JUDGMENT
G.B. Patnaik, J.
1. The enunciation of law made by a Bench of this Court while disposing of a batch of writ applications in O.J.C. Nos. 2001 to 2008 of 1983 (Pradyumna Panda v. State of Orissa) disposed of on 28-9-1988 with regard to the power of the Member, Board of Revenue, in entertaining and disposing of a revision under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Orisa Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) having been doubted by a latter Division Bench, the matter has been referred to a larger Bench. The Member, Board of Revenue, while disposing of the revision came to the conclusion that he could not accept the reference made by the Collector as the satisfaction of the Collector was inadequate. Having not accepted the reference, he had, however, further observed that it was open to the Collector to examine the case afresh giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties and make a reference if he was
satisfied that injustice had been done. This observation made by the Member, Board of Revenue, was held to be without jurisdiction by the earlier Division Bench while disposing of the batch of writ applications in O.J.C. Nos. 2001 to 2008 of 1983. It was held by their Lordships that having dismissed the revision, the Member, Board of Revenue, had no further jurisdiction to require the Collector to make fresh enquiry for any of the purposes including a further report, if any, to the Board of Revenue and the Collector of the district could not assume jurisdiction to enquire into the matter afresh which power the Act did not vest in the Collector. When the present writ application came up for hearing before another Division Bench to which I was a party, prima facie, we were not in agreement with the view expressed by the earlier Bench, referred to supra. On the other hand, it has been held that the power of Board under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act is intended to remedy the defects which can be brought to the notice of the Board by the Collector and the said power is quite wide and there has been no fetter on the same. Therefore, if the Board reaches a conclusion that the Collector has not applied his mind to the materials on * record and has made a reference to the Board, there cannot be any bar for the Board to observe that it would be open for the Collector to examine the materials afresh and make a further reference if he is so satisfied. But instead of taking a different view and disposing of the writ application, the latter Bench had directed’that the writ application should be placed before a larger Bench and that is how the matter was heard by a Full Bench.
2. The moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Board while exercising its power under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act, not being satisfied to accept the reference made by the Collector, can still observe that it is open for the Collector to re-examine the matter and make a further reference if the Collector is so satisfied. The answer to this question would depend upon an interpretation of Section 59(2) of the Act and the content and extent of power that is vested in the Board of Revenue by the said provision.
3. Before examining the different provisions relevant for the purpose of interpreting the power of the Board under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act, it would be necessary to notice briefly the facts of the case. One Dadhibaman Panigrahi had made an application under Section 36-A of the Act before the Revenue Officer for settlement of 4.52 acres of land in mauja Lauguda appertaining to plots Nos. 101 (area 2.26) and 106 (area 2.26) alleging that the said land is non-res umable and is in possession of the applicant as tenant and praying that fair and equitable rent be determined and compensation payable in respect of the same under Section 28(1) of the Act be also assessed. That application was registered as O.L.R. Case No. 84 of 1975. The Revenue Officer disposed of that application by order dated 14-11-1975 holding the land to be non-resumable and further holding the applicant to be a tenant in respect of the land and directing that Patta be issued in favour of the applicant. The said applicant Dadhibaman Panigrahi sold the land to the petitioner under a registered sale-deed dated 15-6-1982 and the petitioner remained in possession of the same after paying due consideration. The District Collector made a reference to the Member, Board of Revenue, invoking his jurisdiction under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act after examining the case records of O.L.R. Case No. 84 of 1975 being of the view that the tenancy claimed by said Dadhibaman was a fake one and, therefore, the order of the Revenue Officer was unsustainable. The Member, Board of Revenue, by the impugned order did not accept the reference as he was of the opinion that the Collector had made the reference on the basis of the report of the Aditional District Magistrate without applying his mind to the same and, therefore, the Collector’s satisfaction could not be held to be a reasonable one. Though he did not accept the reference and rejected the same, but made the following observation :–
“However, it is open to the Collector to examine the case afresh giving a reasonable opportunity to the opposite parties and make a reference to me if he is satisfied that injustice has been done in this case.”
It is this observation of the Member, Board of Revenue, which has been sought to be quashed in this writ application.
4. Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the earlier Bench decision of this Court in the batch of writ applications, referred to supra, contends that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to make an observation and accordingly the same must be quashed. He also contends that the power conferred upon the Board under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 authorises it to revise any order passed by the authority under the Act. The reference made by the Collector cannot be said to be an order passed under the Act and, therefore, if the Board does not entertain the reference made by the Collector, it has no further jurisdiction to observe that the Collector may make further enquiry into the matter and make a reference afterwards. According to Mr. Murty, such an interpretation would cause undue harassment to a citizen, as the Board may interfere with rights after rights are crystallized by lapse of time and settled claims would be unsettled. Mr. Murty, therefore contends that the decision of this Court in the batch of writ applications in O.J.C. Nos. 2001 to 2008 of 1983 should be affirmed.
5. To appreciate the contention raised, it
would be profitable to extract Section 59 of the Act in extenso:–
“59. Revision :–
(1) The prescribed authority may, on application by any party aggrieved by any order passed in an appeal under any provision of this Act filed within the prescribed period, revise such order.
(2) The Board of Revenue may, at any time on being moved in that behalf by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner, revise any order passed by any authority under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of revising any order, the prescribed authority and the Board of Revenue shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and shall have power to call for and examine the records of the proceedings
wherein such order was passed and to pass such order as they deem fit:
Provided that no order under this Section shall be passed without giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
Under the scheme of the Act, an appeal is provided under Section 58 against the order passed by the Revenue Officer under different sections as contained in Section 58(1) of the Act. Obviously, an order passed by the Revenue Officer under Section 36-A is also appealable under Section 58(1). The aggrieved party could maintain a revision against the appellate order to the prescribed authority within the prescribed period and the prescribed authority could revise the order, as provided in Section 59(1) of the Act. The prescribed authority is as provided in Rule 42-B of the Orissa Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules) and the prescribed period for maintaining a revision under Section 59(1) is as provided in Rule 44 of the Rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act, however, is the power of the Board which could be exercised only on being moved by the Collector of the district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner and that power could be exercised by the Board at any time. The expression “at any time” would obviously mean, within such reasonable time depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case concerned. A bare reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 59 clearly indicates that a Board of Revenue could revise any order passed by any authority under the Act and the only restriction is that it could exercise that power only when it is moved in that behalf by a Collector of the district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner. The language of Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act does not put any restriction or fetter on the power of the Board which is the highest revenue authority of the State. Such a power has been conferred obviously to protect the interest of the State and to correct illegalities or irregularities committed by the subordinate revenue authorities in discharge of their functions under the Act. This provision as it now stands was inserted into the statute in the year 1976 and prior to the same,
the Board could exercise a suo motu power or on an application of either party or any interested person to call for and examine the. records of any master under the Act to find out the irregularity, illegality or impropriety of any decision or order passed and could modify, annul and reverse the same. The distinction between Sub-section (2) of Section 59, as it stood prior to amendment in 1976, and the present provision is that under the earlier provisions both the Collector as well as the Board could exercise the power and power could be exercised either suo motu or on an application by either party or any interested person, whereas under the amended provision, as it now exists, it is only the Board which could exercise the power but only on being moved by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner. Thus, for entertaining a revision under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act, though the Legislature has curtailed the power which the Board was exercising under the old provision, inasmuch as it can only entertain under the existing provision on being moved by the Collector of the district or the Land Reforms Commissioner and not otherwise, but in exercising that power no limitation has been put by the Legislature. In other words, an unlimited power to correct any illegality or irregularity has been conferred upon the highest revenue authority of the State if the said authority is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of revenue administration. Sub-section (3) of Section 59 of the Act further amplifies the aforesaid power of the Board under Sub-section (2) by providing that the Board shall have power to call for and examine the records of the proceedings wherein such order was passed and to pass such order as it deems fit. Sub-section (3) of Section 59 clearly indicates the amplitude of the power conferred upon the Board of Revenue under Sub-section (2) of Section 59. The expression “to pass such order as they deem fit” in Sub-section (3) clearly indicates that the Board can pass such order as it thinks fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, and this power would certainly include the power to observe that it would be open for the Collector to further look into the matter whereafter on being satisfied the
Collector could make a further reference. The proviso to said Sub-section (3), however only casts an obligation that before passing any order the parties concerned will have a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (3) further stipulates that the Board shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and the expression “prescribed” has been defined in Section 2(23) to mean, prescribed by rules made by the Government under the Act. Rule 45(2) of the Rules prescribes that hearing and disposal of cases of revision before the Board of Revenue shall be in accordance with the Board of Revenue, Orissa Regulations, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulations”). Clause-9 of the Regulations stipulates that an applicant before the Board cannot be permitted to be heard on any ground other than those set forth in the memorandum, but the Board is not required to confine itself to the grounds set forth in the memorandum. In other words, the Board could interfere with the orders of the lower authority on the ground not taken by the aggrieved party. The aforesaid provision in the Regulations indicates that the power of the Board in disposing of the matter before it is unlimited and there is no restriction on the same. A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it crystal clear that the Board of Revenue has been conferred with an unrestricted power under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act and the only limitation is for entertaining a matter which must be only on being moved by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner.
6. It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the construction must be put from the bare words of the Act itself, if the language used is clear and unambiguous. In the construction of a statute the words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances with reference to which they are used to show that they are used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical meaning. Lord Wensleydale in Grev v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61,
had, therefore, observed that the ordinary sense of the words must be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. While construing the provisions of a statute, a Court has to give effect to the natural meanings of the words used therein if the words are clear enough. If the plain grammatical meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 59 is that the Board of Revenue has an unrestricted and unlimited power thereunder, it would not be proper for a Court to restrict that power on the ground that it may cause undue hardship to a citizen. Applying the general rule of construction of a statute to the provision contained in Section 59(2) of the Act, I do not find any restriction therein and in that view of the matter, when the Board in exercise of that unfettered power does not accept a reference on a finding that the Collector has not scrutinized the materials properly, it would be open for the Board to observe that the Collector may further enquire into the matter and also make a fresh reference if he is so satisfied after such proper enquiry. In my considered opinion, therefore, the construction put to Section 59(2) of the Act by the Bench of this Court while disposing of the batch of writ applications in O.J.C. Nos. 2001 to 2008 of 1983 cannot be said to be correct. I am also of the further opinion that the observation made by the learned Judges while disposing of the batch of writ applications to the effect:–
“…. Having dismissed the revisions, the Member, Board of Revenue, had no further jurisdiction to require the Collector to make fresh enquiry for any of the purposes including a further report, if any, to the Board of Revenue and the Collector of the district cannot assume jurisdiction to enquire into the matter afresh which power the Act does not vest in the Collector…..”
is not in consonance with the interpretation that has been given to Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act in this judgment. The said observation in the batch of writ applications must, therefore, be held to be contrary to the true meaning and import of Section 59(2) of the Act and consequently it must be held that the said observation is not the correct enunciation of law.
7. It would be appropriate to notice two other contentions raised by Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, namely, the Board having been given power to revise any order passed by any authority under the Act under Sub-section (2). and Collector’s order of reference not being an order passed under the Act, the question of issuing a direction to the Collector does not arise and secondly, the power under Sub-section (2) could be exercised only within a reasonable time, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239. So far as Mr. Murty’s contention regarding Board’s power to revise an order passed under the Act is concerned, there is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law. A Board could only revise an order passed under the Act whether original or appellate, but a Board could exercise its power under Sub-section (2) only on being moved by the Collector or the Land Reforms Commissioner. Where a Board does not accept the reference on being moved either by the Collector of a district or by the Land – Reforms Commissioner but observes that it would be open for the Collector to further enquire into the matter and if satisfied to make a further reference in the matter, the Board does not revise any order of the authority under the Act. The Board merely refuses to accept the reference or refuses to invoke its jurisdiction for revising an order under the Act. In this view of the matter, the further observation made by the Board does not amount to revision of an order passed by any authority under the Act and consequently, Mr. Murty’s contention is without any substance.
So far as the question whether power of revision under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 could be exercised after a long lapse of years, the question does not arise in this reference to the Full Bench, inasmuch as the only point that had been canvassed before the Division Bench was that the Board had no further jurisdiction to make any observation to the effect that the Collector could further enquire into the matter and make a fresh reference if satisfied after the Board refuses to accept the reference made by the Collector and does not
exercise its jurisdiction under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 to revise an order passed by the authority under the Act, In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mansaram’s case (supra) on which Mr. Murty has placed reliance, even though there is no period of limitation in Section 59(2) of the Act, we have no manner of doubt to hold that the said power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which necessarily stipulates that it should be exercised within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time so as to be immune from the attack that the power has not been exercised in a reasonable manner would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a given case where the Board in exercise of its power under Section 59(2) revises an order of any subordinate authority under the Act after a long lapse of years and then that order is challenged, it would certainly be open for the Court to examine the facts and circumstances of the case to find out whether the power has been exercised by the Board in a reasonable manner and in such a case, the decision of the Supreme Court in Mansaram’s case (supra) would be a guide, but the question does not arise for consideration in the present case, since the Board has not revised any order passed by any authority under the Act in exercise of its power under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 and that question had not been urged before the Division Bench when the Division Bench referred the matter to the larger Bench. In that view of the matter, there is no substance in Mr. Murty’s argument that the observation made by the Board in the impugned order should be quashed relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mansaram’s case.
8. The writ application being based solely on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to make the observation and in view my conclusion earlier, the writ application is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.
B.L. Hansaria, C.J.
9. I agree.
S.K. Mohanty, J.
10. I agree.