High Court Kerala High Court

Krishnan Venugopalan vs Sreedevi @ Srimathi on 12 February, 2008

Kerala High Court
Krishnan Venugopalan vs Sreedevi @ Srimathi on 12 February, 2008
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

MFA No. 1261 of 1999(B)



1. KRISHNAN VENUGOPALAN
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs

1. SREEDEVI @ SRIMATHI
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.M.P.KRISHNAN NAIR

                For Respondent  :SRI.J.OM PRAKASH

The Hon'ble MR. Justice KURIAN JOSEPH
The Hon'ble MR. Justice HARUN-UL-RASHID

 Dated :12/02/2008

 O R D E R
               KURIAN JOSEPH & HARUN-UL-RASHID, JJ.

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                              M.F.A. NO. 1261 OF 1999

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                     Dated this the 12th day of February, 2008


                                       JUDGMENT

Harun-Ul-Rashid, J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 16.6.1999 in O.P.

(HMA) No.30 of 1998 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Alappuzha.

The petitioner in the Original Petition is the appellant. The petition filed by

the petitioner/husband under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,

1955 for a decree of divorce was dismissed by the trial court holding that

the petitioner is not entitled to get a decree of divorce on the grounds

stated in the petition.

2. The parties herein are referred to as the petitioner and

respondent as in the Original Petition. The parties belong to Ezhava

community. They got married on 15.4.1976 in accordance with the custom

and ceremonies prevalent in the community. After marriage, they resided

together till the end of 1980 and three children were born in the wedlock.

The first two children who are twins were born on 20.2.1977 and the third

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 2

child was born on 1.9.1978. It is pleaded that subsequent to the second

delivery, the respondent started behaving cruelly towards the petitioner,

spoiling the peaceful domestic atmosphere, that she maintained illegal

connection with strangers in the absence of the petitioner, that she treated

the petitioner with contempt and made use of all opportunities to ridicule

him before his friends and relatives, that she failed to discharge the

obligations of marriage and look after the affairs of the petitioner and the

children and that by the end of 1980, the respondent left the house of the

petitioner with the female child and continued her illegal connection with

strangers. Thereafter, the respondent filed M.C. No.42 of 1981 before the

Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court, Cherthala claiming maintenance for

herself and the female child. The said petition was allowed by the

learned Magistrate. The daughter was given in marriage by the respondent

on 13.4.1998 without informing the petitioner. It is also alleged that it is

impossible for the petitioner to have a life with the respondent under any

circumstances. The petitioner also suspects that his life itself would be in

danger in case he happened to live with the respondent.

3. The respondent resisted the petition for divorce contending inter

alia that it was the petitioner who had taken her and the child to her house

on 20.12.1980. She further contended that though the petitioner used to

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 3

visit her every week, subsequently he stopped visiting her and it was

thereafter that she filed the petition for maintenance. The petition was

allowed finding that the petitioner/husband failed to maintain his wife and

daughter without any reasonable cause. The respondent also denied the

allegation that she behaved cruelly to the petitioner and that she

maintained illegal connection with strangers. She pleaded that she had not

treated the petitioner with contempt nor had she deserted him as alleged in

the petition.

4. The court below examined three issues: (i) whether the

respondent had treated the petitioner with cruelty, (ii) whether the

assertions of immorality made against the respondent are true and (iii)

whether the respondent had deserted the petitioner for a continuous period

of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the

Original Petition.

5. The evidence in this case consists of the oral evidence of the

petitioner, his son and the respondent who were examined as PWs.1 and 2

and RW.1 respectively. Exts.A1 to A4(a) were marked on the side of the

petitioner. The court below found that no satisfactory material has been

adduced even prima facie to support the assertions of immorality, that the

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 4

petitioner did not implead the persons with whom the respondent had

allegedly been living in adultery as co-respondents, that the evidence

adduced in this case is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the

respondent had committed physical and mental cruelty to the petitioner and

that the petitioner had not succeeded in showing that the respondent had

deserted him. On the basis of these findings, the court below held that

the petitioner is not entitled to a decree for divorce and dismissed the

petition.

6. It is an admitted fact that the respondent left the residence of the

petitioner along with the female child in the year 1980 and they have been

living separately since then. As PW.1, the petitioner deposed that there

has not been any co-habitation or joint residence between the parties

subsequent to the departure of the respondent from the residence of the

petitioner. The respondent gave evidence stating that the petitioner failed

to visit her house subsequent to their separation and that she filed M.C.

No.42 of 1981 for maintenance. Admittedly, the petitioner and the

respondent had been living separately since the end of 1980. The court

below disbelieved the evidence of the respondent that the petitioner used

to visit her after she began to reside in her house by the end of 1980. So,

it has to be concluded that for the last 27 years, the husband and wife are

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 5

living separately. The conduct of the parties and the facts of the case reveal

that the parties had made up their minds to put an end to the marital

relation and co-habitation permanently, at least for the last two and a half

decades.

7. Desertion is an act which implies abandonment against the wish

of the person charging it. In this case, it was the respondent who left the

matrimonial home and started residing separately. The question raised is

will the conduct amount to desertion on the part of the respondent. The

Supreme Court in the decision reported in Bipinchandra Jaisingbhai

Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 held that where the wife is

forcibly turned out of her marital home by the husband, the husband is

guilty of constructive desertion. The test is not who left the matrimonial

home first. If one spouse by his words and conduct compels the other

spouse to leave the marital home, the former would be guilty of desertion,

though it is the latter who is physically separated from the other and has

been made to leave the marital home. There is no evidence in this case to

find that the wife was forcefully turned out of her matrimonial home by the

husband. Exts.A4 and A4(a) would show that the respondent had

received amounts sent towards maintenance by the petitioner. The

evidence of PW.2, the son of the parties shows that the respondent, his

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 6

mother, had never visited the house where he and his father were residing.

He had also deposed that he is now aged 21 years and that he had seen

the respondent only once after she left the matrimonial home. The

available evidence discussed above shows that the respondent/wife had left

the matrimonial home without reasonable and sufficient cause and that she

had put an end to the marital relation and co-habitation. Under these

circumstances, the respondent is to be blamed for the desertion which

constitutes a ground for divorce.

8. Twenty-seven years have elapsed since the petitioner and

respondent have been separated. We have made some earnest efforts to

find whether the parties are willing to reside together. We find that there

is no possibility of the parties resuming normal marital life. There has

been an irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the husband and the

wife. The husband had proved before the Family Court both the factum of

separation as well as animus deserendi which are the essential elements of

desertion. A workable solution is certainly not possible. The parties

cannot at this stage reconcile themselves and live together forgetting their

past. Because of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, the marriage

between the parties has been rendered a dead wood. Learned counsel

appearing for the appellant submitted before us that no purpose will be

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 7

served by keeping such a marriage alive on paper which would only

aggravate the agony of the parties.

9. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground by itself for

divorce. But, while scrutinising the evidence on record to determine

whether the grounds alleged are made out and in determining the relief to

be granted, the said circumstance can certainly be borne in mind, as held

by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Durga Prasanna

Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy (2005) 7 SCC 353. The Supreme Court

in the above decision, on finding that 14 years have elapsed since the

husband and wife had separated, held that there has been irretrievable

breakdown of marriage between the parties and that reunion was

impossible and that the parties cannot at this stage reconcile themselves

and live together forgetting their past. The Supreme Court, therefore, held

that there is no other option except to allow the appeal and set aside the

judgment of the High Court and affirm the order of the Family Court

granting decree of divorce.

10. We also find that the parties cannot at this stage reconcile

themselves and live together as husband and wife forgetting their past.

Both the parties have crossed the point of no return. Therefore, we are of

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 8

the considered view that in the interest of justice, the appeal is to be

allowed setting aside the impugned judgment.

In the result, the appeal is allowed. A decree of divorce is granted

dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent with

effect from today. There will be no order as to costs.

(KURIAN JOSEPH, JUDGE)

(HARUN-UL-RASHID, JUDGE)

sp/

M.F.A.NO.1261/1999 9

KURAIN JOSEPH &

HAURN-UL-RASHID, J.J

M.F.A.NO1261/1999

JUDGMENT

12TH FEBRUARY, 2008.