ORDER
J.P. Singh, J.
1. Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by Krishan Lai, petitioner, seeking setting aside of order dated 24-8-2001 of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class; Basohli holding his complaint “Not maintainable” and consequently discharging the respondent by directing dismissal of the complaint.
2. Records of learned Judicial Magistrate have been perused. Petitioner complained infraction of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the plea that cheque No. 115793 for an amount of Rupees thirty seven thousand, issued by the respondent and delivered to the petitioner to discharge an existing debt, bounced when presented for payment to the Jammu and Kashmir Bank, Basohli.
3. Two notices appear to have been sent by the petitioner to the respondent. The second notice is stated to have been served on the accused on 24-1 -2000, when the earlier notice returned unserved.
4. Learned Magistrate, on being satisfied with the statement of the complainant and his witness Dev Raj, recorded existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
5. The respondent appeared before the Court in answer to the process, when his statement was recorded on 7-11-2000, where he admitted to have taken an amount of Rupees thirty seven thousand from the petitioner and issued a cheque therefor favouring the petitioner. The respondent specifically admitted of having committed the offence.
6. To a specific question by the Magistrate as to whether he knew that he could be punished and sentenced in the event of his admission of accusation, he answered in the affirmative.
7. It appears that on the request of the accused respondent, the case was adjourned to 30-11 -2000 because the respondent had requested for a longer date on the ground that the marriage of his daughter was fixed for 18-11-2000. The respondent thereafter absented. His presence was secured by warrant of arrest.
8. Learned Magistrate appears to have taken up the complaint for final consideration on the date when the case was stated for securing the presence of the respondent accused and respondent accused had appeared on that date.
9. It is this consideration by the learned Magistrate, which has resulted in passing of the order impugned in this petition.
10. The learned Magistrate held the complaint “Not maintainable” because of non-service of notice contemplated by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
11. Petitioner is aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint.
12. Sh. S. K. Shukla, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has questioned the order of learned Magistrate on the ground that procedure prescribed by law has been given a go-by and the admission of accusation recorded by the learned Magistrate has not been adverted to while dealing with the case, which, according to the learned Counsel, has resulted in miscarriage of Justice.
13. Learned Counsel further submits that the learned Magistrate had proceeded on wrong premise in presuming non-service of notice contemplated by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the respondent.
14. Perusal of the trial Court records shows that, the learned Magistrate, after having recorded admission of accusation contemplated by Section 242 Code of Criminal Procedure Smvt. 1989 and posting the case for further proceedings, on the request of the accused respondent, in terms of Section 243 Code of Criminal Procedure, misdirected himself in proceeding to consider the plea of the accused respondent contrary to the procedure prescribed by Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the trial of Summons Cases. Rather than proceeding under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Magistrate proceeded to dismiss the complaint and that too on plea, which the records do not support.
15. Learned Magistrate held that the complainant petitioner had not served notice on the respondent. The records do not bear testimony to this fact. Petitioner complalnant has specifically stated both in his statement as also in the complaint that the second notice issued to the accused, was served upon him on 24-1-2000. Paragraph 6 of the complaint reads as follows:
6. That the post registered letter returned unserved, the complainant received on 9-1-2000 with the report that the accused was not available at home. There on 9 to 16 January, 2000 the complainant tired to search the accused and on 16-1-2000 the complainant found the accused this residence/house and there on 17-1-2000 the complainant again served a notice through registered letter, acknowledgment due on accused with demand for the payment of the said amount. The said notice was served on accused on 24-1-2000. The acknowledgement duly signed by the accused on 24-1-2000 is appended herewith.
16. Code of Criminal Procedure Smt. 1989, does not vest any such power in a Magistrate holding trial of Summons Cases instituted otherwise than on Police report, to truncate the proceedings and short circuit the procedure prescribed under Chapter XX of Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrates do not possess any inherent jurisdiction or statutory power to review the order of issuance of summons. They are required to pass final orders only after exhausting the procedure prescribed under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
17. Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Ors. reported as AIR 2004 SC 4674 : 2004 Cri LJ 4874, cited by Sh. Shukla, supports the aforesaid position in law.
18. While considering admission of accusation in terms of Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate does not have any option except to convict the person making the admission of accusation, unless: of course, he shows sufficient cause why he should not be convicted for the offence, accusation whereof is admitted by him. In case, the Magistrate finds sufficient cause for not convicting the accused, in that case too, he has no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint on that score; he has instead to proceed to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. The learned Magistrate in the present I case has, thus, proceeded both against facts | as also against law in holding that notice had not been served by the petitioner on the respondent without affording the complainant any opportunity of proving his case as set up in the complaint and in dismissing the complaint of the complainant on that basis in assuming jurisdiction which did not vest in him.
20. Order dated 24-8-2001 passed by learned Magistrate is, therefore, without jurisdiction besides being illegal. This order is, accordingly, set aside. Learned Magistrate is directed to proceed afresh in the matter in accordance with Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
21. The respondent, though served; has not chosen to appear at the time of consideration of this petition. Learned Magistrate shall, thus, issue coercive process for securing the presence of the respondent, accused.
22. Disposal of criminal cases cannot brook unnecessary delay as it affects the criminal justice dispensation system. The present case being a summons case should have concluded within a period of six months, the maximum period prescribed for investigation of offences triable as summons case under Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to avoid injustice to the parties. This, however, has not happened, because of the wrong approach adopted by the learned Magistrate in dealing with the case. The learned Magistrate is, therefore, directed to ensure that the trial in the complaint is concluded in accordance with the law expeditiously and not later than four months from the date of this order. In case the proceedings are not so concluded, the learned Magistrate, seized of the case, shall send a report to the Registrar Judicial of this Court explaining the reasons for delayed trial of the case.
23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner is directed to cause the appearance of his client before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Basohli, on March 20, 2006.