ORDER
G.N. Srinivasan, Member (J)
1. This is an appeal filed by the appellants against a decision of the Collector of Customs, Air Cargo Complex Sahar Bombay made in Order No. S/10-3050/86 ACC (I) dt. 25th November, 1986 whereby he ordered confiscation of the goods and demanded a sum of Rs. 1,95,000/- from the appellants who had filed a bond for the said amount.
2. The appellants purchased from one Diamond Exporter by name Kiritlal Kalidas Diamond Exports on a high seas basis goods concentrated terpeneless Lemon Oil. The said diamond exporters were given additional licences under the Import Policy for the year 1978-79. The goods were imported by the licencee which were sold to the appellants as stated earlier on high seas basis, The licence No. was P/W/3099127/C/WX/96/D-78 dt. 3.9,1985. The appellants filed the Bill of entry on 11.2.1996 indicating inter alia that the goods were imported from Brussels, Belgium. At the time of import the goods formed part of Appendix 2 Part B of the Import Policy dealing with a list of restricted items by the entry 32 thereof. It was contended by the appellants that the goods were not in the list of banned items mentioned in Part A of the Appendix 2 of the relevant policy but formed Part B of the said Appendix dealing with restricted items. Therefore it was contended by them that the goods could be imported, They appeared before the adjudicating authority and explained their case. The Commissioner after hearing the parties and looking into the entire matter including the representations made by the appellants confirmed the demand. It is to be pointed out that the Commissioner dealing with the contentions of the appellants case decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajprakash Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India Civil Appeal No. 4978 of 1985 . He also referred to the case of Supreme Court in the case of Rajnikant Brothers v. UOI and also the case of UOI v. Godrej Soaps. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Indo Afghan Chamber of Commerce v. Union of India . The main contention of the appellant is that in Rajprakash Chemicals case it was the case of replenishment licence not an additional licence and the item in question is found in restricted items not a banned item and therefore the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the Commissioner will not be applicable to the fact of the case. He also invited our attention to Part A of Appendix 2 of the relevant policy regarding banned item. Therefore the instant case is not applicable.
3. As against this Mr. Talajia, Junior Deptl. Representative supported the order made by the adjudicating authority.
4. We have considered the rival submissions. It is true that the Supreme Court in Rajprakash Chemicals case the Court dealt with a banned item. The adjudicating authority followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Godrej Soaps case but however it has to be mentioned that what is banned item and what is restricted item and has been fully described in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indo Afghan Chamber of Commerce which is . In the said judgment at paragraph 11 it was held as follows:
It was declared that the items excluded from import by diamond exporters under Additional Licences under the Import Policy 1985-88 were the items enumerated in Appendix 3 and Appendix 2 Part A of that Import Policy. Appendix 2 Part A is the successor of Appendix 4 (List of Absolutely Banned Items) of Import Policy 1978-79. A question arose before us whether Appendix 2 Part B of Import Policy 1985-88 could also be regarded as a successor of Appendix 4. It appears from the material placed before us that Appendix 2 Part B (List of Restricted items) was also successor of Appendix 4 (List of Absolutely Banned Items). Appendix 4 in the Import Policy 1978-79 was described as the absolutely banned list. In the Import Policy 1982-83, the same Appendix 4 is described as list of Non-Permissible Items (Banned). The same description of Appendix 4 continued in the Import Policy 1983-84. During that year Beef Tallow was added in Appendix 4 in the Import Policy 1984-85. Appendix 4 became Appendix 2 Part A and Appendix 2 Part B. Appendix 2 Part A was described as a List of Banned Items and Appendix 2 List B was described as List of Restricted Items. In the contents of the Import Policy 1985-88 the list of Appendices makes clear that Appendix 4 of Import Policy 1983-84 became Appendix 2 Part A and Appendix 2 Part B of the Import Policy 1984-85. The same description of Appendix 2 Part A and Appendix 2 Part B was continued in the Import Policy 1985-88. Therefore, it is apparent that the present Appendix Part A and Appendix 2 Part B constitute together what was originally List 4 (List of Absolutely Banned Items) under the Import Policy 1978-79. On the reasoning which found favour with this Court in its judgment dated March 5.1986 we hold that diamond exporters holding Additional Licences were not entitled to import goods enumerated in Appendix 2 Part B of the Import Policy 1984-85. On that ground also the respondents diamond exporters are not entitled to take advantage of item 121 of Appendix 2 Part B for the purpose of importing dry fruits. As held by this Court in its judgment dated March 5, 1986, holders of Additional Licences are entitled to import only those goods which are included in Appendix 6 Part 2 List 8 of the Import Policy 1985-88. Dry fruits are not included in that List and therefore they cannot be imported under Additional licences.
(Emphasis supplied)
We have also emphasized the portions underlined by us. In our view the argument of the appellant is not correct legally as found by the Supreme Court in Indo-Afghan Chamber of Commerce case. Following the said judgment we hold that the appellants do not have any case. We are conscious of the fact that Indo Afghan Chamber of Commerce case dealt with dry fruits and the instant matter is in respect of flavouring essence. The principle involved in the case is that it falls within restricted items forming part of Appendix 2 which the appellant could not have imported without having a valid licence. The appeal of the appellant is therefore dismissed.