ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The matter is coming up for admission. Heard Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Arbitration and Land Ceiling.
Respondents 3 and 6 in LAOP No. 95 of 1995 on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nellore, being aggrieved of the order dated 10.7.2007 made in the aforesaid proceeding, had preferred this civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The Office raised an objection relating to the maintainability and in view of the order made by this Court on 24.8.2007, the civil revision petition was numbered subject to the maintainability.
3. Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners had pointed out to the nature of the decree made in the proceeding aforesaid and would maintain that this may not answer the definition of the decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence it cannot be said that there is an effective alternative remedy by way of appeal. The learned Counsel also would submit that even otherwise though the questions had already been answered, as can be seen from the certified copy of the judgment in AS Nos. 1467 of 1999 and 1468 of 1999, dated 30.9.2005, marked as Ex. A34, in a way ignoring the positive findings recorded by the Division Bench of this Court, the order impugned in the civil revision petition had been made. Further, the learned Counsel pointed out to the evidence of PW.5 and would maintain that in the light of the evidence of PW.5, the findings are definitely perverse or at least definitely on improper appreciation of evidence available on record. The learned Counsel while making elaborate submissions had pointed out to the scope and ambit of Sections 18, 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act and also further would maintain that in a matter of this nature recording negative findings relating to the title would be wholly without jurisdiction and hence viewed from any angle the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel incidentally had pointed out that in a similar case where the parties are similarly placed having realized the mistake, the proceeding is being continued by the same learned Judge, but due to the misfortune of the petitioners, the order impugned in the present civil revision petition was made. The learned Counsel had submitted the broad submissions on behalf of the petitioners and also placed strong reliance on several decisions to convince this Court that the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is perfectly maintainable and it is a fit case where the impugned order to be set aside remitting the matter back again to the concerned learned Judge to appreciate the same on merits and decide the matter afresh.
4. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration and Land Ceiling would maintain that it is no doubt true that the operative portion of the order and the decree made are not happily worded, but she would maintain that this is a matter whereunder in LAOP No. 95 of 1995 the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nellore, after framing the point for consideration, discussed the points commencing from Paragraphs 11 to 16 and ultimately answered the reference in a particular way. The learned Government Pleader, however, made it clear that at this stage the merits and demerits need not be gone into. In all fairness the learned Government Pleader would contend that it may be that on merits the revision petitioners may be having a good case, but the question to be decided is whether the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be the proper remedy in the facts and circumstances of the case. In all fairness the learned Government Pleader would submit that may be the remedy may be by way of a Review Application in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances before the self-same Judge or to prefer a regular appeal in the peculiar facts and circumstances. Hence, the learned Government Pleader would conclude that in the light of the facts and circumstances since an effective alternative remedy by way of regular appeal is available and in view of the fact that the powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution to be sparingly exercised, this is not a fit case to be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration and Land Ceiling also placed reliance on certain decisions.
Heard the Counsel.
5. As already referred to supra, initially the office raised an objection relating to the maintainability of the civil revision petition and by an order of this Court, the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was numbered subject to the maintainability.
6. The civil revision petition is filed by the petitioners-respondents 3 and 6 in LAOP No. 95 of 1995 on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nellore, being aggrieved of the order dated 10.7.2007 on the file of the Court aforesaid. This was a reference made under Section 30 read with Section 31(2) of Land Acquisition Act arising out of the Award No. 37/95-96 dated 30.10.1995 made by the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), KPTPS, Nellore. On a cursory glance of the order impugned in the civil revision petition, the respective pleadings of the parties had been referred to, the oral and documentary evidence also had been referred to by the learned Judge and at Paragraph 10 the point for consideration had been framed. The learned Judge proceeded to discuss with the contents of the Award and the report and recorded certain findings and ultimately answered the reference as under:
In the result, the reference made by Special Tahsildar, KPTPS (L.A.), Nellore in Award No. 37/95-96, dated 30.10.1995 is hereby rejected with an observation that the claimants failed to prove that they are the recognized owners of their respective lands acquired by the Government and they are not entitled to receive compensation in respect thereof with interest accrued thereon. Accordingly, this reference is answered. The LAO is at liberty to withdraw the amount deposited in this Court with accrued interest thereon in accordance with law. Advocate fee is fixed at Rs. 1,000/-.
7. Though certain submissions were made that the operative portion of the order and also the decree made in the LAOP referred to supra do not answer the ingredients of a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the light of the nature of the order, which had been made, whether the order may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law, these aspects touching the merits and demerits of the matter need not be gone into while deciding whether this would answer the definition of a decree. Hence, in the light of the same, this Court is not inclined to express any opinion touching the merits and demerits of the matter. Suffice it to say that the revision petitioners are having an effective remedy by way of a regular appeal.
8. The question, which had been argued in elaboration, is that the mere fact that an alternative remedy of appeal is available, by that itself it cannot be said that in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained. In other words, submissions at length were made and several decisions had been relied upon to convince this Court that this remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is available in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.
9. Strong reliance was placed on Ex. A34, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and the clear findings recorded in the said decision and also the evidence of PW.5 and several admissions made by PW.5 in this regard. It is needless to say that these aspects also do relate to the merits and demerits of the matter.
10. The learned Counsel in elaborate broad written submissions submitted before this Court had placed reliance on the under-noted decisions:
Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu (deceased), after him his Heir and Legal Representative, ; Sarpanch, Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and Anr. ; D.M. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee and Ors. ; Trimbak Gangadhar Telang and Anr. v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and Ors. ; Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Anr. ; Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena ; N. Parthasarathy v. Controller of Capital Issues and Anr. ; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge and Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale ; Sukhbir Narain (Dead) By LRs. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation ; Sajja Prabhakar and Ors. v. Special Tahsildar (L.A.) Krishnapatnam Thermal Power Station, Nellore and Anr. ; Iddum Balamani (Died) and Ors. v. Katam Ramanamma and Ors. ; The Officer on Special Duty, Land Acquisition, Ahmedabad v. Gordhanbhai Bhalabhai Patel ; Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poorna and Anr. ; Haryana State Adhyapak Sangh and Ors. Etc. v. State of Haryana and Ors. ; Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. ; Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A.K. Biswas ; Bindheswari Singh v. K.K. Dutta and Anr. ; India Exports House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi and Anr. v. J.R. Vohra ; Miss Maneck Gustedji Burjarji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza and M. Maniklal v. The State of Mysore and Ors. .
The learned Judge of this Court in B. Harikishan Rao v. A. Venkatesham , at Paragraph 9 observed as hereunder:
Looking at the orders impugned and the prayer sought in this revision and keeping the above principles in mind, this Court is of the view that none of the above principles have been satisfied to invoke the said power of superintendence. No doubt, the power of superintendence conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests a duty on this Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But the said power does not vest this Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless this Court interferes.
Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the learned Judge of this Court in Kota Sreevalli and Ors. v. Chinni Seetharamaiah and Ors. , whereunder the learned Judge at paragraph 6 observed as hereunder:
When there exists a regular remedy of appeal, the High Court cannot examine the correctness of a decree, in the proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, it needs to be noticed that the very purpose of conferring supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, is to arm the High Court with adequate power, to ensure that the subordinate Courts do not deviate from the settled principles of law, particularly, in the matter of procedure. A clear distinction needs to be maintained, as to the adjudication of the findings on the findings recorded by the Courts, on the merits, on the one hand, and examination of deviations, if any, by the subordinate Court, from the settled procedure, on the other hand. While the former is in the exclusive province of remedy of appeal, the latter can certainly constitute the subject-matter of the revision, under Article 227. It is in this context that the present matter needs to be examined.
Reliance also was placed on the decision of the learned Judge of this Court in Pragallapati Gangaraju v. K. Satyanarayana and Ors. .
In Miss Maneck Custodji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza , while dealing with the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India observing that the extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases, observed at Paragraph 6 as hereunder:
It is very difficult to appreciate the reasoning behind the order made by the High Court. It is to say the least an extraordinary order which flies in the face of law and judicial procedure. The respondent had clearly a legal remedy available to him by way of an appeal against the decree of the City Civil Court and this remedy was not only adequate but more comprehensive than the one under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even so, for some inexplicable reasons, the respondent chose to prefer a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution and Vaidya, J., entertained the Special Civil Application and granted relief to the respondent casting to the winds the well-settled principle that the High Court does not ordinarily, in exercise of its discretion, entertain a special civil application under Article 227 of the Constitution where an adequate alternative legal remedy is available to the applicant. It is true that this principle is not rigid and inflexible and there can be extraordinary circumstances where despite the existence of an alternative legal remedy, the High Court may interfere in favour of an applicant, but this was certainly not one of such extraordinary cases. It is indeed difficult to see how the learned Judge could entertain a Special Civil Application against a decree passed by a subordinate Court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it and that appeal lies to the High Court itself. It must be realized that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution which is an extraordinary jurisdiction which is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases and it is not to be exercised as if it were an appellate jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever it liked. That apart, it is interesting to note that the order passed by the learned Judge was not an interlocutory order but a final order disposing of the special civil application and by that order the learned Judge did not set aside the decree passed by the City Civil Court, but merely directed stay of its execution pending the disposal of the Small Cause Court suit. It defies one’s comprehension as to how such an order could be made by the learned Judge. It is also difficult to see how the learned Judge could give a direction that the decision of the City Civil Court on the issue whether the respondent was a paying guest would not bind the parties in the adjudication of the Small Cause suit would be bound by the decision of the City Civil Court would be a question which would arise for determination in the Small Cause Court suit and the Small Cause Court would have to determine it in deciding the suit before it. If the decision of the Small Cause Court is erroneous, the aggrieved party would have a right to file an appeal against it and the appellate Court would then consider this question and adjudicate upon it. But we fail to understand how the learned Judge could, without any decision having been given by the Small Cause Court and such decision having been brought up before him in appeal or revision, enter upon a consideration of this question and pronounce upon it. The order passed by the learned Judge was clearly erroneous and it must be quashed and set aside and the Special Civil Application must be dismissed We may make it clear that whenever the Small Cause Court hears the suit it will not take into account any observations made by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment in regard to the question whether the decision of the City Civil Court is binding or not and it will proceed to decide the suit before it in the light of what it considers to be the correct legal position.
No doubt the Counsel for revision petitioners made certain submissions to distinguish this decision on facts.
11. In Bhutnath Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , while dealing with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the successive notifications under Section 4 of the said Act and for the determination of compensation which notification to be taken into consideration and the principles relating thereto held as hereunder:
The District Court held that compensation payable to the owners of land had to be determined on the basis of the market value on the dates of the notifications, dated November 2, 1956 and June 3, 1958 and not on the basis of the notification, dated January 12, 1955. To revise that decision, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution could not be exercised. Normally, the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to ensure that a subordinate Court or Tribunal does not transgress the limits of its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction with which the High Court is invested is not appellate; it cannot seek to correct what it regards as merely an error of law or fact. The learned Judges of the High Court assumed that in the absence of special circumstances when there are successive notifications under Section 4(1) in respect of the same land, the first notification will govern the assessment of the market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the question in each case is whether there was an intention to supersede the previous notification; and if the Government does not choose to explain the reasons which persuaded it to issue a second notification, the Court may be justified in interfering that it was intended to supersede the earlier notification by the later notification.
Determination of the question whether the first notification remained operative, therefore, depended upon proof of facts. The High Courts could not entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against the order of the District Judge, and determine an important issue of fact on which the case of the appellant largely depended, on a presumption. Against the award of compensation by the District Court, an appeal lies to the High Court, and in that appeal the question would be fully considered in all its aspects on the evidence on the record. This was not a case in which the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution could be invoked or exercised.
In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. , the Apex Court observed that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction under this Article. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. The view expressed by the Apex Court in Shyam Kishore and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. , also may be referred to in this context.
12. As already referred to supra, this Court is not inclined to express any opinion touching the merits and demerits of the matter though elaborate submissions were made by the Counsel representing the revision petitioners. It is needless to say that the petitioners are at liberty to pursue their remedies available to them under law. Except making this observation, nothing else can be done in the present proceeding and with the above observation especially in the light of the availability of the effective alternative remedy to the revision petitioners, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
13. Accordingly, the civil revision petition shall stand dismissed at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs. It is made clear that this Court had not expressed any opinion whatsoever touching the merits and demerits of the matter.