High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Lajpat Rai vs State Of Haryana on 24 March, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Lajpat Rai vs State Of Haryana on 24 March, 2009
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                           AT CHANDIGARH



                   Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999
                     Date of decision: 24th March, 2009


Lajpat Rai

                                                              ... Petitioner

                                  Versus

State of Haryana
                                                            ... Respondent


CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA


Present:      Mr. S.K. Garg Narwana, Advocate for the petitioner.

              Mr. Amit Khatkar, Assistant Advocate General Haryana
              for the State.

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. (ORAL)

Present petition has been filed by Lajpat Rai. Petitioner was

running a shop, when on 16th September, 1986 at 9.00 a.m., Food

Inspector visited the premises of the petitioner and bought the sample of

Haldi Sabut. The sample was sent to the public analyst. As per the report

of public analyst, the sample was not in accordance with the

specifications laid in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rules.

On 2nd May, 1997, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar had

convicted and sentenced the petitioner to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for six months and to pay fine of Rs.1000, in default of payment of fine to

further undergo one month.

Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 2

Aggrieved against the same, petitioner had filed an appeal.

The appellate Court upheld the findings of the trial Court and had

maintained the conviction and sentence.

Mr. S.K. Garg Narwana has very fairly stated that he will not

be in a position to assail the conviction of the petitioner in view of the

findings of conviction recorded by two courts below. Mr. Garg has

however, stated that he is conscious that this Court cannot re-appreciate

and do re-appraisal of the evidence. Mr. Garg has stated that petitioner

has undergone six days of actual sentence. He has further submitted

that in the present case, sample was drawn on 16th September, 1986,

therefore, about 22 years are going to elapse and the right of speedy

trial vest in the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It

has further been submitted that petitioner is in the corridors of Court

since last 22 years and he has suffered a protracted trial. He has relied

upon a single Bench judgment of this Court in Mahavir vs. State

through Govt. Food Inspector, 2000(4) RCR (Criminal) 208, wherein it

was held as under:

“6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however,
further contends that the occurrence in this case pertains to
the year 1984, to be precise, February 17, 1984 and a
period of 16 years has already gone by. Petitioner has
already suffered the agony of protracted trial, spanning over
a period of one and half decades. Petitioner was 40 years of
age at the time of occurrence and further that he was
already undergone sentence for a period of 25 days. For the
contention that petitioner should be dealt with leniently in
these circumstances his counsel relies upon Manoj Kumar
v. State of Haryana,
1998(1) RCR 563. Learned State
counsel has, of course, been able to defend this case on
merits but practically has nothing to say insofar as reduction
of sentence imposed upon the petitioner is concerned.
Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 3

7. In totality of the facts and circumstances of this
case, the Court is of the view that ends of justice would be
met if sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to
the one already undergone by him. So ordered. Order of
payment of fine and so also consequences in default thereof
are, however, maintained. Learned counsel for the petitioner
informs the Court that fine has already been paid.”

He has also placed reliance upon another single Bench

judgment Des Raj vs. State of Haryana, 1995(XXII) Criminal Law Times

(482), which reads as under:

“9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and
expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental
rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. These are
meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and
reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused.
The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it
serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-
less right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from
Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This
is how the courts shall understand this right; and have gone
to the extent of quashing the prosecution after such
inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused
keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case.
Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or
more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the
procedure established by law. It is correct that although
minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is
prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the
interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a
speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a
Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 4

convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he
undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of
the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-
ordinary jurisdiction.

10. An identical question had arisen before the apex
Court in Braham Dass’s case (supra), wherein their lordship
were pleased to observe as under:

‘Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the
appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court and High
Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the
appellate Judge has not made clear reference to clause (f).
The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back.
Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part
of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose
would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point
of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence,
though ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Court should
take strict view of such matter.’
This view was followed by this Court in Nand Lal v.
State of Haryana, and Ishwar Singh’s
case (supra). The
present case is fully covered by the view expressed by the
apex Court and by this Court in the judgments cited above
and I have no reason to differ therewith.

11. For the reasons mentioned above, the conviction of
the petitioner for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read
with Section 7 of the Act is hereby maintained. However,
keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and
the fact that the petitioner has already faced the agony of
the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment
for a long period of eight years, his sentence is reduced to
the period of sentence already undergone. Sentence of fine
is, however maintained along with its default clause.”

He has further brought to my notice a judgment by another

Single Bench of this Court in Mahabir vs. State of Haryana, 1997(3)

RCC (469), wherein following view was taken:

Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 5

“The facts indicate that incident pertains to more than
14 years ago. The short question that thus arises for
consideration is as to whether it would be appropriate to
direct the petitioner to undergo the rest of the sentence.
There is no over-emphasizing the fact that speedy trial
which is the essence of justice has been lost. A reference of
some of the precedents in this regard would make the
position clear. In the case of Manjit Singh vs. The State of
Punjab, 1993(2) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases, 67,
11 years had expired before the revision petition was
decided. Keeping in view the inordinate delay, the sentence
was reduced to the one already undergone. The same
question again was considered by this Court in the case of
Pardeep Kumar vs. State (U.T.) Chandigarh, 1994 (1),
Chandigarh Criminal Cases 58. Therein the sample had
been taken in the year 1984. 9 years had expired by the
time the revision petition was heard. Once again the
sentence was reduced to the one already undergone. The
view point of the Delhi High Court is the same in the case of
Vir Singh Chauhan vs. State (Delhi), 1994(2) Chandigarh
Criminal Cases 253. When the revision came up for
hearing, 7 years had expired. Learned Single Judge of the
said Court reduced the sentence to the one already
undergone. Before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the
case of Jamnalal vs. The State of M.P., 1995(1) Prevention
of Adulteration Cases 78, the same view prevailed.

8. All these decisions are based in the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Braham Dass vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh, AIR
1988 SC 1789. Threin the accused
had been convicted for selling masur whole. The accused
had been acquitted by the trial Court, but High Court held
him guilty. 8 years were lost. Part of the sentence had been
undergone. The Supreme Court reduced the sentence to
the one already undergone.

9. The position in the present case is not different. As
already noted above, 14 long years have expired, when the
sample was taken. The petitioner has already undergone a
part of the sentence. In these circumstances, it will not be in
Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 6

the ends of justice that petitioner again to undergo the rest
of the sentence. Consequently, the sentence must be
reduced to the one already undergone.

10. For these reasons, revision petition fails and is
dismissed, but the sentence is reduced to the one already
undergone.”

Again, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this

Court in Mohinder Singh vs. State (Chandigarh Administration),

1997-1 Vol.CXV (Punjab Law Reporter) 623, wherein it has been held as

under:

“8. The last submission made in this regard was
pertaining to the sentence. It was argued that incident
pertains to the year 1980 and the petitioner is facing the
agony of a prolonged trial and thereafter appeal and the
revision, 16 years have elapsed. The decision in the case of
Hyssainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 had set the law into motion. The
scope of Article 21 was extended and it was held that
expeditious disposal of the cases was an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty. In
paragraph 5 it was held:

‘Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of his liberty cannot be ‘reasonable, fair
and just’ unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy
trial and by speedy trial, is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article

21.’
The same question was considered by a Bench of the
Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir and
others, 1985 Crl. L.J. 584. It was concluded that the word
‘trial’ would bring within its sweep, the appeal that would be
Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 7

pending against such an order. In paragraph 17 the Court
had held:

‘Therefore, there seems to be no option, but to hold
that the word ‘trial’ in the context of the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial includes within its sweep a
substantive appeal provided by the Code to the High Court

– whether against conviction or against acquittal. Thus, it
would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial
envisaged an equally expeditious conclusion of a
substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of
the proceedings in the original Court alone.’
Subsequently, the Full Bench of Patna High Court in
Anurag Baitha v. State of Bihar AIR 1987 Patna 274
reiterated the same view and in paragraph 11 it was held:
‘If Art.21 and the right to speedy public trial is not merely a
twinkling star in the high heavens to be worshipped and
rendered vociferous lip-service only but in deed is an
actually meaningful protective provision, then a fortiori
expeditious hearing of substantive appeals against
convictions is fairly and squarely within the mandate of the
said Article.’

9. Reverting back to the fact of the present case as
already mentioned above, the incident pertains to a period
of more than 16 years ago. The petitioner had already
undergone nearly 2 months of the sentence. As pointed out
above, fair, just and reasonable procedure is implicit in
Article 21 of the Constitution. After such a prolonged period,
though the petition is without merit, it would be inappropriate
to insist that petitioner can well be sent to undergo the rest
of the sentence. It would be unfair. Article 21 of the
Constitution would bring within its sweep, not only
expeditious trial but disposal of appeals and revisions. The
fairness to the accused petitioner, therefore, demands in the
peculiar facts of this case that giving predominance to the
said article, the sentence should be reduced to the one
already undergone. Order is made accordingly.”

Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 8

In Bihari lal vs. State of (U.T.) Chandigarh 2000(1) RCR

(Criminal) 222, a single Judge of this Court also reiterated the same view

and held as under:

“5. Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act provides that the person found guilty of the offence shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than six months but which may extend to three
years and with fine which shall not be less than one
thousand rupees. The proviso further provides that in cases
covered by Clauses (i) and (ii) to Section 15(1) of the Act,
for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgement, the Court may impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three
months but which may extend to two years and with fine
which shall not be less than five hundred rupees. Fair, just
and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, creates a right in the accused to be
tried speedily. It is now well settled that the right to speedy
and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and
cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Right
to speedy trial following from Article 21 encompasses all the
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial.

6. In Chander Bhan V. State of Haryana, 1996(1)
Recent Criminal Reports 125, it has been held by this
Court as under:-

” It is correct that although minimum sentence to be
imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet
keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua
the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial
compassion can play a role and a convict can be
compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes
on account of a protracted trial due to the fault of the
prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-
ordinary jurisdiction.”

Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 9

7. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Tek Chand
Bhatia, AIR
1980 Supreme Court 380, the Apex Court held
as under:-

“Though adulteration of an article of food is a serious
anti-social offence which must be visited with exemplary
punishment, it will be rather harsh to pass a sentence of
imprisonment in the facts and circumstances of the
instant case. Under Section 16 as in force at the
material time, the Court had the discretion for special and
adequate reasons under proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 16 not to pass a sentence of imprisonment. In
the instant case, the accused is a man aged 75 years.
The offence was committed more than 11 years ago.
The order of acquittal was based on the decision of the
High Court. The samples were taken from sealed tins.
These are mitigating circumstances. Accordingly,
instead of passing a substantive sentence of
imprisonment, the accused could be sentenced to period
already undergo and directed to pay a fine.”

8. In Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh,
1988 (4) SCC 130, the Supreme Court held as under:-
“Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the
appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court and the
High Court while reversing the judgement of acquittal
made by the appellate Judge has not made clear
reference to clauses (f). The occurrence took place
about more than 8 years back. Records show that the
appellant has already suffered a part of the
imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would
be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of
time for undergoing period of the sentence, though
ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the court should
take strict view of such matter.

While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit
the sentence of imprisonment to be period already
undergone and sustain the fine along with the default
sentence.”

Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 10

9. All the three cases cited above were under the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

10. The mitigating circumstance in this case is that
the petitioner is undergoing the agony of this protracted trial
for the last more than 15 years and he can be compensated
suitably by reducing the substance sentence imposed upon
by him to the one already undergone by him.

11. For the fore-going reasons I reduce the
substantive sentence of the petitioner to the one already
undergone by him. However, the sentence of fine shall
remain unaltered.”

Same view has been reiterated in Sat Pal vs. State of

Haryana 1998(1) RCR (Criminal) 75; Ram Kishan vs. State of

Haryana 2000(1) RCR (Criminal) 196; Krishan Kumar Narang vs.

State (U.T.) Chandigarh 2005(3)RCR 592 and Tirath Ram vs. State of

Punjab, 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) (69), relevant portion of which reads

as under:

“19. However, keeping in view the fact that the
petitioner was 50 years of age at the time of recording of his
statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and he would
be, by now, fairly advanced in the age, as also the fact that
he has faced the agony of criminal proceedings for the last
more than 16-1/2 years, I am of the opinion that the
sentence awarded to him deserves to be reduced to that of
fine. For this view, I draw support from a judgment of the
Supreme Court in Sri Krishan Gopal Sharma and another
v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 1996(2) RCR (Criminal
591: 1996(1)F.A.C. 258 (SC) and also from the judgment of
Allahabad High Court in Bhageloo v. State of U.P. and
another, 1996(2) F.A.C. 199”

Since in the present case, petitioner has suffered a

protracted trial of 22 years and has undergone about 6 days, I find that
Criminal Revision No. 1380 of 1999 11

petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of the consistent view taken by

this Court. Therefore, sentence of the petitioner is reduced to already

undergone. However, sentence of fine is enhanced to Rs.10000/-. The

same shall be deposited within a period of three months from today.

Non deposit of fine by the petitioner shall render the present

revision petition as dismissed.

[KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA]
JUDGE
March 24, 2009
rps