JUDGMENT
A.K. Singh, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
This appeal is directed against the order dated 17.12.1985 passed by the learned Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Banswara in Claim Case No. 16 of 1983, M.L. Aneja v. Managing Director. By the impugned order, the claim filed by the appellant was rejected on the ground that he was not a workman and the injury was not caused to him in connection with work being performed by him.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the instant case, the findings given by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner are not correct and, therefore, the appeal should be allowed and compensation claimed by the appellant in his claim petition should be awarded.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner and added that the finding that the appellant-claimant was not a workman within the meaning of Clause (n) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, is correct. It is also submitted by him that the injury for which compensation has been claimed was not caused to the appellant in connection with the performance of his duties under the respondent.
4. In his application for compensation, the appellant had stated that he is a workman employed by the Managing Director, HSMITC Ltd. (Contractor of Mahi Bajaj Sagar Project Ph-1), Banswara for fabrication and erection of penstock, the opposite party and while he was working as a workman, he received injuries on 4.8.82 while performing his duties. It was also stated in the application for compensation that the cause of injury was an assault with a gandasa by Virendra Pandey while he was on the duty in the premises of the Penstock Feb. Dn., HSMITC, Banswara. A copy of the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Banswara and copy of the statement of medical expert were also referred to in the application. Regarding the nature of the job being performed by the appellant, it was mentioned in the application for compensation that at the time of incident, the applicant was writing cash book, disbursement of cash, checking of vouchers and preparation of vouchers, posting and compilation of accounts and he was the only person on the clerical establishment of the Penstock Division, Banswara. The description of the injuries caused to him was also given and demand was made for award of compensation to the tune of Rs. 42,000.
5. During the hearing, the appellant filed several documents including Exh. P-4, certificate of his pay and allowances. The respondent also filed documents including Exh. D-1 showing the emoluments being paid to the appellant. The oral evidence was also produced before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.
6. In this appeal, two questions arise for determination. The first is, whether the appellant was a workman within the meaning of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The second is whether the appellant had received injuries in course of his employment for the purpose of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in view of the definition of ‘workman’ given in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, any person whose monthly wages were Rs. 1,000 or more could not be regarded as a workman in view of Sub-Clause (2) of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 as it was in the year 1982 before the amendment. It is also submitted by him that in Schedule II, it is provided that a person should be employed otherwise than a clerical capacity for the purpose of the definition of a workman and since the appellant was performing the functions of a clerk and according to the averments made in his claim petition filed by him, he was the only person on the clerical establishment, he could not be regarded as a workman in view of Schedule II.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions contained in Sub-clause (2) of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 were amended in the year 1984 and the words “monthly wages not exceeding Rs. 1,000” were deleted. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the said amendment made on 1.7.1984, should be applied retrospectively because the provisions contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 are in the nature of beneficial legislation.
9. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. It is well established that any law or amendment thereof which creates any new rights, cannot be retrospectively applied unless the legislature expressly provides that such law shall have retrospective application. I, therefore, find no force in the submissions that the amendment made in Sub-clause (2) of Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, in the year 1984, should be retrospectively applied.
10. On the date of alleged incident, i.e., 4.8.1982, Sub-clause (2) of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 provided that a workman means any person whose monthly wages were not exceeding Rs. 1,000. In the instant case, the certificate of pay Exh. P-4 shows that the basic salary of the appellant on the date of incident was Rs. 730 per month. He was being paid D.A. at the rate of Rs. 250 per month and compensatory allowance Mahi Project, Banswara, was also paid to him which was at the rate of Rs. 365 per month. The total emoluments of the appellant, according to the Exh. P-4, were to the tune of Rs. 1,345 per month. The certificate of pay Exh. D-1 produced by the respondent before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner shows that the additional D.A. payable to the appellant was Rs. 282.90 per month and Mahi Project Allowance was Rs. 365 per month. Some other facilities were also provided to him. They were in the nature of free electricity, free water and bonus and travelling allowance. Bonus at the rate of Rs. 750 per annum was being paid to the appellant in addition to the amount of basic pay, additional D.A. and Mahi Project Allowance.
11. Regarding the Mahi Project Allowance, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that this allowance was in the nature of a compensatory allowance and, therefore, it cannot be formed as a part of the wages as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. Even if the Mahi Project Allowance is taken out of consideration, the total amounts of wages of appellant on the date of incident come to Rs. 1,012.90 per month.
12. If the amount of bonus at the rate of Rs. 750 per annum is also added to the above mentioned amount, there would be no escape from the conclusion that the appellant was drawing wages to the tune of more than Rs. 1,000 per month on the date of incident. He, therefore, cannot be regarded as a workman in view of Sub-Clause (2) of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
13. It is an admitted case of the appellant that on the date of the incident, he was the only person on the clerical establishment of the respondent and he was engaged in performing clerical job. In view of Schedule II, a person who is employed as a clerk cannot be regarded as a workman.
14. For the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be said that the appellant was a workman on the date of incident. The point No. 1 is decided accordingly.
15. The second point is a part of point No. 1. On 4.2.1982, the appellant was working as a clerk in the office of the respondent. At that time, he was stabbed by Virendra Pandey who was employed as a class IV employee. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the injury caused to the appellant can be said to be an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The expression ‘accident’ has not been defined in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The learned counsel for the respondents has conceded that the liberal interpretation has been given to the word ‘accident’. According to ordinary meaning of word ‘accident’, the expression ‘accident’ denotes an event which was unintentional. However, the question is from whose point of view, it should be unintentional. Having regard to the object of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it would be proper to hold that, if the event was not intentionally caused by the workman in order to cause injuries to him, then such event may be regarded as an accident from his point of view. Whether the party which caused the injury acted intentionally or otherwise should not change the nature of the event so far as the workman is concerned. The respondent being the master of his office was responsible for employing only those persons who did not indulge in violent activities. The respondent was, therefore, required to maintain such a discipline in its office as to ensure the physical safety to all other workers. Virendra Pandey who caused the injury to the appellant by stabbing with gandasa, acted in a violent manner ignoring all norms of discipline and good behaviour. Persons who work in an office which is being managed by the master, have a legitimate expectation that the master would maintain the discipline of the office and be responsible for maintaining such an environment that no worker is subjected to violent attacks. Therefore, if any person receives injuries on account of a violent attack by any person other than a total stranger, regarding whom there could be no apprehension that he would enter into the office and cause injury, then it will have to be said that the injuries were accidentally caused to the worker and such injury arose out of and in the course of his employment for the purpose of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. For the reasons, in my opinion, if an injury is caused to a workman while he is working in the premises of his master and such injury is caused by any person including a co-worker, unless it is shown that the person who caused the injury entered the premises without the knowledge of the master and that the master had no reasonable apprehension of his entry in the office, it must be said that the injury was caused in the course of employment and that it arose out of an accident for the purpose of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The point No. 2 is decided accordingly.
16. In view of the finding on point No. 1, this appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed.