JUDGMENT
Anil Kumar, J.
1. The controversy in this appeal is whether rejection of highest bid of the appellant after about one year four months and then again not returning the earnest money of the appellant for about four months after rejection of his bid by Delhi Development Authority, can be construed to be an act done or purported to have been done in pursuance to the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 or any rule or regulation made there under so as to attract Section 53B(2) of the Delhi Development Act.
2. The relevant facts for determination of this controversy are that the respondent held an open auction on 25th July, 1974 for sale of a cinema plot no.70, Nehru Place, Kalkaji, New Delhi for grant of perpetual lease hold rights. The highest bidder had to pay 25% of the bid amount towards earnest money in cash or in the form of bank draft at the fall of hammer. The balance amount had to be paid within 120 days from the date of issue of communication for the acceptance of the bid.
3. The appellant was the highest bidder at the auction held by respondent and he deposited a sum of Rs.3.75 lakh being 25% of the bid amount as earnest money. One of the conditions of the bid was that highest bid could be rejected without assigning any reason. The said term is as under:
“5. The bid shall not be revocable by the bidder. The highest bid shall be subject to the acceptance of DDA or such officer who has been authorised to do so. The highest bid can be rejected without assigning any reason. If the bid is not accepted, the earnest money will be refunded to the intending purchaser without any interest.”
4. The appellant had deposited an amount of Rs.3.75 lakh as earnest money after offering the highest bid for a sum of Rs.14.80 lakh. The respondent had issued a receipt dated 31st July, 1974 for the payment of Rs.3.75 lakh. The appellant in accordance with the conditions of auction was required to deposit the balance amount of Rs.11.05 lakhs within 120 days from the date of issue of the communication to the appellant of acceptance of the bid by the respondent. The intimation of acceptance of bid was, however, not received by the appellant for a fairly long time. Consequently the appellant sent a reminder by letter dated 19th March, 1975. The appellant did not receive any communication in reply to his letter dated 19th March 1975. He, therefore, presumed that his bid has been accepted and he sent the balance bid amount of Rs.11.05 lakhs by cheque vide letter dated 27th June, 1975. The cheque of Rs.11.05 lakhs was, however, sent back by respondent on 22nd August, 1975 contending that the balance amount could be accepted only after issue of demand letter. The appellant by his letter dated 18th September, 1975, communicated to the respondent that there was no reason for returning the cheque for the balance bid amount of Rs.11.05 lakhs and asked the respondent to issue necessary bid acceptance and demand letter on an early date.
5. The respondent after a period of about one year and four months informed the appellant by its letter dated 13/14th November, 1975 that the highest bid of the appellant for purchase of cinema plot in the auction held on 25th July, 1974 has not been accepted. No reason for not accepting the bid was given. The appellant was further intimated that action for refund of earnest money shall be taken shortly. No reason or explanation for not refunding the earnest money with the letter refusing bid was given. The respondent continued to retain the earnest money of Rs.3.75 lakhs till 19th February, 1976 when a cheque for the said amount was sent to the appellant.
6. The appellant contended that he had made the deposite of Rs.3.75 lakhs by borrowing it from M/s. Om Appartments Pvt. Limited to whom appellant paid interest at the rate of 17% per annum. The appellant, therefore, contended that he is entitled for interest by way of compensation on sum of Rs.3.75 lakhs at the rate of 17% per annum from 25th July,1974 till 18th February, 1976 amounting to Rs.1,38,104/-. The appellant also demanded an amount of Rs.50,000/- as the amount spent for the survey of land, preparation of plans, elevations, cross sections and drawings and another amount of Rs.5,000/- for installation of the machinery at the plot and Rs.5,000/- as damages. The total claim of the appellant was for Rs.1,98,104/- however, he claimed an amount of Rs.1,10,000/- only as interest after excluding a period of 120 days from the period 25th July,1974 to 18th February, 1976. Appellant contended that since he could make payment of balance amount within 120 days, the respondent also ought to have accepted or rejected bid within that much time and therefore no interest has been claimed for retaining earnest money for this period. The appellant gave a notice dated 9th March,1976 to the respondent demanding the amount and on failure of respondent to pay the amount demanded, the appellant, thereafter, filed the suit for recovery of said amount on 12th November, 1976.
7. The suit was contested by respondent on various grounds. However, the facts, the dates regarding holding of auction, deposit of the earnest money, rejection of bid after considerable time and refund of money on 19.2.1976 were not disputed. The respondent further contended that the plaint had not been signed by a duly authorized person and the suit of the plaintiff is barred by time by virtue of Section 53B of Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 which prescribes a period of six months from the date on which cause of action arises. It was further pleaded that the appellant was bound by the terms and conditions of the auction and the terms and conditions do not provide for awarding any interest on the earnest money. Section 53B of Delhi Development Act,1957 is as under:
“Section 53B Notice to be given of suits –
(1) No suit shall be instituted against the Authority, or any member thereof, or any of its officers or other employees, or any person acting under the directions of the Authority or any member or any officer or other employee of the Authority in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or regulation made there under until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Authority, left at its office, and in any other case, delivered to, or left at the office or place of abode of, the person to be sued and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of residence of the intending plaintiff and unless the plaintiff contains a statement that such notice has been so left or delivered.
(2) No suit such as is described in sub-section (1) shall, unless it is a suit for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to apply to a suit in which the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the institution of the suit.”
8. The suit for recovery of damages under the law of limitation, however, can be filed within a period of three years. The relevant Article of Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 25, which is as follows:
“25. For money payable Three years When the interest for interest upon becomes due money due from the defendant to the plaintiff. ”
9. On the controversies of the parties, The Hon’ble Single Judge framed the following issues:
“The following issues were framed :-
1. Has the suit been validly instituted and the plaint duly signed and verified? OPP
2. Was the bid of the plaintiff duly accepted by the defendant? OPP
3. Is the suit barred by time by virtue of Section 53B of Delhi Development Act,1957 is as under: of the Delhi Development Act, 1957? OPD
4. Was any legal and valid notice served on the defendants? OPP
5. Has the conduct of the defendant been such as to cause loss to the plaintiff and whether in respect of the conduct, the plaintiff is entitled to claim loss, compensation or damage?
6. Assuming that the plaintiff is to recover loss/ compensation or damages, is any interest payable thereon, and if so, at what rate?
7. Relief ”
10. On merits the learned single Judge held that the respondent being a public authority was expected to act fairly and in a just manner which it had obviously not done, and therefore quantified the interest as damages at 17% per annum and held that the plaintiff would be entitled for same. The Learned Single Judge awarded interest at the rate of 17% on the basis of evidence adduced by the appellant. He further held that the respondent itself charges interest on delayed payments ranging from 18 per cent to 36 per cent, which had not been rebutted by the respondent and consequently the claim of 17% per annum was found to be reasonable and not excessive. It was held by the learned single Judge that the plaintiff had been fair enough to exclude a reasonable period of 120 days from the period of 25th July,1974 to 18th February,1976. The learned Single Judge held that plaintiff/appellant is entitled to damages of Rs.1.10 lakh with pendent lite and future interest. The other issues were also decided by the Learned Single judge in favor of the plaintiff/appellant.
11. The Learned Single Judge, however, held that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by time holding that in view of Section 53B(2) of the Delhi Development Act,1957 the period of limitation is six months from the date cause of action arose and dismissed the suit of the appellant by judgment and decree dated 1st December, 1986.
12. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge dated 1st December,1986 the Appellant filed the present appeal. The respondent has not challenged the other findings of the Learned Single Judge by filing any cross appeal or cross objections in the present appeal against the judgment and decree of the Learned Single Judge. Therefore, the issue for determination in the present appeal is whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by time in view of Section Section 53B(2) of Delhi Development Act, 1957 and ordinary law of limitation is not applicable.
13. The refund of amount of earnest money to the appellant along with a forwarding letter dated 19th February, 1976 has not been denied. It is not denied that the cause of action had arisen last on 19th February, 1976 when the respondent sent a cheque of Rs.3,75,000/-. The notice issued by the Appellant under the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 dated 9th March 1976 issued on behalf of appellant has also not been denied. The auction took place on 25th July,1974. The bid of the appellant was highest and the appellant paid the earnest money in compliance with the terms of auction. The appellant not only sent reminders to the respondent but also tendered the entire balance amount of the bid to the respondent. The respondent did not accept the same and returned the balance amount tendered by the appellant and thereafter, cancelled the bid of the appellant, which was highest, without disclosing any reason. The earnest money which had been with the respondent since 25th July,1974 was not returned along with the letter dated 13/14th November,1975 rejecting the bid of the appellant without disclosing any reason. The respondent is a public authority and ought to have acted fairly and in a just manner. No cogent and rational reason has either been pleaded and/or proved justifying not taking the decisiion to cancel the bid within a reasonable time. Though the respondent was not liable to disclose any reason for rejection of the bid to the appellant under the terms of auction, however, for taking the decision after such a long time of about one year and four months and thereafter not returning the earnest money for another four months, the respondent ought to have disclosed the circumstances and justified the reasons. No circumstances and reason has been pleaded and proved for not returning the earnest money for about four months even after rejection of the bid. In order to show that the respondent acted fairly and in just manner and to take shelter under Section Section 53B of DDA Act, 1957 the respondent ought to have disclosed and proved these essential facts. The probable inference in the circumstances is that the respondent has not acted in a fair and just manner and it is highly probable that the highest bid was rejected on mere fancies and whims of some officials after keeping the earnest money for this long time. In order to take shelter under Section Section 53B(2) of the Delhi Development Act,1957 the respondent ought to have disclosed and proved that the action was bona fide and was just and fair and was based on bona fide exigencies of circumstances and thus was an act purported to have been done under the Act or any rule or regulation made there under.
14. It will be pertinent to consider that in cases where the final bids in the auction are made subject to the confirmation by superior authority, in other words, unless that superior authority approves or confirms the final bid, the offer would not be deemed to have been accepted and in such cases, the auctioning authorities act as a conduit pipe. As agent of the superior authority, the auctioneer receives the offer subject to confirmation or approval by the superior authority and in such a case, when a bid is approved or confirmed by the higher authority that the contract of sale would be deemed to be completed and until such confirmation or approval is made, the person whose bid has been sent for confirmation to such higher authority will have no right. However, the confirmation has also to be done by the superior authority within a reasonable time. If the bid cannot be accepted or rejected within reasonable time on account of bona fide reasons or exigencies of administrative circumstances, then those facts must be disclosed. Every authorities must act within a reasonable period especially where other onerous conditions are imposed on bidders. Such authorities can not claim that they have unlimited time for their acts without any liability to pay damages or interest whereas the bidder will be liable even for cancellation of the bid if the bidder does not act within the time prescribed.
15. What is the reasonable period for rejection or acceptance of bid and what is reasonable period for refund of amount due to the bidder in the circumstances. Considering various parameters and facts and circumstances which may be involved in different matters and circumstances, it can not be laid down in a straight jacket formula as to what is a reasonable period for every case. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Learned Single Judge has held that though the terms and conditions of the auction did not provide for the payment of any interest on the earnest money but that could not mean that the earnest money could be retained for an indefinite period. Reliance was placed on Section 46 of the Contract Act and it was held that a period of 120 days was reasonable for the respondent to take the decision and in case of rejection, earnest money should have been returned immediately.
16. Section 53B(2) contemplates a period of six months from the date cause of action arises. The appellant had to tender the entire balance bid amount within 120 days of communication of acceptance of bid. The appellant tendered the balance bid amount in June,1975 without receiving formal acceptance of the bid and demand letter from the respondent presuming that his bid has been accepted. The respondent took more than four months even after rejecting the bid without disclosing any reason for refund of earnest money. In the circumstances, can respondent justify a period of about one year and four months even to reject the highest bid and another period of about four months in returning the earnest money when the appellant had tendered the entire consideration by cheque even without receiving the demand letter. Can such an action of the respondent be construed as just and fair. The respondent can not be allowed to have two yardsticks which are ex-facie not proportionate. The respondent imposed a period of 120 days on the appellant to pay the entire balance bid amount on acceptance of his bid, and other onerous conditions on bidders, and no period is provided for any act and obligations of the respondent under the terms of auction. The respondent was liable to act with promptitude in deciding to accept or reject the bid of the Appellant. If the respondent did not act with promptitude in the facts and circumstances it can not rely on the restriction placed under Section 53B(2) on the common law rights of a person.
17. The contention of the respondent that since the land was a nazul land and the respondent was authorised to auction the same will also not make respondent’s action reasonable, just and fair nor will bring the act of not taking decision on the highest bid of the appellant for about one year four months and not returning earnest money even thereafter for about four months, as an act pursuance to any provision of the Delhi Development Act,1957 or any rules and regulations made there under.
18. The counsel for appellant, Mr. Sandeep Sharma, has placed reliance on some judgments in support of his contention that his suit is not covered under Section 53B(2) of Delhi Development Act,1957 as the action of the respondent was not in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuant of Delhi Development Act,1957 or any rule or regulations made there under. He has relied on a Division bench judgment in the matter of Durga Chand Kaushik Vs Union of India, 2nd (1971) II Delhi 350 which was a suit for recovery of amount charged by DDA in excess of what was due under the lease. It was held that collection of excess amount was not an act falling within the scope of Delhi Development Act and there fore there could not be any reduction of any period of limitation in respect of it. Consequently it was held the period of limitation of three years which was available to the plaintiff under the Limitation Act to bring a suit for recovering the amount collected from him in excess of what was legally due under the said lease deed and could not be reduced by Section 53B(2) of the said Act. It was held that the said provision, being one which restricts the larger period of limitation allowed by Limitation Act, has to be strictly construed. The Hon’ble Division Bench held:
“Since the second defendant was not authorized to collect what was not legally due under the lease deed the collection of the excess amount was not an act falling within the scope of the Delhi Development Act and there could not be any reduction of any period of limitation in respect of it. Consequently, the period of limitation of three years which was available to the plaintiff under the Limitation Act to bring a suit for recovering the amount recovered from him in excess of what was legally due under the said lease deed could not be reduced by Section 53B(2). The expression employed in section 53B(1), “in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act or any rules or regulations made there under”, does not warrant the contention put forward by Mr. Keshav Dayal that the act in the present case, namely, demanding and recovering an amount in excess of what was due under the lease deed was something done in pursuance of this Act. The said provision being one which restricts the larger period of limitation allowed by the Limitation Act has to be strictly construed. Hence we find no merit in the plea of limitation.”
19. In another matter Delux Estates (P) Ltd Vs Delhi Development Authority, , a suit for recovery of amount paid by the bidder was filed. DDA had accepted an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs towards part payment of the balance bid amount and thereafter cancelled the bid on account of failure of the bidder to make payment of the entire remaining sale consideration, bid amount within the stipulated period. After cancelling the bid DDA did not repay amount received from the bidder and retained it even after cancelling the bid. In this case, bid was cancelled on account of lapse on the part of the bidder. Yet it was held that retention of such amount beyond the period when the bid was cancelled was unauthorized, illegal and unwarranted. It was further held that it was obligatory on the part of DDA to return the amount along with letter by which the bid was cancelled. In such an eventuality, where the refund was belated, it was held that it was on account of fault of the DDA and the bidder was awarded reasonable interest. It was also held that such an act was not an act done pursuant to any provisions of Delhi Development Act or rules and regulations framed there under and consequently the limitation as applicable under the Limitation Act was applied. The contention of the respondent that since the land was a nazul land and the respondent was authorised to auction the same did not make respondent’s action reasonable, just and fair nor brought the act in pursuance of the Act or any rules or regulations made hereunder.
20. The appellant has also relied on a judgment reported as AIR 1938 Bombay 410, Vishwanath Sadashiv Nathu and anr. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Bombay. In this case it was held that the act of Municipal Corporation of Bombay issuing debentures containing option of renewal and giving effect to that option were not acts required under the Act and as such protection under Section 527 of Municipal Corporation of Bombay was not available. It was held that the issue of debentures containing option of renewal and giving effect of that option were not acts done in direct execution of any power contained in the Act but were acts done under a contract authorised but not required by the Act. The wrongful action charged against the Corporation was not an action which was directly required by the statute and hence Section 527 had no application. In yet another matter, AIR (31) 1944 Bombay 97 S.V. Mandlik Vs. Borough Municipality of Jalgaon, a Division Bench held that a deliberate breach of the contract cannot be treated as something done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act, therefore, no notice of the suit was necessary under Section 206 of the Act, when the suit filed was based on contract. Reliance has also been placed by appellant on another matter, AIR (35) 1948 Bombay 98 Municipal Borough of Ahmedabad Vs. Jayantlal Chhotalal Patel, Full Bench held that a proper construction on Section 206, which constitutes a restriction on the ordinary rights of litigants, is that it must be strictly construed and for only those suits which fall within the ambit of those sections which are in respect of anything done, or purported to have been done, by the Municipality in pursuance of the Act. It was held that the Act of Municipality in forfeiting the deposit was wrongful and the suit had been brought against the wrongful act of Municipality. And that such an act of forfeiting the deposit could not be given to Municipality of Bombay by statute. The Hon’ble Court held:
“Para 3 – Therefore, if the section applied, the plaintiff’s claim was clearly out of time. In order to place a proper construction on Section 206, first thing to bear in mind is that it constitutes a restriction on the ordinary rights of litigants and, thefore, it must be strictly construed. Only those suits fall within the ambit of section which are in respect of anything done, or purporting to have been done, by the municipality in pursuance of the Act. The key words are “in pursuance of the Act”, and the whole controversy has arisen as to the true meaning and effect of that expression. In this case the plaintiff’s contention is that the act of the municipality in forfeiting the deposit is wrongful and it is in respect of that wrongful act of the municipality that the suit has been brought. Can it be said that forfeiting the deposit is done by the municipality in pursuance of the Act? It is only if the municipality has forfeited this deposit purporting to act under a power given to it by the statute that it could be said that the plaintiff’s claim comes within the section. Under Section 68 (1) (c) of the Act one of the duties cast upon the municipality is the duty of cleansing public streets and under Section 48(1) of the same Act the municipality is empowered to enter into and perform all contracts which may be necessary or expedient in order to carry into effect the provisions and purposes of the Act. Therefore it is clear that while a statutory duty is cast upon the municipality to cleanse the public streets, there is no such duty cast upon it to enter into any contract. It may or may not enter into a contract in order to discharge its duty and no individual could require the municipality to enter into a contract with him. What the plaintiff was seeking to litigate in his suit was his private rights which came into existence as a result of the contract entered into between him and the municipality. He was not seeking to enforce a public duty cast upon the municipality by the statute, and even the defense of the municipality was not that it was forfeiting the deposit in pursuance of the powers given to it under the statute, but that it was doing so in pursuance of a power given to it under the contract. Therefore, while the plaintiff was seeking to enforce his rights under the contract, the municipality was defending that suit on the ground that it was exercising its right to enforce the contract according to the construction placed by it on the contract. Apart from any authority, it seems to us difficult to hold that a suit to enforce the rights of a private individual under a contract entered into with the municipality which the Municipality was not under any statutory obligation to enter into can fall within the ambit of the section.
21. The counsel for respondent, Mrs. Anusuya Salwan, has placed reliance upon matter reported as 1977 RLR 347; Vishal Builders P. Ltd. Vs. DDA where the bidders after giving their bid in an auction subsequently wrote to DDA that the plots were small and they withdrew their bids and claimed the earnest money. DDA, contended that the bidders could not revoke the bids. The bidder sued DDA for recovery of amount. This case does not lay down that the respondent has a right to act according to its whims and fancies in auctioning Nazul lands. In this case bidders were allowed to withdraw their bids before bids were finally accepted and the bidders were held to be entitled for refund of money paid by them at auction. This case does not pertain to the restrictions imposed on ordinary right of litigant to sue within the period prescribed under Section 53(b) of DDA Act, 1957 nor does it lay down that respondent can take such time according to its whims and fancies in deciding to accept or reject the bid and that such an act of the respondent will be an act within the provisions of Act or rules or regulations framed there under.
22. The respondent has also referred to the judgment of Allahabad High Court reported as AIR 1962 Vol.49 174 Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika Vs. Karamjeet Singh and ors. where the auction purchaser had deposited 1/4th of price and had not paid the balance within time leading to forfeiture of his deposit by the trust. In an action brought by auction purchaser for return of deposit it was held that the suit was not in respect of any act purporting to have been done by the trust under the Act and consequently it was held that the suit was not governed by limitation provided under Section 97 providing six months limitation but is governed by three years limitation under the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Court held as follows:-
“The question for decision therefore is as to whether the agreement entered into by the Lucknow Improvement Trust and on which the present suit is founded was an act purporting to be done under the Town Improvement Act. Clearly it would be such an act if we could discover any provision in the Act authorizing the Trust to enter into contracts in their character as such and of the nature of the present contract. The learned counsel on both sides and we endeavored in vain to find any such provision within the four corners of this Act; whether the omission is deliberate or accidental is a matter with which we as a Court of law are not concerned. The result is that it cannot be held that the entering into the agreement which constitutes the main element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action was an act which was “done under this Act.” This being so, the general law of limitation applies and it is agreed that the suit is in time within that law.”
40. We hold that the suit by a bidder at an auction held by the Lucknow improvement trust for selling land in connection with the scheme framed by it under the Town Improvement trust Act, for refund of one fourth prise deposited by him on his bid being accepted, but which was subsequently forfeited by the trust on account of his failure to pay the balance within the prescribed time, is not a suit in respect of an act purporting to be done by the trust under the act.”
This judgment supports the plea of appellant and does not justify the contention of the respondent.
23. Another judgment relied by the respondent is Ram Dulari Vs. DDA and ors. It was held in this case that the act of demolition was integrally connected with the duties of DDA and demolition of a part of the building despite the Court order directing maintenance of status quo would not take away the act from the ambit and scope of the provision. This, however, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present appeal. On the ratio of the said judgment, the respondent cannot contend that their act of retaining the earnest money for considerable long period during which the bid was not rejected and thereafter not returning the earnest money along with the letter of rejection is and can ben an act purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act or any rule or regulation made there under.
24 Auctioning the Nazul land was an act done under a contract but not required by Act. The respondent could not take unduly long time in deciding whether to accept or reject the bid. No reasons or administrative exigencies have been pleaded or proved by the respondent. The bid seem to have been rejected on whims and fancies. It was not pleaded that respondent was not competent to actuion or that the bid amount was unrealistic or any other cogent reason. In a case where bid was rejected on account of lapses on the part of bidder and not refunding money of bidder promptly was held to be an act not purported to have been done under the Delhi Development Act or rules and regulations framed there under than unduly long time taekn in rejecting the bid without disclosing any reason though the bidder had tendered the entire bid amount on his own, by any rational and logical reasoning, such an act can not be construed to be an act purported to have been done under the Act or any rules and regulations framed there under. An inevitable inference in the circumstances is that the act of the respondent was not under the DDA Act, 1957 nor under any rules and regulations framed there under. Considering all the facts and circumstances and the ratio of decision cited and relied on by parties, the action of respondent in retaining earnest money of the appellant amounting to Rs.3,75,000/- from 25.2.1974 till 18.2.1976 was neither in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act or any rule or regulation made there under. Resultantly the respondent shall not be entitled to restrict the period of limitation to six months under Section 53B(2) for the claim of the appellant and the ordinary law of limitation shall be applicable. The cause of action has lastly arose in favor of appellant on 19.2.1976 when the respondent had sent a cheque for Rs.3,75,000/- towards refund of earnest money which has been admitted by the respondent. The appellant had filed the suit for recovery of damages on 12.11.1976. Thus the suit of the plaintiff/appellant is within the period of limitation and is not barred under Section 53B of Delhi Development Act, 1957. The said issue is, therefore, decided in favor of appellant and against the respondent.
25. The learned Single Judge had held that the plaintiff/ appellant is entitled to damages of Rs.1,10,000/- with pendent lite and future interest. Pendent lite and future interest was awarded to the appellant at 17% per annum. The findings of the learned Single Judge has not been challenged by the respondent by filing any appeal or cross-objections in the present appeal. No other finding of the learned Single Judge has been challenged by respondent.
26. In the circumstances, the appellant is entitled to damages of Rs.1,10,000/- with pendent lite with future interest @ 17% per annum and it is held that the suit of the appellant was within time. The impugned judgment and decree dated 1st December, 1986 is set aside and the present Regular first appeal is allowed. A decree for recovery of Rs.1,10,000 with pendent lite and future simple interest at the rate of 17% per annum is passed in favor of appellant and against the respondent. The appellant shall also be entitled for the costs of appeal.