ORDER
1. This is an application filed by the petitioner Ku. Meena Bhandakkar on 11-11-1992 for initiating the proceedings of contempt against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for wilful disobedience of the judgment and order passed by the learned School Tribunal, Nagpur, dated 8-7-1992 in Appeal No. STN/9/1990.
2. The facts leading to the instant contempt petition are in brief as follows :
The petitioner Ku. Meena was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 17th November, 1987 on probation for a period of two years by the respondents/contemnors Nos. 1 and 2. Her services were terminated vide order dt/- 6-7-1989 with effect from 7-8-1989. The termination order was issued on the ground that there being reduction of sections and no approval was granted by the Education Officer to her appointment and, therefore, her services were no more required. The petitioner Ku. Meena preferred an appeal vide Appeal No. STN/9/90 before the School Tribunal, Nagpur. The learned School Tribunal allowed the appeal vide judgment and order dated 8-7-1992. The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur, directed the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in appeal respondents 2 and 3), to re-instate the appellant/petitioner with continuity of service and payment of arrears of emoluments, with effect from 7-8-1989. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were further directed to permit the appellant to join her duties as and when she submits her joining report. The President, School Committee, Nav Jagruti Vidyalaya, Nagpur, was granted 60 days’ time to pay the arrears of emoluments to the appellant for the period from 7-8-1989 up to the date of her joining services (from the date of receipt of judgment). By the order, the appellant was directed to join her duties by submitting her joining report to Head Master within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the judgment. In case the Management fails to pay the arrears of emoluments as mentioned above, within the given time, the respondent No. 1 (the Education Officer (S), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur) was directed to deduct the said amount from the grants due and payable or may become due and payable in future to the Management and pay to the appellant directly.
3. The petitioner, after the judgment of the School Tribunal, passed on 8-7-1992, approached the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the President, Secretary and Head Master) with a joining report. The petitioner handed over the copy of the judgment of the School Tribunal to the first respondent (the President of the society) on 16-7-1992. The Secretary and the Head Master were also present at that time in the school. She was informed that they require time to take decision in the matter and directed her to report after two or three days. Petitioner, thereafter, repeatedly approached the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. She handed over an application to the Head Master on 23-7-1992, however, she was not allowed to resume her duties. The petitioner also lodged a complaint with the Deputy Director of Education on 30-7-1992 against the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and sought necessary action against them. Instead of allowing the petitioner to resume her duties, the respondent No. 1, the President of the Society, sent a communication on 31-7-1992 to the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, seeking guidance. Again the petitioner approached the Education Officer vide communication dated 12-8-1992. The Education Officer (Respondent No. 4), by his order dt/- 27-8-1992 directed the respondents 1 to 3 to immediately comply with the order passed by the School Tribunal and sent report accordingly to him within a period of 8 days, about the compliance of the order of the School Tribunal.
4. The petitioner repeatedly approached the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 requesting them to allow her to join her duties. She also made representations to the Education Officer on 8-10-1992 and to the Deputy Director of Education on 14-10-1992.
5. According to the petitioner, though she repeatedly requested the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to allow her to join her duties in pursuance of the orders passed by the School Tribunal, they did not comply the same. Similarly, though directed by the School Tribunal to the respondent No. 4, i.e. the Education Officer to make the payment to her, the Education Officer failed to pay the arrears of emoluments. Therefore, from the facts and circumstances, as also from the conduct of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 that they have wilfully disobeyed the order passed by the School Tribunal and thereby committed the contempt of Court. She had no other alternative rather than to approach this Court bringing the facts to the notice of the Court to initiate the contempt proceedings against the respondents.
6. It has been stated at bar by the learned counsel of the parties that during the pendency of the instant proceedings, the petitioner has been re-instated in service on 24-11-1992.
7. On the first date of admission, i.e. on 16-11-1992, my brother Shri Mutalik, J. directed the respondents to deposit a sum of Rs. 89,546/- towards the arrears in the Court or to pay the same directly to the petitioner by crossed cheque. The learned brother directed the respondents that the order must be strictly complied before 30th November, 1992 and the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 shall file affidavits accordingly. However, admittedly, the order passed by this Court on 16-11-1992 has not been complied.
8. My brother Shri Desai, J., on 20th April, 1993, directed the respondent-Management to deposit Rs. 10,000/- by 26th April, 1993. In pursuance of the directions given by this Court on 20th April, 1993, an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was directly paid to the petitioner Ku. Meena on 28-4-1993.
9. Again on 22-6-1993, my brother Shri Sambre, J., directed the respondent-Management to deposit Rs. 10,000/- within a week from the date of the order and also directed the contemnor to remain present in the Court on the next day. In pursuance of this order, though not within a week from the date of the order, an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the petitioner on 5-7-1993.
Barring the payment of Rs. 20,000/- in two instalments as stated in preceding paras, no other payment either of the arrears of emolument or of regular salary has been made to the petitioner after her re-instatement in service on 24-11-1992.
10. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed reply. They did not dispute that the petitioner contacted the respondent No. 1 Shri D. M. Joshi, the then Head Master to allow her to join her duties in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Tribunal in STN/9/90. It is further contended that it was the duty of the in-charge Head Master to allow her to join her duties. The respondent No. 3 the in-charge Head Master did not comply with the order of the learned Tribunal and also the order of the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur. The communications were sent by the Education Officer and the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur, to the respondent No. 3, but he deliberately and wilfully suppressed the fact of receiving such communications from the management. It is submitted that the petitioner has not served in the institution after 7-8-1989, i.e. the date of her termination and as such she is not entitled to receive any emoluments after that date. Further it is submitted that the present in-charge Head Master Shri S. D. Borande is also liable for ignoring the order passed by the learned Tribunal. Therefore, according to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, there is no wilful disobedience of the order passed by the School Tribunal and, therefore, they have not committed any contempt of Court as contemplated under S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. There is no whisper in reply about the payment of arrears as also the regular salary from the date of petitioner’s re-instatement in service on 24-11-1992. While arguing the matter, Shri Bari, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that they have no money to pay the arrears and further submitted that the bills are waiting for the approval.
11. The respondent No. 3, the then Headmaster Shri Joshi, filed the Civil Application No. 2783 of 1993 to discharge him from the proceedings. According to him, he was never appointed as the Head Master. He was only directed by the Education Officer to sent pay-bills under his signature of the approved staff of the school. He was not the party to the appeal No. STN/9/90. On behalf of the Head Master, Mr. Borande who was then working as Head Master, attended the proceedings. Shri Mohagaonkar, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, submitted that being in-charge Head Master and that too for specific job to sign the pay-bills of the staff in view of the directions given by the Education Officer vide letter D/- 9-10-1989, the respondent No. 3 had no power to allow the petitioner to join her duties without directions or authority from the management. Contempt Petition No. 130/89 in Writ Petition No. 75/89, the respondent No. 1, Secretary, Shri B. R. Bramhe, submitted an undertaking in writing to the effect that Shri Joshi will continue to be the in-charge Head Master. However, according to Shri Mohagaonkar, till this date no such order has been issued to Shri Joshi. This aspect is not disputed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
The powers of appointment, termination or dismissal, etc., being the powers of the Management, i.e. President, Secretary and other members of the Managing Committee of the Society, the Head Master cannot assume those powers and without any specific order from the Management to that effect, he cannot either appoint any member of teaching or non-teaching staff or terminate or re-instate any employee. At no time, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 issued any order to Shri Joshi or Shri Borande empowering them to re-instate the petitioner or to allow her to join her services.
12. During the course of arguments, it has been transpired that Shri Borande was also working as Head Master of the school and, therefore, he was directed to be joined as contemnor and the rule was issued against him. Shri Borande filed his reply and stated that for the first time, he started working as the in-charge Head Master of the School from November, 1992, in view of the communication issued by the Education Officer vide letter dated 16-11-1992. However, from the documents placed on record, it reveals that even before 16-11-1992, he has worked as the in-charge Head Master without any orders issued by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Immediately after he was appointed, as per the oral directions given by this Court, the petitioner Ku. Meena Bhandakkar was allowed to resume her duties on 24-11-1992. Even prior to his appointment as in-charge Head Master in the month of November, 1992, he had not received any communication whatsoever either from the Management or Education Officer or from the Deputy Director of Education about reinstatement and as such question of allowing the petitioner to resume her duty does not arise. According to him, it is the exclusive duty of the Management to allow the petitioner to resume her duty. Under such circumstances, there is no wilful disobedience on his part of the order passed either by the School Tribunal or by this Court from time to time.
13. The respondent No. 4, the Education Officer, also filed his submissions and made manifold submissions which will be dealt subsequently.
14. All the learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. At the time of starting the dictation of the judgment, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 raised an interesting but legal proposition that in view of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as this Court has not taken the cognizance, the proceedings be dropped. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads as under :
“No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either of its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
A reliance has been placed on a case of Golchha Advertising Agency v. State of Maharashtra (1990 Mah LJ 216). The Division Bench of this Court has observed :
“Contempt proceedings after the expiry of one year from the date of commission of alleged contempt, cannot be initiated. Between the date of commission of alleged contempt and the date of actual initiation of contempt proceeding, no intervening event or order stops the running of time referred to in S. 20.”
15. The learned School Tribunal, Nagpur, passed the order on 8-7-1992, directing the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to re-instate the petitioner and to pay the arrears of salary. The instant petition was filed on 11-11-1992. This Court has not in specific words passed the order ‘admit’ or ‘Rule’. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, this Court has not taken any cognizance or initiated the contempt proceedings. Thus, the provisions of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, are not attracted.
16. Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner, while repelling the submissions of the learned counsel of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and 5, specifically submitted that this Court has taken the cognizance by initiating the proceedings of contempt against the respondents Nos. 1 to 4, which is clear from the order passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mutalik on 16th November, 1992. On 16th November, 1992, the petition was posted for admission. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, brother Mutalik, J., passed the following order :
“Heard Shri A. P. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. B. Dawle has taken notice on behalf of the State-non-applicant No. 5.
2. It is submitted by Shri A. P. Deshpande that even though the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal has passed the order informing respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to reinstate the petitioner and to pay the arrears, since passing of the said order i.e. 8-7-1992 no action is taken by respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
3. Issue notice to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 directing them to remain present in this Court on 30-11-1992. At the same time, the respondents shall deposit a sum of Rs. 89,546/-, which are the arrears from 7-8-1989 ending with October, 1992 in this Court or shall pay the same directly to the petitioner by crossed cheque. The compliance should be made strictly before 30-11-1992 and respondents Nos. 1 to 4 shall file an affidavit accordingly.
From this order, it is crystal clear that my brother Shri Justice Mutalik, after hearing at length Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner and after perusing the documents on record, applied his mind and passed the order to the effect ‘Issue notice to the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 directing them to remain present in this Court on 30-11-1992’. Similarly, respondents were directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 89,546/- towards the arrears of emoluments. The contempt proceedings, after taking cognizance are between the Court and the contemner. Only after taking cognizance, the Court directs the contemner to remain present in the Court on the dates of hearings as contemners otherwise, not. Contents of para 3 of the order show that notices were issued to the respondents contemners Nos. 1 to 4 directing them to remain present in the Court on 30-11-1992. Therefore, according to me, cognizance was taken by this Court on 16-11-1992 its.
17. Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner, further submitted that even assuming that no specific words ‘Rule’ or ‘admit’ or ‘issue notice to the contemnors’ are mentioned, there being continuous wilful negligence of the order passed by the School Tribunal, it is a continuous breach or disobedience in view of the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram . In this case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held (at p. 2288).
“Though the initiation of the proceedings was well within the period of one year, failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature, is a continuing wrong. There was no scope of application of S. 20 of the Act.”
This obiter dicta was not in issue before the Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court, still it is a law within the meaning of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India.
My hands are strengthened by the observation of my Brother Variava, J., in the case of Usman Gani v. State of Maharashtra (1993 Mah LJ 1331).
Placitum (a) reads as follows :
“Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act cannot in any manner be prescribed either a pre-condition or a time limit within which the High Court may exercise its powers under Art. 215 of the Constitution of India.”
I have perused the case (supra). The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited supra has not been considered by this Court in that case.
Similarly, what is continuing wrong has been explained in a case of Balkrishna v. Dnyaneshwar Maharaj sansthan , wherein it is observed (at p. 807 of AIR) :
“If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong.”
Considering the specific order passed by my brother Judge on 16-11-1992 and also the submissions made by Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that my brother Shri Mutalik, J. has applied his mind and initiated the proceedings against the respondents for contempt of Court. Similarly, though the School Tribunal passed the specific order directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service as also to deposit the arrears of emoluments, it has been stated at bar and also not disputed by the contemners Nos. 1 and 2, that barring the payment of Rs. 20,000/- neither arrears of balance amount nor regular salary has been paid to the petitioner. Thus, in my opinion, it is continuing wrong and, therefore, the provision of S. 20 of the Act, are not attracted in the instant case.
18. After giving conscious thought to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the documents, it is found that there is no dispute that it is the sole responsibility of the Management regarding the appointments, termination of service, re-instatement, etc. of the teaching and non-teaching staff. The Head Master or in-charge Head Master is only responsible to run the school according to the settled norms. It is not the duty of the Head Master or in-charge Head Master either to employ, terminate or re-instate any employee on his own accord. Head Master must have specific instructions from the Management regarding the termination of the services or reinstatement of any employee. In the instant case, neither Mr. Joshi nor Shri Borande, received any order appointing either of them as Head Master of in-charge Head Master. Shri Borande, for the first time, received the appointment order for the post of Head Master and that too from the respondent No. 4, the Education Officer, vide letter dated 16-11-1992. As both the Head Masters were not authorised or directed by the Management to re-instate the petitioner, they cannot be held responsible for either disobedience or otherwise of the order passed either by the School Tribunal or by this Court. Therefore, the respondent No. 3 Shri Joshi and also Shri Borande deserve to be exonerated and the rule issued against them is liable to be discharged.
19. Shri Bari, the learned counsel for the contemnors Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that the Nav Jagruti Vidyalaya was run initially by other society. There being disputes amongst the members, the employees had formed another society in the year 1977, after de-recognizing the earlier society in the year 1976. The institution is run by the teachers only, they are not in a position to pay the salary to other teachers. According to Mr. Bari, the contemners Nos. 1 and 2, the President and Secretary, solely depend on Government aid. Admittedly, though the petitioner was allowed to join her services on 24th November, 1992, no payment was made to her till May, 1993. The Education Officer has released the salary of the approved staff from June, 1993. It is stated that the pay bills have been submitted on 15-4-1993 for the period from 24-11-1992 onwards. The bills were returned to the Management, there being certain lacunae. One of the lacunae was that the Management had not submitted the Auditor’s report.
20. Education is the vital question for every one. It is the most important of all our problems. In a way, it is a fundamental problem. The aim of the education is to qualify the illeterate man to think and act for himself with a due sense of responsibility towards the society. The aim of every parent and every teacher should be to enable their children and pupils to be greater and better persons. The aim of the education is also to fit a man and woman for the battle of life. The boys and girls of today are the citizens of tomorrow. The society again comprises of individuals and social health depends upon the proper adjustment of the rights and claims of the individuals who constituted it. Education is both development of the mind and personality of the individual and his development as a useful members of the society. Considering all the laudable objects and aims of the education, the only question poses before me is whether the boys and girls who are taking the education in the institution, will be the citizens of tomorrow in real sense ? A simple answer is ‘No’. The reason is that if the teacher who has to impart education to the boys and girls has not been paid properly and allowed to starve, a citizen cannot claim that their boys and girls would be developed in such a way to stand on their legs as also to be able to participate in the democratic process which is the very life of the nation. In the instant case, it is apparent that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have neither paid earlier arrears nor the regular salary till May, 1993 to the petitioner. Under the circumstances, how one can expect the proper teaching from a starving petitioner. Thus, the pious aim of education is frustrated of making the students ideal citizens of the Republic.
21. Considering all the above aspects, I have no least doubt in my mind that the respondent/contemners Nos. 1 and 2 who are responsible to pay the arrears to the petitioner from the date of termination i.e. 7-8-1989 till she was reinstated on 24th November, 1992 and regular salary thereafter till May, 1993. The relation between the contemner Nos. 1 and 2 on one hand and the petitioner on the other, being of master and servant, it is the primary duty of the contemners Nos. 1 and 2 to make the payment to the petitioner.
In a case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani of the judgment, their Lordships observed (at p. 1610 of AIR) :
“We are only concerned with the liability of the management of the college towards the employees. Under the relationship of master and servant, the management is primarily responsible to pay salary and other benefits to the employees. The management cannot say that unless and until the State compensates, it will not make full payment to the staff. We cannot accept such a contention.”
22. In my opinion, therefore, the contemners Nos. 1 and 2 have deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the order passed by not only the School Tribunal but by this Court on 16-11-1992. The management have no money to pay their employees is no justification or valid defence.
23. Mr. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the contemner No. 4, Education Officer, submitted that the Government is not responsible to make the payment to the employees of the private institutions unless posts are sanctioned and if the bills are found due and payable. Being aggrieved by the order passed by this Court on 16-11-1992, the Education Officer preferred an appeal under S. 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, as Contempt Appeal No. 10/92. The interim stay has been granted in relation to the order passed in respect of the Education Officer, respondent No. 4. The appeal is still pending and the interim stay is in force.
The Education Officer (Respondent No. 4) also preferred the Writ Petition No. 2084 of 1992 again the order passed by the School Tribunal. The respondent No. 1, the President, was allowed to intervene. Initially on 25-11-1992, the stay was granted. However, the petition came to be dismissed on 29-10-1993. Similarly, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed a Writ Petition No. 633 of 1993. The Division Bench of this Court has upheld the order of the learned School Tribunal and dismissed the petition on 29-10-1993.
24. Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, specifically submitted that the School Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass orders against the Education Officer, Deputy Director of Education or the State Government. According to him, the learned School Tribunal has misconceived and distorted the provisions of Act and rules framed thereunder. According to him, the provisions of Sections 9 to 13 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 are not applicable to the State Government or to employees of the State Government. The learned counsel took me through the provisions of the sections referred to above.
Section 9 deals with the rights of appeal to the Tribunal to the employees of the private school. Relevant provision of S. 9 is as under :
“9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school, –
(a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the Management; or
(b) ……………………..
and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under S. 8.”
Section 10 deals with the general powers and procedure of Tribunal.
Section 11 deals with the jurisdictional powers of the Tribunal to give appropriate reliefs and directions. Vide Section 11(2)(a) and (b) the Tribunal is empowered to give directions to the Management to re-instate the employee on the same post or on a lower post as it may specify and also to give arrears of emoluments to the employee for such a period as it may specify.
Section 13 enumerates the penalties on the Management on conviction.
“Section 13(1) : If the Management fails, without any reasonable excuse to comply with any direction issued by the Tribunal “under section 11 or any order issued by the Director under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of section 4A within the period specified in such direction, or as the case may be, under sub-section (5) of Section 4A or within such further period as may be allowed by the Tribunal or Director, as the case may be,” the Management shall, on conviction, be punished –
(a) for the first offence, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees :
Provided that, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, the fine shall not be less than one hundred rupees, and
(b) shall the second and subsequent offences, with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees.”
The decision of the Tribunal is final and binding on the Management in view of S. 12 of the Act. Section 12 reads as under :
“Section 12 : Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, the decisions of the Tribunal on an appeal entertained and disposed of by it shall be final and binding on the employee and the Management; and no suit, appeal or other legal proceeding shall lie in any Court, or before any other Tribunal or authority, in respect of the matters decided by the Tribunal.”
25. The State Government comes in picture as referred in sub-section (3) of S. 11, which reads as under :
“Section 11(3) : It shall be lawful for the Tribunal to recommend to the State Government that any dues directed by it to be paid to the employee, or in case of an order to reinstate the employee any emoluments to be paid to the employee till he is reinstated, may be deducted from the grant due and payable, or that may become due and payable in future, to the Management and be paid to the employee direct.”
Perusal of the provisions of the sections quoted above, make it clear that the Tribunal is empowered or has jurisdiction only to recommend to the State Government for payments to be made to the employees if due and payable. Recommendations by no stretch of imagination, would be mandate or direction to the State Government. What is mandatory and the difference between the mandatory and directory orders has been discussed in a case of Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. The Municipal Board, Rampur , as follows :
“A provision is said to be mandatory where the procedure prescribed by it, if not followed, has the effect of invalidating any action taken contrary to it. On the other hand, a provision is directory if the procedure prescribed by it, is intended to be only directive and advisory any omission or failure to conform to it not resulting, in the invalidation of the action taken in disregard to it.”
26. From the provisions of the Act discussed above, the proceedings before the School Tribunal are between the employer and employee. The State Government does not come in picture as the State Government is not concerned with the appointment, termination or reinstatement of the employees. Under the circumstances in my humble view, even the State Government or its officers particularly, the Education Officer or the Deputy Director of Education, are not the necessary parties to adjudicate the matters between the employees and the employer. Without joining the State Government, the Tribunal is emplowered to recommend to the State Government. Therefore, any orders passed by the School Tribunal directing the State Government or its Officers to make the payment to the employees of the concerned private institutions, will be without jurisdiction.
27. The State Government is liable to make the payment to the employees whose services have been approved or sanctioned by the State Government and not in any other cases. Further the State Government is only liable to make the payment if the grant is due and payable. Merely because the schools are recognised, the Government will not be liable to make the payment of the salary or give other benefits to the employees of the private institutions. It is undisputed fact that at the relevant time, i.e. at the time of termination of the services of Ku. Meena Bhandakkar, her appointment was not approved by the Education Officer. Considering the provisions of law and the fact that petitioner’s appointment was not approved, in my opinion, the Government, i.e. the Education Officer, is not liable to make payment either of arrears of salary or the regular salary to the petitioner. It is squarely and primary duty of the Management to pay the salary to its employees, as observed by the Lordships of the Supreme Court in a case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani (cited supra).
28. Whereas norms have been prescribed by the Government for running the educational institutions smoothly, Rule 95 of the Secondary Schools Code speaks about the reserved fund, which reads as under :
“Every school shall maintain reserved fund, which will be not less than its 4 months’ normal expenditure.”
In view of the specific provision, the Management cannot shirk its responsibility or raise hands, on the ground that they have no funds either to meet out the expenditure or to pay the salary to its employees.
29. In view of the discussion in the preceding paras, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have committed the contempt of Court. The law of the contempt of courts is founded entirely on the public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of the parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should be limited to what is reasonably necessary for the purpose. The power to punish a person for contempt of Court is not for the benefits of the judges of the Courts, but it is for the benefits of the members of the society. If the confidence of the members of the society in the judiciary is destroyed, the loss is not much of the judiciary as that of the members of the society. It has been brought to my notice that earlier in Contempt Petition No. 130/89 in Writ Petition No. 75/89, the Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment D/- 16-7-1991, has observed :
“It is admitted by the respondent No. 1 that he has not acted upon this letter dated 19-7-1989 and, therefore, he has tendered an unconditional apology. The first lapse on his part was due to non-supply of the copy of the Court’s order. But the subsequent communication of the Education Officer brings him in the hold of contempt, for which he has already tendered an unconditional apology. The respondent No. 1 Secretary has also placed on record an undertaking to the effect that Mr. D. M. Joshi will continue to be the in-charge Head Master subject to the decisions of the Cases pending in various Courts and that all the bills will be submitted under his signatures hereafter. He also undertakes to settle the difference that may arise in connection with the payment of regular monthly salary by sitting together with Mr. D. M. Joshi and also the Education Officer, so that no inconvenience is caused to the members of the staff. He also stated in the said undertaking that since many of the issues were the subject matter of various litigations pending in the Courts, all such actions will be subject to the final decisions of the Courts where those matters are pending.
Considering the above undertaking given by the respondent No. 1, we are of the view that the purpose of the members of the staff will be served in case the said undertakings are acted upon by the respondent No. 1 Secretary. Under these circumstances, we hereby accept the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent No. 1.”
The respondents contemners managements Nos. 1 and 2 in one breath, expressed that they are not in a position to pay the arrears as directed by the learned School Tribunal as also by this Court vide order D/- 16-11-1992 and in another breath, they tendered an unconditional apology. This is no justification for non-payment of arrears and regular salary. Similarly, unable to make payment, but compelling her to render her services is no defence. In fact, this is an aggrievating circumstances. It is clear defiance, wilful disobedience and disregard to the order of the Courts. The nature of contempt is grave or serious. If apology is accepted, then the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice is weakened. Therefore, I do not incline to accept the apology having regard to the conduct of the contemners Nos. 1 and 2.
30. From the circumstances as depicted in the preceding paras, I have no hesitation to express that the contemners Nos. 1 and 2 and other members of Management are not in a position to run the Management of the institution and also to look after the welfare and benefits of its employees. It is also clear that the contemners Nos. 1 and 2 have no regard for the judgment and orders of the Courts of Justice. It appears to be the habit of the contemners Nos. 1 and 2 to flout the orders of the Courts and, therefore, they do not deserve any leniency. I do not accept the apology tendered by the contemners. I have already observed that if the teachers are directed to conduct the classes with an empty belly, then difficult to produce the best citizens of tomorrow. Here I remind two couplets :
(1) “Bhukhe bhajan na hot gopala. Sambhalo apani kanthi mala.”
(2) “Bhukhe garib dilaki khuda ki lagan ho. Sach hai kaha ki bhukhe bhajan na ho.”
According to me, the Management is not producing the citizens of tomorrow, but they are spoiling the lives and careers of the tender aged boys. It being a serious matter, the respondents/contemners Nos. 1 and 2 are liable for the punishment.
31. In the result, the respondents/contemners Nos. 1 and 2 are hereby held to have committed contempt of Court and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment or three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- each, within 7 days (seven days) from today, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further simple imprisonment for one month each. Rule is made absolute partly in the above terms.
The rule issued against the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 is discharged.
32. Ours being the welfare state and it being the fundamental duty of the State to educate its objects by according necessary facilities. However, such schools which are unable to pay the regular salary to its employees and look after their welfare and comforts, such schools do not deserve to be in existence. I am the Indian first and Indian last and thereafter the Judge. In my both the capacities, it being my legal and moral duty towards the welfare of society, such school be run by the Government instead of giving reigns of education in the hands of selfish and scrupulous managements. The copy of the judgment be sent to the State Government to consider the fate of such institutions in the interest of the citizens at large by taking necessary action. Now-a-days it is a mushroom growth of the private institutions, where, day-in and day-out, the employee and the teachers who are highly qualified are facing humiliations and difficulties. It being the duty of the welfare State to educate the children, in my humble opinion the schools only be run by the Govt.
33. Shri Bari, the learned counsel for the respondents, Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that the sentence and fine be suspended. Considering the facts and circumstances as discussed in the preceding paras and it be not the first case of this nature, as their unconditional apology earlier in the Contempt Petition No. 130/89 in Writ Petition No. 75/89, was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court, this is nothing but the repetition and suspension of sentence and fine will amount to encouraging the Management to spoil the lives and careers of the youngsters. Under the circumstances the request of the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is not accepted.
34. Order accordingly.