JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioners in these five cases have a common grievance. They allege that the State Transport Commissioner had rejected their applications for the grant of stage carriage permit on the Ropar – Amloh route via Morinda without giving them an opportunity of hearing. Even the order was not conveyed. Still further, the petitioners allege that respondent No. 3, who had somehow managed to get a copy of the order filed an appeal in August 1999. It was promptly allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on September 30, 1999. The petitioners pray thE the orders dated December 18, 1997 and September 30, 1999 passed by the State Transport Commissioner and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal be quashed.
2. The admitted facts are that 85 applications had been received for the grant of stage carriage permits on the Ropar-Amloh route. None of these parties was given any notice of the date of hearing by the State Transport Commissioner. He had rejected all the 85 applications vide order dated December 18, 1997. The petitioners complain that no information regarding the order was given to them. Still further, it is the admitted position that respondent No. 3 has filed an appeal against this order viz. appeal No.328 of 1999 on August 27, 1999. This appeal was registered promptly on the same day and directions for issue of dasti summons to requisition the record were given. On September 10, 1999 the case was adjourned to September 20, 1999 and finally, on September 28, 1999 the case was ordered to be posted for hearing on September 30, 1999. On that date the appeal of respondent No.3 was allowed, Two return trips were granted.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the action of the State Transport Commissioner in rejecting their petitions for the grant of permit was wholly arbitrary and contrary to Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and also Section 80(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It has been pointed out that no hearing was afforded. No reasons for rejecting the request of each of the petitioners were given in the order. No reason was ever communicated to any of the petitioners. In fact, the orders were passed on the wholly wrong assumption that the applications having been invited in the year 1992 the situation had changed and, therefore, it was not necessary to issue any permit. Still further, learned counsel submit that even the factum of rejection of the applications was not communicated to the applicants. On this premises, it is maintained that the basic order passed by the authority deserves to be quashed. Since the order had not been conveyed, the petitioners were unable to avail of the remedy of appeal. Respondent No. 3 had somehow managed to get a copy of the order. He could avail of the remedy of appeal. Others were deprived of the Opportunity.
4. Mr. Berry, Senior DAG Punjab, who appears for the respondents, submits that the appeal filed by respondent No.3 was not competent as the State Transport Commissioner had passed the order under Section 103(2)(a) of the 1988 Act. He further submits that even the Punjab Roadways (State Government undertaking) was an applicant. Its claim was erroneously rejected by the State Transport Commissioner. Thus, even the State of Punjab is supporting the claim of the petitioners and is, in fact, the petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 8422 of 2000.
5. The case on behalf of the respondents has been contested by respondent No. 3. Mr. Sawhney, learned counsel for Kansla Bus Service Regd. Sirhind submits that the peti-
tioners having not challenged the order passed by the State Transport Commissioner are not entitled to either maintain the present petition or to make the grievance against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Learned counsel has referred to the decision, of their Lordships of Supreme Court in The Hanuman Transport Co. Private Ltd v. Meenakshi alias Rama Bai and Ors. Civil Appeal No.794 of 1963 decided on December 20, 1963.
6. Section 80 embodies a positive mandate. It entitles a citizen to apply for a permit at any time. The authority has to ordinarily allow the request. In a case where the authority chooses to reject an application, it has to give to the applicant “its reasons for refusal” in writing. Still further, it also requires that “an opportunity of being heard in the matter” shall be given. In the present case, either out of sheer ignorance or for lack of application, the Stale Transport Commissioner clearly violated the mandate of the statute. He did not offer an opportunity of hearing to any of the applicants. He did not communicate the reasons for rejection of their applications to any one except the third respondent. The petitioners have categorically averred on the record that despite various representations and requests, they were not informed about the passing of the order. This clearly shows that all was not well with the style of functioning.
7. In view of the above, the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by the State Transport Commissioner on December 18, 1997, a copy of which has been produced at Annexure P5 in Civil Writ Petition No.2449 of 2000, was wholly illegal and violation of the mandate of the statute. It is liable to be quashed.
8. Curiously respondent No.3 had got a copy of this order. It filed an appeal on August 27, 1999. Despite the fact that a large number of appeals are admittedly pending before the Appellate Tribunal and this Court gets petitions for directions that the Tribunal should decide the case expeditiously, the appeal of respondent No.3 was finally disposed of by the Officer on September 30, 1999. Ld. counsel for the petitioner points out that it is a laboured order. It has been delivered by the Officer on the last date on which he has to relinquish the charge of the Office. He had retired on September 30, 1999.
9. This court is not concerned with the factum of the Officer having retired on September 30, 1999. Even the speed with which the appeal was decided may be overlooked. However, th’e fact that stares us in the face is that on account of the inaction of the State Transport Commissioner, the other applicants like respondent No.3 were deprived of the chance to file an appeal.
10. Mr. Sawhney submits that the petitioners having not appealed, the order should be deemed to have become final and thus, they are not entitled to raise the challenge against the grant of permit to the third respondent. He places reliance on the decision of their Loarships of the Supreme Court in the case of The Hanuman Transport Co. Ltd. (supra)
11. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by their Lordships. However, the facts of the present case are self-eloquent. The order passed by the State Transport Commissioner was never communicated to the petitioners. In fact, even the third respondent seems to have got a copy sometime in August 1999 despite the fact that the order had been passed in December 1997. If it was shown that the petitioners had notice of the order passed by the State Transport Commissioner and had knowingly not filed the appeal, the claim made on behalf of the third respondent would have been legitimate and tenable. However, in a case where the provisions of a statute have been flagrantly violated and no notice of the order was ever given to the party concerned, it would be unfair and grossly unjust to debar it from seeking its remedy or to draw an inference against it. The action of an authority cannot be permitted to perpetrate injustice. In view of the factual position, the case of the petitioners is clearly distinguishable from that of The Hanuman Transport Co.’s case(supra).
12. Mr. Sawhney contends that the third respondent has been continuing since Feb-
ruary 29, 2000. Thus, it should be allowed to continue during the pendency of the case.
13. Normally, we would have accepted the prayer. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we think it would be unjust to do so. If there is need the Punjab Roadways will be permitted to operate on the route so as to avoid inconvenience to the public. However, the Authorities have to consider the claims of the private contenders. If one of them is allowed to operate to the exclusion of others the scales may get tilted. If we permit the third respondent to continue to operate, the possibility of its influencing the Authority cannot be ruled out. Thus we reject the request made on behalf of the third respondent.
14. No other point has been raised.
15. In view of the above, we find that the orders dated December 18, 1997 and Sep-
tember 30, 1999 passed by the State Transport Commissioner and the State Appellant
Authority respectively are wholly illegal and untenable. These are, consequently, set
aside. The State Transport Commissioner is directed to consider and decide the claims
of the parties as expeditiously as possible preferably within two months from the date of
the receipt of copy of this order. The order shall be communicated to all concerned. In
the circumstances, the parties are left to hear their own costs.