ORDER
Manmohan Sarin, J.
1. By this order, I would be disposing of an office objection by the Registry with regard to Court fee and valuation. Plaintiff had instituted a suit for declaration and injunction. By order dated 29.3.1995 the suit was
directed to be registered subject to objection on Court Fee. The objection being that the value for Court Fee on the relief of declaration ought to be the same as that for pecuniary jurisdiction and Court Fee needs to be paid ad valorem, while the plaintiff had paid fixed court fee.
2. The office objection emanates on the ground that the plaintiff had sought a declaration and also an njunction. The suit was, therefore, one for declaration with consequential relief, falling under Section 7(iv)(c)
of the Court Fee Act on which ad valorem court fee was payable. Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act is attracted when the other relief sought, in addition to the relief of declaration, are consequential to the relief of declaration.
3. In the instant case, the relief of injunction is independent of the relief of declaration and are exigible to payment of separate court fee, i.e. fixed court fee, by virtue of Article 17(iii) of Schedule II to the Court Fee Act and Court Fee for injunction under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act.
4. A meaningful reading of the plaint would show that plaintiff is seeking a declaration that she is the owner of the property. She claims a right of residence on the basis of the Will of her husband irrespective of the title. Plaintiff is also, admittedly, in possession of the suit property. Accordingly, the relief of injunction sought or a restraint from being dispossessed would flow irrespective of the declaration or title of the plaintiff. Likewise, the relief of mandatory injunction, directing the first defendant to deliver the title deeds to the defendant is founded on the plea that title deeds were in her possession but had been forcibly removed and taken away. This would fall within Section 7(iv)(a) of the Court Fee Act. Reference in this connection may be made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Mahant Purushottam Dass and Others Vs. Har Narain & Others .
5. The suit has already been disposed of on the basis of an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, moved by the parties. Learned counsel for the defendant has drawn my attention to a judgement of a Single Judge of this Court in Phipson & Company Ltd. Vs. Gayce Private Limited (1976 PLR 77). While interpreting Section 28 of the Court Fee Act, it has been held that the Court has no power after the judgement has been delivered to call upon a party or a litigant to pay the
deficient court fee even if when initially a document or a plaint was entertained by mistake or inadvertence. In this case, I have reached the conclusion that the office objection is not sustainable. Even if it was otherwise, a irection for making up the deficiency in Court Fee could not have been given at this stage in view of the decision in Phipson & Company Ltd. Vs. Gayce Private Limited (Supra).
6. It may be noted that the suit in this case was disposed of on the basis of an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court, while disposing of the suit, has already directed that mere factum of the decree being passed in terms of Annexure filed with the compromise application would not affect the lawful exercise of jurisdiction by any statutory, municipal or other authority, over or in respect of statutory liabilities of any of the properties covered thereunder.
7. The office objection stands disposed of as above. The decree sheet be prepared.