ORDER
1. This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the respondents No. 8 and 10 in WP (PIL) No. 3988 of 2002 praying that the writ petition be reheard and our judgment dated 10.12.2003 rendered in the writ petition be recalled. This application is filed on the basis that the name of counsel for respondents 8 and 10 did not appear in the list on the relevant date and hence they could not be present to assist the Court while the matter was being heard.
2. Though in the list dated 10.12.2003 the name of Mr. Shekhar Prasad Sinha appeared and his name is shown in the judgment dated 10.12.2003 as appearing for respondents 8 and 10, we thought that we should give an opportunity to Mr. Anwar who moved this petition, of being heard in defence of the writ petition so that we could also consider whether any error has been made while issuing the directions on 10.12.2003. Hence, without going into the question whether the present petition for re-hearing is justified or not, we have chosen to rehear the matter.
3. The dispute related to the D.A.V. School, Dhanbad. The petitioner, the guardian of two pupils studying in the School, came forward with the complaint that the School was being mal-administered and this Court must issue appropriate directions for protection of the interests of the children studying in the school. He had pleaded that the School was established by the people of the locality and it was not funded by the Arya Samaj and there was no question of the school being considered a minority institution. Counter affidavits had been filed by respondents 7 and 9 in one set and respondents 8 and 10 in another. However, in neither of the counter affidavits, there was a specific denial of the pleading that the school was not established by the Arya Samaj. Other plea was that the Arya Samaj had rendered financial help and hand constructed buildings. We considered the question whether the institute could be treated as a minority institution in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and in the light of the fact that Arya Samaj could not be considered a religious denomination but could be considered only as a part of the Hindu Religion. We come to the conclusion that Hindus in Dhanbad which was formerly part of the State of Bihar, but presently part of the State of Jharkhand could not be considered to be in the minority and hence no minority status could be attributed to the institution in question. This, of course, was in addition to our finding that there was nothing to show that the School was established by the Arya Samaj and even if we proceeded on the basis that it was established and was being run by the Arya Samaj, it could not be treated as a minority institution.
4. What is contended by Mr. Anwar in support of rehearing is that in the earlier order of the High Court it was held that the institution must be considered to be a minority institution and that decision was binding on all concerned. This was sought to be met by the writ petitioner by pointing that there were other orders and decisions of the Patna High Court indicating that the D.A.V. School is not a minority institution and also pointing out that the particular decision (Annexure relied on related to a Middle School and it cannot be taken as binding regarding the present institution. It is admitted that in view of the decision in T.M.A. PAI Foundation, 2002 (8) SCC 481, the entire position has to be reconsidered in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court therein and so considered in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to by us in our judgment dated 10.12.2003, it could not be held that the School in question is a minority institution. Of course, there is also the factual position that the School was initially not established by Arya Samaj. We are therefore satisfied that there is no reason to alter the conclusion we have already come to in that judgment dated 10.12.2003 regarding the status of the institution.
5. An attempt was made to suggest that there was no need to ask the Deputy Commissioner to conduct a fresh election for the Managing Committee of the School. In was contended that as per an earlier directions of this Court, a Civil Suit has been filed and that is pending. Of course, there is some merit in that submission and we have in fact referred to that in our judgment dated 10.12.2003. But, the fact remains that on the materials disclosed, it is clear that this institution is being mal-administered and this Court as parens patriae cannot sit back and put matters on hold until the litigation in the Civil Courts comes to an end. An immediate need for bringing order in the institution compelled this Court to pass an order appointing the Deputy Commissioner as a receiver and directing him to immediately call for a General Body Meeting of the Society in question and to get the Office Bearers of the Society elected in terms of the Bye-Laws of the Society. This Order and directions were given to preserve the standard of education in the School and to ensure that the School is run as any educational institution should be run. It cannot be treated as battle ground for rival claims and the cause of education and the cause of the students cannot be allowed to suffer. This foremost aspect weighed with us while dealing with such a litigation. In view of the facts available and the claims put forward, we are satisfied that, that part of our order that the Deputy Commissioner should take over the management and should hold the elections immediately does not warrant any alteration. At best what we feel necessary is to direct the Deputy Commissioner to conduct the election to Managing Committee as expeditiously as possible and within three months from the receipt of a copy of the judgment dated 10.12.2003 and of this order, which will be treated as part of the judgment already rendered by us on 10.12.2003.
Thus, we dispose of this petition fixing the time limit as indicated.
