ORDER
1. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is filed by the petitioner-A2 to quash the proceedings in CC No.468 of 1997 on the file of the learned XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The first respondent herein filed the complaint in CC No.468 of 1997 against the petitioner and another for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 138, 139, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘the Act’). The trial Court had already taken cognizance of the offences basing on the complaint filed by the first respondent herein.
2. The first respondent in the complaint alleged that it used to supply bulk quantities of drugs and medicines to the accused as and when required, by placing purchase orders by them. It is the case of the first respondent/ complainant that a consignment of 200 Kgs., of Ibuprofen was received by the accused on 8-8-1996 and its basic price was Rs.83,000-00. In addition to the basic price, the purchasers have to pay Rs.8,300/- and Rs.3,652/- towards excise duty and sales tax respectively. It is stated in the complaint that the accused had given a post dated cheque for Rs.94,952.00 dated 24-10-1996, drawn on State Bank of India, Rayachoti Branch towards the cost of the
purchases made by them. The first respondent-complainant had deposited the said cheque in State Bank of Mysore, Secunderabad branch on 22-3-1997 and the same was returned with an endorsement “payment stopped by drawer” and the same was informed to the first respondent/complainant on 10-4-1997. The first respondent/complainant thereafter sent a notice under registered post and also under Certificate of Posting on 22-4-1997 and inspite of the receipt of the said notice, the accused failed to pay the amount. Under those circumstances, the first respondent had lodged the complaint.
3. According to the petitioner, the person representing the first respondent-Company is only the Material Manager in the Company and he has no authority to file the complaint on behalf of the Company. It is also the case of the petitioner mat he has not issued the cheque in dispute and the A1 in the complaint has issued the cheque on behalf of M/s. Bhagat Research Laboratories. The notice sent by the first respondent-Company is received by the petitioner on 25-4-1997 and he immediately sent a reply denying issuance of any cheque by him. It is stated that the Company, itself, is not an accused in the complaint and when the Company itself is not an accused, the other persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business cannot be made liable for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. The provisions of Section 141 of the Act can be invoked against the persons who arc incharge of the Company. The persons who conduct business alone are responsible. According to the petitioner, there is not even an allegation against the petitioner that he is responsible in any way either in conducting the business or issuing the cheque.
4. It is also stated in the present application that there was a fire accident in the Company and the first respondent/ complainant was accordingly requested not to present the cheque in dispute. The first respondent/complainant had obtained blank cheques in advance as security and as a matter of fect, the date and amounts are filled in by
the complainant, itself, before presentation. It is also stated in the complaint that the first respondent/complainant has chosen to send the notice to the petitioner herein, who has not issued the cheque, by registered post and to the drawer under Certificate of Posting. The notice contemplated under the Act is to the drawer of the cheque. But, in the instant case there is no notice and the mandatory provisions of the Act arc not complied with. Therefore, the complaint is liable to be quashed.
5. This Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) is well defined. The power of quashing a First Information Report or criminal proceeding has to be sparingly exercised by the Court with due regard to the guidelines laid down in this behalf. It is an extraordinary power that can be exercised by this Court only to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of Justice. The Apex Court had laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, , the categories of cases in which the First Information Report and the criminal proceedings may be quashed. They are:
(i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(iv) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; and
(vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is mataciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
6. It is settled law that this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code would not make any rovings inquiry into the questions of fact and record any findings. It is the duty of the of the trial Court. This Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, in appropriate cases, may scrutinise the First Information Report or the complaint thereafter to take the allegations made in the complaint on their face value and accept the allegations in their entirety and quash the same if the same does not disclose commission of any offence. Truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence collected or the charge-sheet, as the case may be, cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. This
Court would interfere in rarest of the rare cases and only with a view to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of Justice. This Court would interfere only in an extraordinary situation where the continuation of criminal proceedings would result in manifest injustice to the concerned. The process of criminal proceedings once set in motion has to end and culminate in inquiry and trial. Baring in few exceptional situations, normally the proceedings should be allowed to go on. Termination of the proceedings at the initial stage, as held by the Apex Court, would amount to killing of a ‘still born child’.
7. Viewed in the said background, I am of the opinion that the petitioner had not made out any case whatsoever warranting interference of this Court, at this stage. It is not possible for this Court to express any opinion whatsoever with regard to the allegations levelled by the first respondent/ complainant in the complaint. The allegations may be true or not is entirely a different question. Whether G. Madan Mohan Reddy, Material Manager is entitled to represent the complainant-company or not is a question of fact which can be gone into by the trial Court and it shall always be open to the petitioner to raise all such objections and challenge the authority of the said person, who is described as Material Manager, to represent the complainant-company. Whether the said Material Manager is authorised to file the complaint against the petitioner, again is a question of fact. The complaint cannot be quashed on such disputed questions effect. It is not the case of the first respondent/ complainant himself that the Material Manager is not authorised to represent the company. In the complaint, A2 is shown as a director of M/s. Bhagat Research Laboratories. Whether he is a director and represents the company and whether he is liable for the actions of the company, itself, is again a question of fact. No opinion need be expressed on these aspects. According to the first respondent/complainant, the accused has issued a post-dated cheque and on demand failed to pay the amounts. Consequently the first respondent/complainant
has to lodge the complaint under Section 138 of the Act.
8. This Court in R. Ramachandmn v. Yerram Sesha Raddy, 1997 (1) ALD (Crl.) 169, held that from a reading of Section 141 of the Act it would be evident that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, then every person, who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of and was responsible to the company for conducting its business, shall be deemed to be guilty as also the company itself, of the offence and both of them shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It is further held that the company as well as such persons who are responsible and incharge to the conduct of the business of the company are liable for punishment. Each of them is independently liable for punishment. Under those circumstances, this Court held that when the liability is of each one of them, it is perfectly permissible that both, company as well as the persons incharge and responsible to the conduct of the business of the company can be prosecuted jointly or only one can be prosecuted or both can be prosecuted. Therefore, non impleading of the company, as an accused in the complaint is of no consequence and the complaint cannot be quashed on that ground.
9. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri M.N. Narasimha Reddy, relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Suryanarayanan v. M/s. Anchor Marine Service, 1 (1995) BC 466, wherein the Madras High Court quashed the complaint for the reason of non-impleading of company on whose behalf the cheque was issued. Similar is the verdict of the Madras High Court in K. Krishna Bai, MD v. M/s. Arti Press, Sivakasi, 1 (1992) BC 361. The point raised is directly covered by the decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court and I do not find any reason whatsoever to disagree with the said judgment. This Court rightly held that the company, as well as the persons incharge and responsible for the conduct of its business can both be prosecuted or any one alone can be prosecuted. The interpretation
of Section 141 of the Act by this Court in R. Ramachandmn’s case (supra) is in conformity with the scheme of the Act and the purposes for which Sections 138 to 142 were enacted. There is absolutely no justification whatsoever for taking a different view.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner had also placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Satish & Co. v. S.R. Traders, 1997 (6) ALD 195, in support of his proposition that the company cannot be represented by its Manager, who is not authorised to file the complaint. I had already observed that this is a question of fact, which is required to be gone into by the trial Court and it is not possible for this Court to express any opinion on the said question. It is a matter for inquiry and trial. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Satish & Co., case (supra). There the question arose for consideration before this Court is that after full fledged trial whether the company having realised its mistake can give subsequent audiorisation in favour of the Manager to cure the defect. Such is not the case on hand. Therefore, it is not possible to quash the criminal prosecution on the said ground.
11. It is also urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the company requested the complainant much in advance not to present the cheque and also requested the Bank for stopping the payment. It is also submitted that on the date of presentation of the cheque there was sufficient money to the credit of the account to satisfy the cheque, but the same could not be honoured because of me instructions issued by the company to stop the payment. It is not a defence. In Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, , the Apex Court held that even if the cheque is dishonoured because of ‘stop payment’ instructions to the Bank, Section 138 of the Act would get attracted. We need not dialate any further on this aspect as this issue has been conclusively decided by the Apex Court.
12. It had already been observed that as to whether the petitioner herein was in charge
and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is a question of fact. It shall be open to the petitioner to take the said plea in defence. The petitioner is entitled to resist the complaint on such grounds as may be available to him in law.
13. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and nature of the allegations levelled in the complaint. I do not think that it would be appropriate for this Court to quash the complaint at this stage in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. The petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
14. However, the learned XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, shall dispose of CC Nos.468 and 469 of 1997 without being influenced by any of the observations made in this order, as they are confined only for the purpose of disposal of this application.