ORDER
Motilal B. Naik, J.
1. The order of detention issued by the first respondent in
proceedings No.77/L&O-II/A1/99-1, dated 24-2-1999, exercising the powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short ‘COFEPOSA Act’), through which order the detenu is directed to be kept in the Central Prison, Chenchatguda, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, is questioned on various grounds.
2. Few facts in issue are that the petitioner’s son Asanaliyar Rafik, hereinafter referred to as the “detenu” was a passenger from Kuwait to Hyderabad via Ahmadabad in Indian Airlines Flight IC 982 on 5-2-1999. The detenu was intercepted at Hyderabad Air Port by the customs authorities. At Hyderabad Air Port, the detenu though declared in the immigration slip that he is in possession of two baggages, but while passing through the Customs Green channel at the exit gate, he was found carrying only one baggage. On interception by the customs authorities, the detenu seems to have admitted that he abandoned one baggage in the overhead bin above the seat No.20-A which was allotted to him. The customs authorities, in the presence of two independent witnesses,
retrieved the said handbag and showed it to the detenu who admitted that it belonged to him. Thereafter, the customs authorities in the presence of two independent witnesses examined the handbag and recovered along with one biscuit coloured trouser, one red coloured small satin pouch, one blue coloured checkered lungi and a 64 KB Casio digital diary, one hundred and forty five gold bars and a gold coin from the two cloth waist belts in two black coloured Sonda brand leather pouches from the handbag, seized the same under a panchanama on 5-2-1999 for initiating action under the Customs Act, 1962. The customs authorities also recovered 1800 Dirhams in foreign currency from the detenu which was paid to him as remuneration for carrying the 545 gold bars and a gold coin.
3. The detenu said to have made a statement before the Superintendent of Customs, Air Intelligence Unit, Hyderabad, in response to the summons dated 5-2-1999 and in that statement, the delenu seems to have given the particulars about his age, origin, his movements and about his trip to Dubai for searching a job. The Customs authorities came to the conclusion that the detenu at the behest of one Rehman of Dubai has smuggled the gold for which he was paid an amount of Rs.20,000/- per trip and that the detenu was involved in smuggling activity of gold valued at Rs.74,15,340/-. The detenu was arrested on 5-2-1999 and was produced before the Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad who remanded the detenu to judicial custody upto 19-2-1999. However, the judicial remand of the detenu was extended till 4-3-1999. The first respondent-detaining authority found the detenu engaged in smuggling of gold into India knowing fully well that the same is a punishable offence under law. It is in this background, the first respondent-detaining authority, in order to prevent the detenu effectively from further engaging in smuggling of gold bars, has passed the
impugned detention order dated 24-2-1999, under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detenu sent a representation through the jail authorities on 8-3-1999 to the first respondent-detaining authority seeking to release him from detention. However, the detaining authority received the said representation from the jail authorities only on 17-3-1999. The detaining authority-first respondent ultimately rejected the representation of the detenu only on 12-4-1999.
4. Sri B. Kumar, learned senior Counsel representing Sri D. Panduranga, Counsel for the petitioner, mainly challenged the impugned order of detention on the following grounds.
5. It is firstly contended by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the detaining authority relied upon the confessional statement made by the delenu under Section 108 of the Customs Act though such statement was subsequently retracted by the detenu in his bail petition dated 17-2-1999 which was presented to the Court of Economic Offences, Hyderabad on 18-2-1999, a copy of which was served on the Counsel appearing on behalf of the sponsoring authority-Customs Department on 19-2-1999. Learned senior Counsel submitted that the customs department was informed about the bail petition being filed by the detenu on 22-2-1999 and a counter to that bail petition was also filed on 23-2-1999 by the customs department. Learned senior Counsel stated that though the detaining authority-first respondent passed the impugned detention order on 24-2-1999, the fact that the detenu retracted from his statement said to have been made by him under Section 108 of the Customs Act, has not been taken note of by the detaining authority-first respondent. Learned senior Counsel contended that the impugned order of detention was passed on 24-2-1999 by the first respondent without adverting to an important aspect of the
statement of the detenu vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and therefore, pleaded that the impugned order of detention dated 24-2-1999 has to be set aside on this ground alone. In support of this contention, learned senior Counsel has drawn our attention to the following decisions reported in Sita Ram Somani v. State of Rajasthan, , K. Satyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India, , Vashist Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P., and an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.1790 of 1996, dated 7-10-1996 in Prem Prakash v. Union of India and others.
6. It is secondly contended by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the documents relied upon and referred to in the grounds of detention have not been supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. Learned senior Counsel, therefore, submitted that non-supply of the important documents which are relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention violates Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and as such the impugned order of detention is also liable to be set aside on this ground alone. According to the learned senior Counsel, as per the version of the customs authorities, on 5-2-1999 when the detenu got down at Hyderabad Air Port, he seems to have declared in the immigration slip about his possessing two baggages but, however, he was found with only one bag while passing through the green channel. Learned senior Counsel stated that as per the version of the detaining authority, when the detenu was intercepted, he admitted that he had abandoned one baggage in the overhead bin over the seat allotted to him which had lead to the seizure of that baggage in which the gold bars and other items were found concealed. Learned senior Counsel further contended that the immigration slip in which the detenu made his declaration, on which basis the entire case of the respondents rests, such a vital and important
document has not been furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention, enabling the detenu to make an effective representation as required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to the appropriate authorities, thereby the object of the Article 22(5) of the Constitution has been defeated. Apart from the failure of the detaining authority to furnish the important and vital document – immigration slip, learned senior Counsel submitted that the copy of the extension order of remand ordering the detenu’s remand extended upto 4-3-1999 passed by the Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad was also not furnished to the detenu. Learned senior Counsel further submitted that no Tamil version of the passport of the detenu and the police slip were supplied to the detenu thereby the detenu was handicapped to submit an effective representation to the authorities and as such, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. In support ofhis above contentions, learned senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions reported in M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, 1990 SCC (Crl.) 258, Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 SCC (Crl.) 231 and in Yumnam Mangi Babu Singh v. State of Manipur, .
7. It is thirdly contended by Sri B. Kumar, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is an unexplained delay in considering and disposing of the representation of the detenu by the detaining authority. Learned senior Counsel further contended that improper explanation of the abnormal delay for passing an appropriate order on the representation of the detenu would vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. According to the learned senior Counsel, a representation was submitted to the jail authorities by the detenu on 8-3-1999 and the same was received by the detaining authority only on 17-3-1999 and in that process of delay of 8 to 9 days
has occasioned. Apart from this delay, according to the learned senior Counsel, there is also a delay of about 14 days from the date of the detaining authority sending the representation to the Commissioner, Customs and Central Excise calling for his remarks and for sending other documents, which were received only on 31-3-1999. Counsel submitted that a valuable time of 14 days have been lost which has not been properly explained. Learned senior Counsel nextly submitted that after furnishing para-wise remarks to the Government by the sponsoring authority, the Government has taken another 12 days to dispose of the representation which was finally rejected on 12-4-1999. Learned senior Counsel, therefore, stated that there is an abnormal delay of more than one month and five days in disposing of the representation of the detenu and the respondents inability to explain the reasons for such inordinate delay would also vitiate the impugned detention order and on this ground also, the same has to be set aside. In support of this contention, learned senior Counsel has drawn our attention to the decisions reported in Rqjammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 (1) ALD (Crl.) 194 (SC), As/am Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India, and in Rama Dhondu Borade v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police, .
8. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, a counter has been filed by the first respondent and on behalf of the third respondent, a separate counter has been filed. No counter is filed on behalf of the fourth respondent.
9. Smt. Vijayalakshmi, learned Government Pleader attached to the office of the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 while meeting the objections raised on behalf of the writ petitioner, submitted that the detenu was arrested on 5-2-1999 and was produced before the Special Judge for
Eeonomic Offences, Hyderabad. A bail petition dated 17-2-1999 was filed in the said Court on 18-2-1999 on behalf of the detenu, copy of which was furnished to the Counsel for the sponsoring authority on 19-2-1999. Learned Government Pleader further stated that 20-3-1999 and 21-2-1999 being holidays, a counter was only filed on 23-2-1999. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detaining authority had recorded in the office note on 20-2-1999 itself ordering the detention of the detenu and therefore, by the time the bail petition filed on behalf of the detenu had actually come up for consideration after filing counter before the Special Judge, Economic Offences Court, Hyderabad, the order of detention was passed and as such, there was no occasion for the sponsoring authority to place that material of retraction as pleaded by the detenu in the bail petition before the detaining authority. This apart, according to the learned Government Pleader, even the order of remand of the detenu which was extended upto 4-3-1999 could not be placed before the detaining authority as the decision to order detention of the detenu was taken on 20-2-1999 itself. Learned Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that there is no failure on the part of the detaining authority in ignoring these aspects while ordering detention.
10. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. We must firstly say that the order of detention is, admittedly, dated 24-2-1999 through which order the detention is given effect to. It may be true that the detaining authority must have taken a decision on 20-2-1999 itself about ordering detention of the person involved. It may also be true that the detaining authority must have made up his mind on 20-2-1999 but the fact remains that the impugned detention order is only dated 24-2-1999 through which the detention of the detenu is ordered, pursuant to which the detenu was detained in Central
Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad. It is, therefore, difficult for us to appreciate the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the detaining authority had made up his mind on 20-2-1999 itself and ordered the detention of the detenu on the said day in the note-file cannot be accepted in the light of the impugned order bears the date as 24-2-1999. If this contention of the learned Government Pleader is accepted, we are afraid, it would lead to further severe consequences which have no bounds. It is not the case of the respondents that the order dated 20-2-1999 passed by the detaining authority is communicated through an order dated 24-2-1999. A reading of the impugned detention order only indicates that it is passed on 24-2-1999 and there is nothing in it suggesting that the decision was taken on 20-2-1999 and the same is communicated by the said order which is dated 24-2-1999.
11. Two aspects are involved in the first contention raised on behalf of the writ petitioner, viz., though the detenu alleged to have made a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act admitting his guilt, later he has retracted from the said stand which is indicated in his bail petition filed in the Court of Economic Offences, Hyderabad on 18-2-1999. In that bail petition, on behalf of the detenu, it was indicated that his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act is obtained under coercion and it is not made voluntarily. When the detenu makes a retraction from his earlier statement made under Section 108 of the Customs Act, the sponsoring authority ought to have placed this relevant material before the detaining authority for passing an appropriate order. There is no escape for the detaining authority who now tries to plead that the detention order was passed on 20-2-1999 itself and not on 24-2-1999 and cannot wriggle out of the situation in which the detaining authority is placed. In the decisions Sita Ram Somani v. State of Rajasthan, K. Satyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India, Vashist Narain
Karwaria v. State of U.P., (supra) and the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Prakash v. Union of India, (supra), the principle is very much clear that non-placement of the retraction of the confessional statement by the detenu before the detaining authority and non-consideration of the same while arriving at subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention, goes to the root of the order of detention and makes the order of detention invalid. The further principle that emerges from the above decisions is that when relevant facts which would have weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced the mind of the detaining authority, have been purposely withheld and suppressed from the detaining authority, such suppression vitiates the satisfaction.
12. In this case, admittedly, the bail petition on behalf of the detenu was moved on 18-2-1999 before the Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad. A copy of the bail petition was also furnished to the Counsel appearing on behalf of the sponsoring authority on 19-2-1999. A counter was also filed to that bail petition by the sponsoring authority on 23-2-1999. The impugned detention order was only passed on 24-2-1999. Though these developments took place before passing the impugned detention order, the detaining authority was not posted with this important information by the sponsoring authority. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that suppression of relevant facts before the detaining authority, vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
13. To meet the second contention raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that non-furnishing of relevant material to the detenu for offering his effective representation as required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, vitiated the impugned detention order, it is stated by the learned Government Pleader appearing on
behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that the detenu was aware of the entries made in the immigration slip and as such non-furnishing of a copy of the immigration slip would not vitiate the detention order. Learned Government Pleader further stated that the order of extension of remand period of the detenu upto 4-3-1999 was passed by the Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad on 23-2-1999 which is also known to the detenu and as such, non-furnishing of the same to the detenu would not in any cause prejudice to the detenu resulting in vitiation of the detention order.
14. We are not inclined to accept the above contentions of the learned Government Pleader. An interesting feature of this case is that the entire case against the detenu is based only on a declaration made by him in the immigration slip on 5-2-1999 about his possessing two bags. While he was passing through the green channel, he was found with only one bag. At that stage, he was intercepted and he made a statement. On the basis of the statement made by him that he abandoned another baggage in the flight, the customs officials recovered the same in which gold and other items were concealed. When the case of the sponsoring and the detaining authorities solely rests on this important and vital document, in our view, non-furnishing of the said important and vital document irrespective of whether the detenu knows about its contents or not, would definitely vitiate the impugned detention order.
15. The principle emerging from the decisions M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, Yumnam Mangi Babu Singh v. State of Manipur (supra), indicates that the detenu is entitled to have the copies of such vital documents which are used against him and if such documents are not furnished to him along with the grounds of detention, it would vitiate the detention order as the detenu
would be handicapped in making an effective representation against his detention to the appropriate authorities.
16. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India enjoins that when a person is delained in pursuance of an order made under any: law provided for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. It is thus obvious that the safeguards embodied under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India invariably provide for a fair and reasonable opportunity to the detenu also to make proper representation before the authorities concerned about his case. If an effective representation is to be made by the detenu against his detention which is available to him under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, the material on which the detaining authority arrived. subjective satisfaction before ordering the detention, has to be necessarily supplied to the detenu. Otherwise, it would mean that the detenu is prevented from making an effective representation against his detention. In effect, such a denial of important and vital documents to the detenu for making a proper representation would violate the safeguards provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to the detenu.
17. Though the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner also stated that the copy of the order extending the remand of the detenu is not furnished to the detenu for making an effective representation, we do not think, in the circumstances, this document could be held to be a vital document and its denial to the detenu would mean offending Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
18. As discussed by us and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of
India, Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, Yumnam Mangi Babu Singh v. State of Manipur, (cited supra), we are inclined to hold that non-supply of a copy of important and vital document, viz., immigration slip along with the grounds of detention to the detenu, though the detenu knew the contents of the same, vitiated the impugned detention order.
19. Coming to the third limb of the submission made on behalf of the writ petitioner that the representation though submitted by the detenu on 8-3-1999 through the jail authorities, an order on the same has been passed only on 12-4-1999 and thus an abnormal delay of more than 34 days has occasioned in this process, which has vitiated the detention order, learned Government Pleader has stated that though the representation submitted by the detenu bears the date as 8-3-1999, but in fact, it was only submitted on 16-3-1999 to the jail authorities and the jail authorities, in turn, sent it to the Government on the very same day, which was received by the Government on 17-3-1999. Thereafter, the sponsoring authority was asked to furnish para-wise remarks on the same and also for furnishing copies of English translation. The sponsoring authority took nearly 14 days time in furnishing para-wise remarks and other requirements. Learned Government Pleader stated that the file was processed on 3-4-1999 and in between there were public Holidays and the detaining authority ultimately passed an order of rejection on 12-4-1999. It is, therefore, contended that there is no abnormal delay on the part of the authorities in passing an appropriate order on the representation of the detenu and that the delay is only incidental and as such it does not vitiate the impugned detention order.
20. In the wake of these submissions, we have perused the original record relating to the representation said to have been made by the detenu through the jail authorities to the detaining authority, What
we have noticed is that the representation of the detenu bears the date as 8-3-1999. However, the jail authorities on the bottom of the said representation have affixed the stamp indicating ‘attested’ and also put the date as 16-3-1999. Though the learned Government Pleader claimed that the detenu has submitted his representation on 16-3-1999, we are unable to accept the same. It is the procedure commonly followed in Government Departments that when any representation/application is received, the receiving authority would put an initial on it and indicate the date. In this case, to our surprise, there is no initial being found by us on the representation made by the detenu which is dated 8-3-1999. On the contrary, in the bottom of the said representation, we have noticed only a mark of stamp indicating ‘attested’ and the date is shown as 16-3-1999. If really the representation filed by the detenu is on 16-3-1999, there was no difficulty for the jail authorities to indicate that it is received on 16-3-1999. No explanation is forthcoming from the Government Pleader that if really the representation of the detenu was received only on 16-3-1999, then, why did the jail authorities failed to indicate on the representation that it was received only on 16-3-1999 though on the representation the detenu had indicated the date to be 8-3-1999. In the absence of any tangible explanation in this regard, we presume that the detenu must have submitted his representation only on 8-3-1999. If the date of the representation of the detenu is accepted as 8-3-1999, it is seen that there is a delay in processing the same which was ultimately rejected on 12-4-1999.
21. In the counter filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, it is admitted that the representation filed by the detenu was received by the Government only on 17-3-1999, the sponsoring authority was asked to furnish para-wise remarks and it took nearly 14 days in doing so and
thereafter, the file was processed by the detaining authority, in the meanwhile, two to three holidays intervened and finally, the representation of the detenu was rejected on 12-4-1999. Thus, nearly about 35 days have been consumed by these authorities in disposing of the said representation.
22. The Supreme Court in the decision Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (supra) held thus :
“Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words “as soon as may be” in Clause (5) of Article 22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and disposed of at the earliest. But that does not mean that the authority is pre-empted from explaining any delay which would have occasioned in the disposal of the representation. The Court can certainly consider whether the delay was occasioned due to permissible reasons or unavoidable causes.”
23. In this case, as seen by us, the representation of the detenu was submitted to the jail authorities on 8-3-1999 and there was a delay of more than 8 to 9 days in its reaching to the Government through the jail authorities. The story does not end there. The Government sought appropriate para-wise remarks and English translation of the documents from the sponsoring authority on 18-3-1999 and the sponsoring authority has sent the required particulars to the detaining authority only on 31-3-1999. Thereafter, as is evident from the counter filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, the file was processed on 3-4-1999 and it reached the Assistant Secretary (Law), Deputy Secretary (Law) and then went to Secretary (Political) and thereafter returned to the section. In the meanwhile, two holidays intervened and the representation was ultimately rejected on 12-4-1999. The cumulative effect of these developments is that a delay of nearly 35 days has occasioned in disposing of the
representation of the detenu. The respondents 1 and 2 have not been able to explain this delay properly except submitting that the sponsoring authority has taken 14 days time in submitting para wise remarks and other translated documents and intervention of two public holidays.
24. The effect of detention orders are such that, the detenus are subjected to jail term without undergoing trial before the Courts. In effect, the procedure adopted for trial, finding a person guilty and sentencing him/her for a jail term are dispensed with. This is because the Legislature visualised that certain activities of persons which are prejudicial to the interests of the society and that when normal laws would not be sufficient to curb such an activity, in order to prevent such persons from indulging in activities which are prejudicial to the interests of the society, thought that detention laws are only the preventive remedies. When the Legislature has armed the detaining authorities to detain any persons for a period upto 12 months without subjecting such persons detained, to any trial, the Legislature has also visualised that the detenu shall be provided with a fair and reasonable opportunity to make an effective representation, against his detention as provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, to the detaining authority.
25. As already indicated above, the language used in Article 22(5) of the Constitution, make it clear that the detenu shall have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order to the appropriate authority and such authority shall consider the said representation and dispose of the same expeditiously with a sense of urgency without any avoidable delay.
26. In this case, though the detenu claims to have presented his representation on 8-3-1999 to jail authorities for transmitting
the same to the Government, the admitted position is that the Government received the said representation from the jail authorities only on 17-3-1999. In this process, though there is a delay of 8 to 9 days, the reasons for such delay have not been satisfactorily explained. Even the time of 14 days taken for obtaining para-wise remarks from the sponsoring authority by the detaining authority, no satisfactory explanation is offered to this Court in that regard also. Since there is no plausible explanation forthcoming from the respondents for the delay of more than 35 days occasioned in disposing of the representation of the detenu, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India, Rama Dhondu Borade v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police, (cited supra), we are inclined to hold that the unexplained delay by the respondents would render the impugned order of detention invalid.
27. Though the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that there is a palpable variance between the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention and laboured to take us to few decisions on this aspect, we are of the view that the said aspect need not be looked into, as we are convinced that the impugned order of detention passed by the first respondent-detaining authority, cannot be sustained for the foregoing reasons indicated by us.
28. Learned Government Pleader, however, made yet another attempt, contending that in terms of Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, when there are two or more grounds in the order of detention and if any one ground is found to be vague or non-relevant, still the detention order could be sustained. The provision under Section 5-A of COFEPOSA Act, 1974 reads thus:
5-A : Grounds of detention severable :–Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are,–
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;
(b) the Government or Officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.”
29. But the question is whether there is one ground or more than one ground referred in the impugned detention order by the detaining authority. The impugned order of detention is based only on the involvement of the detenu relates to an incident which took place on 5-2-1999, while he was travelling from Dubai to Hyderabad via Ahmadabad and on the basis of the statement made by the detenu that he abandoned
another bag which he had brought from Dubai in the flight, which ultimately resulted in unearthing of gold bars worth Rs.74,15,340/-. Incidentally, in the grounds of detention, though the detaining authority has indicated that the detenu was found to be a repeated offender on the basis of his own admission about his smuggling gold into India, but no other specific incident is mentioned. We are, therefore, not convinced to hold mat in the impugned order of detention, more than one ground has been indicated by the detaining authority. Though the detaining authority has narrated the detenu’s efforts in concealing the gold ornaments in a baggage, his contacts with persons in relation to the said gold either at Dubai or in India, they are all attendant factors relating to the main incident which took place on 5-2-1999 when the detenu was intercepted at Hyderabad Air Port. The grounds indicated in the grounds of detention invariably relate to a single incident which took place on 5-2-1999 and as such, the implication of Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, is not attracted to the case on hand.
30. For all the above reasons, the proceedings No.77/L&O-II/A1/99-1, dated 24-2-1999 issued by the first respondent-detaining authority, through which order the detenu is directed to be kept in the Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, cannot be sustained and we accordingly quash the same. Consequently, we direct the detenu-Asanaliyar Rafik, presently detained in Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
31. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.