ORDER
1. The tenant has preferred this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that both the Courts below have erred in determining the jurisdictional issue pertaining to the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant between the contesting parties.
2. It is not in dispute that the petition premises measuring 10′ x 10′ abutting station road is part and parcel of C.T.S. No. 2674, Hubli Municipality, which in all measures 75′ x 10′. It was owned by Moorusaviramath. The Swamiji of the Math had given on lease the petition
premises along with the other abutting properties to a partnership firm M/s. Shah Parasmal Pittaji Jain and Sons, (in short, the ‘firm’) in the year 1969 for a period of 9 (nine) years. The petition premises was subleased to the present petitioner by the firm much before the expiry of the period of lease in favour of the firm. The respondent took the entire CTS along with the petition premises on lease for a period of 51 years under the registered lease deed dated 6-2-1974 (Ex. P-1). Subsequently, the respondent filed eviction petition in the Court of the 1st Additional Munsiff at Hubli being H.R.C. No. 67 of 1976 seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground of bona fide personal necessity in terms of clauses (h) and (j) of the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (in short, the ‘K.R.C. Act’).
3. In the Trial Court, the petitioner entered his appearance and filed his objections inter alia contending that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent and therefore the eviction proceedings were not maintainable. However, the plea so raised by him was rejected by the Trial Judge and directed eviction by accepting the plea of the respondent of having bona fide personal necessity. Against the above judgment, the petitioner preferred revision under Section 50 of the K.R.C. Act before the District Judge, Dharwad, in Revision (Rent) 84 of 1988 but the same was also dismissed under the impugned judgment dated 6-12-1997.
4. It may be of relevance to mention here that during the pendency of the revision petition, the petitioner acquired title over the petition premises under the registered sale deed dated 1-9-1994 executed by the Swamiji of the above Math. However, the lower revisional Court has taken the view that because of execution of the registered lease deed at Ex. P-1 in favour of the respondent on behalf of the Math, there will be deemed surrender of lease by the firm and the respondent will be deemed to have entered into the shoes of lessee firm and thus, the petitioner remained sublessee under the respondent. The District Judge has also held that despite acquiring of title over the petition premises, his status as a sublessee qua the respondent has remained unaltered. Therefore, according to the learned District Judge, eviction proceedings were maintainable under Section 21 of the K.R.C. Act at the instance of the respondent, who, according to him can claim to be the landlord of the petition premises.
5. In my opinion, the finding arrived at by the learned District Judge suffers from foundational infirmities on the jurisdictional issue. The question to be attended in the present revision petition is as to whether because of execution of the registered lease deed dated 6-2-1974 in favour of the respondent, the petitioner by operation of any statutory provision or legal principle had ipso facto become a subtenant under him or because of implied surrender of lease by the firm he had himself become the head tenant under the Math.
6. It is well established that the lease is a transfer of interest in immoveable property. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short, the ‘T.P. Act’) provides that a lease of immoveable property is a
transfer of right to enjoy such property made for a certain time, express or implied, and for consideration. Clause (j) of Section 108 of the T.P. Act, subject to any contract to the contrary, authorises the lessee to sublease the whole or any part of his interest in the leasehold property. Once, right of subleasing is exercised by the lessee, clause (c) of Section 108 of the T.P. Act will come into operation which reads thus.-
“Section 108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.–A.
Rights and liabilities of the lessor.-
(a) and (b) xxx xxx xxx;
(c) the lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the latter pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contract binding on the lessee, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption.
The benefit of such contract shall be annexed to and go with the lessee’s interest as such, and may be enforced by every person in whom that interest is for the whole or any part thereof from time to time vested”.
7. Therefore, during the subsistence of the lease, the sublessee in whom the lessee’s interest is vested, acquires right to continue in possession over the demised premises during the subsistence of the lease. Therefore, coming to the facts of the present case, but for the surrender of the lease by the head lessee i.e., the firm, the petitioner was entitled to continue his possession over the petition premises till 1978 in his own right since the lease in favour of the firm was for a period of 9 years.
8. Despite the above noted statutory provisions and consequent right of the petitioner flowing therefrom, the same was sought to be destroyed by the respondent on the strength of a registered lease deed dated 6-2-1974 (Ex. P-1) obtained from the owner-Math, by taking a plea that he had obtained the said lease on surrendering of its leasehold rights by the firm and thus, he has stepped into the shoes of erstwhile lessee firm. Thus, according to him, he has become landlord of the petitioner as defined under Section 2(h) of the K.R.C. Act. According to the said provision, in respect of a subtenant, the tenant, who has sublet the premises is the landlord for the purposes of the said Act. This argument was conveniently accepted by both the Courts below by ignoring certain common law provision which has been given statutory recognition under Section 115 of the T.P. Act.
9. Section 115 of the T.P. Act reads as under:—
“115. Effect of surrender and forfeiture on under lease.—
The surrender, express or implied, of a lease of immovable property does not prejudice an under lease of the property or any part thereof previously granted by the lessee, on terms and conditions substantially the same (except as regards the amount of rent) as those of the original lease; but unless the surrender is made for the purpose of obtaining a new lease, the rent payable by and the
contracts binding on, the under-lessee shall be respectively payable to and enforceable by the lessor.
The forfeiture of such a lease annuls all such under leases, except where such forfeiture has been procured by the lessor in fraud of the under-lessees, or relief against the forfeiture is granted under Section 114″.
10. It is no doubt true that the sublessee’s interest being carved out of lessee’s interest, it will, as a general rule, be determined by the determination of the lease itself. But, determination by surrender of the lease by the lessee is an exception to this general rule. Surrendering being a voluntary act on the part of the lessee, the principle that a man cannot derogate from his own grant will come into play and the lessee’s action will not be allowed to prejudice the sublessee. It is this equitable principle which has been incorporated in the above quoted Section 115 of the T.P. Act. By operation of this statutory provision on surrender of the lease by the head lessee, the sublessee becomes a lessee of the lessor on the terms of the sublease. Thus, the under lessee, by operation of law is brought into direct contact with the lessor, except where surrender is made by the head lessee for obtaining new lease.
11. In the case of Tirath Rain Gupta v Gurubachan Singh and Another, in para 8 of the judgment, it has been held by the Supreme Court that Section 115 of the T.P. Act provides that “surrendering of lease does not prejudice an under lease of the property or any part thereof previously granted by the lessee”.
12. In the case of Mahammad Ibrahim v Bani Madhav, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that (para. 15).—
“Section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a surrender, express or implied, of a lease does not prejudice an under lease of the property. The section proceeds on the principle that a man is not permitted to derogate from his own grant. As between the parties to the transaction a surrender by the lessee puts an end to his interest, but it does not affect third persons who have acquired an interest from him. A lessee who has assigned his interest by way of mortgage or otherwise cannot defeat his assignee’s right by a surrender to the lessor and in the same way a surrender by the lessee cannot prejudice the under lessee. Such a surrender operates as an alignment to the lessor of the lessee’s interest and thus brings the underlessee into immediate relations with the lessor. This is a well-established principle of law which is clearly stated in books of authorities like woodfall, Foa and Redman”.
13. Now, reverting to the facts of the present case, the plea raised by the respondent is that before the lease was granted to him on 6-2-1974 under Ex. P-1, the firm had expressly or impliedly surrendered the lease
granted in its favour. If that be so, then by operation of the statutory provisions under Section 115 of the T.P. Act, the petitioner being the under-lessee, himself became the head lessee under the Math. Therefore, there could not have been any occasion for granting any competing lease to the respondent in respect of the petition premises. For this reason, it has to be held that respondent at no point of time, became the landlord of the petitioner for the purpose of the K.R.C. Act entitling him to maintain any eviction proceedings thereunder against the petitioner. Thus, both the Courts below have mis-directed themselves in granting eviction of the petitioner.
14. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside with costs throughout. Advocate’s fee Rs. 550/-. The revision petition is allowed.