithstanding the express orders of this Court, has passed an order of detention against the petitioners under the Act using and relying upon the statements recorded from the petitioners on the three dates referred to above. Therefore it is contended that it is the clearest violation of the order of injunction granted by this Court and that the respondents have done so after they have been clearly informed of the interim injunction granted by this Court. It is further stated that the 2nd respondent appeared to have passed the detention order on 30.5.1994 when the injunction order was in force and subsisting in utter violation of the orders of this Court and that the violation is apparent and obvious. The respondents have attempted to serve the order of detention upon the petitioners despite the order of injunction and in violation of the same. In the above circumstances, the petitioners were advised to file Contempt Application No. 218 of 1994 for punishing the respondents for contempt for having passed the order of detention by using the statements of the petitioners despite the order of injunction that was in force. However, the said petition was withdrawn as not pressed since the petitioners were not able to produce any order of detention or any other material to show that the detention order had indeed been passed against the petitioners after the grant of injunction by this Court.
5. The petitioners submit that the 2nd respondent had filed a counter affidavit to the interim application. In the said counter affidavit, the 2nd respondent had categorically admitted that he had indeed passed an order of detention after the grant of injunction by this Court. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent it has been averred that the detention order had been issued on 30.5.1994 against the petitioners. Thus, it is contended by Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, that there is adequate and correct proof available that the respondents had passed an order of detention on 30.5.1994 and that the respondents have indeed used and relied upon the statements of the petitioners dated 21.1.1994, 22.1.1994 and 27.1.1994 for issuing the order of detention.
6. According to Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondents were prohibited from using those statements of the petitioners and when the interim order issued by this Court was already subsisting on 30.5.1994, the order of detention had been passed by the respondents. Therefore, it is submitted that the detention order had been passed in violation of the order of injunction and as such, the said order requires to be quashed and set at naught. Mr. B. Kumar would submit mat the order passed by this Court had been communicated to the respondents and they have been put in knowledge of the entire order passed by this Court. The apart, notwithstanding the letter of the petitioners’ counsel, the respondents have passed the order of detention in total disregard to the interim order of injunction, which amounts to contempt of the lawful order of this Court. The 1st respondent is the sponsering authority who had also been informed on 6.5.1994 of the interim orders of this Court. The 1st respondent owes a duty to inform the 2nd respondent the materials and other details that will have a lasting impact whether or not to make an order of detention. The failure on the part of the 1st respondent to inform the 2nd respondent about the interim orders passed by mis Court is also a matter of further contempt. Thus, according to the petitioners, both the respondents are responsible for violation of the orders of injunction granted by this Court and as such, they are liable to be punished for contempt.
7. Both the respondents filed separate counter affidavits. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent/Union of India, which was sworn to by Mr. K.L. Verma, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Govt. of India, it is categorically admitted that the letter of the counsel for the petitioners informing the subsistence of the interim order had reached the office of the 2nd respondent on 6.5.1994 and that the said letter informing about the prohibitory order passed in the writ petition was received in the Co-ordinatin Wing of the Finance Ministry but due to over sight the same was not put before the Joint Secretary who passed the order of detention. It is also conceded equally that the statements of the petitioners had been used in the order of detention that had been passed on 30.5.1994. Pointing out the above categorical admissions, Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that it is crystal clear that an order had indeed been passed using the statements recorded from the petitioners in clear violation of the order of injunction passed by this Court on 3-5-1994.
8. The 1st respondent in his counter affidavit has admitted that copies of the representation had indeed come to the office even on 9-5-1994 but no communication had been addressed to the Central Government or its empowered authority, but he purports to have sent a letter to his own headquarters. Relying upon this statement, Mr. B. Kumar would submit, that the 1st respondent is also guilty of contempt and that there has been a violation of the orders passed by this Court. It is useful to resproduce paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent dated 4-4-1995. It reads as follows :
“I find from the records that an order of detention dated 30-5-1994 was made by my predecessor Shri Mehandra Prasad. However, the same was not communicated to the State Government by the 1st respondent for execution and for further necessary action against the petitioner herein. I further find from the records that the letter written by Shri. B. Kumar, counsel for the petitioner was received in the Technical Co-ordination Section of the Ministry of Finance on 6-5-1994. However, the said letter was not put up to the Joint Secretary, empowered to pass the orders of detention and obviously my predecessor would not have been aware of the said letter of the counsel for the. petitioner. Even the notice and interim injunction orders from the Hon’ble Court, though received by the T.C. Section on 23-6-1994 was marked and sent to Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi. It was only after notice in the contempt application was received by the 1st respondent, these facts could be gathered. Despite the fact that there is no direct link between the 1st respondent and the Joint Secretary empowered to pass the detention orders, the order of detention dated 30-5-1994 was communicated to the 1st respondent herein through the Director of Enforcement (Sponsoring Authority) for taking further action, was kept in abeyance till 7-3-1995, in view of the aforesaid orders of this Hon’ble Court dated 3-5-1994 and 18-5-1994. It is therefore clear that at no stage and no point of time, there was even the slightest intention to violate the said orders of this Hon’ble Court.”
9. Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Standing Counsel, in reply to the argument of Mr. B. Kumar contented that after the orders of this Court dated 3-5-1994, which was communicated to the office of the 1st respondent, the 1st respondent’s office has not done any overt or covert action in violation of the said order which was subsequently extended by order dated 18-5-1994. But, on the other hand, the letters dated 12-5-1994 and 3-6-1994 which the 1st respondent wrote to the Directorate at New Delhi, clearly prove the intention to implicitly obey the orders of this Court dated 3-5-1994, which was subsequently extended by order dated 18-5-1994. He would further urge that when the order of detention was received by the 1st respondent, it was also kept in abeyance, in that, it was not communicated to the Appropriate Authority for execution which means, the order was only on file without being given effect to, which was clearly made for the purpose of complying with the abovesaid order of this Court dated 3-5-1994, subsequently extended by order dated 13-5-1994. Therefore, whatever happened by way of correspondence between the 1st respondent and the headquarters at New Delhi or between the headquarters office and the Secretary to Government, Government of India, was only official notings and internal correspondence which have not resulted in any prejudice to the petitioners and with which the petitioners can have no concern since such notings and internal correspondence being privileged. Therefore, Mr. V.T. Gopalan contended that it is clear beyond doubt that the petitioners have abused the judicial process by resorting to the present Contempt Applications and getting interim order by filing sub applications in the manner stated in the counter affidavit, which has naturally placed the concerned officials in great distress and mental agony. For these reasons Mr. V.T. Gopalan prayed mat the interim order in the sub applications be vacated and the main Contempt Applications be dismissed with exemplary costs.
10. When the matter was posted for hearing on 6-4-1995 for the appearance of the respondents, Mr A.K. Banerjee, the Deputy Director, and Mr. K.L. Verma, the Joint Secretary, were present in Court. Their appearance for future hearings was dispensed with. One Mr. M.R. Sivaraman, Secretary, Department of Revenue, has filed counter affidavit stating that since he is heading the Indian Delegation for talks in Pakistan between 4th and 8th April, 1995, which has been fixed long time back, he is not able to be present before Court pursuant to the notice in the Contempt Applications. Therefore, by my order dated 6-4-1995, his name was deleted from the array of parties.
11. The only question that arises for consideration in both the Contempt Applications is as to whether the conduct of the respondents, as contended by the counsel for the petitioners, is contunacious and the petitioners’ personal liberty was at stake, and that the respondents are liable to be punished for contempt of the orders passed by this Court on 3-5-1994.
12. Interim order of injunction was passed by this Court on 3-5-1994. Admittedly, the said order, which was extended subsequently, is in force on the date when the order of detention was passed on 30-5-1994. By the interim order, the respondents were prohibited from in any manner using the statements of the petitioners dated 21-1-1994, 22-1-1994 and 27-1-1994 without giving copies of such statements to them pending disposal of the writ petitions. Admittedly, the respondents have passed the order of detention on 30-5-1994 by using the statements recorded from the petitioners on 21-1-1994, 22-1-1994 and 27-1-1994. As mentioned above, the Joint Secretary who filed the counter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, has categorically admitted that the letter of the counsel for the petitioners informing the substance of the order reached the office of the 2nd respondent on 6-5-1994. From that it is clear to my mind that the letter will impute knowledge of the injunction order.
13. The plea of the respondents in the counter affidavit that the letter of the counsel for the petitioners informing about the prohibitory order passed in the writ petitions was received in the Technical Co-ordination Wing of the Ministry of Finance but due to over sight, the same was not put before the Joint Secretary who passed the order of detention on 30-5-1994, is difficult for this Court to accept since the respondents have equally conceded that the statements obtained from the petitioners have been used in the order of detention that had been passed on 30-5-1994. Therefore, it is crystal clear that an order had indeed been passed using the statements recorded from the petitioners in clear violation of the injunction order passed by this Court on 3-5-1994. Likewise, the 1st respondent is also equally liable, in that, in the counter affidavit that has been filed it has been admitted that the copies of the representation had indeed come to the office even on 9-5-1994 but no communication had been addressed to the Central Government or its empowered authority, but he purports to have sent a letter to his own headquarters. Thus, it is seen that the 1st respondent is also guilty of contempt and that there has been a violation of the orders passed by this Court.
14. It is settled law that a formal communication of the prohibitory order is not the requirement of law but it is sufficient if knowledge of the prohibitory order of injunction is communicated to the person concerned. Three decisions of the Supreme Court were relied on by Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, in this context. In the first decision reported in Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, (A.I.R. 1962, S.C.,1989), it has been held as follows :-
“Where the appellants, who were officers concerned in their official capacity with the allotment and management of land for displaced persons, were informed not merely be interested parties by an Advocate (who was an officer of the Court) that the High Court had passed a vaild order staying delivery of possession of certain lands to certain allottees, and a formal application supported by an affidavit was made to that effect, the appellants had no real justification for doubting the authenticity of the order and it was their duty to carry out that order. If the appellants disobeyed the order, there was, in the eye of the law, a wilful disobedience of the order of the High Court staying delivery of possession, and they were guilty of contempt of Court. The appellants could not take up the plea that as the order had not been officially communicated to them, they were at liberty to ignore it.”
15. In the second decision cited by Mr. B. Kumar and reported in Bunna Prasad V. The State of U.P., it has been held as follows:-
“This Court quoted with approval the following passage from Oswald’s Contempt of Court, in Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, :
‘The judgment or order should be served on the party personally, except in the following cases (1) prohibitive orders, the drawing up of which is not completed;
In order to justify committal for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde, as by telegram, or newspaper report, or otherwise, and knew that it was intended to be enforced, or if he consented to the order, or if he was present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, although he left before the order was pronounced.’
We need not consider whether it makes any difference in law if the order has been drawn up. We will for the purpose of this case assume that it does not make any difference. It is also clear that in such matters those who assert that a person had knowledge of the order must prove this fact beyond all reasonable doubt. If there is any doubt, the benefit ought to be given to the person charged with contempt of court. If a person bona fide comes to the conclusion on the material placed before him that the source of information is not authentic, he cannot be held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the order.”
16. In the third decision cited by Mr. B. Kumar and reported in The Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union , it has been held as follows :-
“In order to justify action for contempt of court for breach of prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been officially served on the party against whom it is granted, if it is proved that he had knowledge of the exact order aliunde and he knew that it was intended to be enforced. Official communication is not a condition precedent, provided there is no valid reason to doubt the authenticity of the order conveyed to him.”
17. It is equally well settled that a command to the Government is a command to the officers responsible for its administration. For this proposition, Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, , wherein the Supreme Court in paragraphs 24 and 34 held as follows :
“Some point was sought to be made of the fact that as the State was a juristic entity merely, the wrong which constituted the disobedience, must have been the act of some servant or agent of the Government and that except on the principle of vigarious liability the State could not be liable. This argument which is partly based on the observations of Mukherji. J. in the passage already extracted would if accepted deny that there could be any action by the State at all, is really part of the last submission and could conveniently be dealt with along with it. Besides, it need only be mentioned that the fact that officers and servants of Government could be dealt with as individuals bound by the orders passed against the defendant Government, nor the fact that they would be liable in contempt is no ground at all for holding that the State Government itself would not be liable for their own act…
“We feel wholly unable to accept the construction suggested of the expression ‘person guilty of disobedience’ in the clause. The reason for the variation in the phraseology employed in Clause (1) and (3) of Order 39 Rule 2 is not far to seek. Under the law when an order of injunction is passed that order is binding on and enforceable not merely against the person eo nomine impleaded as a party to the suit and against whom the order is passed but against ‘the agents and servants, etc.’ of such a party. If such were not the law, orders of injunction would be rendered nugatory, by their being contravened by the agents and servants of parties. For that reason, the law provides that in order that a plaintiff might seek to enforce an order against a servant or an agent of the defendant, these latter need not be added as defendants to the suit and an order obtained specifically against them -an order against the defendant sufficing for this purpose. If such agents or servants, etc., are proved to have formal notice of the order and they disobey the injunction, they are liable to be proceeded against for contempt, without any need for a further order against them under Order 39 Rule 2(1). this legal position is brought out by the terms of an injunction order set out in Form 8 of Appendix F to the Code which reads: ‘The Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant C.D., his servants, agents and workmen, from….’. It is not suggested that the form which the order of the Subordinate Judge took in this case, departed from this model.”
18. Therefore, the contention of Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents, can never be accepted as a valid defence mat because of the administrative lapse, the orders of injunction communicated to the proper ministry and proper authority was not given effect to. In my opinion, if such a defence is accepted, then, no orders of this Court can ever be effective or complied with. It is admitted in the counter affidavit that one Mahendra Prasad, who was then holding the post of Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, had passed the order of detention on 30-5-1994 utilising the statements which have been prohibited from being used. The said Joint Secretary is admittedly a servant or agent of the Government Under Section 3(1) of the Act, the primary responsibility for passing the order of detention is only on the State or the Central Government, as the case may be. It is the Central Government that has empowered the Joint Secretary to pass an order of detention. Therefore, a delegatee is equally bound by the prohibitory order issued by the Central Government itself. In this context, I have already referred to paragraph 34 of the decision , which is to the effect that a command to the Government is the command to the officers responsible for its administration.
19. Another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in The Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union, can also be usefully referred to in the present context. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Apex Court held as follows :-
“In regard to the appeal by the Municipal Board it was contended that the Board being a Corporation it acts through natural persons and therefore, it cannot be convicted of contempt of Court. This submission is unacceptable. The law as it exists to- day admits of no doubt that a Corporation is liable to be punished by imposition of fine and by sequestration for contempt for disobeying orders of competent courts directed against them. A Command to a Corporation is in fact a command to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. If they, after being appraised of the order directed to the Corporation, prevent compliance or fail to take appropriate action, within their power, for the performance of the duty of obeying those orders, they and the corporate body are both guilty of disobedience and may be punished for contempt. The appeal on behalf of the Municipal Board thus also fails and is dismissed.”
Thus, it is seen from the above verdict that the agents and servants are equally bound by an order even after the petition for injunction did not specifically say that it is binding on the agents or servants or any person acting as eo-nominee party to the application for injunction.
20. It is settled by catina of decisions of this Court and also of the Apex Court that the Court has a power, nay, a duty, to set aside and void the action taken and order passed in violation of the prohibitory orders. The proposition put forward by Mr. B. Kumar on this line was not disputed by the other side. In this context, I may first refer to the decision reported in Nalla Senapathi Sarkarai Manradiar v. Sri Ambal Mills (P) Ltd., . Anantanarayanan, Officiating Chief Justice, speaking for the Bench has in paragraph 9 observed as under :
“With regard to all the other respondents, including respondent 3, the fact is indisputable that they participated in the metting, except the 1lth respondent, whose case we shall consider separately, and that they had knowledge of the prohibitory orders of Court. It is not in dispute that a contempt of court might be committed even by a party who is not a party on record, in the order which is the subject of contempt. It is sufficient to refer here to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 8, part I, Section 3, Sub-section 39 (also see Osward on Contempt 1910 Edition, page 106) which runs thus:
‘A stranger to an action who aids and abets the breach of a prohnibitory order obstructs the course of justice, and this contempt is punishable by committal or attachment’
There are several English cases cited in the books in support of this authority. Hence, as far as these other respondents are concerned, they are undoubtedly guilty of contempt, whether they were parties to the order or otherwise, so long as it was brought to their notice that the meeting was prohibited, and, nevertheless, they participated in it.”
21. Next I can refer to the land mark judment of a Full Bench of our High Court consisting of Chief Justice K. Veeraswami and S. Natarajan and S.Mohan, JJ. (as they then were) in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. Suppiah, . While considering the question whether the resolution passed at the meeting held on 14-9-1974 can validly stand, notwithstanding the fact that the meeting was held in violation of the inhibitory order, the Full Bench has also considered the scope and ambit of exercise of the inherent powers of this Court Under Section 151 C.P.C. K. Veeraswami, C.J., speaking for the Bench, observed in paragraph 9 as follows:-
“In our opinion, the inherent powers of this Court Under Section 151 C.P.C are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice. Even apart from Section 151, we should observe that as a matter of judicial policy, the Court should guard against itself being stultified in circumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in disobedience of the Court’s orders. But in this case it is not necessary to go to that extent as we hold that the power is available Under Section 151 C.P.C.”
22. The decision reported in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association, is again by a Full Bench of our High Court. In that case, the Full Bench has held that besides the remedy provided under Rule 2-A of Order 39, C.P.C, the Court can also exercise inherent powers and that the powers under Articles 215 and 223 of the Constitution of India are also available to High Court to undo the wrong.
23. The decision reported in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sri. K.M.M. Shetty, is again a case of breach of an undertaking given by a party to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found him gulity of committing contempt of Court and therefore liable to be convicted. Speaking for the Bench V. Ramaswami, J., in paragraph 11 has observed as follows :
“When a Court accepts an undertaking given by one of the parties and passes orders based on such undertaking, the order cannot be in substance to an injunction restraining that parts from acting in breech thereof. The breach of an undertaking given to the Court by or on behalf of a party to a Civil proceedings is, therefore, reported as tantamount to a breach of injunction although the remedies were not always identical. For the purpose of enforcing an undertaking that undertaking is treated as an order so that an undertaking, if broken, would involve the same consequences on the persons breaking that undertaking as would their disobedience to an order for an injunction. It is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a Court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt. The remedy in such circumstances may be in the form of a direction to the contemnor to purge the contempt or a sentence of imprisonment of fine or all of Word. On the fact and circumstances of this case in the light of our finding that there was a breach of the undertaking us think that more imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the ends of justice. There will have to be an order to purge then contempt by directing me 1st respondent-contemnor to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing the same.”
24. The decision reported in S. Prabhavathi v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Thiruppathur, (1994 (I) H.L.J., 14) (decided by me) is yet another case of our High Court invoking the inherent powers Under Section 151 C.P.C., and setting aside the order passed in disobedience of the of this Court.
In paragraph 6 I have observed as follows:
“It is well settled that the inherent powers of the High Court Under Section 151 C.P.C, are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where, in violation of any order passed by this Court, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong doing. The inherent power will not only be available in such cases but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interest of justice. Since the respondent herein has, in utter violation of my order, conducted a secret enquiry behind the back of the applicant and the applicant has been affected because of that order, the applicant can approach this Court and ask for relief on the ground that the orders passed by the respondent would be destructive of her stand-point, and this Court, on a consideration of the entire circumstances and facts, will have to put back the parties in the same position as they stood prier to the passing of the order. Hence, the applicant is to be put back in the same position as she stood immediately prior to the passing of the impugned order by the respondent.”
25. One unreported judgment of S. Nainar Sundaram, J., as he then was, in Contempt Application No. 339 of 1988 dated 13-4-1989 can also be relied on to support the case of the petitioners. That was also a case of prohibiting the respondent therein not to use the confessional statement obtained from the petitioner on 19/20- 2-1988 for any purpose under any Act or Acts pending W.P. No. 1952 of 1988. However, reliance was admittedly placed on other documents such as the mahazar and remand application wherein there is specific reference to the confessional statement of the petitioner. Attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the. contents of the said mahazar and remand application. S. Nainar Sundaram, J., on a perusal of the same, was convinced that there is a reference and reliance on the confessional statement of the petitioner. The learned Judge has observed that the conduct of the respondent therein cannot be commended and may be held to be reprehensible. While clarifying the scope of the order passed, the learned Judge was of the view that it would serve the purpose of the petitioner if the position is made clear and direction is given restraining the respondent therein from implementing the order of detention passed under the Act on 11-8-1988 and further restraining the respondent therein from in- any manner using the mahazar or the remand application or any other document wherein the confessional statement of the petitioner was being referred to or relied on until the respondent gets cleared through the controversy in the writ petition once and for all.
26. The argument of Mr. V.T. Gopalan that the order was passed only on note file and not communicated to the petitioners and therefore, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners is, in my opinion, unacceptable because it is not the case of the respondents that the Joint Secretary did not pass any order of detention but expressed only an opinion and no final decision was taken. When this is not the stand, it is unnecessary to examine the same. Factually, the 2nd respondent filed a counter, in which K.L. Verma, Joint Secretary has admitted as follows:-
“Joint Secretary empowered to pass the detention order. The detention order dated 30-5-1994 was communicated to the 1st respondent through the Director of Enforcement (Sponsoring Authority) for taking further action.”
27. Thus, not only the decision was taken but the same has been formally expressed in a manner required by the Act. It has also left the portals of the Central Government Secretariat and communicated to the 1st respondent at Madras for taking further action viz., execution of the same. In the light of the above facts, I am of the view that it is futile on the part of the Union of India to contend that the order was only in the decision making process. The order of detention is in the nature of warrant for arrest. There is no such requirement of communication, for, it is only executed and the person’s liberty taken away. The decision relied on by Mr. V.T. Gopalan in State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, , in my view, does not support the case of the Union of India. That was a case where certain officials in the intermediary stage preceding the decision has written in the note file comments contrary to the High Court’s order. Actually, decision of the Government itself was for implementation of the High Court’s orders. But the High Court found fault with the authorities expressing dissenting view even at the process of arriving at the decision. It was held to be wrong by the Supreme Court. Such a situation does not obtain here. In the instant case, not only the decision was made in violation of the orders of this Court but it was also formally expressed in the form of an order and the same was also communicated for the purpose of execution. It is the very same order dated 30-5-1994 which the authorities even now insisted upon being executed. Hence, in my view, it would amount to a greater violation if the respondents are permitted to do so, having passed the order in violation of the prohibitory orders passed by me and extended by my learned Brother.
28. There is also no substance in the contention put forth by the respondents’ counsel that the petitioners are not prejudiced. This Court granted injunction that action should not be taken using the statements without giving copies. The averments in the writ petitions were that it is essential that the copies should be supplied so that the petitioners will have a right to correct and contradict the same and thereby exercise the right flowing from Article 22(1) of the Constitution. If the detention order is passed without giving copies, then, the very basis of the writ petitions and the order granting injunction is frustrated. Therefore, I am of the view, that there is a grave prejudice to the petitioners. Thus, looking from any angle, in the interests of justice, it is necessary to void and set aside the order of detention dated 30-5-1994 passed by the officials of the 2nd respondent in violation of the prohibitory orders, by invoking the inherent powers of this Court Under Section 151 C.P.C., which are wide, as already stated, and are not subject to any limitation.
29. Admittedly, there is a violation of the injunction order passed by this Court and that the same has been done in disobedience of the orders of this Court. Under such circumstances, this Court has a duty to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing as succinctly observed by the Chief Justice K. Veerasawami in his leading judgment on behalf of the Full Bench in . I, therefore, set aside the order of detention dated 30-5- 1994 passed by the officials of the respondents against the petitioners.
30. I shall now consider the question of sentence. Admittedly, the proposal for detention of the petitioners had indeed emanated from the 1st respondent and sent to the 2nd respondent. It is incumbent on the part of the 1st respondent to take immediate, emergent and effective setps, after the of the order of injunction, to ensure that the orders of injunction are scrupulously observed and that there is no violation of the order. The 1st respondent knows full well and it is clear from his counter affidavit; that the proposal requesting for orders of detention has already been forwarded. Under the Act, only the 2nd respondent or any of its officials alone have the power and competence to pass an order of detention. The 1st respondent could not have been unaware of the fact that it was the 2nd respondent or its officials who would pass the order of detention. The allegation that respondents 1 and 2 have nothing to do with the passing of the detention order is equally incorrect The detention order could be passed by a person occupying the rank of Joint Secretary of the Union of India, but, it is undeniable that he has exercised the power of detention as a delegatee of the Central Government albeit, specially empowered by the 2nd respondent to exercise the powers of the Central Government to pass the order of detention. Whereas the principal viz, Central Government itself could not have made the detention order using the statements of the petitioners in view of the orders of injunction passed by this Court, his delegatee viz., the Joint Secretary, would be equally bound by such restraint. It is equally undeniable that Joint Secretary who had passed the order of detention using the statements, is a part of the administration of the 2nd respondent Central Government.
31. Though the writ petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court, the Writ Appeals filed by the petitioners have since been allowed by a Bench of this Court. The respondents have undertaken to forthwith supply copies of the three statements to the petitioners. It is in that view, the writ petitions have been held to have been infructuous. It is a stark reality that the detention order has indeed been passed utilising the statements recorded from the petitioners, the use of which has been prohibited by this Court. The plea of non-violation of the orders of injunction is, therefore, not acceptable.
32. However, the explanation offered by the 2nd respondent in the counter affidavit about the failure on the part of the Technical Co-ordination Wing of the Ministry in not placing before the Joint Secretary, who passed the order of detention on 30-5-1994, the injunction order of this Court, is somewhat convincing. This apart, both the respondents in paragraphs 2 and 4 of their respective counter affidavits, have tendered an unconditional apology in the following terms:
“At the outset, the 2nd respondent herein bona fide believe that they have not, at any time, even intended to violate the orders of this Hon’ble Court dated 3-5-1994 and 18-5-1994 and should this Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold that there has been any violation, I hereby sincerely tender my unconditional apology.”
This Court hope and believe that the respondents would not give any room for any such complaint to be made in future in this regard.
33. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the respondents have committed an act of disobedience of the orders of this Court dated 3-5-1994. However, taking a lenient veiw of the matter and the facts and circumstances of the case and also the unconditional apology tendered by both the respondents, I close both the Contempt Applications.
34. The result is, subject to the observations made above and made hereafter, I declare that the parties are put back in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the order of injunction of this Court dated 3-5-1994 in W.M.P. No. 11872 and 11373 of 1994 in W.P. Nos. 7760 and 7761 of 1994, which means, that the detention order passed by the respondents on 30-5-1994 against the petitioners would have no effect whatsoever. The Contempt Applications are accordingly closed. No costs.