JUDGMENT
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, dated 7th April, 1989 in Revision Application No. MRT/NS/I-2 of 1987.
2. This case has a chequered history. It is suffice to mention that the Petitioners claim that the Petitioners’ predecessor was lawfully cultivating the suit land bearing R.S. No. 137 (now Gat No. 909) admeasuring 18 acres and 15 gunthas situate at village Kadhane, Taluka – Patan, District – Satara, since prior to the tiller’s day i.e. 1st April, 1957. On that premise, it is the case of the petitioners that they became deemed purchased and entitled to purchase the suit land. In fact, sometime in 1963, the Mamlatdar initiated Suo Moto proceedings under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for fixation of purchase price in respect of the suit land. However, it appears that the statement of tenant came to be recorded that he was not willing to purchase the suit land. On that basis, the Mamlatdar, Agricultural Lands Tribunal declared the sale to be ineffective by his Order dated 13th March, 1963. Against that decision, the matter was carried in Appeal by the Petitioners which was, however, dismissed. The matter was then carried in Revision at the instance of the Petitioners which was allowed and the Tribunal remanded the case to the 1st Authority for appropriate inquiry, on accepting the case of the Petitioners that a statement of the tenant has been falsely recorded that he was not willing to purchase the suit land. As per this order, the matter stood restored before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal who was required to undertake fresh inquiry under Section 32-G of the Act to determine the purchase price in respect of the suit land. it is not in dispute that the order of the Tribunal dated 27th April, 1967 has become final, having been confirmed by this Court in Writ Petition preferred by the Respondents vide Order dated 15th June, 1972. While the aforesaid proceedings were going on, the tenant was dispossessed and instead the Respondents were put in possession having regard to the declaration given by the First Authority that the sale has become ineffective. Since that order later on came to be set aside by the Revisional Authority as aforesaid, and which view was confirmed by the High Court, the Talathi took steps to restore the suit land to the tenant along with standing crops thereon. That order was passed and possession of the suit land came to be restored to the Petitioners. The Respondents unsuccessfully assailed the order of the restoration of possession of the land to the tenant in Appeal as well as in Revision and later on, by way of Writ Petition before this Court. Accordingly, the suit land has been restored to the Petitioners – tenants. Be that as it may, pursuant to the remand ordered by the Revisional Authority, the 1st Authority reopened the proceedings under Section 32(G) of the Act. The 1st Authority gave opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and on considering the evidence on record found that the Petitioners were not tenants in the suit land. The 1st Authority further opined that out of 18 acres of land, 0.15 gunthas of land was Potkharaba and 13 acres were under teak, nimb, shrubs and grass fallow on the relevant dated i.e. 1st April, 1957 and even prior to that. The Authority, has, however, found that the area admeasuring 5 acres was cultivated and the same was brought under cultivation for Varadi, Groundnut, Bajari and Paddy. However, in view of the finding that the Petitioners were not tenants, the proceedings under Section 32-G came to be dropped as the Petitioners were held not entitled to purchase the suit land. That decision was passed on 21st April, 1981. Against that decision, the matter was carried in Appeal by the Petitioners which was however dismissed on 24th July, 1986. The Petitioners thereafter carried the matter in Revision which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 7th April, 1989. All the three Authorities below have taken the view as aforesaid. The reasons indicated by the Authorities below in substance are that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Petitioners and the Respondents because the land was ‘Kuran’ (Grass) since long and, in that situation, the relationship of the landlord and the tenant cannot be presumed. It is further found that a mere entry in the record of rights was of no avail. It is further found that the evidence of the village officer who was an independent person was conclusive evidence of the nature of land that it is used as grass land since long. It is further found that there are 3 big nallas running through the suit land and, therefore, cultivable area was in patches and cannot be cultivated permanently. It is further found that the land revenue of the suit land was paid by the landlord and there was no rent receipt and lease to establish the tenancy in favour of the Petitioners. It is further found that grass grows naturally on the suit land on an area of about 13 acres and without any human efforts, therefore, the same was not an agricultural land and consequently the Petitioners cannot be treated as tenants thereof. It is also found that the land is a pasture land or covered by grass or kuran and the landlord used to sell the land to the other villagers and most of the land was grass land on which the grass was naturally grown. The land was not covered by the activity of agricultural within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act. It is further found that unless the substantial portion of the land was under cultivation for agricultural use only then the land could be treated as agricultural land and not otherwise. It is found that since only the portion of the land was under cultivation that too in small patches, the same was not covered by the definition of “Agriculture” activity for which reason relationship of landlord and tenant is not established by the Petitioners. On the above reasoning, the proceedings under Section 326 for determination of the purchase price came to be dropped. This concurrent view taken by the three authorities below is subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition.
3. According to Mr. Gole, learned counsel for the Petitioners, the authorities have committed manifest error in holding that the land was not an agricultural land. He submits that, in the first place, no such issue is framed. Moreover, this contention was raised for the first time only on remand of the case to the 1st Authority by the Tribunal. Learned counsel further contends that in any case the approach of the Authorities below in recording the finding that the suit land was not an agricultural land is completely misdirected and has caused miscarriage of justice to the Petitioners. Similarly, he contends that the finding that the Petitioners were not tenants is also misdirected and is against the settled legal position. It is therefore, submitted that although the present Petition arises against the concurrent views expressed by the courts below as the Authorities have committed manifest error, this Court will be duty bound to correct that mistake and remedy the error committed by the authorities below.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Rane, learned counsel for the Respondents, contends that all the courts below have concurrently recorded finding which is essentially findings of fact. In such a situation, it is not open for this Court to take a different view merely because there is some error here or there. He contends that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is very limited and, therefore, this is not the case for invoking that jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submits that the authorities have rightly considered relevant aspects in concluding that the land in question is not an agricultural land. He contends that the case, as made out by the tenant, was that he was a tenant in respect of 18 acres of land and the finding of fact recorded by all the authorities below is that, only 5 acres of land was under cultivation that to in patches. He submits that since the major portion of the suit land was not utilised for agricultural activities, the Petitioners cannot be treated as tenants in respect of such land. Learned counsel further submits that the courts below have found that the tenant was employed as watchman on payment of Rs. 100/- and, therefore, such a person will not fulfill the definition of tenant within the meaning of this Act. In the circumstances, Mr. Rane contends that the Petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Having considered the rival submissions broadly, two issues have emerged for my consideration; (i) whether the suit land is an agricultural land and (ii) whether the Petitioners are tenants within the meaning of the Act.
6. Indeed, no issue was framed by the Authorities below as to whether the suit land is an agricultural land as such. But, to my mind, that issue being a jurisdictional issue could be and was required to be answered on the basis of the materials on record. Accordingly, the Authorities below cannot be faulted for having adjudicated that aspect of the matter.
7. That takes me to the main issue as to whether the conclusion reached by the authorities below that the entire suit land was not an agricultural land can be sustained? Before I advert to this aspect, it is necessary to refer to the definition of ‘agriculture’ in Section 2(1) of the Act, which reads thus:
“2(1) ‘Agriculture’ includes horticulture, the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or a part thereof for the grazing of his cattle, the use of any land, whether or not an appanage to rice or paddy land, for the purpose of rab manure but does not include allied pursuits or the cutting of wood only.”
The Act also defines the ‘Agriculturist’ in Section 2(2), which reads thus:
“2(2) ‘Agriculturist’ means a person who cultivates land personally.”
The expression “to cultivate personally” is defined in Section 2(6), which reads thus:
“2(6) to cultivate personally means to cultivate land on one’s own account-
(i) by one’s own labour, or
(ii) by the labor of any member of one’s family or
(iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one’s family, by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share, being land, the entire area of which-
(a) is situate within the limits of a single village, or
(b) is so situated that no piece of land is separated from another by a distance of more than five miles, or
(c) forms one compact block:
provided that the restrictions contained in Clause (a) (b) and (c) shall not apply to any land-
(i) which does not exceed twice the ceiling area,
(ii) upto twice the ceiling area, if such land exceeds twice the ceiling area.”
The Act also defines expression “Land” in Section 2(8), which reads thus:
“2(8) ‘land’ means-
(a) land which is used for agricultural purposes or which is so used but is left fallow, and includes the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land; and
(b) for the purposes of Sections 16, 16, 17, 17A, 17B, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 41, 63, 64, 64A, 84A, 84B an 84C-
(i) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or artisans and land appurtenant to such dwelling houses;
(ii) the sites of structures used by agriculturists for allied pursuits;”
On conjoint reading of the above provisions, it can be discerned as to what is an “agricultural land”. And the ‘land’ which is used for ‘agricultural purposes’ or which is so used but is left fallow, is governed by the provisions of this Act. The expression ‘agricultural purposes’, as mentioned earlier, can be seen from the definition of ‘agriculture’ in Section 2(1) which includes horticulture, the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or a part thereof for the grazing of his cattle, the use of any land, whether or not an appanage to rice or paddy land, for the purpose of rab manure but does not include allied pursuits or the cutting of wood only. It is in this context, we have to consider whether the suit land is agricultural land or not. Much was argued and which argument found favour with the Authorities below that major portion of the land about 13 acres was naturally grown grass land and, therefore, the entire land was not covered by the provisions of this Act. It is relevant to recapitulate at this stage that the suit land admeasures 18 Acres and 15 Gunthas. The courts below have concurrently found that agricultural activity was carried on in about 5 Acres of that land in patches and the remaining about 13 Acres of land was “Kuran”, pasture, etc. It is well settled that after the amendment of 1956, even if grass is naturally grown on the land, the same is not extricated from the application of this Act. Whereas, if such naturally grown grass were to be used by the agriculturist for the purpose of grazing of his own cattles then it was covered within the definition of ‘land’ in Section 2(8) of the Act. To put it differently, even on a land where grass is grown naturally but that grass is used for grazing of the cattles of the tenant, such a land will be governed by the provisions of this Act. In the present case, it has been concurrently found by all the Authorities below on the basis of the relevant record that on 1st April, 1957 and even before that, out of 18 acres of the suit land, 0.15 gunthas was under Pot-kharab. The Authorities have further found as a fact on the basis of the materials on record that, out of 18 acres, 13 acres of land were under teak, Nimb, shrubs and grass fallow on 1st April, 1957 and also prior to that. Even accepting the concurrent finding of the Authorities below that in about 13 acres of land grass was grown naturally as it is, that by itself was not sufficient to return a finding that the entire suit land was not governed by the provisions of this Act. For atleast the land which was brought under cultivation for ‘agriculture’ by the tenant to the extent of about 5 Acres was obviously governed by the provisions of this Act irrespective of the fact that it was done in patches because of the nallas cutting across the land. Moreover, even with regard to the other 13 Acres of land on which grass was naturally grown, if it is found that, that grass entire or portion thereof, was used for grazing of the tenant’s cattles then to that extent the land would be governed by the provisions of this Act. Therefore, the Authorities were obliged to consider the plea taken by the Petitioners and which has been adverted to in the order of the 1st Authority, that the Petitioners were utilising about 13 acres of land for grazing of their cattles. If that plea was to be accepted in part or fully, as mentioned above, even such land used for grazing of the cattles, though naturally grown grass, was to be governed by the provisions of this Act. However, as is seen from the judgment of all the three Authorities below, they have not even adverted to this aspect and have not recorded a clear finding either way that the Petitioner were or were not utilising the grass land for grazing of their cattles. To that extent, the Authorities below have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. I shall presently advert to the nature of relief that ought to be granted in such a case.
8. The Authorities below have then concurrently fond that an area of about 5 acres was cultivated and the same was brought under cultivation by the tenant for varadi, tur, groundnut, bajari and paddy on 1st April, 1957 and even before, that is obviously an agriculture activity. Therefore, the land so used will be plainly governed by the provisions of this Act. To overcome this position, it was contended that since major portion of the land was not under cultivation, namely, out of 18 acres, only 5 acres was found to be under cultivation, in such a situation, the entire land would not be governed by the provisions of this Act. I find no force in this submission. There is nothing in the Act to take such a pedantic view so as to frustrate the right of the tenant atleast to the extent of land which is otherwise governed by the provisions of this Act. This Act is a social welfare legislation and the interpretation ought to be to further the legislative intent of protecting the rights and interest of the persons in lawful cultivation. To my mind, if the tenant claims that he is in lawful cultivation of a larger area but positively establishes before the Authorities that atleast some portion of the land was under his lawful cultivation as a tenant, then he should succeed atleast to the limited extent instead of non-suiting him in entirety. In other words, as found by the Authorities below that the land admeasuring about 5 acres 20 Gunthas was brought under cultivation, will have to be held as agricultural land so as to be governed by the provisions of this At. The authorities below have misdirected themselves in this behalf which has caused serious miscarriage of justice.
9. The next question is whether the Petitioners can be treated as tenants in respect of the suit land. According to the Petitioners, their predecessor Rama Bala Kumbhar was lawfully cultivating the suit land from much prior to 1st April, 1957. It is further asserted that 1/3rd area of the suit land was brought under cultivation and the remaining area on which grass was grown was utilised for grazing of cattles. This position is reinforced from the village records for the relevant period. On the other hand, the Respondent contend that the Petitioners’ predecessor was appointed as Watchman on payment of Rs. 100/- as remuneration. He was working as Watchman for 20 years and that the Petitioners’ predecessor was never treated as tenant in any portion of the suit land. It was further asserted on behalf of the Respondents that the land was not agricultural land and that the Petitioners’ predecessor had no agricultural implements but was in business of “Kumbharki”. It was further contended that the Respondents were paying the land revenue and since there was no rent recept, merely on the basis of entries in the village records, the Petitioners cannot claim that they were tenants in respect of the suit land.
10. Before we proceed further, it would be apposite to advert to the definition of “tenant” in Section 2(18) of the Act, which reads thus:
“2(18) “tenant” means as person who holds land on lease and include,-
(a) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4;
(b) a person who is a protected tenant; and
(c) a person who is a permanent tenant;
and the word “landlord” shall be construed accordingly;”
The other definition relevant for our purpose is of expression “tenancy” as contained in Section 2(17) of the Act, which reads thus:-
“2(17) ‘Tenancy’ means the relationship of landlord and tenant;”
Besides it will be necessary to now advert to Section 4 of the Act, which reads thus:
“4. Persons to be deemed tenant.: (1) A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not,-
(a) a member of the owner’s family, or
(b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner of any member of the owner’s family,or
(c) a mortgage in possession.”
…..”
On conjoint reading of the above provisions, it is obvious that a person is a tenant if he holds on lease and would also include a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4 of the Act. We are concerned with the latter category of tenant in the present case. In this case, it is nobody’s case that the Petitioners’ predecessor was occupying the suit land pursuant to a lease deed. But it is contended that he had become deemed tenant by virtue of Section 4 of the Act as he was lawfully cultivating the suit land and the lands were not being cultivated personally by the land owners. The purport of Section 4 has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Dahya Lala and Ors. v. Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim and Ors., reported . It will be apposite to advert to the opinion expressed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court. A portion of paragraph 5 which refers to the plea taken before that Court and the manner in which the same has been resolved by the Apex Court can be discerned from Paragraph 6 of the same decision. A portion of Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 6 of the same decision read thus:
“5. But, Dr. Barlingay, on behalf of the appellants, contended that a person can be said to be lawfully cultivating land within the meaning of Section 4 only if he has derived hi right to cultivate directly from the owner of the land, and not from some other person who has a limited interest, such as a mortgagee from the owner. Counsel also contended that the expression “mortgagee in possession” in Clause (c) of Section 4 includes a person claiming a derivative right such as a tenant of the mortgagee in possession. We are unable to agree with these contentions……”
“6. The Act of 1948, it is undisputed, seeks to encompass its beneficent provisions not only tenants who held land for purpose of cultivation under contracts from the owners but persons who are deemed to be tenants also. The point in controversy is whether a person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must have been cultivating land with the consent or under the authority of the owner. Counsel for the appellants submits that tenancy postulates a relation based on contract between the owner of land, and the person in occupation of the land, and there can be no tenancy without the consent of authority of the owner to the occupation of that land. But the Act has by Section 2(18) devised a special definition of tenant and included therein persons who are not contractual tenants. It would therefore be difficult to assume in construing Section 4 that the person who claims the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land with the consent or authority of the owner. The relevant condition imposed by the statute is only that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land “lawfully”: It is not the condition that he must cultivate land with the consent of or under authority derived directly from the owner. To import such a condition is to rewrite the section, and destroy its practical utility. A person who derives his rights to cultivate land from the owners would normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously not be a “deemed tenant”. Persons such as licences from the owner may certain be regarded as falling within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed therefrom that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all persons who hold agricultural lands as contractual tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others, and it would be unduly restricting the intention of the Legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to persons who derive their authority from the owner, either under a contract of tenancy, or otherwise. In our view, all persons other than those mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4 who lawfully cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or not their authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be deemed tenants of the lands.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. From the above ruling, it is seen that a person, who is lawfully cultivating the land belonging to anther person and not falling under the excepted category, shall deemed to be a tenant of that land. And if he was so cultivating on the tiller’s day i.e. 1st April, 1957, he would become deemed purchaser of such land. This is the mandate of the scheme of the provisions of the Act. In this case, the Petitioners’ predecessor is neither a member of the owner’s family nor a mortgagee in possession. According to the Respondents, however, he was working as Watchman on payment of Rs. 100/- per month. However, on examining the impugned judgments, none of the Authorities below, to my mind, have recorded a positive finding that the Petitioners’ predecessor was paid Rs. 100/- only towards his salary as Watchman. In fact, there is no discussion about the evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondents in that behalf. No doubt, the Tribunal has observed in Paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment on which strong reliance was placed that it has already been found that the Petitioners’ predecessor was kept as Watchman in the suit land. However, on careful examination of the entire judgment of the Tribunal, even the learned counsel for the Respondents was not able to point out any portion that, the Tribunal has discussed that aspect and recorded a positive finding earlier, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the judgment. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, neither the first Authority nor the Appellate Authority has found as a fact that the Petitioners’ predecessor was working as Watchman on the suit land. On the other hand, there is contemporaneous documentary evidence for the relevant period of 1957 and even earlier period which indicates that the Petitioners’ predecessor was lawfully cultivating the suit land as tenant. The entry found in the village record. Moreover, it is seen from the record that the Petitioners’ predecessor was in possession on the relevant date and even prior to that and was lawfully cultivating and engaged in agricultural activity at least to the extent of about 5 acres of land. Merely because there is no Lease or Kabulayat Rent Receipt produced, that alone cannot be the basis to discard the claim of such a person, for there is legal presumption by virtue of Section 4 that he is deemed tenant. It will be relevant at this stage to advert to the ruling of our High Court in Special Civil Application No. 479 of 1972 decided on 20th November, 1975 in the case of Dhondu Bapu Survey v. Aniruddh Yeshwant Vaidya. In that case, the Authority below had given similar reason that because there was no entry in the tenancy column, n rent note to support the Petitioner’s case, he could not be held to be a tenant. That reasoning did not meet the approval of this Court as can be seen from the following observations.
“The reasoning of the Tribunal is against the provision of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, which does not require an entry in the tenancy column or a rent note or a rent receipt to support the claim of a tenant to statutory tenancy that section.”
12. Mr. Rane, learned counsel for the Respondents, has placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Gulabrao N. Wani v. Hemakashiram Gajare and Ors., , to contend that Section 4 only raises a presumption, which is rebuttable, and the Respondents rebutted that resumption by asserting that the Petitioners’ predecessor was employed as Watchman in respect of the suit land on payment of Rs. 100/-. He further contends that the Respondents also examined village Talathi to depose about the status of the land, who is an independent witness. To my mind, this decision is of no avail to the Respondents. In the first place that was a case of contractual relationship between the parties not in the nature of tenancy. Besides, by merely orally asserting that the Petitioners’ predecessor was employed as Watchman will not be sufficient for the Respondents so as to rebut the presumption. Moreover, no case is made out that the Petitioners’ predecessor was paid wages in cash or kind but not in crop share. In so far as the oral evidence of Talathi, who has been examined some time in 1973 that cannot be the basis for discarding the documentary evidence in the nature of village record which also raises a presumption about its correctness. Whereas, the village record pertains to the year 1957 and prior to that period. All that is required to be examined to decide the claim under Section 4 of the Act is of lawful cultivation by a person other than the excepted category. It is not open to the Authorities to read into that section old fashioned notion of the law of landlord and tenant which required the entries in the tenancy column, rent note or rent receipt to support the case of tenancy. The Legislature knowing all these old requirement has adopted a definition of ‘statutory tenancy’ irrespective of such things. It will be useful to also advert to another decision of the Apex Court reported in 1987 Vol. LXXXIX BLR 622 in the case of Jagan Alias Jagannath Umaji v. Gokuldas Hiralal Tewari. In that case, the Appellant was appointed as a Pujari for worshipping the God in the temple and looking after the management of Dharmashalas. While doing so, it was not in dispute that he was cultivating agricultural lands and appropriating the crops in lieu of payment of services which he rendered as Pujari. In that backdrop, and considering the purport of Section 4, the Apex Court observed that as far as the case before them is concerned, the Appellant was admittedly cultivating the lands in question and was not a member of the landlord’s family nor was he a hired labourer. The cultivation was clearly lawful because the respondent to whom lands belonged had permitted to do so. The Apex Court then went on to observe that the record shows that this right to cultivate the land and appropriate the produce was given to the Appellant because of the services he was performing as a Pujari of a temple of the Respondent and as he was looking after Dharmashalas. By reason of these facts, observed the Apex Court, it might be said that he was cultivating the said lands as a servant of the Respondent but he had not been paid nay wages in cash or king but by way of a crop share, the share being the entire crop. Having regard to the above enunciation and the established facts from the record of the present case, as has been found by the authorities below, the Petitioners will necessarily have to be held as tenants at least with regard to the land brought under cultivation to the extent of about 5 acres out of 18 acres of such land. And, therefore, the Petitioners are entitled to be declared as deemed purchasers of that portion of land, provided they do not exceed the prescribed holding. The appropriate Authority will have to examine that aspect and also determine the purchase price for such land to be paid by the Petitioners.
13. Insofar as the remaining 13 acres of the land is concerned, which is stated to be naturally grown grass land, as observed above, the Authorities below ought to have returned a clear finding of fact one way or the other that the predecessor of the Petitioners was or was not utilising that land for grazing of his cattles or otherwise. If the remaining 13 acres of land were being used for grazing of cattles, as contended by the Petitioners, then, as aforesaid, such land will also be governed by the provisions of this Act. That is a question of fact. Instead of appreciating the materials on record, for the first time in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the appropriate course is to remand the matter to the Appellate Authority to return a clear finding of fact on that aspect. The remand, as aforesaid, will be limited to the inquiry with regard to the said about 13 acres of the land stated to be naturally grown grass land. That is essential because, I have already held that if the Petitioners succeed in establishing that the entire or portion of that naturally grown grass was utilising for grazing of their cattles then, they would be entitled to be declared as deemed tenants within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act to the extent of such land utilised for grazing of the cattles and for which reason, they would be entitled to purchase that land for determination of purchase price thereof under the provisions of Section 32(G) of the Act. As further inquiry with regard to the remaining about 13 acres of the land will have to be undertaken, proceedings for determination of purchase price with regard to the said about 5 acres of land can await that decision so that in the event the Authorities find that even the said 13 acres or portion thereof was governed by the provisions of the Act, as it was utilised for grazing of cattles by the Petitioners’ predecessor, then the Petitioners would be entitled for reliefs even with regard to that land. In which case determination of purchase price of the total land liable to be purchased by the Petitioners can be fixed together and on recording a finding that the Petitioners would be entitled to purchase that land as the tenant was not in excise holding.
14. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Writ Petition succeeds on the above terms. The impugned orders passed by the Authorities below are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded for the limited purpose, as aforesaid, to the Appellate Authority, who shall decide the matter finally as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of writ of this Court.
15. There shall be no order as to costs.
16. In view of the above order, Civil Application disposed of.