Kum. Vijaya Mary Lewis vs The General Manager, Hyderabad … on 31 January, 2001

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Andhra High Court
Kum. Vijaya Mary Lewis vs The General Manager, Hyderabad … on 31 January, 2001
Author: S Sinha
Bench: S Sinha, S Nayak


JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. The petitioner herein is the daughter of Sri T.M. Lewis. The said T.M.Lewis, since deceased, was working in the Telecom Department at Hyderabad. He and his son died in an accident on 8.1.1995. The petitioner’s mother at all material times and still is employed in the same department drawing a salary of Rs.9053/-. She is also in receipt of a sum of Rs.2,554/- pm by way of family pension. She has further received an amount of Rs.1,01,860/- as terminal benefits. In view of the death of her father and despite the fact that her mother was an employee the petitioner filed an application to the General Manager, Hyderabad Telecom District for appointment on compassionate ground on 6.9.1995 alleging inter alia therein that her mother had taken loan which has to be repaid. She alleged that the take home pay of her mother is only Rs.1,016/-.

2. On 23.8.1999 the said prayer was rejected stating:

“The Government servant, a T.S. expired on 8.1.1995 leaving behind his wife and daughter. The wife of the deceased is employed as Sr.SS in the department receiving a salary of Rs.9,052/- pm. She is also in receipt of Rs.2,554/- pm as family pension and received Rs.1,01,860/- as terminal benefits. Petitioner is the daughter who is already 32 years old. The wife of the deceased has around 9 years to superannuate. Keeping in view of the financial resources vis–vis liabilities, the family cannot said to be living in indigent condition. The case has also not been recommended by the circle”.

3. An application was filed by the petitioner herein purporting to be aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order before the Central Administrative Tribunal which was marked as O.A.1233 of 2000. By reason of the impugned order dated 11.9.2000 the said application has been dismissed. Hence this petition.

4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner inter alia submitted that the claim for grant of appointment on compassionate ground being based on the doctrine of social justice, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions, the concerned respondents as also the Central Administrative Tribunal must be held to have erred in rejecting the petitioner’s prayer for appointment on compassionate grounds. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on BALBIR KAUR v STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD (2000) 6 SCC 4931.

5. In this connection our attention has also been drawn to the alleged factum of economic distress raised by the petitioner herein in her application.

6. The purpose and object of a benevolent scheme like grant of appointment on compassionate ground is well-known. The said scheme was evolved having regard to the economic distress which may be faced by the family of the deceased and such economic distress must satisfy the test of immediacy and also must arise on account of the death of the sole bread winner. In Balbir Kaur’s case (1 supra) the Apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether a scheme framed for payment of gratuity on superannuation itself would be a ground for denial of appointment on compassionate ground. The answer to the said question was rendered in the negative. But as is well known the ratio of a decision has to be culled out from the facts involved therein and from what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. In C.I.T. v SUN ENGINEERING WORKS (P) LTD., Dr A.S.Anand, J (as the learned Judge then was) stated the law in the following terms:

“…. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ‘law’ declared by this Court. The judgment must be r4ad as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. …”.

7. In JAYA SEN v SUJIT KR. SARKAR, 2000 (1) ILR A&N 145 it was held:

“It is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well known that even a slight distinction in fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision making process. See Quinn V Lealhain [(1900-1903) A.E.R. (Rep.) 1], Krishna Kumar v. Union of India , Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Co. Ltd. , Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Debey and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur [1988 (1) S.C.C. 101].

It is also a settled law that a decision is not an authority on a point which was not argued. See Mittal Engineering Works (p) Ltd. V. Collector of Central Excise .”

8. The law in this regard is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot direct grant of appointment on compassionate grounds contrary to or inconsistent with the scheme laid down therefor. See Regional Manager, APSRTC v SAMPOORNAMMA, 1999 SCC (L&S) 1162 and in B.NAGAMMA V. A.P.S.R.T.C. AND ORS., . Even no supernumerary posts can be created for the said purpose and an appointment on compassionate ground can be made only when clear vacancies exist. See APSRTC v DANNINA RAJESWARI, 1999 SCC (L&S) 1182, ORISSA SEB v. RAJKUMARI PANDA, 1999 Lab.I.C. 729. In SAMSUNNESA v STATE OF W.B., 1995 Lab.I.C. 2580 the purpose for grant of such appointment has been laid down in the following terms:

“It is also well settled that if a son is employed, the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 shall not direct grant of appointment on compassionate ground to other family members of the deceased.”

9. See SUSHEELA B. BHAKTA v KARNATAKA S.R.T. CORPN. (1995 LAB.I.C. 2398) and W.B.STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v SAMIR K. SARKAR .

10. In HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v HAKIM SINGH, the Apex Court inter alia has held that when the members of the family tied over the immediate needs for a number of years the question of grant of appointment on compassionate grounds does not arise.

11. It further appears that there exists a disputed question of fact as regards the amount of salary that is being taken by the petitioner’s mother. In any view of the matter the petitioner herein has also not disputed the fact that her mother is also entitled to family pension and has some income from the retiral benefits which has been paid to her. The said fact appears to have been suppressed by the petitioner. In any view of the matter by reason of sympathy alone the court cannot issue any directions contrary to law. In ASHOKE SAHA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL, CAL LT 1999 (2) HC 1, one of us (Satya Brata Sinha, J, as then was) noticed:

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar & Anr , the law has been laid down in the following terms:

Thus apart from the directions as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be the court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion.”

“In G.Kalyan Sundaram v. U.Co. Bank & Anr. Reported in CLT 1995 (2) HC 201, I had observed that in the fact of that case even sympathy has no role to play and in that connection noticed:

In Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd. Reported in 1911-13 AER (reprint) page 117, Farwell L.J. observed –

“We must be very careful not to allow our sympathy sentiment is a dangerous will Or the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.

In the State of Tamil Nadu & Ors v. St. Joseph Teachers Training College, the apex court observed that court cannot grant relief on humanitarian ground contrary to law.”

12. Reference in this connection may also be made to SAIRINDHRI DOLUI v STATE OF W.B, 2000 1 SLR 803. Reference may also be made to W.B.STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v SAMIR K. SARKAR, , CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION v. SUNIL KUMAR, .

13. For the reasons aforementioned we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal cannot be said to have acted contrary to the well settled principles of law in passing the order impugned in the writ petition warranting interference by this Court. There is even no merit in the writ application, which is accordingly dismissed.

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